http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?action=history&feed=atom&title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers ECON224 Field Exam Papers - Revision history 2026-05-12T22:13:27Z Revision history for this page on the wiki MediaWiki 1.34.2 http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers&diff=31176&oldid=prev imported>Ed at 02:10, 3 April 2010 2010-04-03T02:10:28Z <p></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 02:10, 3 April 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l38" >Line 38:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 38:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>They also added (perhaps wisely):</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>They also added (perhaps wisely):</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Spiller, Pablo (2008), &quot;An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts:  Regulatory Implications&quot;, NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(2008)%20-%20An%20Institutional%20Theory%20of%20Public%20Contracts%20Regulatory%20Implications.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">*</ins>Spiller, Pablo (2008), &quot;An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts:  Regulatory Implications&quot;, NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(2008)%20-%20An%20Institutional%20Theory%20of%20Public%20Contracts%20Regulatory%20Implications.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers&diff=31175&oldid=prev imported>Ed at 02:10, 3 April 2010 2010-04-03T02:10:09Z <p></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 02:10, 3 April 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l36" >Line 36:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 36:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Weingast and Marshall (1988), &quot;The Industrial Organization of Congress&quot;,Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Weingast and Marshall (1988), &quot;The Industrial Organization of Congress&quot;,Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">They also added (perhaps wisely):</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">Spiller, Pablo (2008), &quot;An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts:  Regulatory Implications&quot;, NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(2008)%20-%20An%20Institutional%20Theory%20of%20Public%20Contracts%20Regulatory%20Implications.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers&diff=31174&oldid=prev imported>Ed at 02:05, 3 April 2010 2010-04-03T02:05:38Z <p></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 02:05, 3 April 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l34" >Line 34:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 34:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following additional papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.:  </div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following additional papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.:  </div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Weingast and Marshall (1988), &quot;The Industrial Organization of Congress&quot;,Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Weingast and Marshall (1988), &quot;The Industrial Organization of Congress&quot;,Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers&diff=31173&oldid=prev imported>Ed at 02:05, 3 April 2010 2010-04-03T02:05:04Z <p></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 02:05, 3 April 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l11" >Line 11:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 11:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Williamson, Oliver (1979), &quot;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Williamson, Oliver (1979), &quot;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, Robert (2004), &quot;Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?&quot; (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, Robert (2004), &quot;Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?&quot; (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Whinston (2003), &quot;On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Whinston (2003), &quot;On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), &quot;Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), &quot;Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l29" >Line 29:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 29:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), &quot;Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), &quot;Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), &quot;The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), &quot;The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), &quot;Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), &quot;Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*'''(I)''' McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers&diff=31172&oldid=prev imported>Ed at 02:00, 3 April 2010 2010-04-03T02:00:20Z <p></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 02:00, 3 April 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l1" >Line 1:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 1:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' by Egan and <del class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Hernandez(listed </del>in the order that they appeared in class):</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' by Egan and <ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">Hernandezlisted </ins>in the order that they appeared in class <ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">(marked '''I'''ncluded if they were included by the Shelef, Thompson, et al. peer group</ins>):</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*North, Douglass (1991). &quot;Institutions&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>North, Douglass (1991). &quot;Institutions&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (2000), &quot;New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (2000), &quot;New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), &quot;Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), &quot;Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver, (1983), &quot;Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Williamson, Oliver, (1983), &quot;Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (1991), &quot;Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives&quot;, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Williamson, Oliver (1991), &quot;Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives&quot;, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), &quot;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), &quot;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Coase, Ronald (1937), &quot;The Nature of the Firm&quot;, Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Coase, Ronald (1937), &quot;The Nature of the Firm&quot;, Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (1979), &quot;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Williamson, Oliver (1979), &quot;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, Robert (2004), &quot;Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?&quot; (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, Robert (2004), &quot;Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?&quot; (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Whinston (2003), &quot;On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Whinston (2003), &quot;On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), &quot;Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), &quot;Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), &quot;Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information&quot;, American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), &quot;Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information&quot;, American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), &quot;The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 1041-1080. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lafontaine%20Shaw%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Dynamics%20of%20Franchise%20Contracting.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), &quot;The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 1041-1080. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lafontaine%20Shaw%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Dynamics%20of%20Franchise%20Contracting.