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	<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/api.php?action=feedcontributions&amp;feedformat=atom&amp;user=LaurenB</id>
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	<updated>2026-06-02T02:07:39Z</updated>
	<subtitle>User contributions</subtitle>
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	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Webcrawler&amp;diff=22134</id>
		<title>PTLR Webcrawler</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Webcrawler&amp;diff=22134"/>
		<updated>2017-11-28T22:18:20Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Download PDFs */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[PTLR Codification]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christy &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Monday: 3-5&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tuesday: 9-10:30, 4-5:45&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thursday: 2:15-3:45&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Steps=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Search on Google== &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete, query in command line to get results&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Download BibTex==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Download PDFs==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Incomplete, struggling to find links.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Keywords List==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Find a copy of the Keywords List in the Dropbox: https://www.dropbox.com/s/mw5ep33fv7vz1rp/Keywords%20%3A%20Categories.xlsx?dl=0&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Christy's LOG=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''09/27'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Created file FindKeyTerms.py in Software/Google_Scholar_Crawler which takes in a text file and returns counts of the key terms from the codification page. &lt;br /&gt;
Already included SIS, DHCI and OP terms and working on adding the others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''09/28'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thought that the pdf to text converter wasn't working, but realized that it does just sloooowly (70 papers converted overnight). Should be fine since we are still developing the rest of the code and we only need to convert them to txt once. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Continued to load PTLR codification terms to the word finding code and got most of the way through (there are so many ahhh but I'm learning ways to do this more quickly). Once they're all loaded up, I will create some example files of the kind output this program will produce for Lauren to review and start:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1) Seeking definitions of patent thicket (I think I'll start by pulling any sentence that patent thicket occurs in as well as the sentence before and after). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2) Classifying papers based on the matrix of term appearances that the current program builds. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''10/02'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Program finally outputting something useful YAY. In FindKeyTerms.py (under McNair/Software/Google_Scholar_Crawler) I can input the path of a folder of txt files and it will scan all of them and seek they key words. It will put reports for every file in a new folder called KeyTerms that will appear in the input folder once the program terminates. An example file will be emailed to Lauren for corrections and adjustment. The file currently takes all the categories in the codification page and says 1) How many terms in that category appeared 2) How many times each of those terms appeared. At the bottom, it suggests potential definitions for patent thicket in the paper, but this part is pretty poor for now and needs adjustment. On the bright side, the program executes absurdly quickly and we can get through hundreds of files in less than a minute. In addition, while the program is running I am outputting a bag of words vector into a folder called WordBags in the input folder for future neural net usage to classify the papers. Need a training dataset that is relatively large. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stuff to work on: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1) Neural net classification (computer suggesting which kind of paper it is)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2) Improving patent thicket definition finding&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3) Finding the authors and having this as a contributing factor of the vectors&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4) Potentially going back to the google scholar problem to try to find the PDFs automatically. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''10/10'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Found a way to get past google scholar blocking my crawling so spent time writing selenium code. I can certainly download 10 search result BibTeXs when you search for a certain term automatically now which is awesome. I am part of the way through having the crawler save the pdf link once it has saved the BibTex for the search results. Yay selenium :')))&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Code located at E:/McNair/Software/Google_Scholar_Crawler/downloadPDFs.py&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''11/02'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Things are good! Today made the program so that we can get however many pages of search results we want and get the PDF links for all the ones we can see. Towards the end of the day, google scholar picked up that we were a robot and started blocking me. Hopefully the block goes away when I am back on Monday. Now working on parsing apart the txt file to go to the websites we saved and download the PDFs. Should not be particularly difficult. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Lauren's LOG=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
09/27&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Took a random sample from &amp;quot;Candidate Papers by LB&amp;quot; and am reading each paper, extracting the definitions, and coding the definitions by hand.  This is expected to the be a control group which will be tested for accuracy against computer coded papers in the future.  The random sample contains the following publications:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Entezarkheir (2016) - Patent Ownership Fragmentation and Market Value An Empirical Analysis.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Herrera (2014) - Not Purely Wasteful Exploring a Potential Benefit to Weak Patents.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kumari et al. (2017) - Managing Intellectual Property in Collaborative Way to Meet the Agricultural Challenges in India.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pauly (2015) - The Role of Intellectual Property in Collaborative Research Crossing the 'Valley of Death' by Turning Discovery into Health.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lampe Moser (2013) - Patent Pools and Innovation in Substitute Technologies - Evidence From the 19th-Century Sewing Machine Industry.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Phuc (2014) - Firm's Strategic Responses in Standardization.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reisinger Tarantino (2016) - Patent Pools in Vertically Related Markets.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Miller Tabarrok (2014) - Ill-Conceived, Even If Competently Administered - Software Patents, Litigation, and Innovation--A Comment on Graham and Vishnubhakat.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Llanes Poblete (2014) - Ex Ante Agreements in Standard Setting and Patent-Pool Formation.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Utku (2014) The Near Certainty of Patent Assertion Entity Victory in Portfolio Patent Litigation.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Trappey et al. (2016) - Computer Supported Comparative Analysis of Technology Portfolio for LTE-A Patent Pools.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Delcamp Leiponen (2015) - Patent Acquisition Services - A Market Solution to a Legal Problem or Nuclear Warfare.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Allison Lemley Schwartz (2015) - Our Divided Patent System.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cremers Schliessler (2014) - Patent Litigation Settlement in Germany - Why Parties Settle During Trial.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
09/28&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I added a section to the PTLR Codification page titled &amp;quot;Individual Terms.&amp;quot;  Ed would like to have all downloaded papers searched for these terms and record the frequency of which they appear.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Webcrawler&amp;diff=20455</id>
