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Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms (view source)
Revision as of 03:05, 8 September 2011
, 03:05, 8 September 2011→Model Setup
From here the author studies the relaxation of the <math>b>c</math> assumption.
* First he shows the conditions under which legislators will propose their project --assuming that all other legislators are proposing theirs.
* Then the author discusses the notion that <math>b/c</math> is decreasing over time -- so that the "worthwhile" projects are used early in the game, and the bad ones will continue later. The author notes that at some point, pork is no longer rational for the legislators and voters. However, this happens sooner in the majority rule than the universal rule. The results suggest that "pork" will
