PTLR Core Group Processed BibTeX - Revision history

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@@ Line 207: / Line 207: @@
     thicket_stance={Weak Anti},
     thicket_stance_extract={Evidence does not support the argument that patents simply are not needed to spur innovation, or that patents block future innovation by causing non-negotiable thickets of rights and reducing the software commons. Arguments like these are based largely on theory with a smattering of anecdotes thrown in, rather than on hard empirical evidence.},
-    thicket_def={#B, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Cummulative Invention, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
+    thicket_def={#A, #B, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Cummulative Invention, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
     thicket_def_extract={The theoretical economics literature argues that when innovations are sequential and cumulative, patents may impose more than the typical exclusion-period costs.113 For instance, a patent for an invention early in the innovative process could impose a toll on each sequential innovation that relies on it. Subsequent inventors, therefore, face higher transaction costs––they must pay licensing fees before they can further refine a technology. As the tolls build during the technology’s development path, later research could be discouraged altogether. Alluding to the famous argument for property rights, over-patenting has been dubbed the “tragedy of the anticommons,” as too many people with exclusionary rights can cause underutilization of resources.114 Shapiro uses another metaphor: the patent thicket... Based on the theoretical literature, software patent opponents claim that patent thickets will develop in the software industry. Thus, they assert that patents allow a company or individual to prevent the type of incremental innovation that is so important in the software industry. When small pieces of software that are adaptable to a multitude of applications can be and are patented, it becomes increasingly likely that each complex program will infringe someone’s patent. Therefore, opponents argue that developers have incentives to “over-patent” for strategic or defensive reasons in order to gain leverage in cross-licensing negotiations.119 Strategic patenting results in a patent thicket, an impenetrable barrier to further innovation.},
     tags={#Core Paper},
@@ Line 627: / Line 627: @@
     discipline={Law},
     research_type={Discussion},
-    industry={Software},
+    industry={General},
     thicket_stance={Neutral},
     thicket_stance_extract={The way forward from here is obvious. We need both more data, and more nuanced theory to account for it. And we also need a better understanding of when and how government policy can be brought to bear on these issues. For example, we are just beginning to see how patterns of post-grant transactions affect the economic impact of various property right entitlements. This will have obvious implications for our thinking about the proper contours of property right grants. At the same time, it is likely that in certain cases it will be very difficult or impossible to see far enough down the road to predict the post-grant landscape. In such cases, we must be sensitive to the need for rules and doctrines that permit the “visible hand” of government to prod or even force parties into transactions.},

@@ Line 12: / Line 12: @@
   @article{bessen2003patent,
-    title={Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Taechnologies},
+    title={Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies},
     author={Bessen, J.},
     journal={Available at SSRN 327760},
@@ Line 21: / Line 21: @@
     industry={General, ICT},
     thicket_stance={Pro},
-    thicket_stance_extract={#A, #C1-T, This paper argues that patent thickets can reduce R&D incentives even when there are no transaction costs, holdup or vertical monopoly problems.},
+    thicket_stance_extract={This paper argues that patent thickets can reduce R&D incentives even when there are no transaction costs, holdup or vertical monopoly problems.},
-    thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shapiro, Dubious Patents, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
+    thicket_def={#A, #C1-T, References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shapiro, Dubious Patents, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
     thicket_def_extract={The problem Baker describes is often called a "patent thicket." These occur when each product may involve many patents, in contrast with the one-to-one correspondence between products and patents that is assumed in the patent race literature. Recent commentators suggest that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, creating difficulties for innovators (see Gallini, 2002, for a review). When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), "holdup," and problems of vertical monopoly (Shapiro, 2001).},
     tags={#Core Paper, Private Mechanisms, Cross-licensing, Pools, Firm Strategy, Blocking Patents, Sequential Innovation},
@@ Line 842: / Line 842: @@
     pages={1617},
     year={2006},
-    abstract={The network may be the metaphor of the present era. A network, consisting of \nodes" and \links," may be a group of individuals linked by friendship; a group of computers linked by network cables; a system of roads or airline  ights { or another of a virtually limitless variety of systems of connected \things." The past few years have seen an explosion of interest in \network science," which seeks to move beyond metaphor to analysis in �elds from physics to sociology. Network science highlights the role of relationship patterns in deter- mining collective behavior. It underscores and begins to address the di�culty of predicting collective behavior from individual interactions. This Article seeks �rst to describe how network science can provide new conceptual and empiri- cal approaches to legal questions because of its focus on analyzing the e�ects of patterns of relationships on collective behavior. The Article then illustrates the network approach by describing a study of the network created by patents and the citations between them. Burgeoning patenting has raised concerns about patent quality, re ected in proposed legislation and in renewed Supreme Court attention to patent law. The network approach allows us to get behind the increasing numbers and investigate the patterns of relationships between patented technologies. We can then distinguish between faster technological progress, increasing breadth of patented technologies, and a lower patentability standard as possible explanations for increased patenting. We �nd that, since the late 1980s, the disparity in likelihood of citation between the most \citable" and least \citable" patents has grown, suggesting that the least citable patents may represent increasingly trivial inventions. One possible explanation of this increasing strati�cation is increasing reliance by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on the widely criticized \motivation or suggestion to combine" test for nonobviousness, which is at issue in the case of KSR v. Tele ex, currently pending at the Supreme Court. We also discuss how network science may be employed to address other issues of patent law.},
+    abstract={The network may be the metaphor of the present era. A network, consisting of "nodes" and "links" may be a group of individuals linked by friendship; a group of computers linked by network cables; a system of roads or airline  flights or another of a virtually limitless variety of systems of connected things." The past few years have seen an explosion of interest in network science," which seeks to move beyond metaphor to analysis in �elds from physics to sociology. Network science highlights the role of relationship patterns in deter- mining collective behavior. It underscores and begins to address the di�culty of predicting collective behavior from individual interactions. This Article seeks �rst to describe how network science can provide new conceptual and empiri- cal approaches to legal questions because of its focus on analyzing the e�ects of patterns of relationships on collective behavior. The Article then illustrates the network approach by describing a study of the network created by patents and the citations between them. Burgeoning patenting has raised concerns about patent quality, re ected in proposed legislation and in renewed Supreme Court attention to patent law. The network approach allows us to get behind the increasing numbers and investigate the patterns of relationships between patented technologies. We can then distinguish between faster technological progress, increasing breadth of patented technologies, and a lower patentability standard as possible explanations for increased patenting. We �nd that, since the late 1980s, the disparity in likelihood of citation between the most citable" and least citable" patents has grown, suggesting that the least citable patents may represent increasingly trivial inventions. One possible explanation of this increasing strati�cation is increasing reliance by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on the widely criticized motivation or suggestion to combine" test for nonobviousness, which is at issue in the case of KSR v. Tele ex, currently pending at the Supreme Court. We also discuss how network science may be employed to address other issues of patent law.},
     discipline={Law},
     research_type={Discussion, Measures},
@@ Line 873: / Line 873: @@
   @article{von2012incidence,
     title={Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets-The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity},
-    author={von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S. and Harhoff, D.},
+    author={Von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S. and Harhoff, D.},
     journal={Journal of Industrial Economics},
     year={2012},

