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{{AcademicPaper
|Has title=Sequential Matching of Entrepreneurs to Accelerators and VCs (Academic Paper)Venture Capitalists|Has author=Ed Egan, Jeremy Fox,|Has RAs=Amir KazempourJames Chen,
|Has paper status=In development
}}
 
==Files and Dbases==
 
The primary dbase is '''vcdb2'''
The main SQL script is
E:\McNair\Projects\MatchingEntrepsToVC\DataWork\MatchingEntrepsV2.sql
==Summary==
This paper describes The objective of this project is to create a twomulti-stage matching model and estimates estimate this model using data on entrepreneurs that match to accelerators and (lead) venture capitalists. Once  See [[Fox (2008) - An Empirical Repeated Matching Game Applied to Market]] for a brief write up on a relevant theory paper by Jeremy ==Simple Outline of Model== As of now, the goal is to simulate a repeated matching model is estimatedwith dynamically optimizing agents. More specifically, there are two sides for a matching market with transferable utility (generically, call these men and women for now) with a continuum of agents, we can enact various policy-relevant changes but a finite number of types. They participate in matches for T periods and estimate receive utility that is a sum of a structural component (determined solely by their effectstype and the type they are matched with) and a individual taste component (with some known distribution). For example  What distinguishes this model from a static matching model is that the agents have some probability of transitioning between types that is conditional on the match they make in the previous period (e.g., a man of low type might be more likely to change into a man of high type after being matched to a woman of high type). When making these matches, we could eliminate non-profit acceleratorsthe agents take these transition probabilities into account when evaluating expected future utility. This adds a dynamic element to the model. ==Work to do== *Code up three algorithms to simulate match(primal, government-sponsored venture capitalistsIPFP, or other participants.dual)*Compare with R code from NYU ===Work done so far=== *Coded up primal and IPFP (may have errors) ===Work to do in near term===
See [[Fox *Compare with R code from NYU (2008using current solvers/optimizers, and with Gurobi) - An Empirical Repeated Matching Game Applied to Market]] for a brief write up on Jeremy's theory paper

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