Overconfidence Papers - Revision history

Ed at 17:39, 21 September 2020

2020-09-21T17:39:57Z

Ed at 17:34, 21 September 2020

2020-09-21T17:34:09Z

Ed at 17:20, 20 September 2020

2020-09-20T17:20:07Z

Ed at 17:15, 20 September 2020

2020-09-20T17:15:37Z

Juliette.richert at 20:34, 3 March 2017

2017-03-03T20:34:51Z

Juliette.richert at 22:31, 2 March 2017

2017-03-02T22:31:39Z

Juliette.richert at 22:30, 2 March 2017

2017-03-02T22:30:21Z

JakeSilberman at 16:16, 29 July 2016

2016-07-29T16:16:59Z

JakeSilberman: /* Hall & Liebman 1997 */

2016-07-29T16:13:59Z

Hall & Liebman 1997

JakeSilberman: /* Papers */

2016-07-29T16:13:37Z

Papers

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 {{Project
-|Has project output=
+|Has project output=Content
 |Has sponsor=McNair Center
 |Has title=Overconfidence Papers

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 {{Project
 |Has sponsor=McNair Center
 |Has title=Overconfidence Papers

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 {{Project
 |Has title=Overconfidence Papers
 |Has owner=

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:15, 20 September 2020
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−	~~[[Category:McNair Projects]]~~	+	{{Project
		+	\|Has title=Overconfidence Papers
		+	\|Has owner=
		+	\|Has start date=
		+	\|Has deadline=
		+	\|Has keywords=
		+	\|Has notes=
		+	\|Has project status=Complete
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		+	}}

	=Papers=		=Papers=

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:34, 3 March 2017
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	abstract={This paper analyzes stock option awards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options' performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests examine whether the mix of compensation between stock options and cash pay can be explained by corporate liquidity, tax status, or earnings management. Results indicate that few agency or financial contracting theories have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards.}		abstract={This paper analyzes stock option awards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options' performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests examine whether the mix of compensation between stock options and cash pay can be explained by corporate liquidity, tax status, or earnings management. Results indicate that few agency or financial contracting theories have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards.}
	}		}
		+
		+	==Related Pages==
		+	*[[Winner's Curse in Acquisitions (Academic Paper)]]

@@ Line 12: / Line 12: @@
    year={2005},
    publisher={Wiley Online Library}
-   =abstract={We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company-specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.}
+   abstract={We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company-specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.}
+  }

@@ Line 29: / Line 29: @@
   compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely
   because of increases in stock option grants.}
+  }

@@ Line 22: / Line 22: @@
    institution={National bureau of economic research}
    abstract={A common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance
-and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest,
+ and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest,
-publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm
+ publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm
-performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost
+ performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost
-entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In
+ entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In
-addition, we show that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of
+ addition, we show that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of
-compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely
+ compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely
-because of increases in stock option grants.}
+ because of increases in stock option grants.}
+  }