@@ Line 1,019: / Line 1,019: @@
     tags={},
     filename={Ziedonis (2003) - Patent Litigation In The Us Semiconductor Industry.pdf}
+  }

@@ Line 25: / Line 25: @@
     thicket_def_extract={The problem Baker describes is often called a "patent thicket." These occur when each product may involve many patents, in contrast with the one-to-one correspondence between products and patents that is assumed in the patent race literature. Recent commentators suggest that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, creating difficulties for innovators (see Gallini, 2002, for a review). When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), "holdup," and problems of vertical monopoly (Shapiro, 2001).},
     tags={Private Mechanisms, Cross-licensing, Pools, Firm Strategy, Blocking Patents, Sequential Innovation},
-    filename={Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies.pdf}
+    filename={[[Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies]].pdf}
+  }
@@ Line 190: / Line 190: @@
      thicket_def_extract={Thus a patent thicket usually involves (1) multiple patents on (2) the same, similar, or complementary technologies, (3) held by different parties, making it difficult to negotiate intellectual property rights (for example, licensing agreements) to the point where some scholars feel it might be socially inefficient....  What is a patent thicket? A patent thicket conjures up the image of a thicket, or bramble, a large dense bush with thorns on the branches making it difficult to pass through without getting severely scratched. Thus a patent thicket is a “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, 2001, p. 120). This makes it difficult to negotiate intellectual property rights (for example, licensing agreements1), to the point where some observers feel it might be socially inefficient (Bessen & Meurer, 2008b; Scotchmer, 1996). In such a situation, it is argued that strategic uses of the patent system by applicants may be interfering with one of the goals of the system, by obliging innovators to spend inordinate resources on transaction costs to bring new technology that builds on prior work to market. Such high transaction costs, if and when they exist, would tend to discourage innovation rather than encourage it.},
      tags={},
-     filename={EPO (2012) - Workshop on Patent Thickets.pdf}
+     filename={[[EPO (2012) - Workshop on Patent Thickets]].pdf}
+  }
@@ Line 283: / Line 283: @@
     thicket_def_extract={In particular, Shapiro (2001) has argued that a "patent thicket" has appeared that renders it difficult to commercialize a new technology. In some industries the number of intellectual property rights a firm requires to produce a new product is so large, and their ownership is so dispersed, that it is quite easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent. In this environment  there is, therefore, a hold-up problem: when the manufacturer starts selling its product a patentee might show up threatening to shut production down unless it is paid high royalties.},
     tags={Private Mechanisms, Cross-licensing, Litigation},
-    filename={Galasso (2007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Litigation.pdf}
+    filename={[[Galasso (2007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Litigation]].pdf}
+  }
@@ Line 496: / Line 496: @@
     thicket_def_extract={In the field of biomedical research an early paper by Heller and Eisenberg (1998) raised serious questions regarding the effects of patenting on research productivity in this field, especially at the level of basic scientific research. they argue that patent thickets in biomedical research would make it difficult or impossible for researchers to access basic research tools. By implication research progress in these industries would be stifled. More recent work by Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2002) and Walsh, Cho and Cohen (2005) does not show that these concerns are generally valid. In the field of nanotechnology Lemley (2005) has documented that firms and universi ties are patenting at an unprecedented pace for such a new technology. He points out that this is the first new technology to emerge in which basic scientific building blocks are being patented... What unifies all of this work is its focus on patenting in technologies in which a product is based on a large number of patents, i.e., industries in which products are complex. These patents are valuable only as a set of complementary patent rights. Thus, assumption (iv) 37 of the traditional view of patents is violated. Shapiro (2001) argues that firms in industries based on such complex technologies face a growing “patent thicket”: a dense web of overlapping patents in which a firm is often faced by rivals that hold patents which may block the use of its own patents... In such cases the various patents embodied in the product become “technological complements”. Technological complementarity is one cause for overlapping patents and for the existence of blocking patents. Thus it is one precondition for the emergence of patent thickets and for the amassing of patent portfolios... It may be that the firms involved are attempting to reduce transactions costs that arise within a patent thicket.},
