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@article{gallini2011privatecarrier2012roadmap, title={Private Agreements for Coordinating A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Rights: The Case of Patent PoolsWars and FRAND Licensing}, author={GalliniCarrier, NM.}, journal={Economia e Politica IndustrialeCPI Antitrust Chronicle}, yearvolume={20112}, publisheryear={FrancoAngeli Editore2012}, abstract={Inventors The smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of patents and users of technology often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property in order to implement wars based on those patents. Every day brings a standard new lawsuit or to avoid costly litigationdevelopment between Apple, HTC, Microsoft, Motorola Mobility (“MMI”), Nokia, and Samsung. The lawsuits span numerous courts and several continents. Over And they often pit Apple or Microsoft on one side and manufacturers of Google’s Android operating system—HTC, MMI, and Samsung—on the past two decadesother.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={ICT}, U.S. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary thicket_stance={Neutral}, valid thicket_stance_extract={The smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of patents and essential wars based on those patents as having procompetitive benefits in reducing prices.}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={SSOs, FRAND, transactions costsSmartphone, Antitrust}, filename={Carrier (2012) - A Roadmap To The Smartphone Patent Wars And Frand Licensing.pdf} } @article{choi2005live, title={Live and the incidence Let Live: A Tale of legal suitsWeak Patents}, author={Choi, J.P. Since patent pools are cooperative agreements}, they also have journal={Journal of the potential of suppressing competition ifEuropean Economic Association}, volume={3}, number={2-3}, pages={724--733}, year={2005}, for example abstract={Patent protection has gradually expanded over time, they harbor weak or invalid and many patents, dampen incentives of suspect value are routinely granted owing to conduct research on innovations that compete with the pooled lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process. This has resulted in the recent explosion of patents, foreclose competition from downstream product or upstream input markets, or raise prices on goods granted and potentially creates a "patent thicket" that compete with hinders future innovation. I investigate the question of whether the pooled litigation process can be relied on to restore competition when an imperfect market outcome is sustained through patentsof suspect value. In synthesizing the ideas advanced The analysis undertaken in the economic literature, this paper explores whether these antitrust concerns apply points out the serious lack of private incentives to pools with complementary eliminate patents and, if they do, the implications for competition policy to constrain themof suspect value through litigation. Special attention is given I also discuss potential measures to restore the application soundness of the U.S. Department of Justice‐Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its companion Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007) to recent patent pool casessystem.},
@articlemisc{hall2007patentscompetition2008pharmaceutical, title={Patents and Patent PolicyPharmaceutical Sector Inquiry-Preliminary Report}, author={HallCompetition, B.H.DG}, journalyear={Oxford Review of Economic Policy2008}, volumeabstract={23}, numberdiscipline={4Policy Report}, pagesresearch_type={Empirical, Data Study of Large Originator Companies}, industry={568--587Pharmaceutical}, yearthicket_stance={2007Pro}, abstractthicket_stance_extract={A One commonly applied strategy is filing numerous patents for the same medicine (forming so called "patent is clusters" or "patent thickets"). Documents gathered in the legal right course of the inquiry confirm that an inventor important objective of this strategy is to exclude others from making delay or using a particular inventionblock the market entry of generic medicines. This right is sometimes termed an “intellectual property right” In this respect the inquiry finds that individual blockbuster medicines are protected by up to 1,300 patents and/or pending patent applications EU-wide and is viewed that, as an incentive for innovationmentioned above, certain patent filings occur very late in the life cycle of a medicine... This article surveys In their submissions, both generic and originator companies support the evidence on creation of a single Community patent effectiveness in encouraging innovation and reviews to amend the current controversies in patent policycostly and burdensome system consisting of a bundle of national patents.}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={Pharmaceutical Generics and Originators, Patent Filings, Industry Analysis, European}, filename={Competition (2008) - Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report.pdf} } @article{cotter2008patent, title={Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses}, author={Cotter, T.F.}, journal={J. Corp. L.}, volume={34}, pages={1151}, year={2008}, publisher={HeinOnline}, abstract={}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={Theory, Discussion}, industry={ICT, BiologyGeneral}, thicket_stance={Assumed Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The first of In the problems Barr describes next two Parts, however, I will argue that, ifpatent holdup is clearly a case of mutually assured destruction that leaves the firms serious problem in question no better (and no worse) off than if they were not accumulating massive numbers of patents for defensive purposesreality, and yet at the same time is a very costly strategy. Increasing the administrative costs of patents to firms or certain reforms within the industry itself to discourage this behavior would seem to patent law may be desirable, although the obvious solution, since it would be precise nature of those reforms will depend in large part on the interest comparative error costs of all firms involved different approaches to reduce spending on this activitycalculating reasonable royalties.}, thicket_def={Def4def18}, thicket_def_extract={During the U.S. Federal Trade Commission/Department In this regard, I present a definition of Justice hearings on the patent system and antitrust policy in 2002, holdup as a number type of industry representatives expressed concerns about opportunistic behavior on the difficulty part of negotiating the patent thicket owners that threatens to impose (1) static deadweight losses that are not justified by likely increases in dynamic efficiency, or (2) dynamic efficiency losses due to reduction in their area and the risk of being “heldincentive to participate in standard setting organizations or to engage in follow-up” ex post by a patent on a technology that was only a small component of their productup innovation.}, tags={General IPR Reform, Patent DiscussionHold-up, Antitrust}, filename={Hall Cotter (20072008) - Patents Patent Holdup Patent Remedies And Patent PolicyAntitrust Responses.pdf}
@article{shapiro2003antitrustgilbert2010ties, title={Antitrust limits Ties That Bind: Policies to patent settlementsPromote (Good) Patent Pools}, author={ShapiroGilbert, CR.J.}, journal={RAND Antitrust Law Journal of Economics}, pages={391--411}, year={20032010}, abstract={Patents, patent litigation, and patent settlements increasingly influence competition. Settlements of patent disputes come in many forms,including licensing and cross-licensing agreements, patent pools, mergers, and joint ventures. While frequently procompetitive, such settlements can stifle competition and harm consumers. I propose a specific antitrust rule limiting such settlements: a settlement must leave consumers at least as well off as they would have been from ongoing patent litigation. After establishing that profitable settlements satisfying this constraint generally exist, I show how this antitrust rule can be used to evaluate three types of settlements: mergers, patent pools, and negotiated entry dates.}, discipline={econLaw}, research_type={theoryDiscussion}, industry={generalGeneral}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={As described Patent thickets are common to many high-technology industries in Shapiro (2001)which the manufacture, use, or sale of a device or process may require rights to hundreds of patents.7 Overlapping patent rights raise numerous potential economic problems. Transaction costs of licensing can be high because licensees must identify, search out, more and more companies are facing a negotiate with numerous separate licensors. Litigation risks can be high because an incomplete portfolio of patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses can expose a firm to bring their products safely to marketpotentially large infringement damages.}, thicket_def={def1Refs Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={As described A “patent thicket,” in Shapiro (2001)which many independent patent holders have rights that cover a technology, more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to marketis one example of the anticommons.}, tags={Mergers, Patent Pools, Negotiated Entry Dates, Settlement effects}, filename={Shapiro Gilbert (20032010) - Antitrust Limits Ties That Bind Policies To Promote Good Patent SettlementsPools.pdf}
@article{schmidt2008complementaryhall2007patents, title={Complementary Patents and Market StructurePatent Policy}, author={SchmidtHall, KB.H.}, journal={Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, volume={23}, yearnumber={4}, pages={2008568--587}, publisheryear={CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP70052007}, abstract={Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate A patent is the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration legal right of an IP holder and inventor to exclude others from making or using a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firmsparticular invention. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates This right is sometimes termed an “intellectual property right” and reduce output is viewed as compared to non-integrationan incentive for innovation. Horizontal integration of IP holders (or a This article surveys the evidence on patent pool) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces effectiveness in encouraging innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovationreviews the current controversies in patent policy.},
@article{tullis2005applicationholman2006clearing, title={Application of Clearing a Path through the Government License Defense to Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research: The Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing RegimeThicket}, author={TullisHolman, T.KC.}, journal={UCLA L. Rev.Cell}, volume={53125}, number={4}, pages={279629--633}, year={20052006}, publisher={Elsevier}, abstract={Nanotechnology's potential impact on worldwide industries has nations around the world investing billions of dollars for research in order to capture a part of the projected trillion dollar market for nanotechnology products in 2010. The current rush to patent nanotechnologies may lead to an overcrowded nanotechnology patent thicket that could deter critical Patents do not always promote innovation and continued product development in the United States. At this early stage of nanotechnology's life cycle, increasing numbers of broad and potentially overlapping patents are being issued--while few nonexclusive licenses are being offered. Furthermore, the lack of significant case law provides little guidance on proper nanotechnology patent scope and validity, while the decline of legal defenses such as experimental use leaves innovators exposed particularly when they restrict access to potential infringement liability for even the most fundamental of scientific research studies. In this Comment, the author proposes that the U.S. government exercises the full extent of its rights under the twenty-five year old Bayh-Dole Act discoveries and develop the government license defense to create a limited patent compulsory licensing regime for the fruits tools of federally funded basic research. The author argues However, there are legal and policy approaches that recipients of the billions of dollars in federal nanotechnology research funds should provide broad, nonexclusive licenses may help to the privatized patent rights they obtain as a result of public funding. Ultimately, a well-formulated government license defense, which assesses the extent to which an "infringing" act against a federally funded patent falls along a spectrum of fair use, would provide a means for overcoming the innovation-impeding effects ameliorate problems associated with patenting these sorts of absolute exclusion rightsinventions.},
@article{baluch2005rejensen2004achieving, title={In re Kumar: Achieving the First Nanotech Optimal Power of Patent Case in the Federal CircuitRights}, author={BaluchJensen, AP.S. and Radomsky, LH. and MaebiusWebster, S.BE.}, journal={Nanotech. L. \& Bus.Australian Economic Review}, volume={237}, pagesnumber={3444}, yearpages={2005419--426}, abstractyear={On August 15, 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided what is arguably its first nanotech patent case, In re Kumar. Although the court adjudicated the case on procedural grounds, practitioners in the field of nanotechnology will appreciate several substantive themes in this decision. First, the court appears to treat a nanotechnology patent appeal no differently than patent appeals in cases involving other technologies. In this regard, the court did not establish any special rules for nanotechnology patents. Second, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Qffice ("PTO') is apparently taking the quality of nanotechnology patents seriously, with the Solicitor himself as lead counsel on the brief for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. Third, the court's dicta provides nanotech inventors with guidance for overcoming § 103 obviousness rejections based on overlapping sizes of nanoparticles. Such an argument, as nanotech commentators had predicted, may be used to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness where, as in this case, the claimed nanotech product is made by a different process than that of the prior art,2004}, disciplinepublisher={LawWiley Online Library}, research_typeabstract={Discussion}In this paper, industry={Nanotech}, thicket_stance={Neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={While there is nothing in we identify three policy instruments governments have at their disposal to affect the power of patent law rights to prohibit new and nonobvious claims from overlapping (i.e., claims in different patents which cover prevent imitation: the size of the same product and which are new and not obvious over inventive step used to make the prior art)patent granting decision, the commentators expressed concern that rigour of the allowed claims in some patents may be obvious over patent examination process and the prior art}, thicket_def={Def28}, thicket_def_extract={A large number predisposition of patents containing overlapping claims which cover the same product are often referred courts to as a "affirm the patent thicket"}, tags={Kumar case, prior art, patentability}, filename={Baluch Radomsky Maebius (2005) - In Re Kumar The First Nanotech Patent Case In The Federal Circuit.pdf} } @article{baron2010strategic, title={Strategic inputs into patent pools}, author={Baron, J. and Delcamp, H.}, journal={Cerna working paper}, year={2010}, abstract={This article explores what factors determine the office's decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We propose develop a dynamic analysis simple framework to analyse the effects of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as changing these policy instruments on ex ante investment in invention in the determinants light of inclusion recent concerns about the potential effects of socially undesirable patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.},
@article{calderini2006standardisationking2007clearing, title={Standardisation in Clearing the ICT sectorPatent Thicket: The (complex) interface between antitrust Supreme Court and intellectual propertyCongress Undertake Patent Reform}, author={CalderiniKing, S.M. and Giannaccari, A.}, journal={EconIntell. InnovProp. New Techn\& Tech.LJ}, volume={15}, number={69}, pages={54313--56713}, year={2006}, publisher={Taylor \& Francis2007}, abstract={This article investigates the issue of standardisation in the ICT sector, analysing the most relevant aspects concerning intellectual property rights and anticompetitive strategies that can arise in standard setting organisations. The strategic dimension of this activity is also scrutinised, highlighting the different approaches followed by the United States and by the European Union. In this respect, after underlining the benefits of processes not lead by public structures, the article describes the fundamental role of internal regulations, which are necessary both for the purpose of having a sound process, and also reducing the risk of collusion and other anticompetitive conducts among members.}, discipline={Econ, PolicyLaw}, research_type={Commentary, Discussion}, industry={ICTGeneral}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Obviously, this frequently results in high monetary and transaction costs. The entity of such costs All three developments have led to what is often so great perceived as to discourage innovative activity a marked increase in the downstream phases of the innovation process... Contrarilyjunk patents, in the presence as well as what Carl Shapiro has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping sets of cumulative and systemic innovative activities, there are reasons to believe that too strict intellectual property patent rights would lead leading to perverse effects on innovative activity within a maze of cross-licensing agreements, as well as the industryrise of hold-up litigation.}, thicket_def={refs shapiroRefs Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={This network All three developments have led to what is defined perceived as a patent thicket (marked increase in junk patents, as well as what Carl Shapiro, 2001). A has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping sets of patent thicket consists of rights leading to a number maze of adjacent and overlapping property rightscross-licensing agreements, which impose on whoever wishes to use certain intermediate goods to ask for licenses from several patent holdersas well as the rise of hold-up litigation.}, tags={SSOsupreme court, IP Rightscases, Definition of SSOspatent reform}, filename={Calderini Giannaccari King (20062007) - Standardisation In Clearing The Ict SectorPatent Thicket.pdf}
@articletechreport{carrier2012roadmaplampe2012patent, title={A Roadmap to Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from 20 US Industries under the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND LicensingNew Deal}, author={CarrierLampe, MR.L.}and Moser, journal={CPI Antitrust ChronicleP.}, volumeyear={22012}, yearinstitution={2012National Bureau of Economic Research}, abstract={The smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of patents and wars based on those patents. Every day brings a new lawsuit or development between Apple, HTC, Microsoft, Motorola Mobility (“MMI”), Nokia, and Samsung. The lawsuits span numerous courts and several continents. And they often pit Apple or Microsoft on one side and manufacturers of Google’s Android operating system—HTC, MMI, and Samsung—on the other.}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={DiscussionEmpirical, Econometric Model}, industry={ICTGeneral}, thicket_stance={NeutralWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The smartphone industry today is characterized For example, the creation of a pool may reduce the need for member firms to create patent thickets by a thicket reducing the threat of patents and wars based on those patentslitigation (e.g., Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004).}, thicket_def={refs shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={We also investigate whether part of the observed decline may be driven by a reduction in lower-quality or “strategic” patents. For example, the creation of a pool may reduce the need for member firms to create patent thickets by reducing the threat of litigation (e.g., Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004)}, tags={SSOspatent pools, FRAND, Smartphone, Antitrusteffects on innovation}, filename={Carrier Lampe Moser (2012) - A Roadmap To The Smartphone Do Patent Wars And Frand LicensingPools Encourage Innovation.pdf}
@article{cowin2007policylei2009patents, title={Policy Options Patents versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for the Improvement of the European Patent SystemBiological Research}, author={CowinLei, RZ. and Van der EijckJuneja, WR. and LissoniWright, FB. and Lotz, P. and Van Overwalle, G. and Schovsbo, JD.}, journal={Scientific Technology Options Assessment (STOA) of the European Parliament}, year={20072009}, abstract={A new survey shows scientists consider the proliferation of intellectual property protection to have a strongly negative effect on research.}, discipline={PolicyBiology}, research_type={EmpiricalSurvey, Industry DataRegression}, industry={GeneralBiology}, thicket_stance={ProAnti}, thicket_stance_extract={To meet the challenges Our respondents do not encounter an anticommons or a patent thicket. Rather, they believe that institutionally mandated MTAs put sand in the governance wheels of the European patent a lively system is facing because of the emergence intradisciplinary exchanges of patent thickets research tools. Seeing no countervailing effect on the increasing number supply of patent applications and these tools, they conclude that patenting for defensive and strategic reasons, three options were recommended. These were: (i) enhancing impedes the patent awareness within the European Parliament; (ii) establishing a European Parliament Standing Committee on Patents, which should be linked with an External Advisory Body composed by experts, practitioners and stakeholders; and (iii) enhancing patent awareness within the Commissionprogress of research.}, thicket_def={def31cites Shapiro and heller/eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={The sectors which are most affected by this phenomenon, at least in This question has been of particular concern for the USbiological sciences, are those whose process where production and product innovations rely upon complex technologies where an individual piece exchange of equipment is biological ‘research tools’ are important for ongoing scientific progress. Recent studies addressing this issue in the result of a very large number of componentsUnited States1, all susceptible to patent protection. Here2, the recent boom in patenting observed by many researchers is largely explained not by a firms’ drive to innovate more than beforeGermany3, but by a need to accumulate large enough Australia4 and Japan5 find that “patent thickets”. These patent thickets work as a sort of insurance against possible legal actions from other companies. They are in effect therefore, a kind thickets”6 or an “anticommons”7 rarely affect the research of defensive manoeuvreacademic scientists.}, tags={reforming patent thickets in europeresearch access, open source, defensive use of thicketsIP Rights}, filename={Cowin Lei Juneja Wright (20072009) - Policy Options For The Improvement Of The European Patent SystemPatents Versus Patenting.pdf}
@article{eisenmann2008managinglerner2005theeconomics, title = {Managing Proprietary The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Shared PlatformsBeyond}, author = {EisenmannLerner, Josh and Tirole, Thomas R.Jean}, journal = {California Management ReviewThe Journal of Economic Perspectives}, volume = {5019}, number = {42}, pages = {pp. 3199-53120}, abstract = {In a platform-mediated network, users rely on a common platform (provided by one or more intermediaries) that encompasses infrastructure and rules required by users This paper reviews our understanding of the growing open source movement. We highlight how many aspects of open source software appear initially puzzling to transact with each otheran economist. A fundamental design decision for firms that aspire As we have acknowledge, our ability to develop platform-mediated networks answer confidently many of the issues raised here questions is whether likely to preserve proprietary control or share their platform with rivalsincrease as the open source movement itself grows and evolves. A proprietary platform has a single provider that solely controls its technology (for exampleAt the same time, Federal Expressit is heartening to us how much of open source activities can be understood within existing economic frameworks, Apple Macintosh, or Google)despite the presence of claims to the contrary. With a shared platform such as VisaThe labor and industrial organization literatures provide lenses through which the structure of open source projects, DVDthe role of contributors, or Linux, multiple firms collaborate in developing and the platformmovement's technology and then compete in offering users different but compatible versions of the platform. This article examines factors that favor proprietary versus shared models when designing platforms and then explains how management challenges differ for proprietary and shared platform providers when mobilizing new networksongoing evolution can be viewed.}, year = {20082005}, publisher = {University of California PressAmerican Economic Association}, copyright = {Copyright © 2008 University of California Press2005 American Economic Association}, discipline={ManagementEcon}, research_type={Discussion, Written Theory}, industry={TelevisionGeneral},
@articleincollection{galasso2007broadlerner2008public, title={Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigation: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industryPublic Policy Toward Patent Pools}, author={GalassoLerner, AJ.and Tirole, J.}, booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 8}, journalpages={LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI45157--186}, year={20072008}, publisher={University of Chicago Press}, abstract={In many industries broad cross-license agreements are considered a useful method to obtain freedom to operate The past two decades have seen an explosion of patent awards and to avoid patent litigation. In this paper I study the previously neglected dynamic trade-off between litigating and cross-licensing that firms face to protect their intellectual property. I present across a model wide variety of bargaining with learning in technologies, which firms’ decisions to litigate or crosslicense depend on their investments in technology specific assetsnumerous commentators have suggested has socially detrimental conseuqences. In particular the model predicts that where firms’ sunk costs are higherPatent pools, their incentive to litigate in which owners of intellectual property share patent rights with each other and delay third parties, have been proposed as a crossway in which firms can address this patent-license agreement is lowerthicket problem. In addition, The paper discusses the bargaining game shows how firms with intermediate values current regulatory treatment of asset specificity tend to engage in inefficient "persuasive litigation". Using patent pools and highlights why a novel dataset more nuanced view than focusing on the US semiconductor industry I obtain empirical results consistent with those suggested by extreme cases of perfect complements and perfect substitutes is needed. It also highlights the modelimportance of regulators' stance towward independent licensing, grantback policies, and royalty control. Combining model intuition with some We also present case-study and large-sample empirical figures, I evaluate possible effects of the currently debated patent litigation reformevidence.},
@article{gilbert2010tieslin2001research, title={Ties That BindResearch Versus Development: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent PoolsPooling, Innovation and Standardization in the Software Industry}, author={GilbertLin, RD.}, journal={J.Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L.}, volume={1}, journalpages={Antitrust Law Journal274--309}, year={20102001}, abstract={Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies. Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies. The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g. hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies. As such, patent pooling, once condemned as facilitating antitrust violations in past eras, has been reintroduced as a practice that, if properly structured, has potentially strong pro-competitive benefits. Patent pooling has the potential to reduce the level of research and invention in new technologies that can compete with an incumbent standard. Recent patent jurisprudence and lenient federal antitrust agency of recent patent pooling proposals seem to create an environment that encourages the resurgence of patent pooling.},
@article{holman2005biotechnologymacdonald2004means, title={Biotechnology's Prescription for When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of Patent ReformStrategy on Innovation}, author={HolmanMacdonald, C.MS.}, journal={J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L.Information Economics and Policy}, volume={516}, number={1}, pages={i135--158}, year={20052004}, abstract={On June 8The patent is supposed to be a means to an end, 2005, Congressman Lamar Smith introduced Hthat end being innovation.R. 2795Whether the innovation comes from the protection the patent affords the inventor, or from the “Patent Reform Act dissemination of 2005,” aimed at improving the quality and certainty information of issued patentsinvention the patent allows, simplifying the patent procurement process, harmonizing Uis not meant to be an end in itself.S. law with international practiceThis seems to be changing, and reining in abusive the patent enforcement practicesacquiring a strategic value increasingly independent of innovation. Congress If this development has set the legislation aside for the time beinggone largely unnoticed, but will likely revisit it may be because the issue again shortly. The biotechnology industry, one of the fastest growing sectors in the United States economy, strongly opposes many of patent system tends to be viewed from the proposed reforms. This paper considers the Congressional testimonies entrenched perspectives of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (“BIO”) lawyers and other representatives of biotechnology’s interestseconomists, and finds of a number of interest groups that justify their reliance on the industry’s adamant opposition to many system in terms of the proposals innovation it is driven largely by a belief that biotechnology patents function primarily as tools for securing investment funding, supposed to encourage. These groups have never included small firms and the fear that investment developing countries in biotechnology will be adversely impacted if investors perceive that patent reform has weakened whose name they frequently defend the rights of patent owners and inventorssystem. The paper also considers how the biotechnology sector might be impacted if the proposed reforms are enacted into law, and describes They may have some recent biotechnology cases wherein the outcome might have been different if the reforms had already been in placedifficulty justifying a system whose strategic value is so divorced from its value for innovation.}, discipline={Law, Policy ReportManagement}, research_type={Discussion, Written TheoryCommentary}, industry={BiotechnologyStrategy, General}, thicket_stance={AntiWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={If The pharmaceutical industry has been instrumental in fact creating a patent thicket is significantly impeding biotechnology research and developmentsystem for the pharmaceutical industry, one might expect that organizations representing appropriate to the interests orderly innovation of biotechnology, such as BIO, WARF, and Genentech, would be advocating for reforms that would address industry. Acceptance of the probleminnovation myth has meant that this logic is rarely challenged. IndeedThus, the biotechnology industry has never been shy about advocating for legislative action instance, development may relate to address its concernsmany patents, not just one (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).112 But instead, these groups tend to be among the most adamant defenders The costs of navigating through mazes of the status quo and strong overlapping patent rights. One might infer from this that a – through patent thicket is not in fact substantially impeding biotechnologythickets – are likely to be considerable (Shapiro, 2001), and are likely to be an obstacle to innovation.}, thicket_def={refs Heller Eisenbergshapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Various commentators have proposed that a proliferation The costs of navigating through mazes of patents poses a serious threat overlapping patent rights – through patent thickets – are likely to biotechnology research by creating a patent thicketbe considerable (Shapiro, sometimes referred to as a “patent anticommons2001)..”106 The theory is especially associated with articles published by Heller and Eisenberg in 1998, and Eisenberg and Rai in 2002.107}, tags={Critique on Reform Proposals, Continuation, First innovator, Injunction, strategic use of patents}, filename={Holman Macdonald (20052004) - Biotechnologys Prescription For Patent ReformWhen Means Become Ends.pdf}
@article{holman2006clearingmallo2008patent, title={Clearing a path through Patent-related Barriers to Market Entry for Generic Medicines in the patent thicketEuropean Union: A Review of Weaknesses in the Current European Patent System and Their Impact on Market Access of Generic Medicines}, author={HolmanMallo, L. and Roox, K. and Pike, J. and Brown, A. and Becker, S. and Thaler, CG.}, journal={CellJournal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector}, volume={1255},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion, Industry Statistics},
industry={Biotechnology, Genetics},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={However, for the most part, fears expressed concerning human gene patents have not been manifested overtly in patent litigation. Human gene patent litigation invariably has involved an alleged infringer engaged in substantial commercial activities focused specifically on the single gene that is the subject of the asserted patent, the antithesis of a patent thicket scenario (14). Some have speculated that DNA microarray technology is particularly at risk of becoming entangled in a thicket (6). However, I found no instance in which a human gene patent was asserted against the manufacturer or user of microarray technology, although microarray companies have experienced substantial patent litigation involving nongene patents since the mid-1990s.},
thicket_def={refs heller eiseneberg, barton},
thicket_def_extract={Some have postulated that a “thicket” of patents will impede basic biomedical research and will stifle development and utilization of technologies that involve the use of multiple genetic sequences; DNA microarrays are a prime example (5, 6)},
tags={Gene patent litigation, frequency of litigation},
filename={Holman (2008) - Trends In Human Gene Patent Litigation.pdf}
}
@article{holman2012debunking,
title={Debunking the Myth that Whole-Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands of Gene Patents},
author={Holman, C.M.},
journal={Nature biotechnology},
volume={30},
number={3},
pages={240--244},
year={2012},
publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
