Edit Article: Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers

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==Reference(s)== Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf] ==Abstract== No abstract available at this time ==Topic and Basic ideas== A government is designing a wage scheme to deter corruption in a two period game. The government can choose a period 1 and period 2 wage. The benefit of bribing is <math>b</math> and the probability of being caught is <math>p</math>. Authors solve for optimal wages to deter bribing. Note that this can be costly, but recouped by using entrance fees.

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