PHDBA279A 2011 - Revision history

imported>Bo: Replacing page with 'This page is in the BPP categoryCategory:BPP Back to PHDBA279A for all years. [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/5/55/BA279-DalBo-deFigueiredo_2011.090311x.pdf ...'

2011-12-02T20:06:21Z

Replacing page with '*This page is in the BPP categoryCategory:BPP *Back to PHDBA279A for all years. [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/5/55/BA279-DalBo-deFigueiredo_2011.090311x.pdf ...'

imported>Bo at 20:05, 2 December 2011

2011-12-02T20:05:56Z

imported>Bo at 20:04, 2 December 2011

2011-12-02T20:04:13Z

imported>Bo at 20:03, 2 December 2011

2011-12-02T20:03:36Z

imported>Bo at 20:01, 2 December 2011

2011-12-02T20:01:08Z

imported>Bo at 20:00, 2 December 2011

2011-12-02T20:00:38Z

imported>Bo at 19:54, 2 December 2011

2011-12-02T19:54:33Z

imported>Bo at 19:44, 2 December 2011

2011-12-02T19:44:02Z

imported>Bo at 19:42, 2 December 2011

2011-12-02T19:42:24Z

imported>Bo at 18:10, 27 October 2011

2011-10-27T18:10:22Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:06, 2 December 2011
Line 11:		Line 11:
	* [[Problem Set 2]]		* [[Problem Set 2]]
	* [[Problem Set 3]]		* [[Problem Set 3]]
−
−	~~Ernesto: Papers covered in class:~~
−	*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]
−	*Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Knight%20(2000)%20-%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Requirements%20for%20Tax%20Increases%20Evidence%20from%20the%20States.pdf pdf]. Presentation in 2011 version of class: [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/c/c9/Knight_Presentation.pdf pdf].
−	*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2006)%20-%20Committees%20With%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Yield%20Commitment%20With%20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
−	*Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]
−	*Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cadot%20(1987)%20-%20Corruption%20as%20a%20Gamble.pdf pdf]
−	*Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf]
−	*Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf]
−	*Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf]
−	*Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wittman%20(1989)%20-%20Why%20Democracies%20Produce%20Efficient%20Results.pdf pdf]
−	*Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]
−	* Dal Bó, E. (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(2), 203-225.
−	* Laffont, J-J., and J.Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Chapter 11 (up to section 11.5 incl.).
−	* Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Vol. 19, Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211-240.
−	* Stigler, George J. (1971), The Regulation of Industry, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3-21.
−	* Demsetz (1968), Why Regulate Utilities, Journal of Law and Economics 11, 55- 56.
−	* Laffont, J-J., and J. Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Introductory chapter, and Chapter 1 (up to section 1.7 incl.).
−
−	~~Rui Papers covered in class:~~
−	*[[Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms]], American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20(1979)%20-%20A%20Rational%20Choice%20Perspective%20on%20Congressional%20Norms.pdf pdf]
−	*[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures \|Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)]], Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]
−	*[[Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control]], American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]
−	*[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees \|Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
−	*Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf]
−	*[[Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk]], Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf]

@@ Line 36: / Line 36: @@
 *[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
 *Krishna, V.  and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf]
-*Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf]
+*[[Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk]], Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf]

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:04, 2 December 2011
Line 35:		Line 35:
	*[[Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control]], American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]		*[[Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control]], American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]
	*[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees \|Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]		*[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees \|Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
		+	*Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf]
		+	*Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf]

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:03, 2 December 2011
Line 29:		Line 29:
	* Demsetz (1968), Why Regulate Utilities, Journal of Law and Economics 11, 55- 56.		* Demsetz (1968), Why Regulate Utilities, Journal of Law and Economics 11, 55- 56.
	* Laffont, J-J., and J. Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Introductory chapter, and Chapter 1 (up to section 1.7 incl.).		* Laffont, J-J., and J. Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Introductory chapter, and Chapter 1 (up to section 1.7 incl.).
		+
		+	Rui Papers covered in class:
		+	*[[Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms]], American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20(1979)%20-%20A%20Rational%20Choice%20Perspective%20on%20Congressional%20Norms.pdf pdf]
		+	*[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures \|Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)]], Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]
		+	*[[Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control]], American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]
		+	*[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees \|Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:01, 2 December 2011
Line 27:		Line 27:
	* Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Vol. 19, Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211-240.		* Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Vol. 19, Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211-240.
	* Stigler, George J. (1971), The Regulation of Industry, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3-21.		* Stigler, George J. (1971), The Regulation of Industry, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3-21.
		+	* Demsetz (1968), Why Regulate Utilities, Journal of Law and Economics 11, 55- 56.
		+	* Laffont, J-J., and J. Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Introductory chapter, and Chapter 1 (up to section 1.7 incl.).

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:00, 2 December 2011
Line 23:		Line 23:
	*Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wittman%20(1989)%20-%20Why%20Democracies%20Produce%20Efficient%20Results.pdf pdf]		*Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wittman%20(1989)%20-%20Why%20Democracies%20Produce%20Efficient%20Results.pdf pdf]
	*Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]		*Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]
		+	* Dal Bó, E. (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(2), 203-225.
		+	* Laffont, J-J., and J.Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Chapter 11 (up to section 11.5 incl.).
		+	* Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Vol. 19, Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211-240.
		+	* Stigler, George J. (1971), The Regulation of Industry, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3-21.

@@ Line 13: / Line 13: @@
 Ernesto: Papers covered in class:
+*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]
+*Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Knight%20(2000)%20-%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Requirements%20for%20Tax%20Increases%20Evidence%20from%20the%20States.pdf pdf]. Presentation in 2011 version of class: [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/c/c9/Knight_Presentation.pdf pdf].
+*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2006)%20-%20Committees%20With%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Yield%20Commitment%20With%20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
+*Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 *This page is in the [[BPP]] category[[Category:BPP]]
 *Back to [[PHDBA279A]] for all years.
 New papers:

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:42, 2 December 2011
Line 9:		Line 9:
	* [[Problem Set 2]]		* [[Problem Set 2]]
	* [[Problem Set 3]]		* [[Problem Set 3]]
		+
		+	Ernesto: Papers covered in class:
		+	*
		+	*
		+	*
		+	*

@@ Line 6: / Line 6: @@
 Problem Sets:
-[[Problem Set 1]]
+* [[Problem Set 1]]
-[[Problem Set 2]]
+* [[Problem Set 2]]
-[[Problem Set 3]]
+* [[Problem Set 3]]