     tags={Complements, Substitutes, Fences, Strategic Patenting},
-    filename={Harhoff (2007) - The Strategic Use Of Patents And Its Implications For Enterprise And Competition Policies.pdf}
+    filename={[[Harhoff (2007) - The Strategic Use Of Patents And Its Implications For Enterprise And Competition Policies]].pdf}
+  }
@@ Line 555: / Line 555: @@
     thicket_def_extract={In an anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. 11 When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a tragedy of the anticommons.12 Legal and economic scholars have mostly overlooked this tragedy, but...},
     tags={Seminal Theory!},
-    filename={Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf}
+    filename={[[Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons]].pdf}
+  }
@@ Line 629: / Line 629: @@
     thicket_def_extract={Most famously, Lassig argues that the proliferation of software patents has created an "anticommons" or a patent thicket... so many overlapping patents in the industry that potential innovators cannot readily obtain the approvals necessary to conduct their research. The premise of the model is that assiets will go unused because of the costs of obtaining the permissions necessary to use them.},
     tags={Software, Survey, No Thickets!, No Search},
-    filename={Mann (2005) - Do Patents Facilitate Financing In The Software Industry.pdf}
+    filename={[[Mann (2005) - Do Patents Facilitate Financing In The Software Industry]].pdf}
+  }
@@ Line 648: / Line 648: @@
     thicket_def_extract={This Article is aimed at providing conceptual guidance for those who need to traverse the new thicket of intellectual property rights (IPRs).' Each vine, each plant, standing in one's path represents a distinct IPR owned by an individual. To pass through, one needs a license from each owner. Where a single right blocks the path, this is easy: a single licensing contract does the trick. Today, however, business people more often than not encounter a tangled, twisted mass of IPRs, which criss-cross the established walkways of commerce. Progress along this path does not come cheaply; rather, it requires numerous contracts with multiple, independent right holders},
     tags={Seminal Theory!, First Thicket Metaphor, Copyright, Patents},
-    filename={Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules.pdf}
+    filename={[[Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules]].pdf}
+  }
@@ Line 791: / Line 791: @@
     thicket_def_extract={Multivariate analysis of the data suggests that in selected discrete technologies, patent ‘fences’ may serve to exclude competitors whereas in complex technologies, ‘thickets’ represent exchange forums for complementary technology.... yielding thickets of complementary patents held by different owners.... Patent thickets owned by various patent holders should prevail in complex technologies such as semiconductors, forcing players to use patents as ‘bargaining chips’.4 Here, from the patentee’s standpoint, exchanging technology should be the first-best use for a patent leading to the highest possible profits as exclusion is virtually infeasible....  As both articles show, the “strategic use” of patents (the two most important types being blocking and cross-licensing with patent ‘thickets’ playing a major role for the latter), has classically been discussed from the perspective of those patent holders who either engage in the production of their own technological goods or consider themselves professional intellectual property suppliers who repeatedly interact with manufacturers.},
     tags={Private Mechanisms, NPEs, Firm Strategy, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Value from Position/Portfolio},
-    filename={Reitzig Henkel Heath (2007) - On Sharks Trolls And Their Patent Prey.pdf}
+    filename={[[Reitzig Henkel Heath (2007) - On Sharks Trolls And Their Patent Prey]].pdf}
+  }

@@ Line 854: / Line 854: @@
      tags={},
      filename={Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies.pdf}
+  }