@article{king2007clearingparedes2006written, title={Written Description Requirement in Nanotechnology: Clearing the a Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court and Congress Undertake Patent Reform}, author={KingParedes, SJ.MP.}, journal={IntellJ. PropPat. \& TechTrademark Off. LJSoc'y}, volume={988}, pages={13--13489}, year={20072006}, abstract={Nanotechnology is an emerging technology, and as an emerging technology, there are certain intellectual property issues surrounding the appropriate protection for nanotechnology. Broadly speaking, nanotechnology is the manufacture of structures and manipulation of matter within dimensions below 100 nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel applications. At the nanoscale, the physical, chemical, and biological properties of materials differ in fundamental and valuable ways from the properties of individual atoms and molecules or bulk matter.' Researchers and companies are attempting at applying these novel properties to a wide-range of applications and industries.' One important intellectual property issue in addressing nanotechnology is the patenting of innovative techniques and compositions of matter which are necessary for downstream innovation. The notion of a patent thicket is where an overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees. If you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, "you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and so the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition, but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation." The patent thicket problem in nanotechnology has been suggested by a recent report by LuxResearch (hereinafter "LuxReport"), indicating that many patents have been filed relating to nanomaterials with their claims overlapping.While many companies will want to use these nanomaterials, the LuxReport states these companies will be forced to license patents from many different sources. Potentially, there will be significant transactional costs for further nanotechnology developments due to these overlapping claims. Moreover, the quality of these nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question," so the navigation of a patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents. The legal principles in the written description requirement could clear some of this patent thicket by narrowing overlapping claims in nanotechnology during examination, litigation, and especially in postgrant procedures. This paper generally discusses 1) the background of the nanomaterials in the LuxReport and the patent thicket; 2) the legal principles within the written description requirement; 3) why the written description requirement should be used; 4) the application of the legal principles within the written description requirement to nanomaterials discussed in the LuxReport; and 5) proposals for the written description requirement for the USPTO, the Federal Circuit, and postgrant procedures.},
@article{lee2006examiningrey2012abuse, title={Examining the Viability Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent ThicketIntellectual Property}, author={LeeRey, AP.}and Salant, journal={Nanotech. L. \& BusD.}, volumejournal={3}, pages={317International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year={20062012}, abstract={A patent pool is a cooperative arrangement between several patent holders, all This paper examines the impact of them necessary and fundamental to the creation licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the downstream firms that require access to that IP, as well as on consumers and social welfare. The paper considers a model in which there is product or process, where all differentiation downstream. License fees and fixed entry costs determine the number of downstream competitors and thus variety. We first consider the patents can be licensed at case where there is a single priceupstream owner of essential IP. They are an attractive option for fragmented patent landscapes, where they are created in hopes Increasing the number of avoiding the high cost associated with acquiring numerous licensing agreementslicenses enhances product variety, avoid widespread patent disputeswhich creates added value, and help create a standardbut it also intensifies downstream competition, amongst other reasonswhich dissipates profits. This issue is especially relevant We derive conditions under which the upstream IP monopoly will then want to provide an excessive or insufficient number of licenses, relative to the emerging scientific field number that maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare.When there are multiple owners of nanotechnologyessential IP, where there is widespread concern about royalty stacking can reduce the fragmentation number of the intellectual property landscapedownstream licensees, but also the downstream equilibrium prices the consumers face. This The paper aimed to develop a general list of criteria to aid in derives conditions determining whether patent pools are a viable option for a market by examining relevant literature this reduction in downstream price and conducting interviews; it was then applied variety is beneficial to the dendritic nanotechnology’s drug delivery and pharmaceutical applicationsconsumers or society. The completed list had nine criteria andFinally, when applied to the dendritic nanotechnology market, concludes that a patent pool will not be necessary for paper explores the continued advancement impact of this applicationalternative licensing policies. The primary reason is that With fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a huge amount percentage of patents are in the price, an upstream IP owner cannot control the intensity of one company alonedownstream competition. In contrast, volumebased license fees (i.e., Dendritic Nanotechnologiesper-unit access fees), do permit an upstream owner to control downstream competition and seem to be replicate the primary source for the most highly sought after dendritic patentsoutcome of complete integration. The paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream competition and licensing terms when IP owners charge fixed or volume-based access fees.}, discipline={ManagementEcon}, research_type={Written Theory}, industry={NanotechnologyGeneral},
@incollectionarticle{lerner2008publicschneider2008fences, title={Public policy toward Fences and competition in patent poolsraces}, author={LernerSchneider, JC. and Tirole}, J. journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization}, booktitlevolume={Innovation Policy and the Economy26}, Volume 8 number={6}, pages={1571348--1861364},
publisher={University of Chicago Press}, abstract={The past two decades have seen an explosion This paper studies the behaviour of
firms facing the decision to create a patent awards and litigation across fence, de
fined as a wide variety portfolio of technologies, which numerous commentators have suggested has socially detrimental conseuqencessubstitute patents. Patent pools, in which owners of intellectual property share We set up a patent rights with each other and third partiesrace model, have been proposed as a way in which firms where
firms can address this decide either to patent-thicket problemtheir inventions, or to rely on secrecy. The paper discusses It is shown that fi
rms build patent fences, when the current regulatory treatment duopoly profi
ts net of patent pools and highlights why R&D costs are positive. We also demonstrate that in this context, a more nuanced view than focusing fi
rm will rely on secrecy when the extreme cases speed of perfect complements and perfect substitutes discovery of the subsequent invention is neededhigh compared to the competitors. It also highlights Furthermore, we compare the model under the importance of regulators' stance towward independent licensing, grantback policies, First-to-Invent and royalty control. We also present caseFirst-study and largeto-sample empirical evidenceFile legal rules. Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of patent fences.},
@article{meurer2002businessverbeure2006patent, title={Business Method Patents Patent Pools and Patent FloodsDiagnostic Testing}, author={MeurerVerbeure, B. and van Zimmeren, E. and Matthijs, MG.Jand Van Overwalle, G.}, journal={Wash. UJL \& Pol'yTRENDS in Biotechnology}, volume={824}, number={3}, pages={309115--120}, year={20022006}, abstract={There is increasing concern that overlapping patents in the field of genetics will create a costly and legally complex situation known as a patent thicket, which, along with the associated issues of accumulating royalty payments, can act as a disincentive for innovation. One potential means of preventing this is for the patent holders to enter into a so-called patent pool, such as those established in the electronics and telecommunications industries. Precedents for these also exist in the field of genetics, notably with the patents pertaining to the SARS genome. In this review, we initially address the patent pool concept in general and its application in genetics. Following this, we will explore patent pools in the diagnostic field in more detail, and examine some existing and novel examples of patent pools in genetics.}, discipline={LawPolicy Report}, research_type={Discussion, Commentary}, industry={GeneralBiotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weak Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Furthermore, a thicket of There is increasing concern that overlapping patents may stultify development of technology because of in the cost field of securing genetics will create a costly and legally complex situation known as a patent licenses from thicket, which, along with the large numbers associated issues of patent ownersaccumulating royalty payments, can act as a disincentive for innovation.}, thicket_def={def43def24}, thicket_def_extract={Furthermore, a Patent thicket . The intellectual property portfolios of patents may stultify development of technology because of the cost several companies that form a dense web of securing patent licenses from the large numbers of patent owners.overlapping intellectual property right}, tags={patent pools, business methods patents, patent floods}, filename={Meurer Verbeure (20022006) - Business Method Patents Patent Pools And Patent FloodsDiagnostic Testing.pdf}
research_type={Discussion}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Many of the patents overlap and block the use of other patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”3 It is hypothesized that patent thickets increase transactional costs and stifle innovation by making it more expensive and difficult to bring new developments to the market.}, thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Many of the patents overlap and block the use of other patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”}, tags={Compulsory Licensing, Royalties}, filename={Nielsen Samardzija (2006) - Compulsory Patent Licensing.pdf} } @article{rai2003engaging, title = {Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform}, author = {Rai, Arti K.}, journal = {Columbia Law Review}, volume = {103}, number = {5}, pages = {pp. 1035-1135}, abstract = {The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, charged with adjudicating appeals in patent cases, has adopted an unusual approach that arrogates power over fact finding while it simultaneously invokes rule-formalism. Although the Federal Circuit's approach may be justified by the fact-finding and policy application deficiencies of the trial courts and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), it has had a negative impact on innovation policy and has resulted in a patent system that is sorely in need of reform. This Article argues that because of the interdependence of the various institutions within the patent system, reform of the system must be both multi-institutional and closely attentive to the institutional competence of the system's actors. Although Congress should clearly bolster the PTO's fact-finding abilities, giving plenary responsibility over factual questions to the PTO would not be cost effective. Accordingly, Congress should endow the system with improved fact-finding expertise through the institution of specialized trial courts. As for actual policy formulation, each of the available institutional options--the legislature, the PTO, and the courts--has substantial associated liabilities. On balance, however, the Federal Circuit is probably best positioned to formulate patent policy, so long as the fact-finding expertise of inferior institutions is bolstered and additional appellate mechanisms are instituted. By paying attention to institutional design and revising our institutions accordingly, we can achieve the patent system we should have had all along.}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion, Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={Defensive patenting has become particularly prominent in certain industries like the semiconductor industry, where innovation is cumulative, and a thicket of relevant patents often exists. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. Econ. 101, 104 (2001). In such industries, firms gain freedom to operate through defensive patenting. Indeed, within the semiconductor industry, it appears that much of the increase in patenting per R&D dollar over the last two decades has been the consequence of defensive patenting. See id. (noting that firms "appear to be engaged in 'patent portfolio races' aimed at reducing concerns about being held up by external patent owners and at negotiating access to external technologies on more favorable terms"). According to Hall and Ziedonis, this increase in defensive patenting "is causally related to the pro-patent shift in the U.S. legal environment in the 1980s." Id. I discuss this alleged "pro-patent" shift infra Part III.B.}, thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, Multiple overlapping patents}, thicket_def_extract={Moreover, the guidelines on utility incorporate, at least implicitly, economic concerns that setting the utility standard too low could impede scientific progress by creating a transaction-cost-heavy thicket of patents on basic research}, tags={Patent reform}, filename={Rai (2003) - Engaging Facts And Policy.pdf} } @article{schmalensee2009standard, title={Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy}, author={Schmalensee, R.}, journal={The Journal of Industrial Economics}, volume={57}, number={3}, pages={526--552}, year={2009}, publisher={Wiley Online Library}, abstract={Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSOs). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSOs should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Weakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={One might argue that the rate of innovation or at least of patenting is in fact too high in some sectors, particularly those in which the patent thicket problem is severe. A problem 26 with this argument is that the returns to major innovations would be reduced by collective negotiation, not just the returns to the minor advances that contribute more to patent thickets than to real progress. }, thicket_def={References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={Standard Setting, Antitrust Policy}, filename={Schmalensee (2009) - Standard Setting Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy.pdf} } @article{schmidt2007negotiating, title={Negotiating the RNAi patent thicket}, author={Schmidt, C.}, journal={Nature biotechnology}, volume={25}, number={3}, pages={273--280}, year={2007}, publisher={New York, NY: Nature Pub. Co., 1996-}, abstract={Patent disputes haven’t materialized in the RNAi field yet, but once products near the market, it might be a different story. Charlie Schmidt investigates.}, discipline={Biology}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Biology}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={RNA Interface, Licensing, Royalties}, filename={Schmidt (2007) - Negotiating The Rnai Patent Thicket.pdf} } @article{shand2007trends, title={Trends in intellectual property and nanotechnology: implications for the global south}, author={Shand, H. and Wetter, K.J.}, journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights}, volume={12}, pages={111--117}, year={2007}, abstract={The race is on to win exclusive monopoly patents on nano-scale materials, devices and processes. The US National Science Foundation predicts that the immensely broad power and scope of nano-scale technologies will revolutionize manufacturing across all industry sectors - capturing a $1 trillion market within six or seven years. Although industry analysts assert that nanotech is in its infancy, patent thickets on fundamental nano-scale materials, tools and processes are already creating thorny barriers for would-be innovators. Industry analysts warn that, 'IP roadblocks could severely retard the development of nanotechnology.' After a decade of confusion and controversy over biotech patents, South governments are now facing a newer, bigger technology wave. By 1 July 2013 even 'least developed' countries will be obligated by the World trade Organization's Trade-Related Asapects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) to acccommodate nanotechnology-related inventions. Despite rosy predictions that nanotech will provide a technical fix for health, sustainable energy, and environmental security in the South, researchers in the developing world are likely to find that participation in the proprietary 'nanotech revolution' is highly restricted by patent tolbooths, obliging them to pay royalties and licensing fees to gain access.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Nanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={ Although industry analysts assert that nanotech is in its infancy, patent thickets on fundamental nano-scale materials, tools and processes are already creating thorny barriers for would-be innovators.}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={TRIPS, developing Countries}, filename={Shand Wetter (2007) - Trends In Intellectual Property And Nanotechnology.pdf} } @article{sharrott2006intellectual, title={Intellectual Property Developments in Biochip Nanotechology}, author={Sharrott, D. and Sayeed, H.A.}, journal={Nanotech. L. \& Bus.}, volume={3}, pages={20}, year={2006}, publisher={HeinOnline}, abstract={Microfluidics is the science of devices and processes dealing with fluid volumes on the nanoliter or picoliter scale. The most popular and commercially visible applications of this technology consist of DNA microarrays, or “biochips.” DNA microarrays are most useful for their fast, efficient processing of multiple DNA sequences of genes. In this article, Douglas Sharrott and Hassen Sayeed explain the various intellectual property (“IP”) issues relating to DNA microarrays and microfluidics applications. They also examine alternative methods of protecting valuable IP, such as trade secret and “mask work” protection under the copyright laws. Finally, Sharrott and Sayeed discuss a representative case that teaches valuable lessons to those in the microfluidics industry to help guide IP strategies.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Commentary, Discussion}, industry={Nanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Until recently, the most significant IP concern about biochips involved the patentability of expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”)—gene fragments for which no known functional utility exists. When the National Institutes of Health applied for the first EST patents in 1991, the possibility arose that such patents could overlap with and possibly invalidate later patents directed toward fully-sequenced, expressed genes.8 Commentators describe this proliferation of overlapping patents as a potential “patent thicket”—a tangle of intellectual property rights through which companies must cut to bring new technologies to market.9 In the thicket, scientists and corporations might be forced to renegotiate constantly for the right to exercise any individual gene patent, or to use commercial products obtained from that gene.}, thicket_def={Refs Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Commentators describe this proliferation of overlapping patents as a potential “patent thicket”—a tangle of intellectual property rights through which companies must cut to bring new technologies to market.9 In the thicket, scientists and corporations might be forced to renegotiate constantly for the right to exercise any individual gene patent, or to use commercial products obtained from that gene.}, tags={biochips, trade secrets}, filename={Sharrott Sayeed (2006) - Intellectual Property Developments In Biochip Nanotechology.pdf} } @article{serafino2007survey, title={Survey of patent pools demonstrates variety of purposes and management structures}, author={Serafino, D.}, journal={Knowledge Ecology International. http://keionline. org/content/view/69/1}, year={2007}, abstract={The collective management of intellectual property rights is a term used to describe methods of managing large portfolios of intellectual property assets, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, know-how and data. Patent pools are one such mechanism. A “patent pool” is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties.2 In its 2001 White Paper on Patent Pools, the USPTO said, “A patent pool allows interested parties to gather all the necessary tools to practice a certain technology in one place, e.g, ‘one-stop shopping,’ rather than obtaining licenses from each patent owner individually.”3 The following paper provides a summary of features of 35 patent pools organized or proposed from 1856 to the present. Each of the patent pools was organized in response to a particular set of policy objectives and circumstances. Their purposes were heterogeneous. Some were organized in order to promote the interests of monopolists or cartels. Others were organized to promote competition and benefit the users of patents. There are pools that manage the patents on standards for new information technologies, that enhance R&D for new biomedical or biotechnology agricultural products, or that seek to promote other objectives. Some pools are organized by patent owners, others by manufacturers, and yet others by non-profit institutions, including governments. There is no single reason for creating a patent pool and no single way to manage a patent pool.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Written Theory, Empirics}, industry={General, Technology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The Supreme Court ruled in 1947 that the division of the market by territory violated American antitrust laws, and included the contract between National Lead and DuPont in this ruling, which read, in part...The court also determined that “the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for titanium dioxide products.”}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={patent pools}, filename={Serafino (2007) - Survey Of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety Of Purposes And Management Structures.pdf} } @article{somaya2003strategic, title = {Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation}, author = {Somaya, Deepak}, journal = {Strategic Management Journal}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 17-38}, abstract = {Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are derived for two types of influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their 'defensive' role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Parameter estimates from a sample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the evidence for mutual hold-up is inconclusive. Interindustry comparisons show that nonsettlement of patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased by strategic stakes and, in addition, mutual hold-up appears to play an important role in computer patent suits.}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Wiley}, copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Wiley}, abstract={Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are derived for two types of influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their 'defensive' role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Parameter estimates from a sample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the evidence for mutual hold-up is inconclusive. Interindustry comparisons show that nonsettlement of patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased by strategic stakes and, in addition, mutual hold-up appears to play an important role in computer patent suits.}, discipline={Econ, Management}, research_type={Theory, Empirical, Econometric Model}, industry={ICT, Biotechnology},
PTLR Up Group Processed BibTeX (view source)
Revision as of 19:29, 17 March 2013
, 19:29, 17 March 2013→The Processed Up Group BibTeX Records
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weakly ProAnti}, thicket_stance_extract={A firm’s patent portfolio can enable the firm to mitigate appropriation concerns that arise across multiple deals. This occurs when patents are not specific to an individual deal, but rather apply across multiple technology commercializa- tion projects. Such an intellectual property portfolio port- folio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s technologytech- nology.11 The degree of protection afforded by such a portfolio will, of course, necessarily be dependent on the degree to which patents are rel- evant across multiple commercialization projects.},
thicket_def={Def1},
thicket_def_extract={Such an intellectual property portfolio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s technology.},
tags={Cooperative R&D, Decision-making},
filename={Aggarwal Hsu (2009) - Modes Of Cooperative R And D Commercialization By Start Ups.pdf}
}
@article{allison2003business,
title={The Business Method Patent Myth},
author={Allison, J.R. and Tiller, E.H.},
journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ},
volume={18},
pages={987},
year={2003},
abstract={Internet business method patents have been roundly criticized by most observers as being singularly inferior to most other patents. Many have even argued that business methods should not be patentable subject matter. As a result, Congress and the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) singled them out for special treatment. All of these criticisms were, however, voiced without empirical support. We gathered data on most Internet business method patents issued through the end of 1999 and compared them with a large contemporaneous data set of patents in general. We also compared them with patents in fourteen individual technology areas within the general patent data set. Our comparison focused on several metrics that we believe serve as good proxies for patent quality and value. We found that Internet business method patents appear to have been no worse than the average patent, and possibly even better than most. They also appear to have been no worse, and possibly even better, than patents in most individual technology areas. These findings lead us to question the conventional wisdom that Internet business method patents were uniquely deficient. We briefly explore some possible explanations for the chasm between the accepted view and what we believe to have been the reality, including the possibility that negative opinions about these patents may have been the result of an information cascade. More importantly, we believe that efforts to single out these patents for special treatment not only lacked sound justification in the particular case but also reveal more fundamental problems associated with ex ante definitions to carve out any particular technology area for different treatment.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={empirical},
industry={Internet},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={A patent thicket is just one instance of portfolio value, because a group of patents on related technologies can have a value greater than the sum of its parts even if the patents do not create overlapping rights in the same product. Re- gardless of the particular manifestation of portfolio value, previous research has not captured this aspect of patent value, and we have not ascertained a way to estimate the effect of a patent’s contribution to a portfolio apart from whatever stand-alone value it may or may not have.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro, quotes shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has called “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” Carl S. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,},
tags={patent quality, internet business methods are patentable, inter-industry comparison of patents and prior art references},
filename={Allison Tiller (2003) - The Business Method Patent Myth.pdf}
}
volume={3},
number={10},
pages={803--807808},
year={2002},
abstract={Concerns about human gene patents go beyond moral disquiet about creating a commodity from a part of the human body and also beyond legal questions about whether genes are unpatentable products of nature. New concerns are being raised about harm to public health and to research. In response to these concerns, various policy options, such as litigation, legislation, patent pools and compulsory licensing, are being explored to ensure that gene patents do not impede the practice of medicine and scientific progress.},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Professional organizationsEconomist Carl Shapiro elaborates on the problems created by a‘patent thicket’.Using traditional economic analysis, he has shown how, when several monopolists exist that each control a different raw material needed for development of a product, the price of the resulting product is higher than if a single firm controlled trade in all of the raw materi- als or made the product itself 18. However, such as the American College combined profits of Medical Genetics20 and the College producers are lower in the presence of American Pathologistscomplementary monopolies. So, oppose if there are several patent holders whose permission is needed to create a gene patents as threatening medical advancement therapy (and patient care21. The World Medical Association considers human genes to be part any one of them could block the production of “mankind’s common heritage” and urges medical organizations around the world to lobby against gene patenting22. This mounting concern about gene patents has lead to policy initiatives through litigationtherapy), ineffi- ciencies in the market are created, legislation potentially harming both the patent holder and administrative actionthe patent users.},
thicket_def={def23},
thicket_def_extract={Economist Carl Shapiro elaborates on the problems created by a ‘patent thicket’. Using traditional economic analysis, he has shown how, when several monopolists exist that each control a different raw material needed for development of a product, the price of the resulting product is higher than if a single firm controlled trade in all of the raw materials or made the product itself. However, the combined profits of the producers are lower in the presence of complementary monopolies. So, if there are several patent holders whose permission is needed to create a gene therapy (and any one of them could block the production of the gene therapy), inefficiencies in the market are created, potentially harming both the patent holder and the patent users.},
}
@inproceedings{arundel2003strategic, title={Strategic Patenting}, author={Arundel, A. and Patel, P.}, booktitle={Background report for the Trend Chart Policy Benchmarking Workshop" New Trends in IPR Policy}, year={2003}, abstract={}, discipline={Policy}, research_type={Theory, Statistics from other papers}, industry={General, Public Research}, thicket_stance={Neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={Although there has been extensive discussion in the literature on patent thickets and licensing hold-ups, we know very little about how serious this problem is today or if it has slowed technological progress.}, thicket_def={Pro, quotes and refs shapiro, heller eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={This has been called a patent thicket, or a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, in press).}, tags={offensive and defensive use of patents, discussion of balancing incentives and strategic patenting, IPR Reform}, filename={Arundel Patel (2003) - Strategic Patenting.pdf} } @article{attaran2004patents, title={Patents do not Strangle Innovation, but Their Quality Must be Improved}, author={Attaran, A.}, journal={Bulletin of the World Health Organization}, volume={82}, number={10},
pages={788},
year={2004},
filename={Attaran (2004) - Patents Do Not Strangle Innovation But Their Quality Must Be Improved.pdf}
}
@article{ayres2007tradable, title={Tradable Patent Rights}, author={Ayres, Ian and Parchomovsky, Gideon}, journal={Stanford Law Review}, volume={60}, number={3}, pages={863--894}, year={2007} abstract={Patent thickets may inefficiently retardcumulative innovation. This Article explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price-based regulation of patents through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity-basedregulation through the establishmentofa system of Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold. The Article then discusses how price and quantity regulationcan be combined to effect superiorweeding.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Written Theory}, industry={Various}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets are especially harmful in cumulative innovation settings. In such settings, the need to secure licenses from multiple patentees, each possessing a veto power over the production of new innovation (1) dramatically increases bargaining costs between patentees and subsequent innovators; (2) creates a potential for hold-ups; and (3) lowers the profits of the original patentees. Patent thickets also harm regular users of patented products and technology by making it more expensive for users to gain access to the relevant product or technology.}, thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Patents}, thicket_def_extract={A particularly disconcerting result of the increase in the number of patents is the emergence of patent thickets: multiple patents that cover a single product or technology.}, tags={price and quantity based regulation, regulation, tradable patent rights}, }
@article{barnett2009isintellectual,
title = {Is Intellectual Property Trivial?},
}
@article{barton2002antitrustbaron2010strategic, title = {Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Strategic Inputs into Patent PortfoliosPools}, author = {BartonBaron, J. and Delcamp, John H.}, journal = {Antitrust Law JournalCerna working paper}, volume year= {692010}, number abstract= {3}, pages = {ppThis article explores what factors determine the decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. 851This analysis highlights a trade-882}off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, abstract = {}as measured by a new indicator, language = {English}, year = {2002}, publisher = {American Bar Association}, copyright = {Copyright © 2002 American Bar Association}, abstract={insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={theoryEmpirical, Econometric Model}, industry={general, ictICT}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Oligopolists holding cross-infringing One aspect of this patent proliferation is the « patent thicket » problem 5. The patent thicket describes a situation in which holders of different patents may actually reduce innovation by restricting entry into that are all necessary for complying with a standard mutually block each other in the implementation of the oligopolystandard.}, thicket_def={def1References shapiro, quotes shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={The creator of this term defines the patent thicket as « a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology. » (Shapiro, 2001)..}, tags={Oligopoliespatent pools, Antitrustinputs, Mutual Blockingtheory on pool patent inputs}, filename={Barton Baron Delcamp (20022010) - Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Strategic Inputs Into Patent PortfoliosPools.pdf}
}
