Changes

'''Status:''' Old paper needs repurposing, perhaps into multiple papers. '''Co-authors:''' Jim Brander '''To do:''' Lit reviews '''Project Quality:''' All reasonably high '''Project Page:''' [[VC Acquisitions Paper]]  The original paper ([[Brander Egan (2007) - The Role of VCs in Acquisitions]]) had a full data rebuild, detailed on: the [[VC Acquisitions Paper]]page. We now have a number of possible papers that we could write:#The effects of VC on the returns to acquisitions#The role of Information Asymmetries (IA) in acquisitions of privately-held firms#Measuring IA (1) could be a JFQA Comment, describing how we get a different result from Masulis and Nahata (2011). This requires that we reconsile Masulis and Nahata's results (and perhaps Gompers and Xuan's too). (2) is probably the simplest paper to write. We will use continuous measures of IA, and perhaps compute new distance measures. (3) is best answered using a dataset on acquisition of public firms by public firms (i.e. really Mergers). Also need Dierkins' other measures... All three papers need lit reviews doing first. =Patent Pools Licensing Rate Paper= '''Q. Are licensing rates lower for patents included in pools?'''  '''Status:''' Infancy '''Co-authors:''' David Teece, Ed Sherry '''To do:''' Conference call on how to proceed '''Project Quality:''' Depends on data and empirical execution '''Project Page:''' [[Patent Pool Licensing Project]] =Mexican-Standoff Paper= '''Q.What are the equilibria in patent litigation between competitors?'''  '''Status:''' Conception '''Co-authors:''' David Teece '''To do:''' Lit Review '''Project Quality:''' Potential Job Market Paper '''Project Page:''' None yet ==Background== Nokia sues Apple, Apple sues Sumsung, Samsung sues Nokia, and so on. There's been an endless round of [[Patent Litigation]] between the mobile phone and tablet device manufactures of late. Could this be related to the nature of competition in the markets? Pharma firms apparently sue at every infringement, whereas large semiconductor incumbents apparently never sue each off (are they in a Mexican standoff?). Infringement is obvious for pharma firms and potentially non-obvious for semiconductor firms. NPEs always sue, but they have no production rents to worry about. Some device manufacturers try to shut each other out of the market with ITC injunctions, and sue weak firms...  ==Description== The project would try to describe at least some of the behaviour above using game theory (probably an infinitely repeated, full information game) and then use litigation data to show that the game models reality well. =The Value of Patent Citations for Startups= '''Q. Do some patent citations increase value and others decrease it? And can we use renewals to crudely cut between the two?'''  '''Status:''' Advanced '''Co-authors:''' poss. Bronwyn Hall '''To do:''' Rebuild data incorporating renewals '''Project Quality:''' Potential Job Market Paper? '''Project Page:''' None yet This project might also need data on priority dates and other extentions, though this might be able to be deduced from renewals data. The project either works or doesn't once the data is done. =Technology substitution and the choice of commercialization financing= '''Q. Do firms with more radical innovations seek initial public offerings?'''  '''Status:''' Emprics is there. Needs a model and writing. '''Co-authors:''' poss. Jim? '''To do:''' Work on the model, decide whether the paper is feasible. '''Project Quality:''' Potential Job Market Paper? Has a big maintained assumption unless done with two models (and then has a measurement problem). '''Project Page:''' None yet

The resulting paper was submitted (dual submission) to the 3rd Annual Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation Conference (EFIC) conference and the Review of Corporate Finance Studies maintained assumption would be that citations represent substitution. Otherwise, would need two models (RCFSone for subs, one for comps). It was rejected from both.

The key points from the reviewers wereThere are two possibilities here:*We should explain how we get a different result from Masulis and Nahata (2011), who find a +3% return premium to VC-backed acquisitions*We should use our continous measures of IA (i.e#Build out my 'learning' model., look This might also give rise to find a monotonic effect). And consider withinspin-industry acquisitions to see whether this mitigates IA problemsoff model, particularly if I can get complements in there.*To back up #Use an off the winner's curse we should consider the number of competing bidders.*Possibly we should consider long rum performance and attempt to explain why the acquirers buy VC-backed firmsshelf model (e.*Focus less on the univariate resultsg.?)