http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?action=history&feed=atom&title=PHDBA602_%28Theory_of_the_Firm%29 PHDBA602 (Theory of the Firm) - Revision history 2026-05-13T00:02:04Z Revision history for this page on the wiki MediaWiki 1.34.2 http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34071&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Papers */ 2010-12-17T01:17:24Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Papers</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 01:17, 17 December 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l36" >Line 36:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 36:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), &quot;Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] [[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |(stub)]]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), &quot;Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] [[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |(stub)]]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Centralization/Decentralization<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">:</del>===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Centralization/Decentralization===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], &quot;Decentralization, Duplication And Delay,&quot; Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], &quot;Decentralization, Duplication And Delay,&quot; Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Relational Contracting<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">:</del>===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Relational Contracting===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] &quot;Informal authority in organizations&quot;, Journal of law, economics, &amp; organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] &quot;Informal authority in organizations&quot;, Journal of law, economics, &amp; organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], &quot;Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm&quot;, The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], &quot;Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm&quot;, The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Firm Boundaries<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">:</del>===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Firm Boundaries===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], &quot;The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited,&quot; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], &quot;The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited,&quot; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], &quot;The Firm As A Subeconomy&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], &quot;The Firm As A Subeconomy&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34070&oldid=prev imported>Ed at 01:16, 17 December 2010 2010-12-17T01:16:38Z <p></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 01:16, 17 December 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l15" >Line 15:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 15:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===General Overviews===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===General Overviews===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |</del>Gibbons, Robert (2005)<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">]]</del>, &quot;Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?&quot;, Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, Robert (2005), &quot;Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?&quot;, Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">] [[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |(stub)]</ins>]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), &quot;Chapter 2 The theory of the firm&quot;, In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), &quot;Chapter 2 The theory of the firm&quot;, In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">===Background Literature===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), &quot;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf] [[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization |(stub)]]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*Coase, Ronald (1937), &quot;The Nature of the Firm&quot;, Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] [[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm |(stub)]]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">===Transaction Cost Economics===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), &quot;Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf] [[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process |(stub)]]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], &quot;The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,&quot; American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics |Williamson, Oliver (1979)]], &quot;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Williamson (1991) - Comparative Economic Organization The Analysis Of Discrete Structural Alternatives |Williamson, Oliver (1991)]], &quot;Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives&quot;, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Williamson (1999) - Public And Private Bureaucracies |Williamson, Oliver E. (1999)]], &quot;Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Property Rights Model===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Property Rights Model===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |</del>Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">]]</del>, &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf] [[<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Grossman </ins>Hart (<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">1986</ins>) - <ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership </ins>|<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">(stub)]]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">*</del>[[Hart <del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Moore </del>(<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">1990</del>) - <del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm</del>| Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990)<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">]]</del>, &quot;Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, Dec., pp. 1119-1158 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1990)%20-%20Property%20Rights%20and%20the%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">*</ins>Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990), &quot;Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, Dec., pp. 1119-1158 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1990)%20-%20Property%20Rights%20and%20the%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">] [[Hart Moore (1990) - Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm|(stub)]</ins>]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Multi-tasking===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Multi-tasking===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |</del></div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), &quot;Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">] [[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |(stub)]</ins>]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">]]</del>, &quot;Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]</div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Centralization/Decentralization:===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Centralization/Decentralization:===</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l41" >Line 41:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 51:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Dessein Santos (2006) - Adaptive Organizations |Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006)]], &quot;Adaptive Organizations&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20Santos%20(2006)%20-%20Adaptive%20Organizations pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Dessein Santos (2006) - Adaptive Organizations |Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006)]], &quot;Adaptive Organizations&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20Santos%20(2006)%20-%20Adaptive%20Organizations pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Bajari Tadelis (2001) - Incentives versus Transaction Costs A Theory of Procurement Contracts| Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001)]], &quot;Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20versus%20Transaction%20Costs%20A%20Theory%20of%20Procurement%20Contracts pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Bajari Tadelis (2001) - Incentives versus Transaction Costs A Theory of Procurement Contracts| Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001)]], &quot;Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20versus%20Transaction%20Costs%20A%20Theory%20of%20Procurement%20Contracts pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">==Background Literature==</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">The following papers provide seminal background material:</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization |Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972)]], &quot;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm |Coase, Ronald (1937)]], &quot;The Nature of the Firm&quot;, Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process |Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978)]], &quot;Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], &quot;The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,&quot; American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34069&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Papers */ 2010-12-17T01:10:27Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Papers</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 01:10, 17 December 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l14" >Line 14:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 14:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Papers==</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Papers==</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Introduction</del>===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">General Overviews</ins>===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The <del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">following papers were suggested as a starting point</del>:</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">*[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of </ins>The <ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], &quot;Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?&quot;, Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http</ins>:<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), &quot;Chapter 2 The theory of the firm&quot;, In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div> </div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">===Property Rights Model===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Hart Moore (1990) - Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm| Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990)]], &quot;Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, Dec., pp. 1119-1158 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1990)%20-%20Property%20Rights%20and%20the%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">===Multi-tasking===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], &quot;Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], &quot;Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], &quot;Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?