@articleinproceedings{baumol2004entrepreneurialbaron2011patent, title = {Entrepreneurial Enterprises, Large Established Firms Patent Pools and Other Components of the Free-Market Growth MachinePatent Inflation}, author = {BaumolBaron, William J. and Pohlmann, T.}, journal booktitle= {Small Business Conference Proceedings: 4th ZEW Conference on the Economicsof Innovation and Patenting}, volume = {23}, number year= {1}, pages = {pp. 9-212011}, abstract = {The paper studies This article provides empirical evidence that patent pools contribute to the principal influences accounting for the unprecedented growth patent inflation around technological standards. Building upon theoretical propositions drawn from Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007) and innovation performance a database of the free-market economies64. It indicates that vigorous oligopolistic competition, particularly in high-tech industries, forces firms 619 declarations of essential patents to keep innovating in order to survive. This leads them to internalize innovative activities rather than leaving them to independent inventorsmajor international Standard Developing Organizations (SDO), and turns invention into an assembly-line process. The bulk we investigate how patent pools influence the number of private R&D spending is shown to come from patents on a tiny standard over time. While the high number of very large firms. Yet patents in ICT technologies is increasingly recognized as hampering the revolutionary breakthroughs continue to come predominantly from small entrepreneurial enterprisesimplementation of standards, with large industry providing streams this is the first thorough empirical analysis of the driving factors of incremental improvements that also add up to major contributionsthis patent inflation. Moreover, these firms voluntarily disseminate much We control for a wide array of their innovative technology widely factors relating to standardization and rapidly, both as a major revenue source and in exchange for complementary the technological property field to isolate the incremental effect of other firms, including direct competitorspatent pools. This helps to internalize We find that patent pools increase the externalities number of innovation and speeds elimination essential patents especially through patent races in view of obsolete technologypatent pool creation. Some policy implications To a lower extent, we also find evidence for industrialized and developing countries are also discussedopportunistic patent introductions into existing patent pools.}, year = {2004}, publisher = {Springer}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Springer}, discipline={Econ, Law}, research_type={DiscussionTheoretical, Empirical, Econometric}, industry={generalICT}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={This puts many In view of these firms benefits, patent pools are seen as indispensable instruments in a legal position that can enable each to bring cutting through the manu- facturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic conse- quences this threatens for each of them is the for- mation of a patent pool thickets in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authoritiesICT.}, thicket_def={def13Refs Shpiro}, thicket_def_extract={Similar perils for the public interest arise in the last of the reasons for voluntary technology sharing - the problem of "patent thickets" and the widespread patent Patent pools that have been formed to deal with the thicket problem. A complex piece of equipment, such are seen as a computer, characteristically is made up of components each of which is covered by a surprisingly large number potential solution to inefficiencies resulting from dense “thickets” of overlapping patents, and the patents pertinent for such an item are often owned by a considerable number of different firms, many of them direct competitors in the final-product market. For example, Peter N. Detkin, vice president and assistant general counsel at Intel Corporation, estimates that there were more than 90,000 patents generally related to microprocessors held by more than 10,000 parties in 2002 (Federal Trade CommissionShapiro, 2002, p. 6672001). This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manufacturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic consequences this threatens for each of them is the formation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities...}, tags={Poolpatents losing quality as more are being added to pools, Startups and Incumbentsuncertainty about pools ability to nurture R&D}, filename={Baumol Baron Pohlmann (20042011) - Entrepreneurial Enterprises Large Established Firms Patent Pools And Other ComponentsPatent Inflation.pdf}
}
@article{bawa2005nanotechnologybarpujari2010patent, title={The nanotechnology patent ‘gold rush’Patent Regime and Nanotechnology: Issues and Challenges}, author={Bawa, R. and Bawa, SR and MaebiusBarpujari, S.BI.},
journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights},
volume={1015}, number={53}, pages={426206--433213}, year={20052010}, abstract={During the past decade, a swarm The emergent field of patent applications pertaining to nanotechnology has been arriving at all the major patent offices of the world, including the US Patent and Trademark office (USPTONT). As companies develop products and processes and begin is currently very active worldwide with respect to seek commercial applications for their inventionsintellectual property rights (IPR), especially patents, securing valid with both developed and defensible patent protection will be vital to their longdeveloping countries joining in the nano-term survivalpatents race. In With the decades to comeemergence of any new technology, with nanotechnology further maturing and creates opportunities as well as challenges in adapting the promised breakthroughs accruingpatent regime to its particular context. There is some consensus that patenting NT innovations poses more porblems than other technologies, owing to their multi-disciplinary character, patents will generate licensing revenuecross-sectoral applications, provide leverage broad claims as well as difficulties in deals and mergersfulfilling the patentability criteria of novelty, non-obviousness and reduce the likelihood industrial application. This is aggravated by a lack of infringement. Because development standardized terminology which impedes easy identification of nanotechnano-related products is extremely research intensive, without patents and also the market exclusivity offered by a US fact that patentoffices may not be well-equipped to handle nanotechnology. These problems are likely to be compounded for developing and least developed countries, development which irrespective of these products their state of technological advancement, and their commercial viability capacity of the domestic regime, are obliged to confed IPR in the marketplace will be significantly hamperednew technology. In this This paper, effects seeks to examine the challenges which patenting of 'nanopatent gold rush' that is underway by 'NT entails for the patent prospectors' as start-ups are highlighted whereby corporations compete to lock up broad patents in regimes of nations and how these critical early dayscould be addressed. In fact, it relies on a study of the entire US patent system is under greater scrutiny regimes and straincase laws of other countries, namely, with the USPTO continuing United States to struggle with evaluating nanotech-related draw lessons for India. The low volume of NT patent applicationsand grants at the Indian Patent office and lack of Indian case laws on teh subject make the discussion anticipatory and suggestive in nature. It is unclear whether The paper finally arrives at certain recommendations, to help reconcile the nanotech industry will thrive like need to incentivize innovation in the information new technology (IT) industry or get bogged down like , with the imperative of ensuring that the public interest is served and access to the radio patent deadlockpatented knowledge is not hindered.}, discipline={LawPolicy Report}, research_type={TheoryDiscussion}, industry={NanotechNanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Such The patent proliferation thicket like situation in nanotechnology created as a result of many broad , building block patents , could ultimately result seriously impede developing country researchers from engaging in research in 'patent thickets' that will require patent litigation to sort out, especially if areas of nanotechnology become financially lucrative. Given such a patent ladnscape for nanotechnology, expensive patent litigation is inevitable, with patent owners commanding some leverage with which to avoid a self-destructive patent war. The end result of all this is too familiar to the business and patent communities: (1) higher costs to consumers if and when products are commercialized; and (2) a drag on the innovation process itself.}, thicket_def={def14def27}, thicket_def_extract={Predatory inventors are individuals When holders of such broad patents refuse to license their patents or license these on exclusive basis or at prohibitive prices or corporations that with restrictive conditions, it leads to the growth of patent every possible application around thickets impeding downstream research in nanotechnology. The existence of a novel early technology. If this approach becomes commmon... it could inevitably create nanotech high number of such patents with broad and sometimes, overlapping claims adds to the problem of thickets and leads to the fragmentation of the patent thicketslandscape.}, tags={Licensingproblems of patentability, Patenting strategyspecial categories for nanotech, problems with too many restrictions on patent quality.}, filename={Bawa Bawa Maebius Barpujari (20052010) - The Patent Regime And Nanotechnology Patent Gold RushIssues And Challenges.pdf}
}
@article{bawa2005willbarton2002antitrust, title={Will the Nanomedicine Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization?Portfolios}, author={BawaBarton, RajJohn H.}, journal={Nanomedicine: nanotechnologyAntitrust Law Journal}, biology, and medicine volume = {69}, volumenumber ={13}, pages={346pp. 851--350882}, abstract = {}, language = {English}, year={20052002}, publisher = {American Bar Association}, copyright = {Copyright © 2002 American Bar Association},
abstract={},
discipline={BiologyLaw}, research_type={discussiontheory}, industry={Nanomedicinegeneral, ict}, thicket_stance={Assumed Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Given such a patent landscape, expensive litigation is as inevitable as it was with the biotechnology industry, where extensive patent litigation resulted once the products became commercially successful. In most of the patent battles the larger entity with the deeper pocket s will rule the day even if the brightest stars and innovators are on the other side. ... Ultimately, this situation is all too familiar to the business and patent communities, in that it leads to higher costs to consumers, if and when products are commercialized [5], as well as deter ring Oligopolists holding cross-infringing patents may actually reduce innovation by restricting entry into the innovation process itselfoligopoly}, thicket_def={def1, Complementary inputs with infringement, Includes innovation loss}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology". Such patent thickets, as a result of multiple blocking patents, are considered to discourage and stifle innovation. Claims in such patent thickets have been characterized as boften broad, overlapping and conflicting — a scenario ripe for massive patent litigation battles in the future...}, tags={CommercializationOligopolies, Antitrust, Mutual Blocking}, filename={Bawa Barton (20052002) - Will The Nanomedicine Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Land Grab Thwart CommercializationPortfolios.pdf}
}
@article{beard2002patentbaumol2004entrepreneurial, title={Patent thicketsEntrepreneurial Enterprises, crossLarge Established Firms and Other Components of the Free-licensing, and antitrustMarket Growth Machine}, author={BeardBaumol, T.R. and Kaserman, D.LWilliam J.}, journal={Antitrust Bull.Small Business Economics}, volume={4723}, number = {1}, pages={345pp. 9-21}, abstract = {The paper studies the principal influences accounting for the unprecedented growth and innovation performance of the free-market economies. It indicates that vigorous oligopolistic competition, particularly in high-tech industries, forces firms to keep innovating in order to survive. This leads them to internalize innovative activities rather than leaving them to independent inventors, and turns invention into an assembly-line process. The bulk of private R&D spending is shown to come from a tiny number of very large firms. Yet the revolutionary breakthroughs continue to come predominantly from small entrepreneurial enterprises, with large industry providing streams of incremental improvements that also add up to major contributions. Moreover, these firms voluntarily disseminate much of their innovative technology widely and rapidly, both as a major revenue source and in exchange for complementary technological property of other firms, including direct competitors. This helps to internalize the externalities of innovation and speeds elimination of obsolete technology. Some policy implications for industrialized and developing countries are also discussed.}, year={20022004}, abstractpublisher = {Springer}, copyright ={Copyright © 2004 Springer}, discipline={Econ, Law}, research_type={TheoryDiscussion},
industry={general},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket problem can be severe This puts many of these firms in certain technologically dynamic industries. Consider, for example, the semiconductor industry. In a legal position that industry, there reportedly are already over 250,000 patents in existence that, in principle, a new innovation potentially could infringe. In addition, there are several thousand additional patent applications typically in can enable each to bring the manu- facturing process of reviewthe others to a halt.' 4 As a result The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic conse- quences this threatens for each of these extant and forthcoming patents, it them is virtually impossible the for - mation of a firm patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to knowthe other members of the pool, ex ante, whether and even to outsiders (as a given microprocessor innovation will infringe a patent held step to avoid intervention by another firm. The patent thicket associated with this industry, then, is quite formidable, and it creates considerable uncertainty regarding the future legal status of any intellectual property created by R&D activities.anti-monopoly authorities}, thicket_def={def15def13}, thicket_def_extract={Where a highly complex product or process is covered by numerous interrelated patents, any holder Similar perils for the public interest arise in the last of the reasons for voluntary technology sharing - the problem of a "patent thickets" and the widespread patent pools that applies have been formed to that product or process potentially may block production and/or impede further technological developments, thereby jeopardizing deal with the returns on other parties' prior investmentsthicket problem. In A complex piece of equipment, such situations (i.e.as a computer, where a given product characteristically is made up of components each of which is potentially affected covered by numerous a surprisingly large number of patents , and the patents pertinent for such an item are often owned by a considerable number of different parties)firms, many of them direct competitors in the resulting uncertainty regarding unforeseen patent claims can dampen firms' incentives final-product market. For example, Peter N. Detkin, vice president and assistant general counsel at Intel Corporation, estimates that there were more than 90,000 patents generally related to invest microprocessors held by more than 10,000 parties in R&D activities2002 (Federal Trade Commission, 2002, p. 667). This potential puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manufacturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic consequences this threatens for numerous interrelated each of them is the formation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to deter R&D investment has been called the patent thicket other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (or minefield) problemas a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities...}, tags={Cross-licensingPool, Anti-trustStartups and Incumbents}, filename={Beard Kaserman Baumol (20022004) - Patent Thickets Cross Licensing Entrepreneurial Enterprises Large Established Firms And AntitrustOther Components.pdf}
}
@article{bergman2007globalbawa2005nanotechnology, title={The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape: Implications for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Developmentnanotechnology patent ‘gold rush’}, author={BergmanBawa, KR. and GraffBawa, GSR and Maebius, S.DB.}, journal={Nature biotechnologyJournal of Intellectual Property Rights}, volume={2510}, number={45}, pages={419426--424433}, year={20072005}, abstract={Characteristics During the past decade, a swarm of patent applications pertaining to nanotechnology has been arriving at all the major patent offices of the complex world, including the US Patent and growing stem cell Trademark office (USPTO). As companies develop products and processes and begin to seek commercial applications for their inventions, securing valid and defensible patent landscape indicate strategies protection will be vital to their long-term survival. In the decades to come, with nanotechnology further maturing and the promised breakthroughs accruing, patents will generate licensing revenue, provide leverage in deals and mergers, and reduce the likelihood of infringement. Because development of nanotech-related products is extremely research intensive, without the market exclusivity offered by which public sector research institutions could improve a US patent, development of these products and their commercial viability in the efficiency marketplace will be significantly hampered. In this paper, effects of intellectual property agreements 'nanopatent gold rush' that is underway by 'patent prospectors' as start-ups are highlighted whereby corporations compete to lock up broad patents in these critical early days. In fact, the entire US patent system is under greater scrutiny and strain, with the USPTO continuing to struggle with evaluating nanotech-related patent applications. It is unclear whether the nanotech industry will thrive like the information technology transfers in stem cells(IT) industry or get bogged down like the radio patent deadlock.}, discipline={BiotechnologyLaw}, research_type={DiscussionTheory}, industry={BiotechnologyNanotech}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={By blocking pathways Such patent proliferation of broad patents could ultimately result in 'patent thickets' that will require patent litigation to market and dampening investor interest in commercializationsort out, especially if areas of nanotechnology become financially lucrative. Given such a patent ladnscape for nanotechnology, expensive patent litigation is inevitable, with patent owners commanding some leverage with which to avoid a self-destructive patent thicket has war. The end result of all this is too familiar to the potential business and patent communities: (1) higher costs to slow consumers if and when products are commercialized; and skew (2) a drag on the overall development of new technical applicationsinnovation process itself.}, thicket_def={Def3def14}, thicket_def_extract={In Predatory inventors are individuals or corporations that patent every possible application around a novel early technology. If this approach becomes commmon... it could inevitably create nanotech patent thicket, the existence of many overlapping patent claims can cause uncertainty about freedom to operate, impose multiple layers of transaction costs and stack royalty payments beyond levels that can be supported by the value of single innovationsthickets.}, tags={ClearinghouseLicensing, Patenting strategy}, filename={Bergman Graff Bawa Bawa Maebius (20072005) - The Global Stem Cell Nanotechnology Patent LandscapeGold Rush.pdf}
}
@article{braun2007barriersbawa2005will, title={Barriers to User Innovation: Moving Towards a Paradigm of 'Licence to Innovate'Will the Nanomedicine Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization?}, author={Braun, V. and HerstattBawa, C.Raj}, journal={International Journal of TechnologyNanomedicine: nanotechnology, biology, Policy and Managementmedicine}, volume={7}, number={31}, pages={292346--303350}, year={20072005}, abstract={Research into the phenomenon of user innovation has been sprouting in recent years like seeds after a rainy spring. Users have been found to be an important source of innovation in many different industries. An investigation of the barriers that users face when attempting to innovate is nevertheless lacking completely. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by discussing various factors that can prevent users from innovating. The evolution of the seed-breeding industry will be used for illustration purposes. We will argue that the barriers to user innovation seem to be progressing, potentially indicating that a paradigm change may be imminent.}, discipline={EconBiology}, research_type={Theorydiscussion}, industry={AgricultureNanomedicine}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The golden rice case finely illustrates Given such a patent landscape, expensive litigation is as inevitable as it was with the biotechnology industry, where extensive patent litigation resulted once the effect products became commercially successful. In most of such thickets the patent battles the larger entity with the deeper pocket s will rule the day even if the brightest stars and innovators are on innovative researchersthe other side. .. Swiss scientists had developed a Vitamin A-enhanced rice that promised huge health benefits to millions of poor children in developing countries. Before they could share their developmentUltimately, howeverthis situation is all too familiar to the business and patent communities, the scientists had in that it leads to work their way through 70 patents belonging higher costs to over 30 companies in addition to six restrictive material transfer agreements (Damodaran consumers, if and Srivatswhen products are commercialized [5], 2001).as well as deter ring the innovation process itself}, thicket_def={Def1def1, Complementary inputs with infringement, Includes innovation loss}, thicket_def_extract={These developments certainly do not encourage user-innovation, Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as users wanting "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to amend existing products or to create actually commercialize new ones must navigate the IPR thickettechnology". This refers to an overlapping set Such patent thickets, as a result of IPRsmultiple blocking patents, which requires those seeking are considered to commercialise new technologies to obtain licences (Shapiro, 2001)discourage and stifle innovation. It exists Claims in many industries, such patent thickets have been characterized as in semiconductors and biotechnology (Hall and Ziedonisboften broad, 2001; Heller overlapping and Eisenberg, 1998)conflicting — a scenario ripe for massive patent litigation battles in the future...}, tags={Barriers, LicensingCommercialization}, filename={Braun Herstatt Bawa (20072005) - Barriers To User InnovationWill The Nanomedicine Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization.pdf}
}
@article{burk2003policybawa2007nanotechnology, title={Policy Levers in Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation and the Crisis at the US Patent LawOffice}, author={Burk, D.L. and LemleyBawa, M.AR.}, journal={VaAlb. LLJ Sci. Rev\& Tech.}, volume={8917}, pages={1575--1696699}, year={20032007}, abstract={There is enormous excitement and expectation regarding nanotechnology's potential impact. However, securing valid and defensible patent protection will be critical here. Although early forecasts for nanotechnology commercialization are encouraging, there are bottlenecks as well. One of the major hurdles is an emerging thicket of patent claims, resulting primarily from patent proliferation, but also because of issuance of surprisingly broad patents by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Adding to this confusion is the fact taht the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative's widely-cited definition of nanotechnology is inaccurate and irrelevant. This has also resulted in the PTO's flawed nanotechnology patent classification system. All of this is creating a chaotic, tangled patent landscape in vairous sectors of nanotechnology (e.g., nanoelectronics and nanomedicine) in which competing players are unsure as to the validity and enforceability of numerous issued patents. If this trend continues, it could stifle competition, limit access to some inventions and simply grind commercialization efforts to a halt. Therefore, reforms are urgently needed at the PTO to address problems ranging from poor patent quality and questionable examiniation practices to iinadequate search capabilities, rising attrition, poor employee morale, and a skyrocketing patent application backlog. Only a robust patent system will stimulate the development of commercially viable nanotechnology products.}, discipline={LawPolicy Report}, research_type={Theory, Basic Facts about the industry }, industry={GeneralNanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Particularly in areas like Therefore, if the semiconductor industry, com- panies need some means for "clearing" current dense patent landscape becomes more entangled and the patent thicketproblem worsens, it may prove to be the major bottleneck to viable commercialization, such as crossnegatively impacting the entire nanotechnology revolution. For investors, competing in this high-licensing all the rights needed for their complex productstakes patent game may prove too costly.}, thicket_def={Def1refs, quotes shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Closely related to the problem of complementarity is the prob- lem of horizontal overlaps between patents.122 Patents Patent thickets are fre- quently broader than the products the inventors actually make. Multiple patents often cover the same ground, sometimes broadly defined in acadmeic discourse as an in- tentional result of the patent system"a ' and sometimes because pat- ents regularly issue dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that are too broad or tread on the prior art.'24 Various parties may be able a company must hack its way through in order to lay claim to the same technologies or to aspects of the same actually commercialize new technology. Carl Shapiro has termed this overlap of patent claims the '"... Such patent thicketthickets, a result of multiple blocking patents, naturally discourage and stifle innovation...}, tags={Various theories on Patent Policiestoo many rightsholders, cross-licensing, enforceability of patents, issues with patents in nanotechnology}, filename={Burk Lemley Bawa (20032007) - Policy Levers In Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At The Us Patent LawOffice.pdf}
}
@article{callaway2008patentbeard2002patent, title={Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industrythickets, cross-licensing, and antitrust}, author={CallawayBeard, T.R. and Kaserman, D.L.}, journal={Hastings BusAntitrust Bull. LJ}, volume={447}, pages={135345}, year={2008}, publisher={HeinOnline2002}, abstract={The semiconductor industry comprises organizations of all sizes, from single engineers contracting their work to companies as large and powerful as have ever existed. The rapid advancement of technology in the semiconductor field makes it a crucible for theories about the patent system as a whole. It is arguably desirable that as new technologies come to market, patents should be issued with appropriate scope so that other inventors retain incentive to innovate.' But it is not only the Patent Office which can offer or hinder incentives for inventors. The semiconductor industry is subjected to various incentives, both negative and positive, from Congress, the courts, and from within. Part A of this paper will survey the semiconductor industry and the incentives for patenting integrated circuits. Part B will look at disincentives, and problems that have arisen in the industry. Part C focuses particularly on patent issues relating to "interface circuits"--those circuits that directly connect a chip to the outside world},
discipline={Law},
research_type={theoryTheory}, industry={Semiconductorgeneral}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The proliferation of the 555 by other companies illustrates the cutthroat nature of patent thicket problem can be severe in certain technologically dynamic industries. Consider, for example, the semiconductor industry . In that industry, there reportedly are already over 250,000 patents in its infancyexistence that, in principle, a new innovation potentially could infringe. But todayIn addition, more than everthere are several thousand additional patent applications typically in the process of review.' 4 As a result of these extant and forthcoming patents, large semiconductor companies encourage their rivals it is virtually impossible for a firm to enter cross-licensing agreementsknow, ex ante, whether a given microprocessor innovation will infringe a patent held by another firm. The patent thicket associated with this industry, then, is quite formidable, and it creates considerable uncertainty regarding the future legal status of any intellectual property created by R&D activities.}, thicket_def={def1def15}, thicket_def_extract={Thickets only referenced Where a highly complex product or process is covered by numerous interrelated patents, any holder of a patent that applies to that product or process potentially may block production and/or impede further technological developments, thereby jeopardizing the returns on other parties' prior investments. In such situations (i.e., where a given product is potentially affected by numerous patents owned by a number of different parties), the resulting uncertainty regarding unforeseen patent claims can dampen firms' incentives to invest in footnotesR&D activities. This potential for numerous interrelated patents to deter R&D investment has been called the patent thicket (or minefield) problem.}, tags={555 TimerCross-licensing, History, Industry exampleAnti-trust}, filename={Callaway Beard Kaserman (20082002) - Patent Incentives In The Semiconductor IndustryThickets Cross Licensing And Antitrust.pdf}
}
@article{carrier2003resolvingbergman2007global, title={Resolving the The Global Stem Cell Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite InnovationLandscape: Implications for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Development}, author={CarrierBergman, K. and Graff, MG.AD.}, journal={Vand. L. Rev.Nature biotechnology}, volume={5625}, number={4}, pages={1047419--424}, year={20032007}, abstract={Characteristics of the complex and growing stem cell patent landscape indicate strategies by which public sector research institutions could improve the efficiency of intellectual property agreements and technology transfers in stem cells.}, discipline={LawBiotechnology}, research_type={TheoryDiscussion}, industry={GeneralBiotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={A prominent example of By blocking pathways to market and dampening investor interest in commercialization, a patent thicket is the semiconductor industry, in which hundreds, if not thousands, of patents can read onto a single product. 208 The patents typically cover "aspects of has the circuitry design, materials used potential to achieve a certain outcome, slow and skew the broad array overall development of methods used to manufacture the devicenew technical applications."20 9 Consequently, companies such as IBM, Intel, and Motorola "find it all too easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent in designing a microprocessor, potentially exposing themselves to billions of dollars of liability and/or an injunction forcing them to cease production of key products."210 This concern is especially relevant for firms that have made "costly and rapidly-depreciating investments in wafer fabrication facilities, which inherently utilize a 'thicket' of innovations developed by many parties."}, thicket_def={def16Def3}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has defined In a patent thicket as "an , the existence of many overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking claims can cause uncertainty about freedom to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from operate, impose multiple patentees."20 3 Patent thickets have been associated most frequently with layers of transaction costs and stack royalty payments beyond levels that can be supported by the semiconductor industry, but they also have been observed in the biotechnology, computer software, and Internet industriesvalue of single innovations.}, tags={Pool, BottlenecksClearinghouse}, filename={Carrier Bergman Graff (20032007) - Resolving The Global Stem Cell Patent Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite InnovationLandscape.pdf}
}
@article{carrier2004cabiningbessen2003patent, title = {Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property ParadigmPatent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Taechnologies}, author = {CarrierBessen, Michael AJ.}, journal = {Duke Law JournalAvailable at SSRN 327760}, volume = {54}, number year= {1}, pages = {pp. 1-1452003}, abstract = {One of Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the most revolutionary legal changes in the past generation has been the "propertization" of intellectual property (IP)only patent covering a product. The duration and scope of rights expand without limitBut when technologies are complex, and courts and companies treat IP as absolute this property, bereft right is defective: ownership of any restraints. But astonishinglya product’s technology is shared, scholars have not yet recognized that propertization also can lead to the narrowing of IPexclusive. In contrast to much of the literaturethat case I show that if patent standards are low, which criticizes the propertization firms build “thickets” of IPpatents, this Article takes it as a givenespecially incumbent firms in mature industries. For the transformation is irreversibleWhen they assert these patents, sinking its tentacles further into public and corporate consciousness (as well as the IP laws) with each passing day and precluding the likelihood that IP will return innovators are forced to the prepropertization era. This Article therefore ventures onto a new pathshare rents under cross-licenses, one that follows property into unexpected briar patches of limits. The secret here is that property is not as absolute as it is often claimed to bemaking R&D incentives sub-optimal. After surveying fifty doctrines in property law, Professor Carrier synthesizes limits based on development, necessity, and equity. He then utilizes these limits to construct a new paradigm for IP. The paradigm facilitates On the reorganization of defenses that courts currently recognize as well as a more robust set of defensesother hand, which include (1) a new tripartite fair use doctrine in copyright law, (2) a new defense for public health emergencies and a recovered experimental use defense when lead time advantages are significant and reverse doctrine of equivalents in patent lawstandards are high, (3) a developmentfirms pursue strategies of “mutual non-based limit to trademark dilution, and (4) a functional use defense for the right of publicityaggression. By adopting the paradigm of property” Then R&D incentives are stronger, IP has reopened the door to limits. Rediscovering these limits offers significant promise for the future of innovation and democracyeven optimal.}, year = {2004}, publisher = {Duke University School of Law}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Duke University School of Law}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={Theory, Mathematical}, industry={General, ICT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The danger inherent in these mechanisms is exacerbated This paper argues that patent thickets can reduce R&D incentives even when patents issue for products already on the marketthere are no transaction costs, because the owner of a newly issued patent holds a commanding position over manufacturers already in large-scale production, who cannot easily redesign their products and thus are forced to comply with the new patentee's demandsholdup or vertical monopoly problems.}, thicket_def={def1def29}, thicket_def_extract={Intragenerational bottlenecks The problem Baker describes is often called a “patent thicket.” These occur most frequently when each product may involve many patents, in contrast with the semiconductor industry one-to-one correspondence between products and have also appeared patents that is assumed in the biotechnologypatent race literature. Recent commentators suggest that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, computer softwarecreating difficulties for innovators (see Gallini, 2002, for a review).When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs (Heller and Internet industries.188 In such industriesEisenberg, 1998),there frequently arises a "patent thicket“holdup,"189 in which overlapping patent rights enable each patent holder with a patented input in the product to block the use ” and problems of the product by all othersvertical monopoly (Shapiro, 2001).}, tags={Nature low innovation incentives, lack of IPlead time advantages, Reverse Doctorine subsidize losers of Equivalentsinnovation races}, filename={Carrier Bessen (20042003) - Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property ParadigmPatent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies.pdf}
}
