BPP Field Exam 2009 - Revision history

imported>Ed at 21:17, 8 March 2011

2011-03-08T21:17:08Z

imported>Ed at 21:17, 8 March 2011

2011-03-08T21:17:08Z

imported>Ed: /* Question C: Bargaining over Policy */

2010-06-23T22:46:31Z

Question C: Bargaining over Policy

imported>Ed: /* Question C: Bargaining over Policy */

2010-06-23T22:46:31Z

Question C: Bargaining over Policy

imported>Ed at 00:04, 23 June 2010

2010-06-23T00:04:12Z

imported>Ed at 00:04, 23 June 2010

2010-06-23T00:04:12Z

imported>Ed: /* Question B.2: Opportunistic sellers */

2010-06-16T22:22:29Z

Question B.2: Opportunistic sellers

imported>Ed: /* Question B.2: Opportunistic sellers */

2010-06-16T22:22:29Z

Question B.2: Opportunistic sellers

imported>Ed at 21:45, 16 June 2010

2010-06-16T21:45:55Z

imported>Ed at 21:45, 16 June 2010

2010-06-16T21:45:55Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:17, 8 March 2011
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	*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]		*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]
		+	*This page is provides questions to the [[BPP Field Exam 2009 Answers]]

	The 2009 field exam was on June 27th 2009. Reference material was permitted, communication was not. It was stated that grading would be based on the assigned times for each question.		The 2009 field exam was on June 27th 2009. Reference material was permitted, communication was not. It was stated that grading would be based on the assigned times for each question.

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 '''Part I'''. For the following 2 cases, (1) outline how you would set up a model to study the institution, (2) discuss what you think may be the main interesting propositions, and (3) explain your logic for how they would be derived. (Note: you do not need formal proofs of your propositions, but you do need to sketch them and/or explain why you believe they will hold if formally derived).
-a.) One puzzle in the literature is: If a veto is costly to both the President and Congress, why is the veto ever observed in practice? Whay can't a bargain be struck which avoids the "suboptimal losses" from the actual exercise of a veto? Outline a model in which vetoes are observed in equilibrium. Discuss what you believe are the primary propositions which will be derivable from this model.
+a.) One puzzle in the literature is: If a veto is costly to both the President and Congress, why is the veto ever observed in practice? Why can't a bargain be struck which avoids the "suboptimal losses" from the actual exercise of a veto? Outline a model in which vetoes are observed in equilibrium. Discuss what you believe are the primary propositions which will be derivable from this model.
 b.) Another question about presidential power is: How do the existence of a veto player affect multi-lateral bargaining (in a legislature)? Outline a model of bargaining in legislatures with a Presidential veto. How will the inclusion of a Presidential veto affect you predictions under different institutional settings? In other words, compare how your results compare across different institutional settings (e.g. open versus closed rules, finite versus infinite horizon).

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-This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]
+*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]
 The 2009 field exam was on June 27th 2009. Reference material was permitted, communication was not. It was stated that grading would be based on the assigned times for each question.
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 *C - de Figueiredo
 *D - Spiller
 ==Questions==

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 Consider an economy with many identical Buyers that can each engage in a transaction with one of many sellers. For concreteness, imagine that there are more buyers than sellers and that the market for transactions must clear. The transaction can either succeed or fail. Each buyer’s value of "success" is 1 and of "failure" is 0.
-There are two kinds of Sellers. A proportion <math>1 - \beta\,</math> are "good" and they succeed with probability <math>p > 0\,</math>. A proportion <math>\beta\,</math> are "opportunistic" and can choose some effort, <math>e \in [0,1]\,</math> at a personal cost of <math>c(e)\,</math> where <math>c'(0) = 0, c'(1) = \infty\,</math> and <math>c''(e) > 0 \;\forall e = 0\,</math>. The opportunistic types succeed with probability <math>ep\,</math>.
+There are two kinds of Sellers. A proportion <math>1 - \beta\,</math> are "good" and they succeed with probability <math>p > 0\,</math>. A proportion <math>\beta\,</math> are "opportunistic" and can choose some effort, <math>e \in [0,1]\,</math> at a personal cost of <math>c(e)\,</math> where <math>c'(0) = 0, c'(1) = \infty\,</math> and <math>c''(e) > 0 \;\forall e \ge 0\,</math>. The opportunistic types succeed with probability <math>ep\,</math>.
 The economy operates for 2 periods. Sellers live for two periods but a new cohort of buyers is active in each period, and second period buyers can observe the first period outcome of transactions.

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 e.) If the sellers exert effort in the equilibrium you found in (d) in some period, what market mechanism provides them with incentives? How would you interpret his?
-===Question C1: Bargaining over Policy===
+===Question C: Bargaining over Policy===
 Consider the role of the US President in policy bargaining with the US Congress. Amongst the institutional tools the President has is the Presidential veto. This question asks you to explore the nature of this instrument.

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