		<title>PTLR Webcrawler</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Webcrawler&amp;diff=20455"/>
		<updated>2017-09-29T17:25:42Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Lauren's LOG */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[PTLR Codification]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christy &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Monday: 3-5&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tuesday: 9-10:30, 4-5:45&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thursday: 2:15-3:45&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Steps=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Search on Google== &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete, query in command line to get results&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Download BibTex==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Download PDFs==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Incomplete, struggling to find links.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Christy's LOG=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''09/27'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Created file FindKeyTerms.py in Software/Google_Scholar_Crawler which takes in a text file and returns counts of the key terms from the codification page. &lt;br /&gt;
Already included SIS, DHCI and OP terms and working on adding the others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''09/28'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thought that the pdf to text converter wasn't working, but realized that it does just sloooowly (70 papers converted overnight). Should be fine since we are still developing the rest of the code and we only need to convert them to txt once. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Continued to load PTLR codification terms to the word finding code and got most of the way through (there are so many ahhh but I'm learning ways to do this more quickly). Once they're all loaded up, I will create some example files of the kind output this program will produce for Lauren to review and start:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1) Seeking definitions of patent thicket (I think I'll start by pulling any sentence that patent thicket occurs in as well as the sentence before and after). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2) Classifying papers based on the matrix of term appearances that the current program builds. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Lauren's LOG=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
09/27&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Took a random sample from &amp;quot;Candidate Papers by LB&amp;quot; and am reading each paper, extracting the definitions, and coding the definitions by hand.  This is expected to the be a control group which will be tested for accuracy against computer coded papers in the future.  The random sample contains the following publications:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Entezarkheir (2016) - Patent Ownership Fragmentation and Market Value An Empirical Analysis.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Herrera (2014) - Not Purely Wasteful Exploring a Potential Benefit to Weak Patents.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kumari et al. (2017) - Managing Intellectual Property in Collaborative Way to Meet the Agricultural Challenges in India.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pauly (2015) - The Role of Intellectual Property in Collaborative Research Crossing the 'Valley of Death' by Turning Discovery into Health.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lampe Moser (2013) - Patent Pools and Innovation in Substitute Technologies - Evidence From the 19th-Century Sewing Machine Industry.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Phuc (2014) - Firm's Strategic Responses in Standardization.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reisinger Tarantino (2016) - Patent Pools in Vertically Related Markets.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Miller Tabarrok (2014) - Ill-Conceived, Even If Competently Administered - Software Patents, Litigation, and Innovation--A Comment on Graham and Vishnubhakat.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Llanes Poblete (2014) - Ex Ante Agreements in Standard Setting and Patent-Pool Formation.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Utku (2014) The Near Certainty of Patent Assertion Entity Victory in Portfolio Patent Litigation.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Trappey et al. (2016) - Computer Supported Comparative Analysis of Technology Portfolio for LTE-A Patent Pools.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Delcamp Leiponen (2015) - Patent Acquisition Services - A Market Solution to a Legal Problem or Nuclear Warfare.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Allison Lemley Schwartz (2015) - Our Divided Patent System.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cremers Schliessler (2014) - Patent Litigation Settlement in Germany - Why Parties Settle During Trial.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
09/28&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I added a section to the PTLR Codification page titled &amp;quot;Individual Terms.&amp;quot;  Ed would like to have all downloaded papers searched for these terms and record the frequency of which they appear.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Webcrawler&amp;diff=20410</id>
		<title>PTLR Webcrawler</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Webcrawler&amp;diff=20410"/>
		<updated>2017-09-28T16:18:20Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Lauren's LOG */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[PTLR Codification]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christy &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Monday: 3-5&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tuesday: 9-10:30, 4-5:45&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thursday: 2:15-3:45&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Steps=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Search on Google== &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete, query in command line to get results&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Download BibTex==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Download PDFs==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Incomplete, struggling to find links.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Christy's LOG=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
09/27&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Created file FindKeyTerms.py in Software/Google_Scholar_Crawler which takes in a text file and returns counts of the key terms from the codification page. &lt;br /&gt;
Already included SIS, DHCI and OP terms and working on adding the others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Lauren's LOG=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
09/27&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Took a random sample from &amp;quot;Candidate Papers by LB&amp;quot; and am reading each paper, extracting the definitions, and coding the definitions by hand.  This is expected to the be a control group which will be tested for accuracy against computer coded papers in the future.  The random sample contains the following publications:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Entezarkheir (2016) - Patent Ownership Fragmentation and Market Value An Empirical Analysis.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Herrera (2014) - Not Purely Wasteful Exploring a Potential Benefit to Weak Patents.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kumari et al. (2017) - Managing Intellectual Property in Collaborative Way to Meet the Agricultural Challenges in India.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pauly (2015) - The Role of Intellectual Property in Collaborative Research Crossing the 'Valley of Death' by Turning Discovery into Health.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lampe Moser (2013) - Patent Pools and Innovation in Substitute Technologies - Evidence From the 19th-Century Sewing Machine Industry.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Phuc (2014) - Firm's Strategic Responses in Standardization.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reisinger Tarantino (2016) - Patent Pools in Vertically Related Markets.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Miller Tabarrok (2014) - Ill-Conceived, Even If Competently Administered - Software Patents, Litigation, and Innovation--A Comment on Graham and Vishnubhakat.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Llanes Poblete (2014) - Ex Ante Agreements in Standard Setting and Patent-Pool Formation.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Utku (2014) The Near Certainty of Patent Assertion Entity Victory in Portfolio Patent Litigation.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Trappey et al. (2016) - Computer Supported Comparative Analysis of Technology Portfolio for LTE-A Patent Pools.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Delcamp Leiponen (2015) - Patent Acquisition Services - A Market Solution to a Legal Problem or Nuclear Warfare.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Allison Lemley Schwartz (2015) - Our Divided Patent System.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cremers Schliessler (2014) - Patent Litigation Settlement in Germany - Why Parties Settle During Trial.pdf&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Webcrawler&amp;diff=20409</id>