@article{chu2009effectsbraun2007barriers, title = {Effects Barriers to User Innovation: Moving Towards a Paradigm of Blocking Patents on R&D: A Quantitative DGE Analysis'Licence to Innovate'?}, author = {ChuBraun, V. and Herstatt, Angus C.}, journal = {International Journal of Economic GrowthTechnology, Policy and Management}, volume = {147}, number = {13}, pages = {pp. 55292--78303}, year={2007}, abstract = {What are Research into the effects phenomenon of blocking patents on R&D and consumption? This paper develops user innovation has been sprouting in recent years like seeds after a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights and capital accumulation rainy spring. Users have been found to quantitatively evaluate the effects be an important source of blocking patentsinnovation in many different industries. The analysis focuses on two policy variables (a) patent breadth An investigation of the barriers that determines the amount of profits created users face when attempting to innovate is nevertheless lacking completely. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by an invention and (b) the profit-sharing rule discussing various factors that determines the distribution of profits between current and former inventors along the quality laddercan prevent users from innovating. The model is calibrated to aggregate data evolution of the US economyseed-breeding industry will be used for illustration purposes. Under parameter values We will argue that match key features of the US economy and show equilibrium R&D underinvestmentbarriers to user innovation seem to be progressing, I find potentially indicating that optimizing the profit-sharing rule of blocking patents would lead to a significant increase in R&D, consumption and welfareparadigm change may be imminent. Also, the paper derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy on capital accumulation.}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Springer}, copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Springer},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical}, industry={GeneralAgriculture}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={This reasoning suggests that for The golden rice case finely illustrates the purpose of stimulating R&D, reducing the backloading effect of blocking patents would have been such thickets on innovative researchers. Swiss scientists had developed a less harmful policy instrument than increasing patent breadthVitamin A-enhanced rice that promised huge health benefits to millions of poor children in developing countries. Even if the current level of R&D is socially optimalBefore they could share their development, however, it would be beneficial for the society scientists had to reduce the level of patent breadth and the backloading effect of blocking work their way through 70 patents simultaneously belonging to over 30 companies in addition to keep R&D constantsix restrictive material transfer agreements (Damodaran and Srivats, 2001).}, thicket_def={def1Def1}, thicket_def_extract={Today, most basic and applied researchers are effectively standing on top of a huge pyramid... Of courseThese developments certainly do not encourage user-innovation, a pyramid can rise as users wanting to far greater heights than could any one person... But what happens if, in order amend existing products or to scale the pyramid and place a create new block on the top, a researcher ones must gain navigate the permission IPR thicket. This refers to an overlapping set of each person who previously placed a block in the pyramidIPRs, perhaps paying a royalty or tax which requires those seeking to commercialise new technologies to gain such permission? Would this system of intellectual property rights slow down the construction of the pyramid or limit its heights? obtain licences (Shapiro, 2001)... To complete the analogyIt exists in many industries, blocking patents play the role of the pyramid's building blocks.Carl Shapiro such as in semiconductors and biotechnology (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).}, tags={Blocking patentsBarriers, Profit sharing rulesLicensing}, filename={Chu Braun Herstatt (20092007) - Effects Of Blocking Patents On R and D A Quantitative DGE AnalysisBarriers To User Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{cotter2008patentburk2003policy, title={Policy Levers in Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust ResponsesLaw}, author={CotterBurk, TD.FL. and Lemley, M.A.}, journal={JVa. CorpL. LRev.}, volume={3489}, pages={11511575--1696}, year={2008}, publisher={HeinOnline2003},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In Particularly in areas like the next two Partssemiconductor industry, however, I will argue that, ifpatent holdup is a serious problem in reality, certain reforms to com- panies need some means for "clearing" the patent law may be desirablethicket, although the precise nature of those reforms will depend in large part on such as cross-licensing all the comparative error costs of different approaches to calculating reasonable royalties.rights needed for their complex product}, thicket_def={def18Def1}, thicket_def_extract={In this regardClosely related to the problem of complementarity is the prob- lem of horizontal overlaps between patents.122 Patents are fre- quently broader than the products the inventors actually make. Multiple patents often cover the same ground, I present a definition of patent holdup sometimes as a type an in- tentional result of opportunistic behavior on the part of patent owners that threatens to impose (1) static deadweight losses system"' and sometimes because pat- ents regularly issue that are not justified by likely increases in dynamic efficiency, too broad or (2) dynamic efficiency losses due tread on the prior art.'24 Various parties may be able to lay claim to reduction in the incentive to participate in standard setting organizations same technologies or to engage in follow-up innovationaspects of the same technology.Carl Shapiro has termed this overlap of patent claims the "patent thicket}, tags={IPR Reform, Various theories on Patent Hold-up, AntitrustPolicies}, filename={Cotter Burk Lemley (20082003) - Policy Levers In Patent Holdup Patent Remedies And Antitrust ResponsesLaw.pdf}
}
@article{denicolo2007docalderini2006standardisation, title = {Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?Standardisation in the ICT sector: The (complex) interface between antitrust and intellectual property}, author = {DenicolòCalderini, M. and Giannaccari, VincenzoA.}, journal = {Economic PolicyEcon. Innov. New Techn.}, volume = {2215}, number = {526}, pages = {pp. 679+681543--729567}, year={2006}, publisher={Taylor \& Francis}, abstract = {Is This article investigates the current level of patent protection too high or too low? To address this issue, this paper reformulates the theoretical analysis of standardisation in the optimal level of patent protection to take into account ICT sector, analysing the empirical findings of the innovation production function literature. This literature finds a strong relationship between R&D spending most relevant aspects concerning intellectual property rights and inventions and estimates an elasticity of the supply of inventions of 0anticompetitive strategies that can arise in standard setting organisations.5 or more. Thepaper then assesses the current level The strategic dimension of patent protectionthis activity is also scrutinised, exploiting estimates of highlighting the different approaches followed by the private United States and social returns to R&D taken from by the empirical literature and other available sourcesEuropean Union. Although more research is needed for a more precise assessmentIn this respect, after underlining the evidence available suggests that patents do benefits of processes not overcompensate innovators.}lead by public structures, year = {2007}, publisher = {Wiley on behalf the article describes the fundamental role of the Centre for Economic Policy Researchinternal regulations, Center which are necessary both for Economic Studiesthe purpose of having a sound process, and also reducing the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme}, copyright = {Copyright © 2007 Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies risk of collusion and Maison des Sciences de l'Hommeother anticompetitive conducts among members.}, discipline={Econ, Policy}, research_type={TheoryDiscussion}, industry={GeneralICT}, thicket_stance={Weakly AntiPro}, thicket_stance_extract={It is tempting to conclude that policy reformObviously, if anything, should strengthen patent protection. At this stage, however, no policy conclusion can be anything but tentativefrequently results in high monetary and transaction costs. The assessment developed entity of such costs is often so great as to discourage innovative activity in this paperthe downstream phases of the innovation process... Contrarily, while highly suggestivein the presence of cumulative and systemic innovative activities, is not truly compelling: reasonable interpretations of there are reasons to believe that too strict intellectual property rights would lead to perverse effects on innovative activity within the same evidence (or lack thereof) might differindustry.}, thicket_def={def19refs shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={In certain industries, such as telecommunications and biotechnology, production of new products often requires many complementary innovative components that are owned by different firms. The proliferation and fragmentation of intellectual property rights creates This network is defined a 'patent thicket' that is often viewed as an obstacle to innovation. Two main problems may emerge. First, a proliferation of patents held by different owners increases transaction costs and might even prevent manufacturers from obtaining the right to develop the new products, creating the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller and EisenbergShapiro, 19982001). Second, with complementary patents there may be A patent thicket consists of a problem number of Cournot complements (Shapiroadjacent and overlapping property rights, 2001) that increases the deadweight loss which impose on whoever wishes to use certain intermediate goods to profit ratioask for licenses from several patent holders. }, tags={Complementary InnovationsSSO, IP Rights, Definition of SSOs}, filename={Denicolo Calderini Giannaccari (20072006) - Do Patents Over Compensate InnovatorsStandardisation In The Ict Sector.pdf}
}
@article{devlin2009indeterminismcallaway2008patent, title = {Indeterminism and Patent Incentives in the Property-Patent EquationSemiconductor Industry}, author = {DevlinCallaway, AlanD.}, journal = {Yale Hastings Bus. LJ}, volume={4}, pages={135}, year={2008}, publisher={HeinOnline}, abstract={The semiconductor industry comprises organizations of all sizes, from single engineers contracting their work to companies as large and powerful as have ever existed. The rapid advancement of technology in the semiconductor field makes it a crucible for theories about the patent system as a whole. It is arguably desirable that as new technologies come to market, patents should be issued with appropriate scope so that other inventors retain incentive to innovate.' But it is not only the Patent Office which can offer or hinder incentives for inventors. The semiconductor industry is subjected to various incentives, both negative and positive, from Congress, the courts, and from within. Part A of this paper will survey the semiconductor industry and the incentives for patenting integrated circuits. Part B will look at disincentives, and problems that have arisen in the industry. Part C focuses particularly on patent issues relating to "interface circuits"--those circuits that directly connect a chip to the outside world}, discipline={Law & Policy Review}, volume research_type={theory}, industry= {28Semiconductor}, number thicket_stance= {1Weakly Pro}, pages thicket_stance_extract= {ppThe proliferation of the 555 by other companies illustrates the cutthroat nature of the semiconductor industry in its infancy. 61But today, more than ever, large semiconductor companies encourage their rivals to enter cross-106licensing agreements.}, language thicket_def= {Englishdef1}, year thicket_def_extract= {2009Thickets only referenced in footnotes}, publisher tags= {Yale Law & Policy Review555 Timer, History, Industry example}, Inc filename={Callaway (2008) - Patent Incentives In The Semiconductor Industry.pdf} } @article{carrier2003resolving, copyright title= {Copyright © 2009 Yale Law & Policy ReviewResolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation}, author={Carrier, IncM.A.}, journal={Vand. L. Rev.}, volume={56}, pages={1047}, year={2003},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={More fundamentally stillA prominent example of a patent thicket is the semiconductor industry, in which hundreds, if not thousands, of patents can read onto a single product. 208 The patents typically cover "aspects of the innumerable overlapping patents in circuitry design, materials used to achieve a certain high tech fields create an impenetrable outcome, and the broad array of methods used to manufacture the device."thicket20 9 Consequently, companies such as IBM, Intel, and Motorola " that frustrates quixotic conceptions find it all too easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent in designing a microprocessor, potentially exposing themselves to billions of dollars of Coasian bargaining liability and acts only as /or an anticommons injunction forcing them to cease production of key products."210 This concern is especially relevant for firms that paradoxically fore closes innovationhave made "costly and rapidly-depreciating investments in wafer fabrication facilities, which inherently utilize a 'thicket' of innovations developed by many parties."}, thicket_def={def20def16}, thicket_def_extract={More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "Carl Shapiro has defined a patent thicketas " that frustrates quixotic conceptions an overlapping set of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons patent rights requiring that paradoxically fore closes innovationthose seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees. One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a single patentee's ability to enjoin production of a "20 3 Patent thickets have been associated most frequently with the semiconductor chip that implicates thousands of patents creates powerful negative externalities. Given such distinctionsindustry, many view but they also have been observed in the worlds of patent law biotechnology, computer software, and traditional property as sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogyInternet industries.}, tags={Comparison of real and intellectual property rightsPool, Bottlenecks}, filename={Devlin Carrier (20092003) - Indeterminism And Resolving The Property Patent EquationAntitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{federal2003promotecarrier2004cabining, title={To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and PolicyCabining Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm}, author={Federal Trade CommissionCarrier, Michael A.}, journal={WashingtonDuke Law Journal}, DC volume = {54}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 1-145}, abstract = {One of the most revolutionary legal changes in the past generation has been the "propertization" of intellectual property (IP). The duration and scope of rights expand without limit, and courts and companies treat IP as absolute property, bereft of any restraints. But astonishingly, scholars have not yet recognized that propertization also can lead to the narrowing of IP. In contrast to much of the literature, which criticizes the propertization of IP, this Article takes it as a given. For the transformation is irreversible, sinking its tentacles further into public and corporate consciousness (as well as the IP laws) with each passing day and precluding the likelihood that IP will return to the prepropertization era. This Article therefore ventures onto a new path, one that follows property into unexpected briar patches of limits. The secret here is that property is not as absolute as it is often claimed to be. After surveying fifty doctrines in property law, Professor Carrier synthesizes limits based on development, necessity, and equity. He then utilizes these limits to construct a new paradigm for IP. The paradigm facilitates the reorganization of defenses that courts currently recognize as well as a more robust set of defenses, which include (1) a new tripartite fair use doctrine in copyright law, (2) a new defense for public health emergencies and a recovered experimental use defense and reverse doctrine of equivalents in patent law, (3) a development-based limit to trademark dilution, and (4) a functional use defense for the right of publicity. By adopting the paradigm of property, IP has reopened the door to limits. Rediscovering these limits offers significant promise for the future of innovation and democracy.}, year={20032004}, publisher = {Duke University School of Law}, abstractcopyright ={Copyright © 2004 Duke University School of Law}, discipline={Policy ReportLaw}, research_type={DiscussionTheory}, industry={General, Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology, ICT, Semiconductor},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={This process can deter follow-The danger inherent in these mechanisms is exacerbated when patents issue for products already on innovation and unjustifiably raise costs to businesses andthe market, ultimatelybecause the owner of a newly issued patent holds a commanding position over manufacturers already in large-scale production, who cannot easily redesign their products and thus are forced to consumers.comply with the new patentee's demands}, thicket_def={def1, def21}, thicket_def_extract={This tends to create a “patent thicket” – that is, a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through Intragenerational bottlenecks occur most frequently in order to actually commercialize new technology... Questionable patents contribute to the patent thicket. In semiconductor industry and have also appeared in the context of a patent thicketbiotechnology, questionable patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficultiescomputer software, and Internet industries.188 In such as royalties stacked one on top of anotherindustries, and can increase uncertainty about the there frequently arises a "patent landscapethicket, thus complicating business planning. Questionable patents "189 in which overlapping patent thickets can frustrate competition by current manufacturers as well as potential entrants. Because rights enable each patent holder with a manufacturer needs a license patented input in the product to all block the use of the patents that cover its product, firms can use questionable patents to extract high royalties or to threaten litigation...by all others}, tags={FTC ReportNature of IP, Reverse Doctorine of Equivalents}, filename={FTC Carrier (20032004) - To Promote InnovationCabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm.pdf}
}
@article{federal2011evolvingcarrier2002antitrust, title={The Evolving IP MarketplaceWhy Antitrust Should Defer to the Intellectual Property Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: Aligning Patent Notice A Commentary on Teece \& (and Remedies with Competition.”) Sherry}, author={Federal Trade CommissionCarrier, M.A.}, journal={March, available at http://wwwMinn.ftcL.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreportRev.pdf}, volume={87}, pages={2017-2034}, year={20112002},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy ReportLaw}, research_type={Discussion, Commentary}, industry={ITGeneral},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Furthermore, if The clearing of patent thickets and fostering of cumulative innovation and new markets through SSOs offers perhaps the alleged infringer would face large switching costs due to sunk investments based on the patented technology, it may be forced to pay higher royalties than it would have negotiated prior to launch.30 These risks increase expected costs, reducing firms’ incentives to pursue innovative projects,31 while the associated expenses cause firms to reduce spending on R&Dmost powerful benefits for competition and innovation.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={Indeed, IT products are often surrounded by “patent thickets” – densely overlapping patent rights held by multiple patent owners...}, tags={FTC ReportSSOs, Role of Antitrust, IPR Reform}, filename={FTC Carrier (20112002) - Why Antitrust Should Defer To The Evolving IP MarketplaceIntellectual Property Rules Of SSOs.pdf}
}
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={These developments over The lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- in conjunction with the past few decades have recent explosion of patents granted- has led some economists and legal experts to conclude – contrary to conventional belief – a serious concern that the strengthening of current patent rights has frustratedsystem may impede, rather than supportedpromote, incentives to innovateinnovation by creating a "patent thicket"(Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003).}, thicket_def={def1refs shapiro, gallini, bessen}, thicket_def_extract={A patent thicket arises when there are overlapping patent rights that must be identified and licensed The lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- in order for an innovator conjunction with the recent explosion of patents granted- has led to bring a new product or technology to market..serious concern that the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating a "patent thicket"(Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003).}, tags={Poolspatents of suspect value, litigation issues, substitute patents, exclusive rights to first invalidator, IPR Reform}, filename={Gallini Choi (20112005) - Private Agreements For Coordinating Patent RightsLive And Let Live A Tale Of Weak Patents.pdf}
}
@article{ganslandt2009intellectualchu2009effects, title={Intellectual property rights and competition policyEffects of Blocking Patents on R&D: A Quantitative DGE Analysis}, author={GanslandtChu, MAngus C.}, yearjournal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, volume = {14}, number ={20091}, publisherpages ={Emerald Group Publishing Limitedpp. 55-78}, abstract={Intellectual property rights and competition policy What are intimately related. In this paper I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law effects of blocking patents on R&D and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that consumption? This paper develops a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights and competition law can interact in many different ways, capital accumulation to quantitatively evaluate the presentation focuses on several key issueseffects of blocking patents. The economic literature analysis focuses on two policy variables (a) patent breadth that determines the interaction between competition law amount of profits created by an invention and intellectual property rights shows (b) the profit-sharing rule that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms determines the distribution of basic principlesprofits between current and former inventors along the quality ladder. Significant tensions exist, however, and it The model is difficult calibrated to balance IPR and competition law in practiceaggregate data of the US economy. The significant differences in approach between Under parameter values that match key features of the United States US economy and show equilibrium R&D underinvestment, I find that optimizing the European Union simply reflect the underlying reality that efforts profit-sharing rule of blocking patents would lead to achieve a sensible balance do not result significant increase in R&D, consumption and welfare. Also, the paper derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy harmonizationon capital accumulation.}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Springer}, copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Springer},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={DiscussionTheory, Empirical}, industry={IT, BiotechGeneral}, thicket_stance={Weak Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets may, therefore, impede the ability of firms to conduct research effectively (Eisenberg 1989)... Shapiro (2001) argues This reasoning suggests that problems with patent thickets become especially thorny in conjunction with for the risk purpose of hold-upstimulating R&D, which is reducing the danger that new products will inadvertently infringe on backloading effect of blocking patents issued after these products were designedwould have been a less harmful policy instrument than increasing patent breadth. In terms Even if the current level of empirical evidenceR&D is socially optimal, it would be beneficial for the problem may be insignificant in practice, at least at society to reduce the general level. Walsh et al. (2003) find that drug discovery has not been substantially impeded by of patent breadth and the multiplicity backloading effect of patented prior inventions and they find little evidence that university research has been impeded by concerns about blocking patents on research toolssimultaneously to keep R&D constant.}, thicket_def={Def1, Def22def1}, thicket_def_extract={In additionToday, the significant increase in the multiplicity of patents, referred to as “patent thickets” most basic and “patent floods”, applied researchers are considered by many to impede the ability effectively standing on top of firms a huge pyramid... Of course, a pyramid can rise to conduct R&D activity effectively (Eisenberg 1989; Shapiro 2001)far greater heights than could any one person... A second issue relevant for sequential innovations is so-called “patent thickets”. In some industriesBut what happens if, particularly biotechnology in order to scale the pyramid and information technologies, it is common that place a new entrantblock on the top, a researcher must gain the permission of each person who previously placed a block in order to engage in research or productionthe pyramid, must obtain perhaps paying a large number royalty or tax to gain such permission? Would this system of licenses from existing and previous innovators and producersintellectual property rights slow down the construction of the pyramid or limit its heights? ... This problem raises To complete the analogy, blocking patents play the cost role of product commercialization and may create substantial entry barriers for new firmsthe pyramid's building blocks.Carl Shapiro (2001)}, tags={IPR ReformBlocking patents, AntitrustProfit sharing rules}, filename={Ganslandt Chu (2009) - Intellectual Property Rights And Competition PolicyEffects Of Blocking Patents On R and D A Quantitative DGE Analysis.pdf}
}
}
@article{kieff2011removingcowin2007policy, title = {Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and CompetitionPolicy Options for the Improvement of the European Patent System}, author = {KieffCowin, R. and Van der Eijck, W. and Lissoni, F. Scott}and Lotz, journal = {Supreme Court Economic Review}P. and Van Overwalle, volume = {19}G. and Schovsbo, number = {1J.}, pages journal= {pp. 25-50Scientific Technology Options Assessment (STOA) of the European Parliament}, year = {20112007}, abstract = {Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that sees property rule treatment of intellectual property (IP) as a cause of excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and retard innovation, competition, and economic growth. The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift towards some limited use of weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and where escape hatches are most needed. This essay is designed to make two contributions. First, it shows how a set of changes in case law over just the past few years have hugely re-shaped the patent system from having several major, and helpful, liability-rule pressure-release valves, into a system that is fast becoming almost devoid of significant property rule characteristics, at least for those small entities that would most need property rule protection. The essay then explores some harmful effects of this shift, focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede the beneficial deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and competition. The basic intuition behind this bad effect of liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for a market-challenging patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of a potential contracting party (especially one that is a larger more established party) while preserving the option to terminate the negotiations in favor of striking a deal with a different party. At the same time, liability rules can have an additional bad effect of helping existing competitors to coordinate with each other over ways to keep out new entrants. The essay is designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular, as well as the broader literatures on property and coordination, by first showing how a seemingly disconnected set of changes to the legal rules impacting a particular legal regime like the patent system can have unintended and sweeping harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within the more middle range of the spectrum between the two poles of property rules and liability rules, a general shift towards the property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in access and competition.}, discipline={EconPolicy}, research_type={DiscussionEmpirical, Industry Data},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In To meet the vast majority challenges that the governance of the intellectual property (IP) literature, property rule treatment European patent system is facing because of the emergence of IP is said to cause excessive transaction costs, patent thicketsthe increasing number of patent applications and patenting for defensive and strategic reasons, anticommonsthree options were recommended. These were: (i) enhancing the patent awareness within the European Parliament; (ii) establishing a European Parliament Standing Committee on Patents, hold-ups, hold- outswhich should be linked with an External Advisory Body composed by experts, practitioners and trolls, unduly taxing stakeholders; and retarding innovation, competition, and economic growth(iii) enhancing patent awareness within the Commission.}, thicket_def={def31}, thicket_def_extract={The sectors which are most affected by this phenomenon, at least in the US, are those whose process and product innovations rely upon complex technologies where an individual piece of equipment is the result of a very large number of components, all susceptible to patent protection. Here, the recent boom in patenting observed by many researchers is largely explained not by a firms’ drive to innovate more than before, but by a need to accumulate large enough “patent thickets”. These patent thickets work as a sort of insurance against possible legal actions from other companies. They are in effect therefore, a kind of defensive manoeuvre.}, tags={Recent Trends reforming patent thickets in Case Law about Patents and Liabilityeurope, defensive use of thickets, IPR Reform}, filename={Kieff Cowin (20112007) - Removing Property From Intellectual Property And IntendedPolicy Options For The Improvement Of The European Patent System.pdf}
}
@article{kwon2012patentd2009pools, title={Patent Thicket, SecrecyPools, Thickets and LicensingOpen Source Nanotechnology}, author={KwonD'Silva, IJ.}, journal={The Korean Economic European Intellectual Property Review}, volume={2831}, number={16}, pages={27300--49306}, year={20122009}, abstract={This paper considers a Discusses how to promote the development of nanotechnology by overcoming problems with the patent system. Considers how patent thickets and patent portfolio race where firms compete for complementary trolls may discourage innovative work. Describes the advantages of licensing patents, called by means of a patent thicketpool. When firms have an option Examines to keep their innovation secret, this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium where firms’ patent propensity is strictly between zero and one. In such an equilibrium, stronger patent protection reduces what extent inventors can benefit from the experience of the firms’ investment in innovation. Moreover, this result does not change even when a licensing contract is feasibleopen-source software movement.}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={TheoryDiscussion}, industry={ICTNanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Thus, on In most cases this will deter many smaller startups and research centres from attempting to traverse the one hand, firms would try to build up their patent portfolio, or patent thicket. Also broad, overlapping and conflicting thickets are likely to lead to defend their product. On the other hand, such potential lengthy and costly patent lawsuits would eventually reduce the R&D investment, called the hold-up problembattles.}, thicket_def={def1def30}, thicket_def_extract={A growing number of studies have emphasized the negative effect of the hold-up problem when firms compete When multiple organisations each own individual patents that are collectively necessary for a portfolio of complementary patentsparticular technology, called apatent their competing intellectual property rights form a "patent thicket ". (ecites: Gavin Clarkson and David DeKorte, "The Problem of Patent Thickets in Convergent Technologies" [2006] Ann. N.Y.gAcad.Sci. 1093, Bessen 2004, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Shapiro 2001181.).}, tags={Economic model trying to solve the holdup problem by licensingpatent pools, open sourcing}, filename={Kwon DSilva (20122009) - Patent Thicket Secrecy Pools Thickets And LicensingOpen Source Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{lanjouw2004protectingdenicolo2007do, title = {Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms HandicappedDo Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?}, author = {Jean O. Lanjouw and Mark SchankermanDenicolò, Vincenzo}, journal = {Journal of Law and EconomicsEconomic Policy}, volume = {4722}, number = {152}, pages = {pp. 45679+681-74729}, abstract = {Abstract This Is the current level of patent protection too high or too low? To address this issue, this paper studies reformulates the theoretical analysis of the determinants optimal level of patent suits protection to take into account the empirical findings of the innovation production function literature. This literature finds a strong relationship between R&D spending and inventions and settlements during 1978–99 by linking information from estimates an elasticity of the Usupply of inventions of 0.S5 or more. Thepaper then assesses the current level of patent officeprotection, exploiting estimates of the private and social returns to R&D taken from the federal courts, empirical literature and industry other available sources. We find that litigation risk Although more research is much higher needed for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trademore precise assessment, or other characteristics the evidence available suggests that facilitate “cooperative” resolution of disputes, are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits. However, postsuit outcomes patents do not depend on these characteristics. These findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits. Our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costsovercompensate innovators.}, year = {20042007}, publisher = {The University Wiley on behalf of Chicago Press the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for The Booth School of Business of Economic Studies, and the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law SchoolMaison des Sciences de l'Homme}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 The University of Chicago2007 Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme}, discipline={Law, Econ}, research_type={EmpiricalTheory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed ProWeakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={Carl Shapiro emphasizes It is tempting to conclude that firms rely heavily on cross-licensing arrangements and policy reform, if anything, should strengthen patent pools as a way of mitigating these problems protection. At this stage, however, no policy conclusion can be anything but tentative. The assessment developed in this paper, while highly suggestive, is not truly compelling: reasonable interpretations of the anticommons same evidence (fragmented property rightsor lack thereof).47 But small firms are effectively blocked from using these arrangements unless cash payments are accepted for participation, and typically they are not.might differ}, thicket_def={References Shapirodef19}, thicket_def_extract={In certain industries, such as telecommunications and biotechnology, production of new products often requires many complementary innovative components that are owned by different firms. The proliferation and fragmentation of intellectual property rights creates a 'patent thicket' that is often viewed as an obstacle to innovation. Two main problems may emerge. First, a proliferation of patents held by different owners increases transaction costs and might even prevent manufacturers from obtaining the right to develop the new products, creating the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Second, with complementary patents there may be a problem of Cournot complements (Shapiro, 2001) that increases the deadweight loss to profit ratio. }, tags={Litigation issues for small firmsComplementary Innovations}, filename={Lanjouw Schankerman Denicolo (20042007) - Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Are Small Firms HandicappedDo Patents Over Compensate Innovators.pdf}
}
