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{{Article
|Has page=Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
|Has author=Shepsle, K.
|Has year=1979
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
|Has publisher=
}}
Back to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]
==Paper's Motivation==
==Model==
*Consider a two-dimensional case. Any policy <math>z_{i}</math> is characterized by coordinates <math>(x_i, y_i)</math>.
==Result==
*In first stage we vote on <math>x_{i}</math>. and obtain policy equal to median voters bliss point x_m<math>x_{m}</math>. In second stage we vote on <math>y_i </math> and obtain policy equal to median voters bliss point <math>y_m</math>, so we obtain unique outcome <math>z=(x_m, y_m)</math>. Notice, that with this sequential voting, we do not get the median policy, but the median policy by dimension.

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