Project Planning - Revision history

imported>Ed at 17:59, 31 August 2012

2012-08-31T17:59:45Z

imported>Ed at 17:59, 31 August 2012

2012-08-31T17:59:01Z

imported>Ed: Protected "Project Planning" [edit=trusted:move=trusted:read=trusted]

2012-07-26T21:45:38Z

Protected "Project Planning" [edit=trusted:move=trusted:read=trusted]

imported>Ed: /* To Do List */

2012-07-19T23:22:03Z

To Do List

imported>Ed at 23:21, 19 July 2012

2012-07-19T23:21:12Z

imported>Ed at 21:43, 17 July 2012

2012-07-17T21:43:23Z

imported>Ed: /* Acquisitions Paper */

2012-07-17T21:08:11Z

Acquisitions Paper

imported>Ed at 21:05, 17 July 2012

2012-07-17T21:05:52Z

imported>Ed at 20:56, 17 July 2012

2012-07-17T20:56:52Z

imported>Ed: /* Acquisitions Paper */

2012-07-17T20:35:23Z

Acquisitions Paper

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:59, 31 August 2012
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	'''Project Page:''' [[Technology Financing Paper]]		'''Project Page:''' [[Technology Financing Paper]]

		+	This project currently has priority over all others.

	=Acquisitions Paper=		=Acquisitions Paper=

@@ Line 7: / Line 7: @@
 *Determine the extent of the literature on the ''''choice' between IPO and acquisition''' for startup firms seeking commercialization financing
 *Put together a list of models on complements and substitute technologies
 =Acquisitions Paper=

@@ Line 4: / Line 4: @@
 Each project has its own 'to do', but in order to explore new projects or break existing (inc. planned) projects into better questions there are the following tasks to be done:
-*Determine whether there are existing models for the effects of the winner's curse under asymmetric information
+*Determine whether there are existing models for the effects of the '''winner's curse under asymmetric information'''
-*Determine the extent of the literature on the 'choice' between IPO and acquisition for startup firms seeking commercialization financing
+*Determine the extent of the literature on the ''''choice' between IPO and acquisition''' for startup firms seeking commercialization financing
 =Acquisitions Paper=

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:21, 19 July 2012
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	This is a private page for those with 'Trusted' access that summarizes my thoughts on current intended projects.		This is a private page for those with 'Trusted' access that summarizes my thoughts on current intended projects.
		+
		+	=To Do List=
		+
		+	Each project has its own 'to do', but in order to explore new projects or break existing (inc. planned) projects into better questions there are the following tasks to be done:
		+	*Determine whether there are existing models for the effects of the winner's curse under asymmetric information
		+	*Determine the extent of the literature on the 'choice' between IPO and acquisition for startup firms seeking commercialization financing

	=Acquisitions Paper=		=Acquisitions Paper=

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:43, 17 July 2012
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	This project might also need data on priority dates and other extentions, though this might be able to be deduced from renewals data. The project either works or doesn't once the data is done.		This project might also need data on priority dates and other extentions, though this might be able to be deduced from renewals data. The project either works or doesn't once the data is done.
		+
		+	=Technology substitution and the choice of commercialization financing=
		+
		+	'''Q. Do firms with more radical innovations seek initial public offerings?'''
		+
		+	'''Status:''' Emprics is there. Needs a model and writing.
		+	'''Co-authors:''' poss. Jim?
		+	'''To do:''' Work on the model, decide whether the paper is feasible.
		+	'''Project Quality:''' Potential Job Market Paper? Has a big maintained assumption unless done with two models (and then has a measurement problem).
		+	'''Project Page:''' None yet
		+
		+	The maintained assumption would be that citations represent substitution. Otherwise, would need two models (one for subs, one for comps).
		+
		+	There are two possibilities here:
		+	#Build out my 'learning' model. This might also give rise to a spin-off model, particularly if I can get complements in there.
		+	#Use an off the shelf model (e.g. ?)

← Older revision	Revision as of 21:45, 26 July 2012
(No difference)

@@ Line 20: / Line 20: @@
 (2) is probably the simplest paper to write. We will use continuous measures of IA, and perhaps compute new distance measures.
-(3) is best answered using a dataset on acquisition of public firms by public firms (i.e. really Mergers)
+(3) is best answered using a dataset on acquisition of public firms by public firms (i.e. really Mergers). Also need Dierkins' other measures...
 All three papers need lit reviews doing first.

@@ Line 34: / Line 34: @@
   '''Project Page:''' [[Patent Pool Licensing Project]]
-=Mexican Standoff Paper=
+=Mexican-Standoff Paper=
 '''Q. What are the equilibria in patent litigation between competitors?'''
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 The project would try to describe at least some of the behaviour above using game theory (probably an infinitely repeated, full information game) and then use litigation data to show that the game models reality well.

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 =Acquisitions Paper=
-The original paper ([[Brander Egan (2007) - The Role of VCs in Acquisitions]]) had a full data rebuild, detailed on: [[VC Acquisitions Paper]].
+ '''Status:''' Old paper needs repurposing, perhaps into multiple papers.
 =Patent Pools Licensing Rate Paper=
 '''Q. Are licensing rates lower for patents included in pools?'''
 =Mexican Standoff Paper=
 '''Q. What are the equilibria in patent litigation between competitors?'''
 ==Background==
-Nokia sues Apple, Apple sues Sumsung, Samsung sues Nokia, and so on. There's been an endless round of [[Patent Litigation]] between the mobile phone and tablet device manufactures of late. Could this be related to the nature of competition in the markets? Pharma firms apparently sue
+Nokia sues Apple, Apple sues Sumsung, Samsung sues Nokia, and so on. There's been an endless round of [[Patent Litigation]] between the mobile phone and tablet device manufactures of late. Could this be related to the nature of competition in the markets? Pharma firms apparently sue at every infringement, whereas large semiconductor incumbents apparently never sue each off (are they in a Mexican standoff?). Infringement is obvious for pharma firms and potentially non-obvious for semiconductor firms. NPEs always sue, but they have no production rents to worry about. Some device manufacturers try to shut each other out of the market with ITC injunctions, and sue weak firms...

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:35, 17 July 2012
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	The original paper ([[Brander Egan (2007) - The Role of VCs in Acquisitions]]) had a full data rebuild, detailed on: [[VC Acquisitions Paper]].		The original paper ([[Brander Egan (2007) - The Role of VCs in Acquisitions]]) had a full data rebuild, detailed on: [[VC Acquisitions Paper]].
−
−	The resulting paper was submitted (dual submission) to the 3rd Annual Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation Conference (EFIC) conference and the Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS). It was rejected from both.
−
−	~~The key points from the reviewers were:~~
−	*We should explain how we get a different result from Masulis and Nahata (2011), who find a +3% return premium to VC-backed acquisitions
−	*We should use our continous measures of IA (i.e., look to find a monotonic effect). And consider within-industry acquisitions to see whether this mitigates IA problems.
−	*To back up the winner's curse we should consider the number of competing bidders.
−	*Possibly we should consider long rum performance and attempt to explain why the acquirers buy VC-backed firms.
−	*Focus less on the univariate results.
−
−	~~The obvious possibilities for this paper are to:~~
−	*Focus more on the IA.
−	*Do a supply-side VC analysis (i.e., include reputations, the possibility of grandstanding, etc.)
−
−	~~The immediate 'to do' is:~~
−	*Read the Masulis and Nahata (2011) paper carefully.

	=Patent Pools Licensing Rate Paper=		=Patent Pools Licensing Rate Paper=