@article{lemley2006patentdevlin2009indeterminism, title={Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Holdup and Royalty StackingEquation}, author={LemleyDevlin, M. and ShapiroAlan}, C. journal = {Yale Law & Policy Review}, yearvolume ={200628}, abstractnumber ={We study several interconnected problems that arise under the current U.S. patent system when a patent covers one component or feature of a complex product. This situation is common in the information technology sector of the economy. Our analysis applies to cases involving reasonable royalties1}, but not lost profits pages = {pp. First61-106}, we show using bargaining theory that the threat to obtain a permanent injunction greatly enhances the patent holder’s negotiating power language = {English}, leading to royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark range based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of the patent. Such royalty overcharges are especially great for weak patents covering a minor feature of a product with a sizeable price/cost margin year = {2009}, including products sold by firms that themselves have made substantial R publisher = {Yale Law &D investments. These royalty overcharges do not disappear even if the allegedly infringing firm is fully aware of the patent when it initially designs its product. HoweverPolicy Review, the hold-up problems caused by the threat of injunctions are reduced if courts regularly grant stays to permanent injunctions to give defendants time to redesign their products to avoid infringement when this is possibleInc. Second}, we show how hold-up problems are magnified in the presence of royalty stacking copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Yale Law & Policy Review, i.eInc.}, when multiple patents read on a single product. Third, using third-generation cellular telephones and Wi-Fi as leading examples, we illustrate that royalty stacking can become a very serious problem, especially in the standard-setting context where hundreds or even thousands of patents can read on a single product standard. Fourth, we discuss the use of “reasonable royalties” to award damages in patent infringement cases. We report empirical results regarding the measurement of “reasonable royalties” by the courts and identify various practical problems that tend to lead courts to over-estimate “reasonable royalties” in the presence of royalty stacking. Finally, we make suggestions for patent reform based on our theoretical and empirical findings. abstract={}, discipline={EconLaw},
research_type={Theory},
industry={ICTGeneral}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The fact that a great many More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents can read on a single product, and that this is common in certain critical industries, creates numerous practical problems for the operation high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of the patent systemCoasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation.}, thicket_def={def1, cites Heller and Eisenberg(1998)def20}, thicket_def_extract={Royalty stacking, patent thicketsMore fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and the related “anti-commons” problem have been acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation. One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a single patentee's ability to enjoin production of a source semiconductor chip that implicates thousands of concern in patents creates powerful negative externalities. Given such distinctions, many view the semiconductor worlds of patent law and biotechnology industries for some timetraditional property as sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogy.}, tags={Royalty-stacking, hold-upComparison of real and intellectual property rights}, filename={Lemley Shapiro Devlin (20062009) - Indeterminism And The Property Patent Holdup And Royalty StackingEquation.pdf}
}
@article{lemley2005probabilisticdhar20071, title={Probabilistic PatentsThe Impact of Intellectual Property Rights in the Plant and Seed Industry}, author={LemleyDhar, M.AT. and ShapiroFoltz, CJ.}, journal={The Journal Agricultural Biotechnolgy and Intellectual Property Protection: Seeds of Economic PerspectivesChange}, volumepages={19161}, numberyear={22007}, pagespublisher={75--98CABI}, yearabstract={2005}This work uses changes in intellectual property rights regimes for plants as a way to identify the value and cost to industries and society of the different components of property rights: exclusivity, research exemptions, abstract={and revelation of research outcomes. A simple model is described that can account for these differences in company choice of intellectual property versus keeping trade secrets. The data used include observations on multiple crop types over a span of 20+ years across 3 different intellectual property rights regimes. Differences in the replicability of crop types are shown to cause intellectual property rights to have diverse sets of incentives for research and property rights claims.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical}, industry={General, PharmaceuticalAgriculture}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Similarly, A 2002 court ruling in Madey v. Duke University greatly contracts the research exemption rules on US patents especially for universities making this patent thickets can have deleterious effects on both competition and innovationthicket potentially more of a problem.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={In a A number of key industriesobservers of patenting, particularly semiconductors (Hall and Ziedonisin the biological sciences, 2001) have suggested that patenting rules and computer software (Bessen and Hunt, 2004), companies file numerous patent applications on related components that are integrated into a single functional product.The result is overlapping claims have generated a "patent thicket," in which hundreds of patents can apply to a single product that has impeded innovation and made the R&D process more costly (ShapiroRai, 2001; FTCRai, 20031999). Rai (2001) for example, argues that broad patents especially on upstream platform technologies represent a threat to competition and the cumulative process of innovation in the biopharmaceutical industry.}, tags={cross-licensingfirm strategy, utility patents, revelation loss, IPR, uncertaintytrade secrets}, filename={Lemley Shapiro Dhar Foltz (20052007) - Probabilistic PatentsThe Impact Of Intellectual Property Rights In The Plant And Seed Industry.pdf}
}
@article{lemley2005patentingeisenmann2008managing, title={Patenting NanotechnologyManaging Proprietary and Shared Platforms}, author={LemleyEisenmann, M.AThomas R.}, journal={Stanford Law California Management Review}, pagesvolume = {50}, number ={601--6304}, yearpages ={2005pp. 31-53}, abstract={Universities In a platform-mediated network, users rely on a common platform (provided by one or more intermediaries) that encompasses infrastructure and companies are rushing rules required by users to the patent office in record numbers to patent nanotechnology inventionstransact with each other. This rush A fundamental design decision for firms that aspire to the patent office develop platform-mediated networks is so signficant that many law firms have established nanotechnology practice groups and the Uwhether to preserve proprietary control or share their platform with rivals.S. Patent and Trademark Office A proprietary platform has now created a new single provider that solely controls its technology class designed to track nanotechnology products. Three big differences between the emerging science of nanotechnology and other inventions make the role of patents more significant in this arena than elsewhere. First, this is almost the first new field in a century in which the basic ideas are being patented at the outset. In many of the most important fields of invention over the past century - computer hardware(for example, softwareFederal Express, the InternetApple Macintosh, even biotechnology- the basic building blocks of the field were either unpatented or teh patents were amde available to all users by government regulationGoogle). In othersWith a shared platform such as Visa, patents were delayed by interferences for so long that the industry developed free from their influence. In nanotechnologyDVD, by contrast, companies and universities alike are patenting early and often. A second factor distinguishing nanotechnology is its unique cross-industry structure. Unlike other new industriesor Linux, multiple firms collaborate in which developing the patentees are largerly actual or at least potential participants platform's technology and then compete in the market, a significant number offering users different but compatible versions of nanotechnology patentees will own rights not just in the industry in which they participate, but in other industries as wellplatform.This overlap may signficantly affect thier incentives to license the patentsarticle examines factors that favor proprietary versus shared models when designing platforms and then explains how management challenges differ for proprietary and shared platform providers when mobilizing new networks. Finally}, a large number year = {2008}, publisher = {University of the basic nanotechnology patents have been issued to universitiesCalifornia Press}, which have become far more active in patenting in the last twenty-five years. While universities have no direct incentive to restrict competition, their interests may or may not align with the optimal implementation copyright = {Copyright © 2008 University of building-block nanotechnology inventions. The result is a nascent market in which a patent thicket is in theory a serious risk. Whether it will prove a problem in practice depends in large part on how efficient the licensing market turns out to be.California Press}, discipline={LawManagement},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={NanotechnologyTelevision},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The dispersion A second type of overlapping patents across too IP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many firms different patented technologies, each of which has no obvious substitute. Firms may find themselves in a patent "thicket," in which several parties are able to derail a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contributions.12 Each firm can also create issue an anticommons or thicket problemultimatum, making effective use demanding a large share of the technology difficult, if not impossibleplatform's added value}, thicket_def={def1, refers potential of building-block patents to stifle downstream innovation and difficulty of acquiring licenses from patent holdersRefs Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Some fear that ownership A second type of nanotechnology patents is too fragmentedIP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many different patented technologies, risking the development each of which has no obvious substitute. Firms may find themselves in a patent "thicket," in which several parties are able to derail a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contributions."12 Each firm can issue an ultimatum, demanding a large share of the platform's added value}, tags={Thoughts on the potential effect of patent thickets on the nanotech industryShared Platform, Licensing}, filename={Lemley Eisenmann (20052008) - Patenting NanotechnologyManaging Proprietary And Shared Platforms.pdf}
}
@techreportarticle{llanes2009anticommonseisenstein2010up, title={Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential InnovationUp for Grabs}, author={LlanesEisenstein, GM. and Trento}, journal={Nature Biotechnology}, volume={28}, number={6}, S. pages={544--546}, year={20092010}, publisher={Nature Publishing Group}, abstract={When innovation is sequentialAs recently as three months ago, it still all seemed so simple. Shinya Yamanaka, whose team at the development University of new products depends on Kyoto in Japan is generally acknowledged by the research community as the access first to previous discoveries. As a consequence successfully reprogram differentiated cells into iPS cells1, was also the sole patent system affects both holder for the revenues technology. But as with any other patent land grab, iPS cell intellectual property (IP) is beginning to look less and less like a one-horse race. Two other recently issued patents in the cost of the innovator. We construct United States and United Kingdom (Table 1), each awarded to a different inventor with a model of sequential innovation in potentially strong claim to priority, now stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which an innovator uses n patented inputs was exclusively issued in R&D to invent a new productJapan. We ask three With this newly tangled IP landscape, questions: (i) what is are arising about the net effect possible emergence of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are a patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is thicket. On the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find other hand, early signs suggest that the answers iPS cell marketplace may evolve to these questions depend provide ample room for many different contenders. Whereas for now companies are focused primarily on the degree iPS cell cultivation as a means for deriving clinically relevant mature cells, companies may take advantage of complementarity and substitutability between recent data on transdifferentiation that suggest that this pluripotent midpoint may even be dispensable in the inputs used in researchfuture2.}, discipline={EconBiology}, research_type={TheoryDiscussion}, industry={Biomedical, BiotechnologyStem Cells, ICTBiology}, thicket_stance={NeutralWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={When the inputs are complementsAs recently as three months ago, it still all seemed so simple. Shinya Yamanaka, whose team at the profitability University of Kyoto in Japan is generally acknowledged by the innovation is decreasing in research community as the first to successfully reprogram differentiated cells into iPS cells1, was also the sole patent holder for the technological complexitytechnology. In the limit But as with any other patent land grab, iPS cell intellectual property (when n -> infinityIP), when the degree of substitutability is below beginning to look less and less like a threshold level, which is higher than one-horse race. Two other recently issued patents in the United States and United Kingdom (Table 1), the innovation is never profitable. This paper therefore gives each awarded to a different inventor with a formal treatment of the tragedy of the anticommons. On the other handpotentially strong claim to priority, when the inputs are substitutesnow stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, the profitability of the innovation is increasing which was exclusively issued in technological complexityJapan. Even in With this case, when n -> infinitynewly tangled IP landscape, questions are arising about the cost possible emergence of gathering all the inputs for the innovation is always too high from a social point of view and thus the probability of innovation is suboptimalpatent thicket.}, thicket_def={def5}, thicket_def_extract={As the number of inputs needed in research increases, the innovator faces a patent thicket and is threatened by the possibility of hold-up, namely the risk that a useful innovation is not developed because of lack of agreement with the patent holders. This problem has been dubbed the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller 1998, Heller and Eisenberg 1998).}, tags={patent pooliPS industry, intercountry patents, licensinginternational applications}, filename={Llanes Trento Eisenstein (20092010) - Anticommons And Optimal Patent Policy In A Model Of Sequential InnovationUp For Grabs.pdf}
}
@article{liu2008internalfederal2003promote, title={Internal Sequential InnovationsTo Promote Innovation: How does Interrelatedness Affect The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Renewal?Law and Policy}, author={LiuFederal Trade Commission}, K. and Arthurs journal={Washington, J. and CullenDC}, J. and Alexander year={2003}, R. abstract={}, journaldiscipline={Research PolicyReport}, volumeresearch_type={37Discussion}, numberindustry={5General, Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology, ICT, Semiconductor}, thicket_stance={Pro}, pagesthicket_stance_extract={946This process can deter follow--953on innovation and unjustifiably raise costs to businesses and, ultimately, to consumers.}, yearthicket_def={2008def1, def21}, abstractthicket_def_extract={The value This tends to create a “patent thicket” – that is, a “dense web of patented innovations has attracted substantial research attention, especially overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology... Questionable patents contribute to the patent thicket. In the context of a patent renewalthicket, questionable patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as royalties stacked one on top of another, and can increase uncertainty about the patent landscape, thus complicating business planning. However, research often assumes that Questionable patents in patent thickets can frustrate competition by current manufacturers as well as potential entrants. Because a manufacturer needs a firm’s patented innovations are independent from each other.We draw upon evolutionary economics and suggest that some license to all of a firm’s the patents share important genealogical relationshipsthat cover its product, which we refer firms can use questionable patents to extract high royalties or to as internal sequential innovationsthreaten litigation...We propose internal sequential innovations are more valuable and therefore more likely to be renewed than stand}, tags={FTC Report}, filename={FTC (2003) -alone innovationsTo Promote Innovation. We examine our hypotheses from a dataset of US pharmaceutical pdf} } @article{federal2011evolving, title={The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and biotechnology patentsRemedies with Competition. The results confirm our hypotheses ”}, author={Federal Trade Commission}, journal={March, available at both the patent and the firm levelshttp://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf}, year={2011}, abstract={}, discipline={EconPolicy Report}, research_type={EmpiricalDiscussion}, industry={Pharmaceutical, BiotechnologyIT}, thicket_stance={Assumed AntiPro}, thicket_stance_extract={With Furthermore, if the power of alleged infringer would face large switching costs due to sunk investments based on the intellectual regimepatented technology, it may be forced to pay higher royalties than it would have negotiated prior to launch.30 These risks increase expected costs, reducing firms’ incentives to pursue innovative projects, internal sequential innovations offer a larger thicket of protection that can define 31 while the underlying technologies in a set of overlapping patentsassociated expenses cause firms to reduce spending on R&D.}, thicket_def={def6def1}, thicket_def_extract={With the power of the intellectual regimeIndeed, internal sequential innovations offer a larger thicket of protection that can define the underlying technologies in a set of IT products are often surrounded by “patent thickets” – densely overlapping patents. That is, a sequence of patents revolving around the same technological trajectory can define the intellectual property more precisely and protect it with an enlarged degree of coveragepatent rights held by multiple patent owners. The holder of such patented innovations can thereafter exclude competitors from the collective scope of the claims laid out in all of the sequential patents (Wagner and Parchomovsky, 2005). In contrast, stand-alone innovations are more likely to be invented around and the underlying intellectual property has a higher hazard of being appropriated (Shapiro, 2000).}, tags={Internal sequential innovations, renewalsFTC Report}, filename={Liu FTC (20082011) - Internal Sequential InnovationsThe Evolving IP Marketplace.pdf}
}
@article{meniere2008patentfeldman2004open, title={The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Law and Complementary InnovationsMisuse?}, author={M{\'eFeldman, R.}ni, journal={Minnesota Journal of Law, Science \`e& Technology}re, Y. volume={6}, journalyear={European Economic Review2004}, volumediscipline={52Law}, numberresearch_type={7Theory, Discussion}, pagesindustry={1125--1139Biotechnology}, yearthicket_stance={2008Assumed Pro}, abstractthicket_stance_extract={The patent system was initially designed Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to provide incentives to develop stand-alone innovations in fi
elds such as mechanics, chemicals or pharmaceuticalsdescribe the problem of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barriers. Its application is therefore problematical in more recent
elds such as biotechnology Most scholars and ICT industries, where innovation patterns are different. A well-known problem concerns cumulative innovations. Patent law must then trade off those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of rights granted to upstream patent owners with the incentives to develop subsequent innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; Donoghue, Scotchmer hamper research and Thisseinnovation, 1998; Denicolòparticularly in the biotech field.21 One scholar, 2000). Another issue concerns complementary innovationshowever, which are the focus of has challenged the papernotion. When
final products embody several complementary innovations, 22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the scattering problem of patents between various owners jeopardizes multiple rights for example, by moving offshore beyond the commercial exploitation reach of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelsonpatent rights, 1990; Heller & Eisenberginventing around the rights, 1998; Shapiro, 2001)and using public research tools. 23 In biotechnologyparticular, this is the case of therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests Walsh argues that academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures and that require the use of multiple patented gene fragments (Heller & Eisenbergpatent holders passively acquiesce.}, 1998). It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics thicket_def={refs shapiro, computer hardware and softwarelemley}, where
firms thicket_def_extract={Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001)describe the problem of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barriers. Shapiro (2001) reports, for example, Most scholars and those reporting from the field agree that in the semi-conductor industry
rms receive thousands large numbers of patents each year rights hamper research and manufacturers can potentially infringe on hundreds of patents with a single product". The situation is similar innovation, particularly in the U.Sbiotech field. software industry21 One scholar, where there are potentially dozens or hundreds of patents covering individual components of a product(FTChowever, 2003)has challenged the notion. I study 22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the problem of multiple rights for example, by moving offshore beyond the production reach of complementary innovations in a model of dynamic R&D competition between two
firmsthe patent rights, inventing around the rights, and argue using public research tools.23 In particular, Walsh argues that in some cases complementary innovations should not be patentable as such, but bundled with other innovations prior to patenting. To do so I consider two complementary innovations academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures and examine whether they should be patented separately or as a bundlethat patent holders passively acquiesce. This approach echoes several papers on cumulative innovations where patentability requirements are de
ned as the need to develop two or more successive innovations before obtaining a patent (Scotchmer and Green}, 1990; Hunt tags={open source biotechnology, 1995; ODonoghueacademic research tools}, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000 filename={Feldman (2004)- The Open Source Biotechnology Movement Is It Patent Misuse. As regards complementary innovationspdf} } @article{galasso2007broad, the optimal patenting rule depends on a trade title={Broad Cross-off between the pro
fit loss due to scattered complementary patents, license Agreements and Persuasive Patent Litigation: Theory and Evidence from the possible bene
fit of patent disclosure. The scattering of complementary patents between different owners creates a double marginalization issue. Since each patentee behaves as a monopolistSemiconductor Industry}, the Cournot (1838) theorem predicts that prices do not maximize the
rmspro
ts (Shapiro author={Galasso, 2001; Lerner & TiroleA.}, 2005)1 journal={LSE STICERD Research Paper No. The requirement that complementary innovations be bundled prior to patenting can be a way to prevent this pro
t loss. HoweverEI45}, year={2007}, small innovations abstract={In many industries broad cross-license agreements are not disclosed when innovations have considered a useful method to be bundled prior obtain freedom to patenting (Scotchmer operate and Green, 1990)to avoid patent litigation. As a result,
firms lose In this paper I study the possibility previously neglected dynamic trade-off between litigating and cross-licensing that firms face to quit the race after protect their intellectual property. I present a
first innovation has been patented, model of bargaining with learning in which leads firms’ decisions to R&D cost duplicationslitigate or crosslicense depend on their investments in technology specific assets. I show In particular the model predicts that patent disclosure has a positive social effectwhere firms’ sunk costs are higher, although it does not permit their incentive to litigate and delay a fully effi cient coordination between
firmscross-license agreement is lower. In this contextaddition, bundling innovations prior to patenting can be more effi cient if innovations can be devel- oped quickly. As I argue in the Conclusion, this condition is consistent bargaining game shows how firms with the legal de
nition intermediate values of the asset specificity tend to engage in inefficient "inventive steppersuasive litigation" patentability requirement. The paper is structured in six sections. First, the model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 then considers the case in which innovations can be patented separately, while Section 4 focuses Using a novel dataset on the case in which they must be bundled prior to patenting. Section 5 compares US semiconductor industry I obtain empirical results consistent with those suggested by the social outcomes of the two require- mentsmodel. FinallyCombining model intuition with some empirical figures, Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications I evaluate possible effects of the modelcurrently debated patent litigation reform.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical, Econometric Model}, industry={ICTGeneral, BiotechnologySemiconductors},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The present paper upholds policy arguments In particular, Shapiro (2001) has argued that emphasize the importance of a severe application of this patentability requirement as a means to limit the size of "patent thicketsthicket" and has appeared that renders it difficult to promote innovation in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent (Jaffe, 2000; Barton, 2003; FTC, 2003)commercialize a new technology... When
final products embody several complementary innovations, In some industries the scattering number of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation intellectual property rights a firm requires to produce a new product is so large, and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelsontheir ownership is so dispersed, 1990; Heller & Eisenbergthat it is quite easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent. In this environment there is, 1998; Shapirotherefore, 2001)a hold-up problem: when the manufacturer starts selling its product a patentee might show up threatening to shut production down unless it is paid high royalties.}, thicket_def={def1refs shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware During the past few years various scholars1 and software, where
rms industry representatives have drawn attention to navigate "specific inefficiencies generated by the patent thickets" system in several industries. In particular, Shapiro (Shapiro, 2001).has argued that a "patent thicket" has appeared that renders it difficult to commercialize a new technology}, tags={Patent disclosure, bundling and separate patents, Cross-licensing}, filename={Meniere Galasso (20082007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Law And Complementary InnovationsLitigation.pdf}
}
@article{paredes2006writtengallini2011private, title={Written Description Requirement in NanotechnologyPrivate Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: Clearing a The Case of Patent ThicketPools}, author={ParedesGallini, J.PN.}, journal={J. Pat. \& Trademark Off. Soc'yEconomia e Politica Industriale}, volumeyear={882011}, pagespublisher={489}, year={2006FrancoAngeli Editore}, abstract={Nanotechnology is an emerging technology, Inventors and as an emerging users of technology, there are certain often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property issues surrounding the appropriate protection for nanotechnologyin order to implement a standard or to avoid costly litigation. Broadly speaking, nanotechnology is Over the manufacture of structures and manipulation of matter within dimensions below 100 nanometerspast two decades, where unique phenomena enable novel applicationsU. At the nanoscaleS. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary, the physicalvalid and essential patents as having procompetitive benefits in reducing prices, chemicaltransactions costs, and biological properties of materials differ in fundamental and valuable ways from the properties incidence of individual atoms and molecules or bulk matterlegal suits.' Researchers and companies Since patent pools are attempting at applying these novel properties to a wide-range of applications and industries.' One important intellectual property issue in addressing nanotechnology is cooperative agreements, they also have the patenting potential of innovative techniques and compositions of matter which are necessary suppressing competition if, for downstream innovation. The notion of a patent thicket is where an overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees. If you get monopoly rights down at the bottomexample, "you may stifle competition that uses those they harbor weak or invalid patents later , dampen incentives to conduct research on and so innovations that compete with the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle pooled patents, foreclose competitionfrom downstream product or upstream input markets, but also have adverse effects in the long run or raise prices on innovation." The patent thicket problem in nanotechnology has been suggested by a recent report by LuxResearch (hereinafter "LuxReport"), indicating goods that many compete with the pooled patents have been filed relating to nanomaterials with their claims overlapping.While many companies will want to use these nanomaterialsIn synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, the LuxReport states this paper explores whether these companies will be forced antitrust concerns apply to license pools with complementary patents from many different sources. Potentiallyand, if they do, there will be significant transactional costs the implications for further nanotechnology developments due competition policy to these overlapping claimsconstrain them. Moreover, Special attention is given to the quality application of these nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question," so the navigation U.S. Department of a patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents. The legal principles in Justice‐Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the written description requirement could clear some Licensing of this patent thicket by narrowing overlapping claims in nanotechnology during examination, litigation, Intellectual Property (1995) and its companion Antitrust Enforcement and especially in postgrant procedures. This paper generally discusses 1) the background of the nanomaterials in the LuxReport Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and the patent thicket; 2) the legal principles within the written description requirement; 3) why the written description requirement should be used; 4Competition (2007) the application of the legal principles within the written description requirement to nanomaterials discussed in the LuxReport; and 5) proposals for the written description requirement for the USPTO, the Federal Circuit, and postgrant proceduresrecent patent pool cases.}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={DiscussionTheory}, industry={NanotechnologyGeneral},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={While many companies will want to use these nanomaterials, These developments over the LuxReport states these companies will be forced past few decades have led some economists and legal experts to license patents from many different sources. Potentially, there will be significant transactional costs for further nanotechnology developments due conclude – contrary to these overlapping claims. Moreover, conventional belief – that the quality strengthening of these nanotechnology patents patent rights has been repeatedly called into questionfrustrated," so the navigation of a patent thicket will have rather than supported, incentives to be around these questionable patents.innovate},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={The notion of a A patent thicket is where an arises when there are overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking must be identified and licensed in order for an innovator to commercialize bring a new product or technology obtain licenses from multiple patenteesto market...}, tags={Written Description Requirement for Patent Grant ProceduresPools}, filename={Paredes Gallini (20062011) - Written Description Requirement In NanotechnologyPrivate Agreements For Coordinating Patent Rights.pdf}
}
@article{reitzig2007sharksganslandt2009intellectual, title={On Sharks, Trolls, Intellectual property rights and Their Patent Prey—Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed”competition policy}, author={ReitzigGanslandt, M. and Henkel, J. and Heath, C.}, journal={Research Policy}, volume={36}, numberyear={12009}, pagespublisher={134--154}, year={2007Emerald Group Publishing Limited}, abstract={Patent trolls (or sharks) are patent holding individuals or (often small) firms who trap R&D intensive manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers Intellectual property rights and competition policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpointare intimately related. In this paper we show why patent sharks I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that intellectual property rights and competition law can operate profitablyinteract in many different ways, why they the presentation focuses on several key issues. The economic literature on the interaction between competition law and intellectual property rights shows that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms of growing concernbasic principles. Significant tensions exist, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against themhowever, and which issues policy makers need it is difficult to addressbalance IPR and competition law in practice. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms The significant differences in approach between the United States and large manufacturers within a theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of European Union simply reflect the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is underlying reality that efforts to achieve a central condition for sharks to operate profitablysensible balance do not result in policy harmonization.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={TheoryDiscussion}, industry={GeneralIT, Biotech},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={We further argued that Patent thickets may, therefore, impede the increasing technology monitoring efforts for victims ability of trolls, namely large manufacturing R&D intensive firms, due to ballooning numbers conduct research effectively (Eisenberg 1989)... Shapiro (2001) argues that problems with patent thickets become especially thorny in conjunction with the risk of patent applicationshold-up, probably led to which is the increase danger that new products will inadvertently infringe on patents issued after these products were designed. In terms of sharks’ relevance for innovators. It facilitates 'trapping’ manufacturers by ‘hiding’ patented technologies empirical evidence, the problem may be insignificant in confusing patent thickets—a second necessary condition for sharks to operate. oreoverpractice, at least at the strengthening of patent holder’s rights in certain jurisdictions (egeneral level.gWalsh et al. (2003) find that drug discovery has not been substantially impeded by the US) most likely enabled sharks to operate more profitably, toomultiplicity of patented prior inventions and they find little evidence that university research has been impeded by concerns about patents on research tools.}, thicket_def={def7Def1, Def22}, thicket_def_extract={As both articles showIn addition, the “strategic use” significant increase in the multiplicity of patents , referred to as “patent thickets” and “patent floods”, are considered by many to impede the ability of firms to conduct R&D activity effectively (the two most important types being blocking Eisenberg 1989; Shapiro 2001)... A second issue relevant for sequential innovations is so-called “patent thickets”. In some industries, particularly biotechnology and cross-licensing with patent ‘thickets’ playing information technologies, it is common that a major role for the latter)new entrant, has classically been discussed from the perspective of those patent holders who either in order to engage in research or production, must obtain a large number of licenses from existing and previous innovators and producers. This problem raises the production cost of their own technological goods or consider themselves professional intellectual property suppliers who repeatedly interact with manufacturersproduct commercialization and may create substantial entry barriers for new firms.}, tags={Patent Trolls and Sharks and their operationsIPR Reform, Antitrust}, filename={Reitzig Henkel Heath Ganslandt (20072009) - On Sharks Trolls Intellectual Property Rights And Their Patent PreyCompetition Policy.pdf}
