Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity - Revision history

Ed at 23:15, 29 September 2020

2020-09-29T23:15:17Z

Maintenance script at 17:23, 29 September 2020

2020-09-29T17:23:59Z

Maintenance script at 17:20, 29 September 2020

2020-09-29T17:20:49Z

Maintenance script at 17:14, 29 September 2020

2020-09-29T17:14:02Z

Maintenance script at 17:07, 29 September 2020

2020-09-29T17:07:08Z

Ed at 16:48, 29 September 2020

2020-09-29T16:48:17Z

imported>Ed: /* The Model */

2010-06-21T02:42:36Z

The Model

imported>Ed: /* Delegation */

2010-05-23T00:38:21Z

Delegation

imported>Ed at 00:38, 23 May 2010

2010-05-23T00:38:03Z

imported>Ed at 23:16, 22 May 2010

2010-05-22T23:16:01Z

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{Article
 |Has page=Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity
-|Has title=Organizational Capacity
+|Has bibtex key=
 |Has author=Ting
 |Has year=2009

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 |Has page=Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity
 |Has title=Organizational Capacity
-|Has author=
+|Has author=Ting
 |Has year=2009
 |In journal=

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 |Has title=Organizational Capacity
 |Has author=
-|Has year=
+|Has year=2009
 |In journal=
 |In volume=

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{Article
 |Has page=Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity
-|Has title=
+|Has title=Organizational Capacity
 |Has author=
 |Has year=

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{Article
-|Has page=
+|Has page=Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity
 |Has title=
 |Has author=

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:48, 29 September 2020
Line 1:		Line 1:
		+	{{Article
		+	\|Has page=
		+	\|Has title=
		+	\|Has author=
		+	\|Has year=
		+	\|In journal=
		+	\|In volume=
		+	\|In number=
		+	\|Has pages=
		+	\|Has publisher=
		+	}}
	*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]		*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]

@@ Line 27: / Line 27: @@
 The variables are:
-*Policy set by the principal is <math>x_t \in X, for <math>t=\{1,2\}\,</math>.
+*Policy set by the principal is <math>x_t \in X\,</math>, for <math>t=\{1,2\}\,</math>.
 *Agents have ideal points of <math>x^A\,</math> and <math>x^P\,</math>.
 *Agents can invest in capacity <math>c\,</math>, at a cost <math>k(c)\,</math> which is continuous, increasing and convex

@@ Line 183: / Line 183: @@
 In this section the paper first considers what would happen if the principal gave the agent the authority to choose policy in the first period, and then considers whether the principal would endogenously choose to do so.
 In the GC game:
@@ Line 190: / Line 191: @@
 **Therefore the agent invests more heavily in capacity and realized implementation is higher, as compared with the standard GC model, particularly if the discount factor is low so the second period gets little weighting.
 *<math>\hat{c}_1^* > c_1^*\,</math> and <math>\hat{z}_1^* > z_1^*\,</math>.
 In the SC game:
@@ Line 196: / Line 198: @@
 **Choose <math>x_1 = x^A\,</math> and pay twice for the capacity investment that is only realized once (in period 2), but get some benefits from <math>x^A\,</math> in the first period.
 **Choose <math>x_1 = x^A\,</math> and invest nothing, taking just the benefits from the first period - this can be particularly ideal if <math>\delta\,</math> is very low.
 In choosing delegation endogenously:
 *The payoffs from the two GC games (to the principal) are compared. Under "many functional assumptions" <math>P\,</math> is less likely to delegate as the distance between <math>x^A\,</math> and <math>x^P\,</math> diverge.
 *In the SC game, delegating authority to the agent is weakly dominated.

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:38, 23 May 2010
Line 171:		Line 171:
	**If <math>p\,</math> is low and the agent's utility is independent of policy, then implementation <math>z\,</math> strictly increases as with the distance between the agent's and the principal's ideal points.		**If <math>p\,</math> is low and the agent's utility is independent of policy, then implementation <math>z\,</math> strictly increases as with the distance between the agent's and the principal's ideal points.
	**If <math>p\,</math> is high then an agent might be willing to shift the target policy away from <math>x^A\,</math>, and in doing so reduce the implementation needed to satisfy the principal.		**If <math>p\,</math> is high then an agent might be willing to shift the target policy away from <math>x^A\,</math>, and in doing so reduce the implementation needed to satisfy the principal.
		+
		+
		+	===Endogenous Specialization===
		+
		+	Whether specialization would occur if it were endogenously choosen depends on both who is choosing, and if the prinicpal is choosing where the agent's ideal point is:
		+	*The utility of the agent is strictly higher in SC than in GC
		+	*The utility of the principal is strictly lower in SC than in GC if <math>x^A \ge x_c\,</math>.
		+
		+
		+	===Delegation===
		+
		+	In this section the paper first considers what would happen if the principal gave the agent the authority to choose policy in the first period, and then considers whether the principal would endogenously choose to do so.
		+
		+	In the GC game:
		+	*The principal's choices in period 2 remain unchanged.
		+	*However, the agent now chooses his ideal point as the policy in period 1.
		+	*Recall that the total utility is the sum over the two periods with the second period discounted.
		+	**Therefore the agent invests more heavily in capacity and realized implementation is higher, as compared with the standard GC model, particularly if the discount factor is low so the second period gets little weighting.
		+	<math>\hat{c}_1^ > c_1^\,</math> and <math>\hat{z}_1^ > z_1^*\,</math>.
		+
		+	In the SC game:
		+	*There are three possibilities for the agent:
		+	**Choose <math>x_1 = y\,</math> and the game is as before
		+	**Choose <math>x_1 = x^A\,</math> and pay twice for the capacity investment that is only realized once (in period 2), but get some benefits from <math>x^A\,</math> in the first period.
		+	**Choose <math>x_1 = x^A\,</math> and invest nothing, taking just the benefits from the first period - this can be particularly ideal if <math>\delta\,</math> is very low.
		+
		+	In choosing delegation endogenously:
		+	*The payoffs from the two GC games (to the principal) are compared. Under "many functional assumptions" <math>P\,</math> is less likely to delegate as the distance between <math>x^A\,</math> and <math>x^P\,</math> diverge.
		+	*In the SC game, delegating authority to the agent is weakly dominated.

@@ Line 94: / Line 94: @@
 In the first period, <math>P\,</math>'s best response to any <math>c\,</math> is <math>x^P\,</math>. <math>A\,</math> then maximizes utility by choosing <math>c_1\,</math> subject to this. However, as <math>z\,</math> is independent of <math>x\,</math> (and <math>y\,</math>), and as <math>A\,</math>'s utility is concave in <math>c\,</math>, but costs are convex, <math>A\,</math> chooses the interior maximum irrespective of <math>P\,</math>'s choice to maximize <math>z\,</math> and hence <math>u\,</math> (subject to the constraint that <math>x=x^p\,</math>). Any <math>y\,</math> can be choosen as it will have no effect.
 ===Specialized Capacity (SC)===
@@ Line 154: / Line 155: @@
 :<math>y^* \in [y_c,x^A]\,</math>
 ===Comparing GC and SC===