		<title>PTLR Webcrawler</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Webcrawler&amp;diff=20409"/>
		<updated>2017-09-28T16:17:39Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* LOG */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[PTLR Codification]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christy &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Monday: 3-5&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tuesday: 9-10:30, 4-5:45&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thursday: 2:15-3:45&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Steps=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Search on Google== &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete, query in command line to get results&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Download BibTex==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Download PDFs==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Incomplete, struggling to find links.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Christy's LOG=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
09/27&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Created file FindKeyTerms.py in Software/Google_Scholar_Crawler which takes in a text file and returns counts of the key terms from the codification page. &lt;br /&gt;
Already included SIS, DHCI and OP terms and working on adding the others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Lauren's LOG=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
09/27&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Took a random sample from &amp;quot;Candidate Papers by LB&amp;quot; and am reading each paper, extracting the definitions, and coding the definitions by hand.  This is expected to the be a control group which will be tested for accuracy against computer coded papers in the future.  The random sample contains the following publications:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Entezarkheir (2016) - Patent Ownership Fragmentation and Market Value An Empirical Analysis.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Herrera (2014) - Not Purely Wasteful Exploring a Potential Benefit to Weak Patents.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Kumari et al. (2017) - Managing Intellectual Property in Collaborative Way to Meet the Agricultural Challenges in India.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Pauly (2015) - The Role of Intellectual Property in Collaborative Research Crossing the 'Valley of Death' by Turning Discovery into Health.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Lampe Moser (2013) - Patent Pools and Innovation in Substitute Technologies - Evidence From the 19th-Century Sewing Machine Industry.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Phuc (2014) - Firm's Strategic Responses in Standardization.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Reisinger Tarantino (2016) - Patent Pools in Vertically Related Markets.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Miller Tabarrok (2014) - Ill-Conceived, Even If Competently Administered - Software Patents, Litigation, and Innovation--A Comment on Graham and Vishnubhakat.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Llanes Poblete (2014) - Ex Ante Agreements in Standard Setting and Patent-Pool Formation.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Utku (2014) The Near Certainty of Patent Assertion Entity Victory in Portfolio Patent Litigation.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Trappey et al. (2016) - Computer Supported Comparative Analysis of Technology Portfolio for LTE-A Patent Pools.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Delcamp Leiponen (2015) - Patent Acquisition Services - A Market Solution to a Legal Problem or Nuclear Warfare.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Allison Lemley Schwartz (2015) - Our Divided Patent System.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
Cremers Schliessler (2014) - Patent Litigation Settlement in Germany - Why Parties Settle During Trial.pdf&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20408</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20408"/>
		<updated>2017-09-28T16:06:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Authors */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license fee''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''accumulating patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral bargaining''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''non-participating''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''research''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''development''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent troll''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated invention space''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Individual Terms=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20407</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20407"/>
		<updated>2017-09-28T15:57:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license fee''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''accumulating patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral bargaining''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''non-participating''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''research''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''development''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent troll''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated invention space''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20245</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20245"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T23:45:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Topics */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license fee''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''accumulating patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral bargaining''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''non-participating''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''research''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''development''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent troll''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated invention space''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20244</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20244"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T23:42:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Topics */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license fee''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''accumulating patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral bargaining''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''non-participating''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''research''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''development''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent troll''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20243</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20243"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T23:41:08Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license fee''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''accumulating patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral bargaining''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''non-participating''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''research''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''development''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent troll''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20242</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20242"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T23:22:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license fee''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''accumulating patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral