Grief (1993) - Revision history

Ed at 23:14, 29 September 2020

2020-09-29T23:14:53Z

2020-09-29T17:22:54Z

2020-09-29T17:19:45Z

2020-09-29T17:06:05Z

2020-09-29T16:47:53Z

2011-06-08T00:29:49Z

What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?

2011-06-08T00:27:15Z

How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence?

2011-06-07T23:19:25Z

2011-06-07T07:38:10Z

How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?

2011-06-07T07:35:24Z

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← Older revision		Revision as of 16:47, 29 September 2020
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		+	{{Article
		+	\|Has page=
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	==Theory Questions:==		==Theory Questions:==
	===What is the research question?===		===What is the research question?===

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:29, 8 June 2011
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	===What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===		===What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===
		+
		+	Unfortunately the data mentioned above probably does not exist. Even if it did, one might wonder why an agent (and we researchers) would know about his improved outside options without his employers ever knowing about it.
		+
		+	The types of events that would lead an agent to change careers (starting a new business, marrying into a rich family, etc) are often observable in a social context and are likely to be known by their employers (the merchants).
		+
		+	If the merchants knew that the infinite horizon was about to end, they would respond by no longer hiring the agent -- since the agent no longer has incentives for good behavior.

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:27, 8 June 2011
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	===How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? ===		===How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? ===

		+	A key, underpinning aspect of the model is its infinite horizon assumption. Without it, the agents have less of an incentive to be honest.

		+	Suppose that an exogenous factor results in some agents having better opportunities than being an honest trader. If the agent knows he will leave the trading business in advance, he would have no more reason to maintain his reputation and should begin shirking until he leaves the industry.
		+
		+	If we had data about entries and exits to the agency business, we may be able to learn something about whether reputation is indeed driving good behavior.

	===What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===		===What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===

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 ===What is the author's hypothesis? ===
 ===How does the author test the hypothesis? ===
 ===How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?===
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 ===How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? ===
 ===What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===

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 ===How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?===
-Based on the lack of historical evidence, the author says that a court-enforced legal system was not used to overcome the commitment/agency problem. The author also notes that asymmetric information problems would hinder the court's ability to enforce contracts. For example: An 11th Century court has no way of verifying whether a storm destroyed goods or if the goods were stolen. On the rare occasions in which the courts were indeed used, they were evidently expensive and time consuming. The author speculates that this would be prohibit their use. Jewish law also (according to the author) restricts the ability to sue agents.
+* Based on the lack of historical evidence, the author says that a court-enforced legal system was not used to overcome the commitment/agency problem. The author also notes that asymmetric information problems would hinder the court's ability to enforce contracts. For example: An 11th Century court has no way of verifying whether a storm destroyed goods or if the goods were stolen. On the rare occasions in which the courts were indeed used, they were evidently expensive and time consuming. The author speculates that this would be prohibit their use. Jewish law also (according to the author) restricts the ability to sue agents.
 ===How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? ===

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 ===What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===
-Empirical Questions:
+==Empirical Questions: ==
 ===What's the author's hypothesis? ===
 ===How it is tested?===