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), &quot;Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), &quot;Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Anderson, Erin (1988), &quot;Strategic Implications of Darwinian Economics for Selling Efficiency and Choice of Integrated or Independent Sales Forces,&quot; Management Science, 34 (May), 599-618. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Anderson%20(1988)%20-%20Strategic%20Implications%20of%20Darwinian%20Economics%20for%20Selling%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Anderson, Erin (1988), &quot;Strategic Implications of Darwinian Economics for Selling Efficiency and Choice of Integrated or Independent Sales Forces,&quot; Management Science, 34 (May), 599-618. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Anderson%20(1988)%20-%20Strategic%20Implications%20of%20Darwinian%20Economics%20for%20Selling%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), &quot;Informal Authority in Organizations&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics &amp; Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), &quot;Informal Authority in Organizations&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics &amp; Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, R. (1998), &quot;Incentives in Organizations.&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, pp. 115-32 (especially pp. 115-23). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(1998)%20-%20Incentives%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, R. (1998), &quot;Incentives in Organizations.&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, pp. 115-32 (especially pp. 115-23). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(1998)%20-%20Incentives%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Prendergast. C. (1999), &quot;The Provision of Incentives in Firms.&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7-63 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Provision%20of%20Incentives%20in%20Firms.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Prendergast. C. (1999), &quot;The Provision of Incentives in Firms.&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7-63 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Provision%20of%20Incentives%20in%20Firms.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo (1990), &quot;Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo (1990), &quot;Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), &quot;Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), &quot;Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Prendergast, Canice (2003), &quot;The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency&quot;, Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Prendergast, Canice (2003), &quot;The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency&quot;, Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), &quot;Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms&quot;, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), &quot;Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms&quot;, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Demsetz, Harold (1968), &quot;Why Regulate Utilities&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Demsetz, Harold (1968), &quot;Why Regulate Utilities&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), &quot;Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), &quot;Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), &quot;The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), &quot;The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), &quot;Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), &quot;Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*<ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">'''(I)''' </ins>McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers&diff=31171&oldid=prev imported>Ed at 23:45, 4 March 2010 2010-03-04T23:45:59Z <p></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 23:45, 4 March 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l1" >Line 1:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 1:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):</div></td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' <ins class="diffchange diffchange-inline">by Egan and Hernandez</ins>(listed in the order that they appeared in class):</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*North, Douglass (1991). &quot;Institutions&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*North, Douglass (1991). &quot;Institutions&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (2000), &quot;New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (2000), &quot;New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l32" >Line 32:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 32:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">The following additional papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.: </ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class='diff-marker'>+</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">*Weingast and Marshall (1988), &quot;The Industrial Organization of Congress&quot;,Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf]</ins></div></td></tr> </table> imported>Ed http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers&diff=31170&oldid=prev 128.32.74.87 at 01:58, 27 February 2010 2010-02-27T01:58:12Z <p></p> <table class="diff diff-contentalign-left" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #222; text-align: center;">Revision as of 01:58, 27 February 2010</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l3" >Line 3:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 3:</td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*North, Douglass (1991). &quot;Institutions&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*North, Douglass (1991). &quot;Institutions&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (2000), &quot;New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (2000), &quot;New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), &quot;Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), &quot;Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver, (1983), &quot;Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver, (1983), &quot;Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (1991), &quot;Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives&quot;, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (1991), &quot;Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives&quot;, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), &quot;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), &quot;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Coase, Ronald (1937), &quot;The Nature of the Firm&quot;, Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Coase, Ronald (1937), &quot;The Nature of the Firm&quot;, Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (1979), &quot;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver (1979), &quot;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, Robert (2004), &quot;Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?&quot; (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, Robert (2004), &quot;Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?&quot; (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Whinston (2003), &quot;On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Whinston (2003), &quot;On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), &quot;Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), &quot;Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), &quot;Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information&quot;, American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), &quot;Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information&quot;, American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), &quot;The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 1041-1080. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lafontaine%20Shaw%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Dynamics%20of%20Franchise%20Contracting.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), &quot;The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 1041-1080. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lafontaine%20Shaw%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Dynamics%20of%20Franchise%20Contracting.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), &quot;Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), &quot;Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Anderson, Erin (1988), &quot;Strategic Implications of Darwinian Economics for Selling Efficiency and Choice of Integrated or Independent Sales Forces,&quot; Management Science, 34 (May), 599-618. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Anderson%20(1988)%20-%20Strategic%20Implications%20of%20Darwinian%20Economics%20for%20Selling%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Anderson, Erin (1988), &quot;Strategic Implications of Darwinian Economics for Selling Efficiency and Choice of Integrated or Independent Sales Forces,&quot; Management Science, 34 (May), 599-618. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Anderson%20(1988)%20-%20Strategic%20Implications%20of%20Darwinian%20Economics%20for%20Selling%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), &quot;Informal Authority in Organizations&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics &amp; Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), &quot;Informal Authority in Organizations&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics &amp; Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, R. (1998), &quot;Incentives in Organizations.&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, pp. 115-32 (especially pp. 115-23). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(1998)%20-%20Incentives%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Gibbons, R. (1998), &quot;Incentives in Organizations.&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, pp. 115-32 (especially pp. 115-23). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(1998)%20-%20Incentives%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Prendergast. C. (1999), &quot;The Provision of Incentives in Firms.&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7-63 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Provision%20of%20Incentives%20in%20Firms.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Prendergast. C. (1999), &quot;The Provision of Incentives in Firms.&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7-63 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Provision%20of%20Incentives%20in%20Firms.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo (1990), &quot;Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo (1990), &quot;Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), &quot;Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), &quot;Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Prendergast, Canice (2003), &quot;The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency&quot;, Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Prendergast, Canice (2003), &quot;The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency&quot;, Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), &quot;Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms&quot;, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), &quot;Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms&quot;, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Demsetz, Harold (1968), &quot;Why Regulate Utilities&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Demsetz, Harold (1968), &quot;Why Regulate Utilities&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), &quot;Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), &quot;Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), &quot;The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), &quot;The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), &quot;Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), &quot;Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'>−</td><td style="color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></del></div></td><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> <tr><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div></td><td class='diff-marker'> </td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #222; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>*De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div></td></tr> </table> 128.32.74.87 http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=ECON224_Field_Exam_Papers&diff=31169&oldid=prev imported>Ed: New page: *This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' (listed in the order that they appeared in class): *Nor... 2010-02-25T08:55:43Z <p>New page: *This page is included under the section <a href="/wiki/BPP_Field_Exam" title="BPP Field Exam">BPP Field Exam</a> The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 &#039;Institutions&#039; (listed in the order that they appeared in class): *Nor...</p> <p><b>New page</b></p><div>*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]<br /> <br /> The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):<br /> *North, Douglass (1991). &quot;Institutions&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Williamson, Oliver (2000), &quot;New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), &quot;Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Williamson, Oliver, (1983), &quot;Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Williamson, Oliver (1991), &quot;Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives&quot;, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), &quot;Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization&quot;, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Coase, Ronald (1937), &quot;The Nature of the Firm&quot;, Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Williamson, Oliver (1979), &quot;Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Gibbons, Robert (2004), &quot;Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?&quot; (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), &quot;The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Whinston (2003), &quot;On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), &quot;Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), &quot;Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information&quot;, American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Garicano, Luis (2000), &quot;Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), &quot;The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data&quot;, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 1041-1080. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lafontaine%20Shaw%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Dynamics%20of%20Franchise%20Contracting.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), &quot;Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Anderson, Erin (1988), &quot;Strategic Implications of Darwinian Economics for Selling Efficiency and Choice of Integrated or Independent Sales Forces,&quot; Management Science, 34 (May), 599-618. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Anderson%20(1988)%20-%20Strategic%20Implications%20of%20Darwinian%20Economics%20for%20Selling%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), &quot;Informal Authority in Organizations&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics &amp; Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Gibbons, R. (1998), &quot;Incentives in Organizations.&quot;, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, pp. 115-32 (especially pp. 115-23). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(1998)%20-%20Incentives%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Prendergast. C. (1999), &quot;The Provision of Incentives in Firms.&quot;, Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7-63 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Provision%20of%20Incentives%20in%20Firms.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Spiller, Pablo (1990), &quot;Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), &quot;Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective&quot;, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Prendergast, Canice (2003), &quot;The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency&quot;, Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), &quot;Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms&quot;, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Demsetz, Harold (1968), &quot;Why Regulate Utilities&quot;, Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), &quot;Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV&quot;, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), &quot;The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation&quot;, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), &quot;Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988&quot;, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), &quot;Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control&quot;, JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]<br /> <br /> *De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), &quot;An informational perspective on administrative procedures&quot;, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]</div> imported>Ed