bargaining''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''non-participating''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20241</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20241"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T23:14:01Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license fee''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20240</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20240"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T22:57:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20239</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20239"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T22:41:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertain''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coase''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2011''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20222</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20222"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T02:01:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20221</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20221"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T02:00:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Frequent 'Author(s): Cockburn &amp;amp; MacGarvie 2009/2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfectly defined property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''probabilistic''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20220</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20220"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T01:23:13Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20219</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20219"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T01:21:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Core Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Burk &amp;amp; Lemley 2003, Regibeau &amp;amp; Rockett 2011'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hidden action''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld &amp;amp; Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe &amp;amp; Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20218</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20218"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T00:58:14Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Core Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''lack of coordination of licensing prices)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple inputs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''tragedy of the anticommons''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''license''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalty stacking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bilateral arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''individual arrangements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican Standoff''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20217</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20217"/>
		<updated>2017-09-22T00:01:15Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Core Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''saturated''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complements''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''free-ride''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''substitutes''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20216</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=20216"/>
		<updated>2017-09-21T23:14:46Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Core Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Frequent Author: Teece'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Process&amp;diff=19334</id>
		<title>PTLR Process</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Process&amp;diff=19334"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T02:08:40Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A comprehensive list of codes is populated in &lt;br /&gt;
 http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/PTLR_Codification#Topics&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Next steps:&lt;br /&gt;
#Use https://www.dropbox.com/s/g6utez9tb9xhayu/workingforlauren.xlsx?dl=0 from the dropbox&lt;br /&gt;
#Compare excel to ~/Dropbox/Egan and Teece/PTLRv3/AllRecoded.bib and ensure Bibtex corresponds&lt;br /&gt;
#Clean and organize the contents of https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ysoad9qe3er0pqs/AABqrtL8FW7aO6EphRw3IRPba?dl=0 to correspond to Bibtex and Excel files&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19333</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19333"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T02:00:21Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Topics */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''market entry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''compete''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19332</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19332"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T01:51:12Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''hold-out''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''pre-emptive patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican standoffs''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19331</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19331"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T01:48:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Core Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarines''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''pre-emptive patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican standoffs''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19330</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19330"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T01:46:34Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''court fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''licensing fees''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro (2001)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''pre-emptive patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican standoffs''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Individual Items'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Code for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND / RAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent trolls''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Shapiro (2001), &amp;quot;Navigating the patent thicket&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), &amp;quot;Anti-commons something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cites: Heller (1997?), &amp;quot;Something...&amp;quot;''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Process&amp;diff=19329</id>
		<title>PTLR Process</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Process&amp;diff=19329"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T01:03:34Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: Created page with &amp;quot;This page is a part of Patent Thicket Literature Review&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page is a part of [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Untangling_the_Economics_of_Patent_Thickets&amp;diff=19328</id>
		<title>Untangling the Economics of Patent Thickets</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Untangling_the_Economics_of_Patent_Thickets&amp;diff=19328"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T01:02:39Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Codification */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{AcademicPaper&lt;br /&gt;
|Has title=Patent Thicket Literature Review&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Ed Egan, David Teece&lt;br /&gt;
|Has RAs=Lauren Bass,&lt;br /&gt;
|Has paper status=Working paper&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
==The Paper==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Latest version is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 \coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\McN-PatentThicket-Egan-092215.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This file is posted at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/untangling-patent-thicket-literature&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Codification==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
See the [[PTLR Codification]] page for details&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
See the [[PTLR Process]] page for details&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Test Run==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Example BibTeX:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 @article{BibTeXKeyGoesHere,&lt;br /&gt;
   title={},&lt;br /&gt;
   author={},&lt;br /&gt;
   journal={},&lt;br /&gt;
   year={},&lt;br /&gt;
   abstract={},&lt;br /&gt;
   discipline={},&lt;br /&gt;
   research_type={},&lt;br /&gt;