}
@inproceedingsarticle{rubinfeld2004strategicgaule2006towards, title={The Strategic Use of Patents: Implications for AntitrustTowards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?}, author={RubinfeldGaul{\'e}, DP.L. and Maness}, journal={Innovation Strategy Today}, R. volume={2}, booktitlenumber={Antitrust2}, Patent and Copyright Conference pages={123--143}, year={20042006},
abstract={},
discipline={Management, Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={RetailBiotechnology}, thicket_stance={NeutralWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The competitive offensive advantage associated strength of the anti‐commons thesis rests on two assumptions that are very difficult to test: (1) that developing commercial biomedical products requires access to many different IP rights and (2) that negotiating access with a different patent thicket can be highowners is prohibitively difficult and costly. It followsOn the first point, the number of coursebiotechnology patents has certainly increased dramatically over the last decade, although by itself that does not necessarily imply greater fragmentation. Walsh et al. (2003) report from interviews with biotechnology industry IP practitioners that there is also preliminary freedom to operate searches can sometimes find hundreds of patents relevant to a substantial defensive advantage as well. The result candidate product but that on closer inspection “there may be , in a “race” complicated case, about 6‐12 that they have to grow one’s IP portfolioseriously address, but that more typically the number was zero. Unfortunately” Enough anecdotal evidence exists, however, it is not clear whether to suggest that race will be “to the top” (i.e., fragmentation of rights in the social interest), or “to the bottom” (i.e., harmful from biotechnology is sometimes a social point of view)serious concern.}, thicket_def={def1Def32}, thicket_def_extract={Shapiro (2001) characterizes The IP rights situation described above was arguably a classical case of a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property with fragmented IP rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new and uncertainty about technology.”ownership}, tags={Patent Thickets strategic use in negotiation and business strategypatent pools, cross-licensing}, filename={Rubinfeld Maness Gaule (20042006) - The Strategic Use Of Patents Implications For AntitrustTowards Patent Pools In Biotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{rey2012abusegilbert2004antitrust, title={Abuse Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual PropertyPolicy Evolution}, author={ReyGilbert, PR. and Salant, DJ.}, journal={International Journal of Industrial OrganizationStanford Technology Law Review}, volume={2004}, year={20122004}, abstract={This paper examines the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the downstream firms that require access to that IP, as well as on consumers and social welfare. The paper considers a model in which there is product differentiation downstream. License fees and fixed entry costs determine the number of downstream competitors and thus variety. We first consider the case where there is a single upstream owner of essential IP. Increasing the number of licenses enhances product variety, which creates added value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, which dissipates profits. We derive conditions under which the upstream IP monopoly will then want to provide an excessive or insufficient number of licenses, relative to the number that maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare.When there are multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking can reduce the number of the downstream licensees, but also the downstream equilibrium prices the consumers face.The paper derives conditions determining whether this reduction in downstream price and variety is beneficial to consumers or society. Finally, the paper explores the impact of alternative licensing policies. With fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a percentage of the price, an upstream IP owner cannot control the intensity of downstream competition. In contrast, volumebased license fees (i.e., per-unit access fees), do permit an upstream owner to control downstream competition and to replicate the outcome of complete integration. The paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream competition and licensing terms when IP owners charge fixed or volume-based access fees.}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={TheoryDiscussion, Equations},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets have long been a concern due to the potential for delaying deployment of products and adversely affecting consumers.}, thicket_def={def9}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets, layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer products that embody technologies owned by multiple firms, and licensing policies have drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers. Patent thickets involve complementary products, which gives rise to double marginalization - the so-called royalty stacking problem - and has the potential to retard diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare.}, tags={Optimal licensing policies regarding downstream Antitrust, patent pools, competition, fixed access feesIPR Reform}, filename={Rey Salant Gilbert (20122004) - Abuse Of Dominance And Licensing Antitrust For Patent Pools A Century Of Intellectual PropertyPolicy Evolution.pdf}
}
}
@article{sabety2004nanotechnologygoozner2006innovation, title={Nanotechnology innovation and Innovation in Biomedicine: Can Stem Cell Research Lead the patent thicket: Which IP policies promote growthWay to Affordability?}, author={SabetyGoozner, TM.}, journal={Alb. LJ Sci. \& Tech.PLoS medicine}, volume={153}, number={5}, pages={477e126}, year={20042006}, publisher={Public Library of Science},
abstract={},
discipline={LawBiology}, research_type={Policy, Discussion, Industry Statistics}, industry={NanotechnologyBiology, RadioStem Cell}, thicket_stance={NeutralAssumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={On the one handWhile many researchers, especially in academia, the fear of the find ways around patent thicket has been raised: "[i]f you get monopoly rights down at the bottomrestrictions, you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and so . . . the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competitionmany companies have no trouble executing license agreements, but also there are cases where “patent thickets” have adverse effects in the long run on innovation."9On the discouraged other hand, encouraging private investment in commercialization has also been raised: "[b]y enabling corporations to negotiate exclusive licenses researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of promising technologies [that were publicly funded],... [this] encourage[s] them to invest in the additional research, development, and manufacturing capabilities needed to bring new products to marketinquiry." The information technology industry did not suffer severe patent deadlock in its early years while the radio industry did}, thicket_def={def1refs heller eisenberg, refs eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro defines "While many researchers, especially in academia, find ways around patent thicket" as "an overlapping set restrictions, and many companies have no trouble executing license agreements, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patenteesinquiry."}, tags={licensingIncentives, Patent Proliferation, License Agreements, Patent Pool, government fundingOpen Source}, filename={Sabety Goozner (20042006) - Nanotechnology Innovation And The Patent ThicketIn Biomedicine.pdf}
}
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Discussion}, industry={GeneralICT, Biology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={This “patent thicket” The first of the problems Barr describes is clearly a case of mutually assured destruction that leaves the firms in question no better (Shapiro, 2001and no worse) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does off than if they were not internalize accumulating massive numbers of patents for defensive purposes, and yet at the negative external effect on same time is a very costly strategy. Increasing the revenues administrative costs of patents to firms or reforms within the industry itself to discourage this behavior would seem to be the other patent holders when setting his royaltiesobvious solution, so since it would be in the sum interest of all royalties will be inefficiently highfirms involved to reduce spending on this activity.}, thicket_def={def1Def4}, thicket_def_extract={This “patent thicket” (ShapiroDuring the U.S. Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice hearings on the patent system and antitrust policy in 2002, 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on number of industry representatives expressed concerns about the revenues difficulty of negotiating the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so thicket in their area and the sum risk of being “held-up” ex post by a patent on a technology that was only a small component of all royalties will be inefficiently hightheir product.}, tags={patent poolsGeneral Patent Discussion}, filename={Schmidt Hall (20082007) - Complementary Patents And Market StructurePatent Policy.pdf}
}
@article{schneider2008fenceshemphill2003preemptive, title={Fences Preemptive Patenting, Human Genomics, and competition in patent racesthe US Biotechnology Sector: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights with Societal Welfare}, author={SchneiderHemphill, CT.A.}, journal={International Journal of Industrial OrganizationTechnology in Society}, volume={2625}, number={63}, pages={1348337--1364349}, year={20082003}, abstract={This paper studies Within the behaviour biotechnology sector of
firms facing the decision to create US economy, aggressive patenting, i.e. preemptive patenting, of human genomic research results are practiced by private-sector firms, the academic community, and non-profit organizations. Preemptive patenting has traditionally been practiced by the private sector as a patent fencecompetitive strategy, being driven by economic considerations. Recently, de
fined academics and patients/consumers have instituted preemptive patenting strategies as a portfolio way of substitute patents. We set up a patent race modelensuring access to genomic sequences for, where
firms can decide either to patent their inventionsrespectively, or research study purposes and life-enhancing access to rely on secrecydiagnostic gene testing. It To reduce this non-economic motivation for preemptive patenting by these nontraditional competitors, it is shown recommended that fi
rms build the biotechnology industry initiate a strategy of its own which will: (1) relax firm patent fences, when the duopoly profi
ts net enforcement of R&D costs genomic sequences that are positive. We also demonstrate that essential for academic researchers to use in this context, their studies; and (2) provide for a fi
rm will rely on secrecy when the speed of discovery of the subsequent invention is high compared to the competitors. Furthermore, we compare the model under the First‘means-to-Invent and Firsttest’ approach that incorporates a ‘staggered’ fee-schedule for academic researchers to-File legal rulescharge their subjects, i.e. Finallypatients, we analyze the welfare implications of patent fencesfor gene tests and diagnostic results.}, discipline={EconPolicy}, research_type={TheoryDiscussion}, industry={GeneralBiotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={While the issue of "thickets" of complementary technologies in cumulative innovations has been extensively analyzed2To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent rights, as well as the institutional solutions firms often attempt to overcome this problem (Lerner and Tirolecreate a ‘patent thicket, 2005 and Shapiro’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product or process, 2001), little attention has been paid but on a host of related products or processes [11]. Firms that try to compete with the inventing firm will find their attempts to fencing duplicate the central product or process blocked by the inventing firm’s grip on alternative technologies. Many of the firm’s patents so faron related products or processes may never be used or licensed; such ‘sleeping patents’ are held only to raise the costs of entry or imitation by potential rivals.}, thicket_def={def10def33}, thicket_def_extract={More precisely,
firms will To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent a coherent group of inventionsrights, which form what is sometimes called firms often attempt to create a patent "bulk"‘patent thicket, aimed at protecting ’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product. The "bulk" can either be or process, but on a "fence" host of substitute patents related products or a "thicket" of complementary patents (see Reitzig, 2004 and Cohen et al., 2000)processes [11].}, tags={patent fencespreemptive patenting, consumer welfare, international affairs, strategic value}, filename={Schneider Hemphill (20082003) - Fences Preemptive Patenting Human Genomics And Competition In Patent RacesThe Us Biotechnology Sector.pdf}
}
@article{santore2010patentholman2005biotechnology, title = {Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental EvidenceReform}, author = {Rudy Santore and Michael McKeeHolman, and David BjornstadC.M.}, journal = {Journal of Law and EconomicsJ. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L.}, volume = {53}, number = {15}, pages = {pp. 167-183i}, year = {20102005}, publisher abstract= {The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business On June 8, 2005, Congressman Lamar Smith introduced H.R. 2795, the “Patent Reform Act of 2005,” aimed at improving the University of Chicago quality and The University certainty of Chicago Law School}issued patents, abstract = {Abstract Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among simplifying the patent holdersprocurement process, harmonizing U.S. law with international practice, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty feesreining in abusive patent enforcement practices. Summed across patentsCongress has set the legislation aside for the time being, these fees become but will likely revisit the total producer cost issue again shortly. The biotechnology industry, one of the package fastest growing sectors in the United States economy, strongly opposes many of patentsthe proposed reforms. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities This paper considers the Congressional testimonies of the downstream product Biotechnology Industry Organization (“BIO”) and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibriaother representatives of biotechnology’s interests, which are very fragile in and finds that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm industry’s adamant opposition to not license many of the technologyproposals is driven largely by a belief that biotechnology patents function primarily as tools for securing investment funding, resulting and the fear that investment in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of biotechnology will be adversely impacted if investors perceive that patent reform has weakened the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing rights of patents in a patent poolowners and inventors. We find that pool-like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures The paper also considers how the biotechnology sector might be impacted if the proposed reforms are enacted into law, and describes some recent biotechnology cases wherein the outcome might have been different if the reforms had already been in the pricing of complementary patentsplace.}, discipline={Law, EconPolicy Report}, research_type={Discussion, Written Theory, Empirical}, industry={GeneralBiotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed ProAnti}, thicket_stance_extract={More recentlyIf in fact a patent thicket is significantly impeding biotechnology research and development, a National Academy one might expect that organizations representing the interests of Sciences (2006) committee studied biotechnology, such as BIO, WARF, and Genentech, would be advocating for reforms that would address the issueproblem. Indeed, concluding that even though evidence of blocking or market failures the biotechnology industry has yet never been shy about advocating for legislative action to emergeaddress its concerns.112 But instead, these groups tend to be among the most adamant defenders of the anticommons or status quo and strong patent rights. One might infer from this that a patent thickets may well emerge as profit opportunities thicket is not in biomedical markets growfact substantially impeding biotechnology.}, thicket_def={def1refs Heller Eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={Shapiro (2001) broadens the concept Various commentators have proposed that a proliferation of patents poses a serious threat to biotechnology research by creating a patent thicket, sometimes referred to as a “patent thicket” anticommons.”106 The theory is especially associated with articles published by Heller and Eisenberg in which possible outcomes include excessively high fees for the use of the patent set, uncertainty regarding potential patent infringement1998, and, Eisenberg and Rai in the limit, holdup problems2002.107}, tags={patent poolsCritique on Reform Proposals, Continuation, First innovator, Injunction, IPR Reform }, filename={Santore McKee Bjornstad Holman (20102005) - Biotechnologys Prescription For Patent Pools As A Solution To Efficient Licensing Of Complementary PatentsReform.pdf}
}
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Commentary}, industry={NanotechnologyGeneral, Research}, thicket_stance={Assumed ProWeakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={The development of such a patent thicket could deter further innovationAlthough upstream patents have been widely criticized, 6 and the active enforcement by nanotechnology patent holders of their exclusivity rights ultimately could result in the creation there are a number of a nanotechnology anticommons-a situation in which a scarce resource becomes prone cases where specific patents clearly seem to underuse because have impeded innovation, there are too many owners holding the right is little objective evidence to exclude others from support a conclusion that resourcepatents constitute a widespread substantial obstacle to biomedical R&D, and no one has an effective privilege of useparticularly in the academic sector.}, thicket_def={def1Refs heller/eisenberg, rai/eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={UnfortunatelyUpstream patents have been criticized on a number of counts. For example, it has been proposed that the rush to secure worldwide intellectual property rights proliferation of patents covering research tools has resulted in nanotechnology could lead to the development of a "patent “patent thicket." This term, coined by intellectual property scholars, refers ” rendering it virtually impossible to an overlapping set conduct biomedical research without inadvertently infringing upon a host of conflicting patent rights that requires researchersclaims (Heller and Eisenberg, inventors1998; Rai and Eisenberg, and entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize new technologies to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.2002)}, tags={government license defensepatents of dubious quality, research use, public domain}, filename={Tullis Holman (20052006) - Application Of Clearing A Path Through The Government License Defense To Federally Funded Nanotechnology ResearchPatent Thicket.pdf}
}
@article{taylor2003americanholman2008trends, title={American Trends in Human Gene Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy ChangeLitigation}, author={TaylorHolman, C.M.R. and Cayford, J.}, journal={Harv. JL \& Tech.Science}, volume={17322}, number={5899}, pages={321198--199}, year={20032008}, publisher={American Association for the Advancement of Science},
abstract={},
discipline={LawPolicy}, research_type={TheoryCommentary, Discussion, Industry Statistics}, industry={Biotechnology, Genetics}, thicket_stance={ProAnti}, thicket_stance_extract={The However, for the most part, fears expressed concerning human gene patents have not been manifested overtly in patent litigation. Human gene patent thicket litigation invariably has involved an alleged infringer engaged in substantial commercial activities focused specifically on the single gene that is the subject of the asserted patent, the antithesis of a problem because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologiespatent thicket scenario (14). The field of biotechnology Some have speculated that DNA microarray technology is particularly dependent on at risk of becoming entangled in a thicket (6). However, I found no instance in which a human gene patent was asserted against the cumulative work manufacturer or user of many researchersmicroarray technology, and therefore is vulnerable to although microarray companies have experienced substantial patent litigation involving nongene patents since the “anticommons” problem mentioned earliermid-1990s.}, thicket_def={def1refs heller eiseneberg, barton}, thicket_def_extract={This pattern — the increasing number Some have postulated that a “thicket” of patents, increasing patent breadth, will impede basic biomedical research and will stifle development and utilization of technologies that involve the issuance use of patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call multiple genetic sequences; DNA microarrays are a patent thicket in biotechnology: “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patenteesprime example (5, 6)}, tags={Gene patent policies negative effects on African agriculturelitigation, frequency of litigation}, filename={Taylor Cayford Holman (20032008) - American Trends In Human Gene Patent Policy Biotechnology And African AgricultureLitigation.pdf}
}
@article{van2006clearingholman2012debunking, title={A Clearing House for Diagnostic Testing: Debunking the Solution to Ensure Access to and Use Myth that Whole-Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands of Patented Genetic Inventions?Gene Patents}, author={Van ZimmerenHolman, EC. and Verbeure, B. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, GM.}, journal={Bulletin of the World Health OrganizationNature biotechnology}, volume={8430}, number={53}, pages={352240--359244}, year={20062012}, publisher={SciELO Public HealthNature Publishing Group}, abstract={In genetic diagnostics, the emergence of a so-called “patent thicket” is imminent. Such an overlapping set of patent rights may have restrictive effects on further research and development of diagnostic tests, and the provision of clinical diagnostic services. Currently, two models that may facilitate access to and use of patented genetic inventions are attracting much debate in various national and international fora: patent pools and clearing houses. In this article, we explore the concept of clearing houses. Several types of clearing houses are identified. First, we describe and discuss two types that would provide access to information on the patented inventions: the information clearing house and the technology exchange clearing house. Second, three types of clearing houses are analysed that not only offer access to information but also provide an instrument to facilitate the use of the patented inventions: the open access clearing house, the standardized licences clearing house and the royalty collection clearing house. A royalty collection clearing house for genetic diagnostic testing would be the most comprehensive as it would serve several functions: identifying patents and patent claims essential to diagnostic testing, matching licensees with licensors, developing and supplying standardized licences, collecting royalties, monitoring whether users respect licensing conditions, and providing dispute resolution services such as mediation and arbitration. In this way, it might function as an effective model for users to facilitate access to and use of the patented inventions. However, it remains to be seen whether patent holders with a strong patent portfolio will be convinced by the advantages of the royalty collection clearing house and be willing to participate.}, discipline={Policy ReportLaw}, research_type={Commentary, Discussion}, industry={Biology, Genetics}, thicket_stance={Weakly ProAnti}, thicket_stance_extract={Moreover, there are factors There is also good reason to think that may lead even the claims most likely to the emergence be infringed, reciting short fragments of a patent blocking problem in genetics in the future: increased awareness among researchers; and growing rate genomic DNA, or broadly defined methods of patent enforcement caused testing for genetic variation, would not necessarily be infringed by all forms of WGS, particularly next-generation technologies that do not amplify genes. A company that provides WGS services, but that leaves the strategic enforcement job of their rights by patent holders and analyzing the proliferating complexity sequence data for clinically important variations to others, would be particularly unlikely to be found liable for infringing any of biomedical research requiring a broader range and greater number of inputs of which a growing number is patentedthese gene patents.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={This pattern — the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call a patent thicket in biotechnology: “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.}, tags={patent poolsWhole Genome Sequencing, clearing housesInfringement}, filename={VanZimmeren Holman (20062012) - A Clearing House For Diagnostic TestingDebunking The Myth That Whole Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands Of Gene Patents.pdf}
}
@article{verbeure2006patenthorn2003alternative, title={Patent Pools and Diagnostic TestingAlternative approaches to IP management: One-stop technology platform licensing}, author={Verbeure, B. and van Zimmeren, E. and MatthijsHorn, G. and Van Overwalle, GL.}, journal={TRENDS in BiotechnologyJournal of commercial biotechnology}, volume={249}, number={32}, pages={115119--120127}, year={20062003}, publisher={Palgrave Macmillan}, abstract={There As a pioneering, one-stop technology platform licensing enterprise, MPEG LA is increasing concern that overlapping patents in the field of genetics will create a costly and legally complex situation known presented as a template for patent thicketpooling. By providing the marketplace with fair, whichreasonable, along with the associated issues non- discriminatory access to a portfolio of accumulating royalty paymentsworldwide essential patents under a single licence, can act as a disincentive for innovation. One potential means this example of preventing this is for the patent holders to enter into a soone-called patent poolstop technology platform licensing programme enables widespread implementation, such as those established in the electronics interoperability and telecommunications industries. Precedents for these also exist in the field use of genetics, notably with the fundamental broad-based technologies covered by many patents pertaining to the SARS genome. In this review, we initially address the owned by many patent pool concept in general and its application in geneticsowners. Following this, we This paper will explore patent pools in : (1) present observations from MPEG LA’s unique experience and perspective including a description of the diagnostic field in more detailnecessary elements and principles on which such efforts are based, what works and examine some existing why; and (2) describe efforts to apply this innovative licensing model to the biotechnology and novel examples pharmaceutical industries within the larger context of historical patent pools in geneticspooling as a solution to biotechnology bottlenecks.}, discipline={Policy ReportLaw},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Technology, Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={There is increasing concern that overlapping In addition, there has been enormous growth in the number of issued patents containing progressively narrower claims. Therefore, licences under multiple patents in owned by multiple patent owners are required. In the field absence of genetics will create a costly patent pool, the transaction costs required to identify the blocking patents and legally complex situation known as conclude negotiations for a licence under each of them (assuming the patent thicketowners are even willing to enter into licence negotiations), whichto say nothing of paying multiple royalties, along are too costly for the average user – with the associated issues result that technological advancement, adoption and use are impeded; freedom of accumulating royalty payments, can act as a disincentive technological movement is restricted; the potential for innovationconflict is increased; and traditional one-on-one licensing arrangements fall short.}, thicket_def={def24refs shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thicket. The intellectual property portfolios Therefore, if the ‘thicket’2 of several companies that form a dense web essential IP rights underlying their use cannot be accessed under reasonable terms and conditions (eg cost) applied evenly to all similarly situated competitors, the best of overlapping intellectual property rightstandards often go unused.}, tags={patent technology platform licensing, standards pools}, filename={Verbeure Horn (20062003) - Patent Pools And Diagnostic TestingAlternative Approaches To IP Management.pdf}
}
@article{wang2010risehussinger2006silence, title={Rise of Is Silence Golden? Patents versus Secrecy at the Patent IntermediariesFirm Level}, author={WangHussinger, A.WK.}, journal={Berkeley Tech. LJEconomics of Innovation and New Technology}, volume={2515}, number={8}, pages={159735--752}, year={20102006}, publisher={Taylor \& Francis}, abstract={Patents are evolving In the 1990s, patenting schemes changed in many respects: upcoming new technologies accelerated the shift from purely exclusionary instruments into intellectual property assets that play price competition towards competition based on technical inventions, a part worldwide surge in business strategy patenting took place, and have value the ‘patent thicket’ arose as transactional goodsa conse- quence of strategic patenting. Businesses operating This study analyzes the importance of patenting versus secrecy as an effective alternative to protect intellec- tual property in the intellectual property marketplace have experienced an unprecedented explosion of activity involving these intangible but valuable assetsinventions’ market phase. The sales figure with new market products is introduced as a new measure for intellectual property has inspired entrepreneurial legal professionals and business professionals alike to create new companies and expand existing ones to act as middlemen, encouraging the continued proliferation importance of patent transactionsIP protection tools among product innovating firms. These entities operate and thrive Focusing on the German manufacturing in 2000, it turns out that patents are impor- tant to protect intellectual property in the intermediary market between buyers and sellers of intellectual property as well as auxiliary markets related , whereas secrecy seems to the protection of intellectual propertybe rather important for early-stage inventions.}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={Discussionempirical, econometric model}, industry={ICTGeneral, Manufacturing}, thicket_stance={Assumed Proneutral}, thicket_stance_extract={In this age A further development is that patents gained in value by their ability to be linked with other patents, which encourages patenting of marginal inven- tions. The resulting complex network of single patents that bears many legal pitfalls for patent thicketsapplicants was given the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001). These developments put into question an organization must tread carefully lest it infringe countless increased number of patents just motivated by doing business (cites Heller Eisenberg's Anticommons)an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic value of patents to have driven the patent surge. To summarize: on the one hand, recent changes in patenting schemes have caused an elevated need for patents as an IP protection tool. On the other hand, they gained in importance as strategic instruments.}, thicket_def={refs shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro defines a patent thicket as a “dense web The resulting complex network of overlapping intellectual property rights single patents that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” Carl Shapiro, Navigating bears many legal pitfalls for patent applicants was given the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 name ‘patent thicket’ (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.Shapiro, 2001). These developments put into question an increased number of patents motivated by an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic value of patents to have driven the patent surge.}, tags={patenting secrecy, firm strategy}, filename={Wang Hussinger (20102006) - Rise Of Is Silence Golden Patents Versus Secrecy At The Patent IntermediariesFirm Level.pdf}
}
@article{wagner2003informationiyama2005uspto, title = {Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies The USPTO's Proposal of Controla Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesn't Hold Water}, author = {WagnerIyama, RS. Polk}, journal = {Columbia Stanford Law Review}, volume = {103}, number = {4}, pages = {pp. 9951223--10341241}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.2005}, abstract = {This Essay challenges a central tenet of the recent criticism of intellectual property rights: the suggestion that the control conferred by such rights is detrimental to the continued flourishing of a public domain of ideas and information. In this Essay, Professor Wagner argues that such theories understate the significance of the intangible nature of information, and thus overlook the contribution that even perfectly controlled intellectual creations make to the public domain. In addition, this Essay shows that perfect control of propertized information--an animating assumption in much of the contemporary criticism--is both counterfactual and likely to remain so. These findings suggest that increasing the appropriability of information goods is likely to increase, rather than diminish, the quantity of "open" information. Further, the benefits of control in fostering coordination and enabling flexibility in arrangements are essential elements of promoting progress in a changing world.}, filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants To Be Free.pdf}
discipline={Law},
