Difference between revisions of "Baker Hubbard (2004) - Contractibility And Asset Ownership"

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(New page: ==Reference(s)== *Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, p...)
 
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==Reference(s)==
 
==Reference(s)==
 
*Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
 
*Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf]

Latest revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020

Article
Has bibtex key
Has article title Contractibility And Asset Ownership
Has author Baker Hubbard
Has year 2004
In journal
In volume
In number
Has pages
Has publisher
© edegan.com, 2016

Reference(s)

  • Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. pdf

Abstract

We investigate how contractual incompleteness affects asset ownership in trucking by examining cross-sectional patterns in truck ownership and how truck ownership has changed with the diffusion of on-board computers (OBCs). We find that driver ownership of trucks is greater for long than short hauls, and when hauls require equipment for which demands are unidirectional rather than bidirectional. We then find that driver ownership decreases with OBC adoption, particularly for longer hauls. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that truck ownership reflects trade-offs between driving incentives and bargaining costs, and indicate that improvements in the contracting environment have led to less independent contracting and larger firms.