   industry={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_stance={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_stance_extract={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_def={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_def_extract={},  &lt;br /&gt;
   tags={},&lt;br /&gt;
   filename={}&lt;br /&gt;
 }&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Files===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pick 5 files at random from:&lt;br /&gt;
 Dropbox\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\CandidatePapers&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
List them here:&lt;br /&gt;
*Cockburn MacGarvie (2006) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
*Murray Stern (2007) - Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge?: An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Do the following:&lt;br /&gt;
*Create a new text file in the dropbox. Note where the file is saved!&lt;br /&gt;
*Find each paper on Google Scholar and put the BibTeX entry into the text file&lt;br /&gt;
*Add the fields from the sample entry above and file them out as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
**Disciple: publication type&lt;br /&gt;
**Research_type: 'Types' (see above)&lt;br /&gt;
**Industry: industries (see above)&lt;br /&gt;
**thicket_def_extract: The text from the paper that you will use to decide the thicket definition&lt;br /&gt;
**thicket_def: one or more of DHCI, Saturated, Overlapping, Gaming, etc. &lt;br /&gt;
**tags: hash tags for modern terms and topic key words, e.g., #Probabilistic, #PatentPool, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**Filename: Only download the file if we don't have it in '''Candidate Papers'''. Put the file name in this tag.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Maybe Important Files==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRCore.bib - Might contain core BibTeX entries&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRDefinitions.pdf - useful to contrast conflicting definitions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRBibliography.bib - Long list of citations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLR-HoldupQuotes.txt - List of complete quotes with citations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLR-PolicyRpts.txt - Short list of policy reports ranging from 2002 - 2013&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRUp.bib - Another bibliography, additions or subtractions unknown&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Files in C:\Users\Ed\Dropbox\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\ThicketWiki &lt;br /&gt;
**Particularly: CoreWithNewCoreForSorting-rev.txt&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==.PL files==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*BibTucker.pl -  location PTLRv2 &amp;amp; 3 folders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRBibTeXReprocessing.pl - location PTLRv2 &amp;amp; 3 folders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*temp.pl - location PTLRv2 folder&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*BibTuckerV20.pl - PTLRv3 folder&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PLTROldTables.txt&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Untangling_the_Economics_of_Patent_Thickets&amp;diff=19327</id>
		<title>Untangling the Economics of Patent Thickets</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Untangling_the_Economics_of_Patent_Thickets&amp;diff=19327"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T01:02:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{AcademicPaper&lt;br /&gt;
|Has title=Patent Thicket Literature Review&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Ed Egan, David Teece&lt;br /&gt;
|Has RAs=Lauren Bass,&lt;br /&gt;
|Has paper status=Working paper&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
==The Paper==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Latest version is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 \coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\McN-PatentThicket-Egan-092215.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This file is posted at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/untangling-patent-thicket-literature&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Codification==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
See the [[PTLR Codification]] page for details&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
See the [[PTLT Process]] page for details&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Test Run==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Example BibTeX:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 @article{BibTeXKeyGoesHere,&lt;br /&gt;
   title={},&lt;br /&gt;
   author={},&lt;br /&gt;
   journal={},&lt;br /&gt;
   year={},&lt;br /&gt;
   abstract={},&lt;br /&gt;
   discipline={},&lt;br /&gt;
   research_type={},&lt;br /&gt;
   industry={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_stance={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_stance_extract={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_def={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_def_extract={},  &lt;br /&gt;
   tags={},&lt;br /&gt;
   filename={}&lt;br /&gt;
 }&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Files===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pick 5 files at random from:&lt;br /&gt;
 Dropbox\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\CandidatePapers&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
List them here:&lt;br /&gt;
*Cockburn MacGarvie (2006) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
*Murray Stern (2007) - Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge?: An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Do the following:&lt;br /&gt;
*Create a new text file in the dropbox. Note where the file is saved!&lt;br /&gt;
*Find each paper on Google Scholar and put the BibTeX entry into the text file&lt;br /&gt;
*Add the fields from the sample entry above and file them out as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
**Disciple: publication type&lt;br /&gt;
**Research_type: 'Types' (see above)&lt;br /&gt;
**Industry: industries (see above)&lt;br /&gt;
**thicket_def_extract: The text from the paper that you will use to decide the thicket definition&lt;br /&gt;
**thicket_def: one or more of DHCI, Saturated, Overlapping, Gaming, etc. &lt;br /&gt;
**tags: hash tags for modern terms and topic key words, e.g., #Probabilistic, #PatentPool, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**Filename: Only download the file if we don't have it in '''Candidate Papers'''. Put the file name in this tag.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Maybe Important Files==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRCore.bib - Might contain core BibTeX entries&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRDefinitions.pdf - useful to contrast conflicting definitions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRBibliography.bib - Long list of citations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLR-HoldupQuotes.txt - List of complete quotes with citations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLR-PolicyRpts.txt - Short list of policy reports ranging from 2002 - 2013&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRUp.bib - Another bibliography, additions or subtractions unknown&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Files in C:\Users\Ed\Dropbox\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\ThicketWiki &lt;br /&gt;
**Particularly: CoreWithNewCoreForSorting-rev.txt&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==.PL files==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*BibTucker.pl -  location PTLRv2 &amp;amp; 3 folders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRBibTeXReprocessing.pl - location PTLRv2 &amp;amp; 3 folders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*temp.pl - location PTLRv2 folder&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*BibTuckerV20.pl - PTLRv3 folder&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PLTROldTables.txt&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Property_talk:Page/User:LaurenB&amp;diff=19326</id>
		<title>Property talk:Page/User:LaurenB</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Property_talk:Page/User:LaurenB&amp;diff=19326"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T00:59:54Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Methodology to Extract */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; '''Created from ''' http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/PTLR_Codification#Types&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Untangling_the_Economics_of_Patent_Thickets&amp;diff=19323</id>
		<title>Untangling the Economics of Patent Thickets</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Untangling_the_Economics_of_Patent_Thickets&amp;diff=19323"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T00:54:16Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Measures */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{AcademicPaper&lt;br /&gt;
