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The case-based paper is quick and easy, but isn't going to place into a good journal. The empirical paper, if done well (see the product-based sample, below), could place very well. A theory paper is only worthwhile if there is something sufficiently interesting going on to merit a model (most likely in the interaction between complements and network effects, etc).
 
=Discussion=
 
On the 3rd of August we discussed the project.
 
==Data==
 
Data availability is hugely problematic. The only paper with data inside and outside of a pool, Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011), doesn't have data on licensing incidences or rates.
 
We dicussed the possibility of getting data from users and contributors directly. David suggested trying Dolby (his MBA student is their licensing manager).
 
There are further problems:
*Generally we won't know the distribution of royalties among the pool participants.
**Probably a metric based on number and value of patents. Often a simple proportionality.
*A license to the pool isn't a license to the actually essential patents
**Not all patents declared standard essential are actually essential. E.g. 30 declared, 15 actually essential... Which are essential isn't disclosed. This is a method to avoid antitrust scrutiny. I.e., they don't want to license substitutes/competing-patents.
**Patents are vetted by independent tech expert as 'essential'. This is probably not disclosed.
*SSOs provide lists of Dec'd Ess. But they won say if this is actually correct. (They don't want liability.)
**Even those without Dec'd Ess. patents, could still say that they have a patent that bears that on the patent - especially those that are not a part of the SSO. They could sue years later.
**Within the SSO, some firms make blanket declarations
**Some firms leave the SSO. E.g., RAMBUS quit SSO. Didn't make a RAND committment, made one declaration.
*The highest participation rate in a pool is estimated at 50%...
=Basic Economics=
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