&quot;, Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf]</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">The Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989) also provides a chapter on the theory of the firm:</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), &quot;Chapter 2 The theory of the firm&quot;, In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Centralization/Decentralization:===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Centralization/Decentralization:===</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34068&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Papers */ 2010-12-17T01:02:10Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Papers</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 01:02, 17 December 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l35" >Line 35:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 35:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], &quot;The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited,&quot; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], &quot;The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited,&quot; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], &quot;The Firm As A Subeconomy&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], &quot;The Firm As A Subeconomy&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">===Adaptation===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Dessein Santos (2006) - Adaptive Organizations |Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006)]], &quot;Adaptive Organizations&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20Santos%20(2006)%20-%20Adaptive%20Organizations pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Bajari Tadelis (2001) - Incentives versus Transaction Costs A Theory of Procurement Contracts| Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001)]], &quot;Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20versus%20Transaction%20Costs%20A%20Theory%20of%20Procurement%20Contracts pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Background Literature==</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Background Literature==</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34067&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Papers */ 2010-11-27T23:38:51Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Papers</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 23:38, 27 November 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l28" >Line 28:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 28:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Relational Contracting===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Relational Contracting<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">:</ins>===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] &quot;Informal authority in organizations&quot;, Journal of law, economics, &amp; organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] &quot;Informal authority in organizations&quot;, Journal of law, economics, &amp; organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], &quot;Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm&quot;, The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], &quot;Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm&quot;, The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34066&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Relational Contracting */ 2010-11-23T03:50:39Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Relational Contracting</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 03:50, 23 November 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l29" >Line 29:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 29:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Relational Contracting===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Relational Contracting===</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] &quot;Informal authority in organizations&quot;, Journal of law, economics, &amp; organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], &quot;Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm&quot;, The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], &quot;Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm&quot;, The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] &quot;Informal authority in organizations&quot;, Journal of law, economics, &amp; organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Firm Boundaries:===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Firm Boundaries:===</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34065&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Papers */ 2010-11-23T03:44:22Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Papers</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 03:44, 23 November 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l27" >Line 27:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 27:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], &quot;Decentralization, Duplication And Delay,&quot; Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], &quot;Decentralization, Duplication And Delay,&quot; Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">===Relational Contracting===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], &quot;Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm&quot;, The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] &quot;Informal authority in organizations&quot;, Journal of law, economics, &amp; organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Firm Boundaries:===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===Firm Boundaries:===</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34064&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Papers */ 2010-11-15T20:51:38Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Papers</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 20:51, 15 November 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l14" >Line 14:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 14:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Papers==</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Papers==</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===<del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Background</del>===</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Introduction</ins>===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were suggested as a starting point:</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were suggested as a starting point:</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34063&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Papers */ 2010-11-15T20:51:03Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Papers</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 20:51, 15 November 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l14" >Line 14:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 14:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Papers==</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Papers==</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">===Background===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were suggested as a starting point:</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were suggested as a starting point:</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l23" >Line 23:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 24:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), &quot;Chapter 2 The theory of the firm&quot;, In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), &quot;Chapter 2 The theory of the firm&quot;, In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Centralization/Decentralization:</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">===</ins>Centralization/Decentralization:<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], &quot;Decentralization, Duplication And Delay,&quot; Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], &quot;Decentralization, Duplication And Delay,&quot; Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Firm Boundaries:</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">===</ins>Firm Boundaries:<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], &quot;The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited,&quot; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], &quot;The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited,&quot; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], &quot;The Firm As A Subeconomy&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], &quot;The Firm As A Subeconomy&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA602_(Theory_of_the_Firm)&diff=34062&oldid=prev imported>Ed: /* Papers */ 2010-11-15T20:50:26Z <p><span dir="auto"><span class="autocomment">Papers</span></span></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 20:50, 15 November 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l14" >Line 14:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 14:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Papers==</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Papers==</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers <del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">are </del>suggested as a starting point:</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers <ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">were </ins>suggested as a starting point:</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration&quot;, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l22" >Line 22:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 22:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989) also provides a chapter on the theory of the firm:</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989) also provides a chapter on the theory of the firm:</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), &quot;Chapter 2 The theory of the firm&quot;, In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), &quot;Chapter 2 The theory of the firm&quot;, In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">Centralization/Decentralization:</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], &quot;Decentralization, Duplication And Delay,&quot; Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], &quot;When Does Coordination Require Centralization?&quot; American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">Firm Boundaries:</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], &quot;The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited,&quot; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], &quot;The Firm As A Subeconomy&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Background Literature==</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==Background Literature==</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed