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Protected "VC Acquisitions Paper" [edit=trusted:move=trusted:read=trusted]
This page details the work rebuilding [[Brander Egan (2007) - The Role of VCs in Acquisitions]] in to a new paper for our submission to the RCFS special issue and associated conference.
Connect to the Postgres database (inside the Berkeley network only) with: psql -h 128.32.252204.201 203 -U ed_egan Acqs
==Submission DetailsCurrent Status== This paper was submitted (dual submission) to the 3rd Annual Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation Conference (EFIC) conference and the Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS). It was rejected from both.  The key points from the reviewers were:*We should explain how we get a different result from Masulis and Nahata (2011), who find a +3% return premium to VC-backed acquisitions*We should use our continous measures of IA (i.e., look to find a monotonic effect). And consider within-industry acquisitions to see whether this mitigates IA problems.*To back up the winner's curse we should consider the number of competing bidders.*Possibly we should consider long rum performance and attempt to explain why the acquirers buy VC-backed firms.*Focus less on the univariate results. The obvious possibilities for this paper are to:*Focus more on the IA.*Do a supply-side VC analysis (i.e., include reputations, the possibility of grandstanding, etc.) The immediate 'to do' is:*Read the Masulis and Nahata (2011) paper carefully.*Do a proper literature review again! ===Lit Review=== The main [[VC Acquisitions Lit Review]] page details searches for papers related to the intersection of venture capital, acquisitions and explaining abnormal returns. There are seperate lit reviews for related topics, such as:*[[Information Asymmetry Measures]]*[[Information Asymmetry in Acquisitions Lit Review]]*[[The Winners Curse]] The key papers found were:*[[Masulis Nahata (2011) - Venture Capital Conflicts Of Interest]]*[[Gompers Xuan (2008) - Bridge Building In Venture Capital Backed Acquisitions]]*[[Gompers Xuan (2006) - The Role Of Venture Capitalists In The Acquisition Of Private Companies]]*[[Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies]] ====Comparing Results==== Comparing our CARs with those from the literature (some values are inferred - see the review pages) Our Paper M&N'11 G&X'06 G&X'08 B&Z'10 Data Range 80-'10 91-06 90-01 92-06 80-03 Model Mkt Sub Mkt Mkt Mkt Univariate Private Target 0.7% 4.8% 1.5% NA NA VC 0.3% 6.3% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% Non-VC 0.8% 3.4% 1.6% NA NA With Controls VC indicator 0.5% 2.7% 0.3% Target Ind. Q 4.8% Related 0.5% R2 1.6% 4.3% 1.6% N 22,961 490 8693 1261 489  Note that using the subtraction model our univariate results are: 0.95% (all), 0.98% (Non-VC) and 0.59% (VC). ==Latest Version==
The Third Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation Conference on June 10thlatest version of the paper is:*[[:Image:Brander Egan (2012) -11th in Boston, MA, is supported by the Kauffman Foundation Investor Expectations and the Society for financial studiesRole of Venture Capitalists in Acquisitions. Conference papers will be considered for inclusion in a special issue of doc |Brander Egan (2012) - Investor Expectations and the Review Role of Corporate Finance StudiesVenture Capitalists in Acquisitions. doc]]
The conference details are hereNote: http://sites.kauffman.org/efic/overviewThis version was submitted to the both the EFIC and RCFS.cfm
The deadline for submission current reference is '''March 7th:*Brander, James A., and Edward J. Egan (2012'''), though earlier submission is encouraged. Authors will be notified if their "Investor Expectations and the Role of Venture Capitalists in Acquisitions: Bargaining and the Winner’s Curse", Working paper has been selected by , March 2012, under review for inclusion in the end Third Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation Conference and a special issue of Review of AprilCorporate Finance Studies.
The program committee includes: Thomas Hellmann, Adam Jaffe, Bill Kerr, Josh Lerner, David Robinson, Morten Sorenson, Bob Strom, and others.==Submission Details==
==Errors in This paper was '''submitted''' under the existing version==dual-submission process to both the '''3rd EFIC and the RCFS''' on March 7th.
The Dierkins 1991 reference is missing: @article{dierkens1991information, title={Information asymmetry Third Entrepreneurial Finance and equity issues}Innovation Conference (EFIC) on June 10th-11th in Boston, author={DierkensMA, Nis supported by the Kauffman Foundation and the Society for financial studies.}, journal={Journal Conference papers will be considered for inclusion in a special issue of the Review of Financial and Quantitative Analysis}, volume={26}, number={2}, pages={181--199}, year={1991}, publisher={Cambridge Univ Press} }Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS).
The Boehmer reference has a typo - the second author is Mus'''u'''meciconference details are here: http://sites. Also, in para 2, pkauffman.19, I think it was McKinley that "suggest[ed] a method that combines both cross-sectional and time-series informationorg/efic/overview..."cfm
Other points:*There were a few other typos.*Also Authors will be notified if their paper has been selected by the GX paper gets very little mention - I thought we had a whole subsection devoted to themend of April.The program committee includes: Thomas Hellmann, Adam Jaffe, Bill Kerr, Josh Lerner, David Robinson, Morten Sorenson, Bob Strom, and others..*I was surprised that we didn't have a year fixed-effect variable in the main analysis (though we have ''Boom'', which is more interesting)
==Rebuilding the Paper==
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