|Has title=Patent Thicket Literature Review&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Ed Egan, David Teece&lt;br /&gt;
|Has RAs=Lauren Bass,&lt;br /&gt;
|Has paper status=Working paper&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
==The Paper==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Latest version is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 \coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\McN-PatentThicket-Egan-092215.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This file is posted at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/untangling-patent-thicket-literature&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Test Run==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Example BibTeX:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 @article{BibTeXKeyGoesHere,&lt;br /&gt;
   title={},&lt;br /&gt;
   author={},&lt;br /&gt;
   journal={},&lt;br /&gt;
   year={},&lt;br /&gt;
   abstract={},&lt;br /&gt;
   discipline={},&lt;br /&gt;
   research_type={},&lt;br /&gt;
   industry={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_stance={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_stance_extract={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_def={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_def_extract={},  &lt;br /&gt;
   tags={},&lt;br /&gt;
   filename={}&lt;br /&gt;
 }&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Files===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pick 5 files at random from:&lt;br /&gt;
 Dropbox\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\CandidatePapers&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
List them here:&lt;br /&gt;
*Cockburn MacGarvie (2006) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
*Murray Stern (2007) - Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge?: An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Do the following:&lt;br /&gt;
*Create a new text file in the dropbox. Note where the file is saved!&lt;br /&gt;
*Find each paper on Google Scholar and put the BibTeX entry into the text file&lt;br /&gt;
*Add the fields from the sample entry above and file them out as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
**Disciple: publication type&lt;br /&gt;
**Research_type: 'Types' (see above)&lt;br /&gt;
**Industry: industries (see above)&lt;br /&gt;
**thicket_def_extract: The text from the paper that you will use to decide the thicket definition&lt;br /&gt;
**thicket_def: one or more of DHCI, Saturated, Overlapping, Gaming, etc. &lt;br /&gt;
**tags: hash tags for modern terms and topic key words, e.g., #Probabilistic, #PatentPool, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**Filename: Only download the file if we don't have it in '''Candidate Papers'''. Put the file name in this tag.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Maybe Important Files==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRCore.bib - Might contain core BibTeX entries&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRDefinitions.pdf - useful to contrast conflicting definitions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRBibliography.bib - Long list of citations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLR-HoldupQuotes.txt - List of complete quotes with citations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLR-PolicyRpts.txt - Short list of policy reports ranging from 2002 - 2013&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRUp.bib - Another bibliography, additions or subtractions unknown&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Files in C:\Users\Ed\Dropbox\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\ThicketWiki &lt;br /&gt;
**Particularly: CoreWithNewCoreForSorting-rev.txt&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==.PL files==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*BibTucker.pl -  location PTLRv2 &amp;amp; 3 folders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRBibTeXReprocessing.pl - location PTLRv2 &amp;amp; 3 folders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*temp.pl - location PTLRv2 folder&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*BibTuckerV20.pl - PTLRv3 folder&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PLTROldTables.txt&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Untangling_the_Economics_of_Patent_Thickets&amp;diff=19322</id>
		<title>Untangling the Economics of Patent Thickets</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Untangling_the_Economics_of_Patent_Thickets&amp;diff=19322"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T00:53:01Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Definitions */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{AcademicPaper&lt;br /&gt;
|Has title=Patent Thicket Literature Review&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Ed Egan, David Teece&lt;br /&gt;
|Has RAs=Lauren Bass,&lt;br /&gt;
|Has paper status=Working paper&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
==The Paper==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Latest version is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 \coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\McN-PatentThicket-Egan-092215.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This file is posted at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/untangling-patent-thicket-literature&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Measures=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Types==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Theory:''' Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem. (p.5)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Empirical:''' Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI. (p.5)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Discussion:''' It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion. (p.30)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Industries==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Basic Science:''' Basic research, which includes the commercialization of academic research, biotechnology, genetics, nanotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. (p.28)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Complex Science:''' Complex product industries, which includes information and communications technology (aside from software and the internet but specifically including semiconductors), manufacturing, and sewing machines (which in the period of analysis of papers discussing it was a complex cutting-edge product). (p.28)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Software / Bus. Method:''' An aggregate of firms focused on software, business methods, and the internet. (p.28)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Topics==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Effects on Academia:''' Overlapping patents are curiously related to basic science and the effects of patenting on academic research, both of which depend upon cumulative innovation. (p.30)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Private Mechanism:''' Private arrangement papers discuss cross-licensing, patent pools, patent clearinghouses, patent collectives, FRAND licensing agreements, patent intermediaries (including NPEs), shared platforms, technology standards, and Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs). (p.27)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Industry Commentary:''' There was also a distinct set of publications that engaged in industry commentary; commentary on the nanotechnology and genetics industries were particularly common. (p.27-28)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''IPR Reform:''' IPR reform papers suggest reforms to the nature of intellectual property rights, examine processes for granting patents at the patent office, and advocate approaches to patent-related transactions for anti-trust authorities. (p.27)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Firm Strategy:''' Firm strategy papers provide strategic advice to firms regarding their intellectual property – they discuss the strategic implications of blocking patents, pre-emptive patenting, secrecy, ever-greening, avoiding willful infringement, engaging in Mexican standoffs, and other defensive or offensive patenting behaviors, as well the consequences of doings so on collaboration, industry structure (including entry), and the value of firms. (p.27)&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Patent Thickets:''' We suggest that one reason why papers implement definitions that are consistent with more than one economic issue is that many of the original definitions of patent thickets were made by analogy. Analogies face the risk of multiple possible interpretations. Shapiro (2001) is frequently quoted in the literature saying that patent thickets are “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology&amp;quot;. Shapiro’s analogy is compatible with all four of the most commonly discussed economic issues referred to as patent thickets. (p.3-4)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Publication Type==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Econ'''&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Law'''&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Science'''&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Policy Report'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Number of Authors'''&lt;br /&gt;