research_type={Written Theory, Discussion}, industry={ICTBiology}, thicket_stance={AntiPro}, thicket_stance_extract={Control-talk But how likely is of "it that a patent thicket for biological research will develop? According to the second enclosure movementNIH working group on research tools," the lurking "tragedy a thicket of research tool patents has already begun to form...The cumulative result of these actions is the anticommons," or the dangers initial formation of "a patent thickets" -not to mention the phenomenon thicket for research tools. The negative consequence of litigation efforts (or perhaps social movements?) sporting their own slogans (an extensive research tool patent thicket and logos), such as "Free its accompanying licensing scheme is the Mouse," "Create Like It's 1790," or "When Copyright Attackspotential chilling effect on innovation."}, thicket_def={def25refs shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={"Patent thickets" refer to Under this metaphor, a patent thicket arises when each block is granted separate yet concurrent exclusivity rights. The so-called thicket is the fact resulting nexus of concurrent and overlapping IP rights that one must navigate in many areas of technology, great numbers of related patents exist at any particular time, and many might have applicability order to practice any commercial productevolutionary form of science.}, tags={information, drmPatent pool, controlantitrust}, filename={Wagner Iyama (20032005) - Information Wants to be FreeThe Usptos Proposal Of A Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesnt Hold Water.pdf}
}
@article{allison2003businessjacob2009patents, title={The Business Method Patent MythPatents and Pharmaceuticals}, author={Allison, J.R. and Tiller, E.H.}, journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ}Jacob, volume={18}, pages={987Robin}, year={20032009}, abstract={Internet business method patents have been roundly criticized by most observers as being singularly inferior to most other patents. Many have even argued that business methods should not be patentable subject matter. As a result, Congress and the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) singled them out for special treatment. All of these criticisms were, however, voiced without empirical support. We gathered data on most Internet business method patents issued through the end of 1999 and compared them with a large contemporaneous data set of patents in general. We also compared them with patents in fourteen individual technology areas within the general patent data set. Our comparison focused on several metrics that we believe serve as good proxies for patent quality and value. We found that Internet business method patents appear to have been no worse than the average patent, and possibly even better than most. They also appear to have been no worse, and possibly even better, than patents in most individual technology areas. These findings lead us to question the conventional wisdom that Internet business method patents were uniquely deficient. We briefly explore some possible explanations for the chasm between the accepted view and what we believe to have been the reality, including the possibility that negative opinions about these patents may have been the result of an information cascade. More importantly, we believe that efforts to single out these patents for special treatment not only lacked sound justification in the particular case but also reveal more fundamental problems associated with ex ante definitions to carve out any particular technology area for different treatment.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={empirical}, industry={Internet}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extractjournal={A patent thicket is just one instance of portfolio value, because a group of patents paper given on related technologies can have a value greater than 29th November at the sum Presentation of its parts even if the patents do not create overlapping rights in the same product. ReDirectorate- gardless General of the particular manifestation Competition’s Preliminary Report of portfolio value, previous research has not cap- tured this aspect of patent value, and we have not ascertained a way to estimate the effect of a patent’s contribution to a portfolio apart from whatever standPharma-alone value it may or may not have.}, thicket_def={refs shapiro, quotes shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has called “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” Carl S. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,}, tags={patent quality, internet business methods are patentable, inter-industry comparison of patents and prior art references}, filename={Allison Tiller (2003) - The Business Method Patent Myth.pdf} } @inproceedings{arundel2003strategic, title={Strategic Patenting}, author={Arundel, A. and Patel, P.}, booktitle={Background report for the Trend Chart Policy Benchmarking Workshop" New Trends in IPR Policy}, year={2003sector inquiry},
abstract={},
discipline={Public, Policy}, research_type={Theory, Statistics from other papersCommentary}, industry={General, Public ResearchPharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={Although Every patentee of a major invention is likely to come up with improvements and alleged improvements to his invention. By the time his main patent has expired there has been extensive discussion will be a thicket of patents intended to extend his monopoly. Some will be good, others bad. It is in the literature on nature of the patent thickets system itself that this should happen and it has always happened. There is nothing new about “evergreening”, only the name and licensing hold-upsthe implication which flows from the word, we know very little about how serious this problem that there is today or if something sinister going on and that it has slowed technological progressonly recently been discovered.}, thicket_def={Pro, quotes and refs shapiro, heller eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={This has been called a patent thicket, or a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, in press).}, tags={offensive and defensive use of patents, discussion of balancing incentives and strategic patentingcompetition}, filename={Arundel Patel Jacob (20032009) - Strategic PatentingPatents And Pharmaceuticals.pdf}
}
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Econometric ModelWritten Theory}, industry={ICTGeneral},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={One aspect of this patent proliferation is the « patent thicket » problem5. The patent owner may do this by creating a thicket describes a situation in which holders of different patents that pantents, so other parties are all necessary for complying swamped with a standard mutually block each other so much complex technical documentation that they cannot separate the chaff from the wheat. Developing patent thickets is relatively easy to do in this regime since the patent examination process is cursory...the implementation average cost of the standard.dispute resolution will be high}, thicket_def={References shapiro, quotes shapirodef35}, thicket_def_extract={The creator of patent owner may do this term defines the patent by creating a thicket as « a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights pantents, so other parties are swamped with so much complex technical documentation that a company must hack its way through they cannot separate the chaff from the wheat. Developing patent thickets is relatively easy to do in order to actually commercialize new technologythis regime since the patent examination process is cursory. » (Shapiro, 2001)..the average cost of dispute resolution will be high}, tags={Designing patent pools, inputs, theory on pool patent inputssystem}, filename={Baron Delcamp Jensen Webster (20102004) - Strategic Inputs Into Achieving The Optimal Power Of Patent PoolsRights.pdf}
}
@inproceedingsarticle{baron2011patentkato2004patent, title={Patent Pools and Patent InflationPool Enhances Market Competition}, author={BaronKato, JA. }, journal={International Review of Law and PohlmannEconomics}, T. volume={24}, number={2}, booktitlepages={Conference Proceedings: 4th ZEW Conference on the Economics of Innovation and Patenting255--268}, year={20112004}, abstract={This article provides empirical evidence that patent pools contribute to the patent inflation around technological standards. Building upon theoretical propositions drawn from Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007) and investigates a database of 64.619 declarations pool of essential substitute patents that enable firms to major international Standard Developing Organizations (SDO), we investigate how patent pools influence the number reduce marginal costs of patents on a standard over timeproduction. While the high number of patents in ICT technologies is increasingly recognized as hampering Contrary to the implementation of standardsgeneral belief, this it is the first thorough empirical analysis of the driving factors of this patent inflation. We control for shown that a wide array pool of factors relating to standardization and substitute patents may promote competition under certain conditions, thereby enhancing social welfare in the technological field to isolate the incremental effect of patent poolsproduct market. We find The intuition is that patent pools increase the number of essential patents especially through patent races when firms compete in view of patent pool creationlicensing fees, resultant low licensing fees discourage firms from licensing to outside firms. To This leads to fewer licensees than when a lower extent, we also find evidence for opportunistic patent introductions into existing patent poolspool is formed.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={TheoreticalModel, Empirical, EconometricTheory}, industry={ICTGeneral},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In view the field of these benefitseconomics, patent pools are seen as indispensable instruments in cutting through analyzed by Shapiro (2000). He considers the role of patent thickets pools in ICT“patent thicket,” which means that there are so many patents issued that a single new patent will likely infringe on some other patents. This situation discourages and retards research, development and commercialization.}, thicket_def={Refs ShpiroShapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Patent In the field of economics, patent pools are analyzed by Shapiro (2000). He considers the role of patent pools in “patent thicket,” which means that there are seen as so many patents issued that a potential solution to inefficiencies resulting from dense “thickets” of overlapping single new patent will likely infringe on some other patents (Shapiro. This situation discourages and retards research, 2001)development and commercialization.}, tags={patent pools, substitute patents losing quality as more are being added to pools, uncertainty about pools ability to nurture R&Dwelfare}, filename={Baron Pohlmann Kato (20112004) - Patent Pools And Patent InflationPool Enhances Market Competition.pdf}
}
@article{barpujari2010patentkesselheim2005university, title={The patent regime and nanotechnology: issues University-based Science and challengesBiotechnology Products}, author={BarpujariKesselheim, IA.S. and Avorn, J.}, journal={Journal JAMA: the journal of Intellectual Property Rightsthe American Medical Association}, volume={15293}, number={37}, pages={206850--213854}, year={20102005}, publisher={Am Med Assoc}, abstract={The emergent field of nanotechnology (NT) is currently very active worldwide with respect to intellectual property rights (IPR), especially patents, with both developed pharmaceutical and developing countries joining in the nanobiotechnology industries have long relied on pat-patents race. With enting as the emergence primary means of any allocating ownership and control over new technologydiscoveries. Yet, nanotechnology creates opportunities as well as challenges in adapting the patent regime to its particular context. There protection is some consensus a double-edged sword that patenting NT innovations poses more porblems than other technologies, owing to their multi-disciplinary character, cross-sectoral applications, broad claims as well as difficulties has major implications for the future of innovation in biomedical science in fulfilling the patentability criteria United States. Excessive “upstream” patenting of novelty, non-obviousness genes and industrial application. This is aggravated molecular targets could hinder further research by creating a lack of standardized terminology which impedes easy identification of nano-patents need for expensive and also teh fac that patent offices may not be wellinefficient cross-equipped to handle nanotechnologylicensing. These problems are likely to be compounded for developing and least developed countriesHowever, which irrespective of their state of technological advancement, and capacity of the domestic regime, are obliged to confed IPR in the new technology. This paper seeks limiting such basic science patenting could allow pri- vate entities to examine use the challenges which patenting results of NT entails for the patent regimes years of nations costly publicly funded research to produce and how these could be addressedmarket lucrative products without compensating university- or public sector–based innovators. it relies on a study of the patent regimes Academic and case laws of other countriesnonprofit research cen- ters would, namelytherefore, the United States to draw lessons be deprived of revenue for Indiapursuing novel therapeu- tics or other seminal research work that may not be patentable. The low volume of NT patent applications and grants at Recent court cases illustrate the Indian Patent office inherent conflicts in allocating ownership and lack control of Indian case laws on teh subject make basic biomedical discoveries. Several options exist to avoid the discussion anticipatory complex prob- lems of overlapping basic science patents while still rewarding pivotal discoveries and suggestive in natureencouraging further innovation. The paper finally arrives at certain recommendationsThese include establishing ba- sic science patent pools and mandating arbitration arrangements that would assign credit and royalties for biotechnology innovations that depend on prior research that was performed, financed, to help reconcile the need to incentivize innovation or both in the new technology, with the imperative of ensuring that the public interest is served and access to the patented knowledge is not hinderedsector.}, discipline={Policy ReportBiology},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={NanotechnologyBiotechnology, Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket like situation in nanotechnology created as a result Basic investigations conducted at universities and academic medical cen- ters, usually publicly funded, often pro- duce key insights about the mecha- nisms underlying physiological function and disease states. Private corpora- tions can then commercialize these insights by designing and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on them. In this chain of many broad, building block patentsdevelopment, allowing patenting of each incremental innovation could seriously impede developing country researchers from engaging in risk generating a dense thicket of overlap- ping intellectual rights and thus hinder research in nanotechnologyefforts.}, thicket_def={def27quotes shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={When holders of such broad patents refuse to license their patents or license these on exclusive basis or Basic investigations conducted at prohibitive prices or with restrictive conditionsuniversities and academic medical cen- ters, usually publicly funded, it leads to often pro- duce key insights about the growth mecha- nisms underlying physiological function and disease states. Private corpora- tions can then commercialize these insights by designing and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on them. In this chain of patent thickets impeding downstream research in nanotechnology. The existence development, allowing patenting of each incremental innovation could risk generating a high number dense thicket of such patents with broad overlap- ping intellectual rights and sometimes, overlapping claims adds to the problem of thickets and leads to the fragmentation of the patent landscapethus hinder research efforts.}, tags={problems of patentabilityUniversity research, special categories for nanotechupstream patents, problems with too many restrictions on patent quality.defining lineage of products}, filename={Barpujari Kesselheim Avorn (20102005) - The Patent Regime And Nanotechnology Issues University Based Science And ChallengesBiotechnology Products.pdf}
}
@article{bawa2007nanotechnologykieff2011removing, title={Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation Removing Property from Intellectual Property and the Crisis at the US Patent Office(Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition}, author={BawaKieff, RF.Scott}, journal={Alb. LJ Sci. \& Tech.Supreme Court Economic Review}, volume={1719}, number = {1}, pages={699pp. 25-50}, year={20072011}, abstract={There is enormous excitement Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that sees property rule treatment of intellectual property (IP) as a cause of excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and expectation regarding nanotechnology's potential impact. Howeverretard innovation, competition, securing valid and defensible patent protection will be critical hereeconomic growth. Although early forecasts for nanotechnology commercialization The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift towards some limited use of weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are encouraging, there at their worst and where escape hatches are bottlenecks as wellmost needed. This essay is designed to make two contributions. One First, it shows how a set of changes in case law over just the past few years have hugely re-shaped the patent system from having several major hurdles , and helpful, liability-rule pressure-release valves, into a system that is an emerging thicket fast becoming almost devoid of patent claimssignificant property rule characteristics, resulting primarily from patent proliferationat least for those small entities that would most need property rule protection. The essay then explores some harmful effects of this shift, but also because of issuance of surprisingly broad patents by focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede the U.S. Patent beneficial deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and Trademark Office (PTO)competition. Adding to The basic intuition behind this confusion bad effect of liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the fact taht the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative's widelyability for a market-cited definition of nanotechnology is inaccurate challenging patentee to attract and irrelevant. This has also resulted in hold the PTO's flawed nanotechnology patent classification system. All constructive attention of this a potential contracting party (especially one that is creating a chaotic, tangled patent landscape in vairous sectors of nanotechnology (e.g., nanoelectronics and nanomedicinelarger more established party) in which competing players are unsure as while preserving the option to terminate the validity and enforceability negotiations in favor of numerous issued patentsstriking a deal with a different party. If this trend continuesAt the same time, it could stifle competition, limit access liability rules can have an additional bad effect of helping existing competitors to some inventions and simply grind commercialization efforts coordinate with each other over ways to a haltkeep out new entrants. ThereforeThe essay is designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular, reforms are urgently needed at as well as the PTO to address problems ranging from poor patent quality broader literatures on property and questionable examiniation practices to iinadequate search capabilitiescoordination, rising attrition, poor employee morale, and by first showing how a skyrocketing patent application backlog. Only seemingly disconnected set of changes to the legal rules impacting a robust particular legal regime like the patent system will stimulate can have unintended and sweeping harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within the more middle range of the development spectrum between the two poles of commercially viable nanotechnology productsproperty rules and liability rules, a general shift towards the property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in access and competition.}, discipline={Policy ReportEcon}, research_type={Theory, Basic Facts about the industry Discussion}, industry={NanotechnologyGeneral}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Therefore, if In the current dense patent landscape becomes more entangled and vast majority of the patent thicket problem worsensintellectual property (IP) literature, it may prove property rule treatment of IP is said to be the major bottleneck to viable commercializationcause excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, negatively impacting the entire nanotechnology revolution. For investorshold-ups, competing in this highhold-stakes patent game may prove too costlyouts, and trolls, unduly taxing and retarding innovation, competition, and economic growth.}, thicket_def={refs, quotes shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in acadmeic discourse as "a 'dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.'"... Such patent thickets, a result of multiple blocking patents, naturally discourage and stifle innovation...}, tags={too many rightsholders, cross-licensing, enforceability of patents, issues with patents Recent Trends in nanotechnologyCase Law about Patents and Liability}, filename={Bawa Kieff (20072011) - Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation Removing Property From Intellectual Property And The Crisis At The Us Patent OfficeIntended.pdf},
}
@article{bessen2003patentkim2004vertical, title={Vertical Structure and Patent thickets: Strategic patenting of complex technologiesPools}, author={BessenKim, JS.H.}, journal={Available at SSRN 327760Review of Industrial Organization}, volume={25}, number={3}, pages={231--250}, year={20032004}, publisher={Springer}, abstract={Patent race models assume It is well known that an innovator wins patent pools can enhance efficiency by eliminating the only patent covering a productcom- plements problem. But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership This paper investigates how the presence of vertically integrated firms affects the economic impact of a product’s technology is shared, not exclusivepatent pool. In that case I show that if Without a patent standards are lowpool, firms build “thickets” the presence of patents, especially incumbent integrated firms in mature industriesmay either increase or decrease the final product price as there are two countervailing effects – reduced double marginalization and raising rivals’ costs. When they assert these patentsHowever, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenseswhen there is a patent pool, making R&D incentives sub-optimalvertical integration always lowers the final product price. On In conclusion, the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and economic efficiency arguments for patent standards pools are high, enhanced when some firms pursue strategies of “mutual non-aggression.” Then R&D incentives are stronger, even optimalvertically integrated.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Mathematical},
industry={General, ICT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={When distinct firms are selling inputs – all of which are required for pro- duction of the final product – they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This paper argues that results in each patent thickets can reduce R&D incentives even when there are no holder setting too high a royalty rate. A ‘‘patent pool’’ has begun to attract widespread attention as a solution to both the transaction costs, holdup or vertical monopoly cost and com- plements problems.}, thicket_def={def29Refs shapiro and heller/eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={The problem Baker describes proliferation of fragmented and overlapping patent rights is often called increasingly being recognized as a “patent thicket.” These occur when each product may involve many patents, in contrast with the one-serious problem; referred to-one correspondence between products and patents that is assumed in the patent race literature. Recent commentators suggest that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, creating difficulties for innovators (see Gallini, 2002, for as a review).When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs ‘‘patent thicket’’ (or ‘‘anticommons’’ by Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Besides the additional transaction costs incurred in navigating a patent thicket, “holdup,” and problems of vertical monopoly Shapiro (Shapiro, 2001)has called attention to another source of inefficiency – the complements problem. When distinct firms are selling inputs – all of which are required for pro- duction of the final product – they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This results in each patent holder setting too high a royalty rate.}, tags={low innovation incentivesvertical integration, patent pools, lack of lead time advantagesraising rivals' costs, subsidize losers of innovation racesdouble marginalization}, filename={Bessen Kim (20032004) - Vertical Structure And Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex TechnologiesPools.pdf}
}
}
@article{calderini2004intellectualkwon2012patent, title={Intellectual Property Rights as Strategic Assets: The Case of European Patent Opposition in the Telecommunications IndustryThicket, Secrecy, and Licensing}, author={Calderini, M. and ScellatoKwon, GI.}, journal={CESPRIThe Korean Economic Review}, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation volume={28}, Universita'Bocconi, Working Paper number={1}, volumepages={15827--49}, year={20042012}, abstract={The This paper empirically investigates the phenomenon of considers a patent portfolio race where firms compete for complementary patents, called a patent litigation through the analysis of the all population of European patents’ opposition cases in the telecommunication industrythicket. We recover the complete legal history of each dispute and the patent portfolios of the When firms involved. We suggest have an option to keep their innovation secret, this paper shows that in there exists an industry characterised by strong technological complementarities the distribution of equilibrium where firms’ patent rights may induce situations of mutual hold-up among innovatorspropensity is strictly between zero and one. The risk of retaliation through counter- suits represents a credible threat that can eventually favour In such an equilibrium, stronger patent protection reduces the instauration of collusive behavioursfirms’ investment in innovation. Our results confirm Moreover, this hypothesis, since the occurrence of patent oppositions among large incumbents result does not change even when a licensing contract is significantly lower than industry averagefeasible.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, summary statistics}, industry={Telecommunications, ICT}, thicket_stance={n/aWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={n/aThus, on the one hand, firms would try to build up their patent portfolio, or patent thicket, to defend their product. On the other hand, such potential patent lawsuits would eventually reduce the R&D investment, called the hold-up problem.}, thicket_def={n/adef1}, thicket_def_extract={n/A growing number of studies have emphasized the negative effect of the hold-up problem when firms compete for aportfolio of complementary patents, called apatent thicket (e.g., Bessen 2004, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Shapiro 2001).}, tags={patent portfolios, strategic use of patents, retaliation riskEconomic model trying to solve the holdup problem by licensing}, filename={Calderini Scellato Kwon (20042012) - Intellectual Property Rights As Strategic AssetsPatent Thicket Secrecy And Licensing.pdf}
}
@articletechreport{carrier2002antitrustlampe2009patent, title={Why Antitrust Should Defer to Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the Intellectual Property Rules of Standard19th-Setting Organizations: A Commentary on Teece \& (and) Sherrycentury Sewing Machine Industry}, author={CarrierLampe, MR.AL. and Moser, P.}, journalyear={Minn. L. Rev.2009}, volumeinstitution={87National Bureau of Economic Research}, pagesabstract={2017Members of a patent pool agree to use a set of patents as if they were jointly owned by all members and license them as a package to other firms. Regulators favor pools as a means to encourage innovation: Pools are expected to reduce litigation risks for their members and lower license fees and transactions costs for other firms. This paper uses the example of the first patent pool in U.S. history, the Sewing Machine Combination (1856-2034}1877) to perform the first empirical test of the effects of a patent pool on innovation. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the sewing machine pool appears to have discouraged patenting and innovation, in particular for the members of the pool. Data on stitches per minute, year={2002}as an objectively quantifiable measure of innovation, abstract={confirm these findings. Innovation for both members and outside firms slowed as soon as the pool had been established and resumed only after it had dissolved.}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={DiscussionEmpirical}, industry={GeneralSewing},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The clearing of Almost one hundred years later, patent thickets pools have re-emerged as a remedy for industries that are plagued by litigation and fostering patent blocking, which occurs when owners of competing patents prevent the commercialization of cumulative innovation and new markets through SSOs offers perhaps the most powerful benefits for competition and innovationtechnologies.}, thicket_def={Refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={SSOsPatent pools, Role of Antitrustincentives to innovation}, filename={Carrier Lampe Moser (20022009) - Why Antitrust Should Defer To The Intellectual Property Rules Of SSOsDo Patent Pools Encourage Innovation.pdf}
}
}
@article{choi2005livelanjouw2004protecting, title={Live and let liveProtecting Intellectual Property Rights: A tale of weak patentsAre Small Firms Handicapped?}, author={Choi, J.PJean O.Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman}, journal={Journal of the European Economic AssociationLaw and Economics}, volume={347}, number={2-31}, pages={724-pp. 45-73374}, yearabstract ={2005}Abstract This paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978–99 by linking information from the U.S. patent office, abstract={Patent protection has gradually expanded over timethe federal courts, and many industry sources. We find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios. Patentees with a large portfolio of suspect value patents to trade, or other characteristics that facilitate “cooperative” resolution of disputes, are routinely granted owing much less likely to the lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination processprosecute infringement suits. However, postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics. This has resulted These findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in the recent explosion protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of patents granted and potentially creates a "patent thicket" that hinders future innovationtheir suits. I investigate the question Our empirical estimates of whether the heterogeneity in litigation process risk can be relied on help in developing private patent litigation insurance to restore competition when an imperfect market outcome is sustained through patents mitigate the adverse affects of suspect valuehigh enforcement costs. }, year = {2004}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press for The analysis undertaken in Booth School of Business of the paper points out the serious lack University of private incentives to eliminate patents Chicago and The University of suspect value through litigation. I also discuss potential measures to restore the soundness Chicago Law School}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 The University of the patent system.Chicago}, discipline={Law, Econ}, research_type={TheoryEmpirical},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The lack Carl Shapiro emphasizes that firms rely heavily on cross-licensing arrangements and patent pools as a way of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- in conjunction with the recent explosion mitigating these problems of patents granted- has led to a serious concern that the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating a "patent thicket"anticommons (Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003fragmented property rights).47 But small firms are effectively blocked from using these arrangements unless cash payments are accepted for participation, and typically they are not.}, thicket_def={refs shapiro, gallini, bessenReferences Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={The lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- in conjunction with the recent explosion of patents granted- has led to a serious concern that the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating a "patent thicket"(Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003).}, tags={patents of suspect value, litigation Litigation issues, substitute patents, exclusive rights to first invalidatorfor small firms}, filename={Choi Lanjouw Schankerman (20052004) - Live And Let Live A Tale Of Weak PatentsProtecting Intellectual Property Rights Are Small Firms Handicapped.pdf}
}
@techreportarticle{cohen2000protectingleaffer2009patent, title={Protecting their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions Patent Misuse and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)Innovation}, author={CohenLeaffer, W.M. and Nelson, R.R. and Walsh, J.P.}, yearjournal={2000}, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}, abstract={Based on a survey questionnaire administered to 1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufacturing sector in 1994, we find that firms typically protect the profits due to invention with a range of mechanisms, including patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and the use of marketing complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities Of these mechanisms, however, patents tend to be the least emphasized by firms in the majority of manufacturing industries, and secrecy and lead time tend to be emphasized most heavily.A comparison of our results with the earlier survey findings of Levin et al.[1987]sugest that patents may be relied upon somewhat more heavily by larger firms now than in the early 1980s.For the protection of product innovations, secrecy now appears to be much more heavily employed across most industries than previously Our results on the motives to patent indicate that firms patent for reasons that often extend beyond directly profiting from a patented innovation through either its comercialization or licensing.In addition to the prevention of copying,the most prominent motives for patenting include the prevention of rivals from patenting related inventions (i.e.,"patent blocking"),the use of patents in negotiations and the prevention of suits. We find that firms commonly patent for different reasons in "discrete" product industries, such as chemicals, versus "complex" product industries, such as telecommunications equipment or semiconductorsJ. In the former, firms appear to use their patents commonly to block the development of substitutes by rivals, and in the later, firms are much more likely to use patents to force rivals into negotiationsHigh Tech.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Empirical}, industry={General, Manufacturing}, thicket_stance={Neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={Our data do not show the degree to which patent portfolio races distort the nature of R&D incentives or lead to socially wasteful outcomes, or whether such portfolio races or patent thickets actually block entry. Nor do they indicate whether fee stacking or the breakdown of negotiations in complex technology industries have ever undermined the commercialization of innovation. The data do suggest, however, that the potential for such outcomes may be more pervasive than previously thoughtL.}, thicket_defvolume={def30}, thicket_def_extract={For example, the building of patent fences can be carried to the extreme noted by Scherer [1980] and others to the point of creating "patent thickets" that foster broader monopolies than anticipated by patent policy which in turn impede entry and the innovation that may accompany it.}, tags={patenting strategy, patent portfolio races}, filename={Cohen Nelson Walsh (2000) - Protecting Their Intellectual Assets.pdf} } @incollection{cohen2008real, title={Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research}, author={Cohen, W.M. and Walsh, J.P.}, booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 810}, pages={1--30142}, year={2008}, publisher={University of Chicago Press2009}, abstract={Numerous scholars have expressed concern over the growing "privatization of the scientific commons" represented by the growth in academic patenting. Even before the Bayh-Dole Act and the pervasive patenting of academic science, how ever, there was an earlier concern over the extent to which the drive for recognition among scientists and competition for priority and associated rewards also limited contributions to the scientific commons. This suggests the utility of a more open-ended consideration of the different factors-not just patenting-that might affect knowledge flows across scientists. In this paper, we use a simple economic perspective that emphasizes the benefits and costs of excluding others from research results and analyze the empirical evidence on exclusion in biomedical research. We suggest, first, that one might distinguish between legal and practical (i.e., lower cost) excludability- and that practical excludability, at least in the world of academic research, may have little to do with patents. At the same time, however, we suggest that excludability may indeed be a real concern for academic and, particularly, biom?dical research, but to understand where and how it occurs, we need to look beyond patents to consider additional ways in which flows of knowledge and other inputs into research may be restricted (including secrecy and control over materials). We do find restrictions imposed on the flow of information and materials across biom?dical researchers. While patents play some role, they are not determinative. What appears to matter are both academic and commercial incentives and effective excludability. Exclusion is rarely associated with the existence of a patent in academic settings, but is more readily achieved through secrecy or not sharing research materials.}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={EmpiricalWritten Theory}, industry={BiomedicalGeneral},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Even if Single company acquisition of a dense web of overlapping patents do not stop ongoing research, -patent thickets15-may create a seemingly impenetrable web which a company must hack its way through in order to commercialize new technology.1 6 As the very prospect number of a thicket or restricted access may dissuade researchers issued patents skyrocket, companies more frequently enter into arrangements with competitors "not only to recover their investment from choosing particular projects and limit lines creating patented products but also to avoid the patent landmines that line the path of attack in that wayinnovation."}, thicket_def={Refs Shapiro, Heller and Eisenbergdef34}, thicket_def_extract={Although their focus is largely on commercial projects, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and Shapiro (2000) suggest A firm with a large patent portfolio enveloping a competitor's key technologies-one that the patenting of could be termed a broad range of research tools that researchers need to do their work has spawned "patent thicketsthicket" that may make -has the acquisition of licenses and other rights too burdensome potential to use it to permit suppress competition in the pursuit ultimate goods market.142 As stated above, patent thickets may encompass patents of what should otherwise be scientifically and socially worth while researchdubious merit.143 Unfortunately, (engendering a tragedy it is costly to innovate around assertions of the "anticommons" [Heller and Eisenberg 1998]).15infringement}, tags={incentiesantitrust, sharing of information and knowledge, exclusionary behaviorpatent misuse}, filename={Cohen Walsh Leaffer (20082009) - Real Impediments To Academic Biomedical ResearchPatent Misuse And Innovation.pdf}