# '''Repeat Authors'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Current List of Papers==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Processed papers===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Test Run==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Example BibTeX:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 @article{BibTeXKeyGoesHere,&lt;br /&gt;
   title={},&lt;br /&gt;
   author={},&lt;br /&gt;
   journal={},&lt;br /&gt;
   year={},&lt;br /&gt;
   abstract={},&lt;br /&gt;
   discipline={},&lt;br /&gt;
   research_type={},&lt;br /&gt;
   industry={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_stance={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_stance_extract={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_def={},&lt;br /&gt;
   thicket_def_extract={},  &lt;br /&gt;
   tags={},&lt;br /&gt;
   filename={}&lt;br /&gt;
 }&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Files===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pick 5 files at random from:&lt;br /&gt;
 Dropbox\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\CandidatePapers&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
List them here:&lt;br /&gt;
*Cockburn MacGarvie (2006) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
*Murray Stern (2007) - Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge?: An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
*...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Do the following:&lt;br /&gt;
*Create a new text file in the dropbox. Note where the file is saved!&lt;br /&gt;
*Find each paper on Google Scholar and put the BibTeX entry into the text file&lt;br /&gt;
*Add the fields from the sample entry above and file them out as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
**Disciple: publication type&lt;br /&gt;
**Research_type: 'Types' (see above)&lt;br /&gt;
**Industry: industries (see above)&lt;br /&gt;
**thicket_def_extract: The text from the paper that you will use to decide the thicket definition&lt;br /&gt;
**thicket_def: one or more of DHCI, Saturated, Overlapping, Gaming, etc. &lt;br /&gt;
**tags: hash tags for modern terms and topic key words, e.g., #Probabilistic, #PatentPool, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**Filename: Only download the file if we don't have it in '''Candidate Papers'''. Put the file name in this tag.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Maybe Important Files==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRCore.bib - Might contain core BibTeX entries&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRDefinitions.pdf - useful to contrast conflicting definitions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRBibliography.bib - Long list of citations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLR-HoldupQuotes.txt - List of complete quotes with citations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLR-PolicyRpts.txt - Short list of policy reports ranging from 2002 - 2013&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRUp.bib - Another bibliography, additions or subtractions unknown&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Files in C:\Users\Ed\Dropbox\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\ThicketWiki &lt;br /&gt;
**Particularly: CoreWithNewCoreForSorting-rev.txt&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==.PL files==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*BibTucker.pl -  location PTLRv2 &amp;amp; 3 folders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PTLRBibTeXReprocessing.pl - location PTLRv2 &amp;amp; 3 folders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*temp.pl - location PTLRv2 folder&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*BibTuckerV20.pl - PTLRv3 folder&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*PLTROldTables.txt&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19317</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19317"/>
		<updated>2017-07-14T00:34:24Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Core Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''pre-emptive patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican standoffs''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Property_talk:Page/User:LaurenB&amp;diff=19316</id>
		<title>Property talk:Page/User:LaurenB</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Property_talk:Page/User:LaurenB&amp;diff=19316"/>
		<updated>2017-07-13T23:52:34Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; '''Created from ''' http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/PTLR_Codification#Types&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Methodology to Extract=&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Property_talk:Page/User:LaurenB&amp;diff=19315</id>
		<title>Property talk:Page/User:LaurenB</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=Property_talk:Page/User:LaurenB&amp;diff=19315"/>
		<updated>2017-07-13T23:49:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: Created page with &amp;quot; '''Created from ''' http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/PTLR_Codification#Types&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; '''Created from ''' http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/PTLR_Codification#Types&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19314</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19314"/>
		<updated>2017-07-13T23:47:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Types */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''pre-emptive patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican standoffs''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19152</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19152"/>
		<updated>2017-07-10T20:01:55Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Authors */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''pre-emptive patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican standoffs''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 ''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''How many authors are repeat authors?''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19150</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19150"/>
		<updated>2017-07-10T20:01:08Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Topics */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''pre-emptive patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''secrecy''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''blocking patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Mexican standoffs''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Publication Type=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Econ - (ECON)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Law - (LAW)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Science - (SCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Policy Report - (POLR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Authors=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 'What are the number of authors? (0-9)'&lt;br /&gt;
 'How many authors are repeat authors?'&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19147</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19147"/>
		<updated>2017-07-10T19:48:15Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanotech industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''genetics industry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''upstream patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''nanobiotech''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''synthetic biology''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''property rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''USPTO''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''transaction costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''propertization''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''IP rights''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19119</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19119"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:59:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Topics */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cumulative innovation''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''basic science''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cross-licensing''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent pools''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent clearinghouses''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent collectives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent intermediaries''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''NPEs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''technology standards''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''standard setting organizations''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19118</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19118"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:54:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Types */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Overlapping patents''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19117</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19117"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:53:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Overlapping patents''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19116</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19116"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:53:15Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Overlapping patents''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19115</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19115"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:52:03Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Topics */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO);'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Overlapping patents''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19114</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19114"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:31:25Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Types */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO);'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Theory - (T):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.''&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
'''Empirical - (E):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Discussion - (D):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Topics=&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19113</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19113"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:27:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO);'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''DHCI''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=Types=&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19112</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19112"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:18:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO);'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI when a &amp;quot;hold-out&amp;quot; player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.&lt;br /&gt;
 *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse patent hold-up''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19111</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19111"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T22:09:23Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolio''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Hall &amp;amp; Ziedonis''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hold-out - (HO);'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Can occur in situations of DHCI where the holdout player&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19110</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19110"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T21:52:43Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Strategic Patents - (SP):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19109</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19109"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T21:48:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer use the invention and wait to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow and costly for the patentee.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19108</id>
		<title>PTLR Codification</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PTLR_Codification&amp;diff=19108"/>
		<updated>2017-06-30T21:45:46Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;LaurenB: /* Modern Terms */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt; Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them.  See below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Core Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''  &lt;br /&gt;
 ''imperfect competition - (IC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''cluster - (CLSTR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''adjacent - (Adj)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordination - (COOR)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''diversely-held - (DH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''complementary inputs - (CI)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dispersed - (DIS)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''fragmented - (Frag)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Cournot problem - (CP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.&lt;br /&gt;
 Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent overlap - (PO)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''overlapping claims - (OC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''similar claims - (SC)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Example of:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''&lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents - (SP)''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''dubious''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''likely invalid''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''junk''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''impeding genuine innovators''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rent-seeking''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bad faith''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Modern Terms==&lt;br /&gt;
'''Transaction Costs - (TC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''prosecution costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentive''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''bargaining costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''coordinating costs''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''maintenance fees''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  &lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Bessen''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Lemley &amp;amp; Shapiro''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''information asymmetry''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''uncertainty''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invalid patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''invent around''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Kiley''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''ever-greening''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Jacob''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''submarine patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''viagra''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''expected returns''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''commercialization opportunities''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''spurious patents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''gaming the patent system''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''patent portfolios''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''stand-alone commercial value''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''&lt;br /&gt;
 All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Wang''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Coasian'&lt;br /&gt;
 ''perverse incentives''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''willful infringement''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH):'''&lt;br /&gt;
 The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
 '''Look for:'''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Epstein''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Farrell''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Williamson's''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''rents''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''royalties''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''reverse hold-up''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''guile''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''FRAND''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''SEP''&lt;br /&gt;
 ''Langus''&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>LaurenB</name></author>
		
	</entry>
</feed>