}
@miscarticle{competition2008pharmaceuticallee2006examining, title={Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry-Preliminary ReportExamining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket}, author={CompetitionLee, DGA.}, yearjournal={2008Nanotech. L. \& Bus.}, abstractvolume={3}, disciplinepages={Policy Report317}, research_typeyear={Empirical, Data Study of Large Originator Companies2006}, industryabstract={Pharmaceutical}A patent pool is a cooperative arrangement between several patent holders, thicket_stance={Pro}all of them necessary and fundamental to the creation of a product or process, thicket_stance_extract={One commonly applied strategy is filing numerous where all of the patents can be licensed at a single price. They are an attractive option for fragmented patent landscapes, where they are created in hopes of avoiding the same medicine (forming so called "high cost associated with acquiring numerous licensing agreements, avoid widespread patent clusters" or "patent thickets")disputes, and help create a standard, amongst other reasons. Documents gathered in This issue is especially relevant to the course emerging scientific field of nanotechnology, where there is widespread concern about the inquiry confirm that an important objective fragmentation of this strategy is the intellectual property landscape. This paper aimed to delay or block the market entry develop a general list of generic medicines. In this respect the inquiry finds that individual blockbuster medicines criteria to aid in determining whether patent pools are protected a viable option for a market by up examining relevant literature and conducting interviews; it was then applied to 1,300 patents the dendritic nanotechnology’s drug delivery and/or pending patent pharmaceutical applications EU-wide . The completed list had nine criteria and that, as mentioned abovewhen applied to the dendritic nanotechnology market, certain concludes that a patent filings occur very late in pool will not be necessary for the life cycle continued advancement of this application. The primary reason is that a medicinehuge amount of patents are in control of one company alone, Dendritic Nanotechnologies, and seem to be the primary source for the most highly sought after dendritic patents...In their submissions}, discipline={Management}, research_type={Written Theory}, industry={Nanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, both generic and originator companies support thicket_stance_extract={They are often viewed as the creation “simplest solution” to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with multiple stakeholders that have overlapping sets of IP (a.k.a single Community patent to amend the current costly and burdensome system consisting thickets) or are uncertain if there is possible infringement of patent issues (a bundle of national patents.k.a. Patent Hold-Up).}, thicket_def={def37}, thicket_def_extract={...to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with multiple stakeholders that have overlapping sets of IP (a.k.a patent thickets)}, tags={Pharmaceutical Generics and Originators, Patent Filingspatent pool, Industry Analysis, Europeannanotechnology}, filename={Competition Lee (20082006) - Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary ReportExamining The Viability Of Patent Pools For The Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
}
@article{dhar20071lemley2006patent, title={The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights in the Plant Patent Holdup and Seed IndustryRoyalty Stacking}, author={DharLemley, TM. and FoltzShapiro, JC.}, journal={Agricultural Biotechnolgy and Intellectual Property Protection: Seeds of Change}, pages={161}, year={2007}, publisher={CABI2006}, abstract={We study several interconnected problems that arise under the current U.S. patent system when a patent covers one component or feature of a complex product. This work uses changes situation is common in intellectual property rights regimes for plants as the information technology sector of the economy. Our analysis applies to cases involving reasonable royalties, but not lost profits. First, we show using bargaining theory that the threat to obtain a way permanent injunction greatly enhances the patent holder’s negotiating power, leading to identify royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark range based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of the patent. Such royalty overcharges are especially great for weak patents covering a minor feature of a product with a sizeable price/cost margin, including products sold by firms that themselves have made substantial R&D investments. These royalty overcharges do not disappear even if the allegedly infringing firm is fully aware of the patent when it initially designs its product. However, the hold-up problems caused by the threat of injunctions are reduced if courts regularly grant stays to permanent injunctions to industries and society of give defendants time to redesign their products to avoid infringement when this is possible. Second, we show how hold-up problems are magnified in the different components presence of property rights: exclusivityroyalty stacking, research exemptionsi.e., when multiple patents read on a single product. Third, using third-generation cellular telephones and revelation of research outcomes. A simple model is described Wi-Fi as leading examples, we illustrate that royalty stacking can account for these differences become a very serious problem, especially in company choice the standard-setting context where hundreds or even thousands of intellectual property versus keeping trade secrets. The data used include observations patents can read on multiple crop types over a span single product standard. Fourth, we discuss the use of 20+ years across 3 different intellectual property rights regimes“reasonable royalties” to award damages in patent infringement cases. Differences in We report empirical results regarding the replicability measurement of crop types are shown “reasonable royalties” by the courts and identify various practical problems that tend to cause intellectual property rights lead courts to have diverse sets over-estimate “reasonable royalties” in the presence of incentives royalty stacking. Finally, we make suggestions for research patent reform based on our theoretical and property rights claimsempirical findings.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical}, industry={AgricultureICT}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={A 2002 court ruling The fact that a great many patents can read on a single product, and that this is common in Madey v. Duke University greatly contracts certain critical industries, creates numerous practical problems for the operation of the research exemption rules on US patents especially for universities making this patent thicket potentially more of a problemsystem.}, thicket_def={def1, cites Heller and Eisenberg(1998)}, thicket_def_extract={A number of observers of patentingRoyalty stacking, particularly in the biological sciencespatent thickets, have suggested that patenting rules and overlapping claims the related “anti-commons” problem have generated a "patent thicket" that has impeded innovation and made the R&D process more costly (Rai, 2001; Rai, 1999). Rai (2001) for example, argues that broad patents especially on upstream platform technologies represent been a threat to competition and the cumulative process source of innovation concern in the biopharmaceutical industry.semiconductor and biotechnology industries for some time}, tags={firm strategyRoyalty-stacking, utility patents, revelation loss, IPR, trade secretshold-up}, filename={Dhar Foltz Lemley Shapiro (20072006) - The Impact Of Intellectual Property Rights In The Plant Patent Holdup And Seed IndustryRoyalty Stacking.pdf}
}
@article{d2009poolslemley2005probabilistic, title={Pools, Thickets and Open Source NanotechnologyProbabilistic Patents}, author={D'SilvaLemley, JM.A. and Shapiro, C.}, journal={European Intellectual Property ReviewThe Journal of Economic Perspectives}, volume={3119}, number={62}, pages={30075--30698}, year={20092005}, abstract={Discusses how }, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General, Pharmaceutical}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Similarly, patent thickets can have deleterious effects on both competition and innovation.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={In a number of key industries, particularly semiconductors (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and computer software (Bessen and Hunt, 2004), companies file numerous patent applications on related components that are integrated into a single functional product.The result is a "patent thicket," in which hundreds of patents can apply to a single product (Shapiro, 2001; FTC, 2003).}, tags={cross-licensing, uncertainty}, filename={Lemley Shapiro (2005) - Probabilistic Patents.pdf} } @article{lemley2005patenting, title={Patenting Nanotechnology}, author={Lemley, M.A.}, journal={Stanford Law Review}, pages={601--630}, year={2005}, abstract={Universities and companies are rushing to promote the development of patent office in record numbers to patent nanotechnology by overcoming problems with inventions. This rush to the patent systemoffice is so signficant that many law firms have established nanotechnology practice groups and the U. Considers how patent thickets S. Patent and Trademark Office has now created a new technology class designed to track nanotechnology products. Three big differences between the emerging science of nanotechnology and patent trolls may discourage innovative workother inventions make the role of patents more significant in this arena than elsewhere. First, this is almost the first new field in a century in which the basic ideas are being patented at the outset. Describes In many of the most important fields of invention over the past century - computer hardware, software, the Internet, even biotechnology- the advantages basic building blocks of licensing the field were either unpatented or teh patents were amde available to all users by government regulation. In others, patents were delayed by means interferences for so long that the industry developed free from their influence. In nanotechnology, by contrast, companies and universities alike are patenting early and often. A second factor distinguishing nanotechnology is its unique cross-industry structure. Unlike other new industries, in which the patentees are largerly actual or at least potential participants in the market, a significant number of nanotechnology patentees will own rights not just in the industry in which they participate, but in other industries as well.This overlap may signficantly affect thier incentives to license the patents. Finally, a patent poollarge number of the basic nanotechnology patents have been issued to universities, which have become far more active in patenting in the last twenty-five years. Examines While universities have no direct incentive to what extent inventors can benefit from restrict competition, their interests may or may not align with the experience optimal implementation of building-block nanotechnology inventions. The result is a nascent market in which a patent thicket is in theory a serious risk. Whether it will prove a problem in practice depends in large part on how efficient the open-source software movementlicensing market turns out to be.}, discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In most cases this will deter The dispersion of overlapping patents across too many smaller startups and research centres from attempting to traverse firms can also create an anticommons or thicket problem, making effective use of the patent thicket. Also broadtechnology difficult, overlapping and conflicting thickets are likely to lead to lengthy and costly patent battles.if not impossible}, thicket_def={def30def1, refers potential of building-block patents to stifle downstream innovation and difficulty of acquiring licenses from patent holders}, thicket_def_extract={When multiple organisations each own individual Some fear that ownership of nanotechnology patents that are collectively necessary for a particular technologyis too fragmented, their competing intellectual property rights form risking the development of a patent "patent thicket". (cites: Gavin Clarkson and David DeKorte, "The Problem of Patent Thickets in Convergent Technologies" [2006] Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1093, 181.)}, tags={Thoughts on the potential effect of patent pools, open sourcingthickets on the nanotech industry}, filename={DSilva Lemley (20092005) - Pools Thickets And Open Source Patenting Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={A second type of IPFirms can also address these problems in non-open-source ways, such as patent pools, standard-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many different patented technologiessetting organizations, each of which has no obvious substituteand self-imposed commitments. Firms may find themselves in In a patent "thicketpool," in which several parties are able firms blend their patents with those of other firms. These pools allow users to derail access a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contributions.12 Each firm can issue an ultimatumnumber of firms’ patents simultaneously, demanding a large share of thereby avoiding the platform's added value“patent thicket.”}, thicket_def={Refs Shapirodef38}, thicket_def_extract={A second type of IP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many different patented technologiesSecond, each open source avoids the problem of which has no obvious substitute. Firms may find themselves in a patent "thicket“patent thicket” when multiple firms have overlapping intellectual property rights," in which several parties are able and at least one party attempts to derail extract a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contributionshigh fee for its particular contribution.12 Each firm can issue an ultimatum, demanding a large share of the platform's added value}, tags={Shared Platformopen source, Licensingpatent pools}, filename={Eisenmann Lerner Tirole (20082005) - Managing Proprietary The Economics Of Technology Sharing Open Source And Shared PlatformsBeyond.pdf}
}
@article{eisenstein2010uplerner2003structure, title={Up for GrabsThe Structure and Performance of Patent Pools: Empirical Evidence}, author={EisensteinLerner, J. and Strojwas, M. and Tirole, J.}, journal={Nature Biotechnology}, volume={28}, number={6}, pages={544--546Working paper}, year={2010}, publisher={Nature Publishing Group2003}, abstract={As recently as three months ago, it still all seemed so simple. Shinya Yamanaka, whose team at the University of Kyoto in Japan is generally acknowledged by the research community as the first to successfully reprogram differentiated cells into iPS cells1, was also the sole patent holder for the technology. But as with any other patent land grab, iPS cell intellectual property (IP) is beginning to look less and less like a one-horse race. Two other recently issued patents in the United States and United Kingdom (Table 1), each awarded to a different inventor with a potentially strong claim to priority, now stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which was exclusively issued in Japan. With this newly tangled IP landscape, questions are arising about the possible emergence of a patent thicket. On the other hand, early signs suggest that the iPS cell marketplace may evolve to provide ample room for many different contenders. Whereas for now companies are focused primarily on iPS cell cultivation as a means for deriving clinically relevant mature cells, companies may take advantage of recent data on transdifferentiation that suggest that this pluripotent midpoint may even be dispensable in the future2.}, discipline={BiologyEcon}, research_type={DiscussionEmpirical, Regression}, industry={Stem Cells, BiologyGeneral}, thicket_stance={Weak Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={As recently as three months ago, it still all seemed so simple. Shinya Yamanaka, whose team at Numerous commentators have suggested that the University proliferation of Kyoto in Japan is generally acknowledged by the research community as the first to successfully reprogram differentiated cells into iPS cells1, was also the sole patent holder for the technology. But as with any other patent land grab, iPS cell these awards has had socially detrimental consequences: overlapping intellectual property (IP) is beginning rights may make it difficult for inventors to look less and less like a one-horse racecommercialize new innovations. Two other recently issued patents in the United States and United Kingdom (Table 1), each awarded to a different inventor with a potentially strong claim to priority, now stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which was exclusively issued in Japan. With Gallini [2002] reviews this newly tangled IP landscape, questions are arising about the possible emergence of a patent thicketliterature.)}, thicket_def={def39}, thicket_def_extract={A more benign alternative is that firms enter into patent pools to solve the “patent thicket” problem: the presence of overlapping intellectual property holdings that make it difficult for third parties to license patent holdings and develop new technologies.}, tags={iPS industry, intercountry patents, international applicationsPools}, filename={Eisenstein Lerner Strojwas Tirole (20102003) - Up For GrabsThe Structure And Performance Of Patent Pools Empirical Evidence.pdf}
}
@articletechreport{feldman2004openlerner2002efficient, title={The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Efficient Patent Misuse?Pools}, author={FeldmanLerner, RJ.}and Tirole, journal={Minnesota Journal of Law, Science \& Technology}, volume={6J.}, year={20042002}, disciplineinstitution={LawNational Bureau of Economic Research}, research_typeabstract={Theory, Discussion}, industry={Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to describe the problem The paper builds a tractable model of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barriers. Most scholars and those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of rights hamper research and innovation, particularly in the biotech field.21 One scholar, however, has challenged the notion.22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the problem of multiple rights for example, by moving offshore beyond the reach of the a patent rightspool, inventing around the rights, and using public research tools.23 In particular, Walsh argues that academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures and that an agreement among patent holders passively acquiesce.}, thicket_def={refs shapiro, lemley}, thicket_def_extract={Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” owners to describe the problem license a set of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barrierstheir patents to one another or to third parties. Most scholars It Þrst provides a necessary and those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of rights hamper research and innovation, particularly in the biotech field.21 One scholar, however, has challenged the notion.22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the problem of multiple rights sufficient condition for example, by moving offshore beyond the reach of the a patent rights, inventing around the rights, and using public research toolspool to enhance welfare.23 In particular, Walsh argues It shows that academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and that patent holders passively acquiesce.}, tags={open source biotechnology, academic research tools}, filename={Feldman (2004) - The Open Source Biotechnology Movement Is It Patent Misuse.pdf} } @article{fischer2011patent, title={Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology-An Empirical Analysis of Trolls' Patent Acquisitions}, author={Fischer, T. and Henkel, J.}, journal={Available at SSRN 1523102}, year={2011}, abstract={Patent trolls appropriate profits from innovation solely by enforcing patents against infringers. They are often characterized as relying on low-quality patents, an assessment that, only if correctthe pool is otherwise welfare reducing, would imply a property that eradicating such patents would effectively terminate allows the troll businessantitrust authorities to use this requirement to screen out unattractive pools. In this The paper, we shed light on this issue by empirically analyzing trolls’ patent acquisitions. We draw on then undertakes a unique dataset number of 565 extensions: cases where patents acquired by known patent trolls between 1997 and 2007differ in importance, which we compare to 1where asymmetric blocking patterns exist,130 patents acquired by practicing firms. Our findings regarding patent characteristics support recent theoretical propositions about the troll business model. Trolls focus on patents that have a broad scope and that lie in patent thicketswhere licensors are also licencees. Surprisingly, and contrary to common belief, we find that troll patents are We also undertake some initial explorations of significantly higher quality than those in the control groupimpact of pools on innovation. This result implies We conclude by showing that elevating minimum patent quality will not put an end to the patent troll businessanalysis has broader applicability than pools, and suggests that as it is sustainable in the long run. Furthermore, we discuss the fact that trolls are peculiar players on markets for technology insofar as they are solely interested in the exclusion right, not in the underlying knowledge. We posit that transactions involving patent trolls may only be the tip of the iceberg also relevant to a number of “patentco-only” transactions, a conjecture with strong implications for the efficiency of markets for technologies. Managerial and policy implications are discussedmarketing arrangements.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, ModelTheory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The second patent characteristic patent trolls should favor is a high cost of substituting the underlying invention Innovations in products. This substitution cost increases with the difficulty of inventing around the patentcomputer hardware, software, which in turn is high if the patent density and complexity biotechnology often build on a number of the relevant technology field is high. This means that many patents exist that have other innovations owned by a high degree diverse set of overlap between them owners and with the as a result patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent under consideration, so claims that finding a gap for a nonpreclude the adoption of new technologies -patented substitutive technology is difficultcan be severe.}, thicket_def={Refs Shapirodef40}, thicket_def_extract={This means that many patents exist that have Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a high degree diverse set of overlap between them owners and with the as a result patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent under consideration, so claims that finding a gap for a non-patented substitutive technology is difficult. In other words, preclude the focal patent is part adoption of a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001)new technologies - can be severe.}, tags={patent trolls, patent quality, licensingPatent pools, business modelwelfare}, filename={Fischer Henkel Lerner Tirole (20112002) - Efficient Patent Trolls On Markets For TechnologyPools.pdf}
}
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical, Econometric Model}, industry={General, SemiconductorsPolicy}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In particular, Shapiro (2001) has argued Many observers have suggested that a "patent -thicket" has appeared that renders it difficult problems where key patents are widely held affect many emerging industries. Patent thickets may lead to commercialize a new technologythree problems. In some industries the number of intellectual property rights First, royalty stacking may result: each individual patent holder may charge a firm requires to produce a new product is so largeroyalty that seems reasonable when viewed in isolation, and their ownership is so dispersedbut together they represent an unreasonable burden. Second, that it is quite easy even if other firms agree to unintentionally infringe on license their patents at a patent. In this environment there is, thereforemodest rate, a hold-up out problem: when may result if a single firm then sets a high license fee for its technology Finally, the very process of arranging the manufacturer starts selling its product needed licenses may prove to be time consuming. Patent pools thus offer a patentee might show up threatening to shut production down unless it is paid high royaltiesone-stop shop through which these problems can be avoided.}, thicket_def={refs shapirodef41}, thicket_def_extract={During the past few years various scholars1 and industry representatives Many observers have drawn attention to specific inefficiencies generated by the patent system in several industries. In particular, Shapiro (2001) has argued suggested that a "patent -thicket" has appeared that renders it difficult to commercialize a new technologyproblems - where key patents are widely held affect many emerging industries}, tags={Cross-patent pools, licensing, grantback, royalties, substitutes and complements, welfare}, filename={Galasso Lerner Tirole (20072008) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Public Policy Toward Patent LitigationPools.pdf}
}
@article{gaule2006towardslerner2007impact, title={Towards What is the Impact of Software Patent Pools in BiotechnologyShifts?Evidence from Lotus v. Borland}, author={Gaul{\'e}Lerner, J. and Zhu, PF.}, journal={Innovation Strategy TodayInternational Journal of Industrial Organization}, volume={225}, number={23}, pages={123511--143529}, year={20062007}, abstract={Economists have debated the extent to which strengthening patent protection spurs or detracts from technological innovation. This paper examines the reduction of software copyright protection in the Lotus v. Borland decision. If patent and copyright protections are substitutes, weakening of one form should be associated with an increased reliance on the other. We find that the firms affected by the diminution of copyright protection disproportionately accelerated their patenting in subsequent years. But little evidence can be found for any harmful effects on firms' performance and incentive to innovate: in fact, the increased reliance on patents is correlated with growth in measures such as sales and R&D expenditures.}, discipline={Management, LawEcon}, research_type={DiscussionEmpirical, Regression, Model}, industry={BiotechnologySoftware, Technology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The strength of the anti‐commons thesis rests on two assumptions that are very difficult to testenvironment is a complex one: (1) that developing commercial biomedical products requires access to many different IP rights and (2) that negotiating access with different patent owners is prohibitively difficult and costly. On the first pointother changes, such as the number widespread dissemination of biotechnology patents has certainly increased dramatically over the last decadeInternet, although may have differentially affected firms during this period. While our result contradicts the claim by itself that does not necessarily imply greater fragmentation. Walsh et al. Bessen and Hunt (20032004) report from interviews with biotechnology industry IP practitioners that preliminary freedom to operate searches can sometimes find hundreds of software patents relevant substitute for R&D at the firm level, increased reliance on patenting could at the same time contribute to a candidate product but patent thickets that on closer inspection “there may be, slow down overall innovation in a complicated case, about 6‐12 that they have to seriously address, but that more typically the number was zeroindustry.” Enough anecdotal evidence existsTherefore, however, to suggest that the fragmentation patent thicket problem – an overlapping set of patent rights in biotechnology is sometimes a serious concern.requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees (Shapiro, 2001) – could still exist}, thicket_def={Def32refs shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={The IP rights situation described above was arguably a classical case Therefore, the patent thicket problem – an overlapping set of a patent thicket with fragmented IP rights and uncertainty about requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology ownershipobtain licenses from multiple patentees (Shapiro, 2001) – could still exist}, tags={uncertainty, patent pools, cross-licensingand copyright protections}, filename={Gaule Lerner Zhu (20062007) - Towards What Is The Impact Of Software Patent Pools In BiotechnologyShifts.pdf}
}
@articletechreport{gilbert2004antitrustllanes2009anticommons, title={Antitrust for Anticommons and Optimal Patent Pools: A Century Policy in a Model of Policy EvolutionSequential Innovation}, author={GilbertLlanes, RG.Jand Trento, S.}, journal={Stanford Technology Law Review}, volume={2004}, year={20042009}, abstract={When innovation is sequential, the development of new products depends on the access to previous discoveries. As a consequence the patent system affects both the revenues and the cost of the innovator. We construct a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs in R&D to invent a new product. We ask three questions: (i) what is the net effect of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find that the answers to these questions depend on the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the inputs used in research.}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={Discussion, EquationsTheory}, industry={GeneralBiomedical, Biotechnology, ICT}, thicket_stance={Neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={When the inputs are complements, the profitability of the innovation is decreasing in the technological complexity. In the limit (when n -> infinity), when the degree of substitutability is below a threshold level, which is higher than 1, the innovation is never profitable. This paper therefore gives a formal treatment of the tragedy of the anticommons. On the other hand, when the inputs are substitutes, the profitability of the innovation is increasing in technological complexity. Even in this case, when n -> infinity, the cost of gathering all the inputs for the innovation is always too high from a social point of view and thus the probability of innovation is suboptimal.}, thicket_def={def5}, thicket_def_extract={As the number of inputs needed in research increases, the innovator faces a patent thicket and is threatened by the possibility of hold-up, namely the risk that a useful innovation is not developed because of lack of agreement with the patent holders. This problem has been dubbed the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller 1998, Heller and Eisenberg 1998).}, tags={Antitrust, patent poolspool, competitionlicensing}, filename={Gilbert Llanes Trento (20042009) - Antitrust For Anticommons And Optimal Patent Pools Policy In A Century Model Of Policy EvolutionSequential Innovation.pdf}
}
discipline={Law},
research_type={DiscussionWritten Theory}, industry={GeneralSoftware, Technology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets are common Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to many high-technology industries in which the manufacturecommercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, useas new technologies build upon old technologies, or sale of they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a device or process may require rights result, are often subject to hundreds the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.7 Overlapping patent rights raise numerous potential economic problemsg. Transaction costs of licensing can be high because licensees must identify, search hold-out, problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and negotiate with numerous separate licensors. Litigation risks can be high because an incomplete portfolio commercialization of patent licenses can expose a firm to potentially large infringement damagesthese new technologies.},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={A “patent thicketDespite the impressive pace of modern invention,” in which many independent patent holders commentators have rights observed a certain “patent thicket” effect that cover may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a technologyresult, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, is one example covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the anticommonsdevelopment and commercialization of these new technologies.}, tags={Patent PoolsOpen standards, SSO, }, filename={Gilbert Lin (20102001) - Ties That Bind Policies To Promote Good Patent PoolsResearch Versus Development.pdf}
}
@article{goozner2006innovationlin2011licensing, title={Innovation Licensing Strategies in Biomedicine: Can Stem Cell Research Lead the Way to Affordability?Presence of Patent Thickets}, author={GooznerLin, ML.}, journal={PLoS medicineJournal of Product Innovation Management}, volume={328},
number={5},
pages={e126698--725}, year={20062011}, publisherabstract={Public Library Many key industries (e.g., biomedical, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and information technologies) are characterized by cumulative innovations, where the introduction of a new product or service often requires many complementary technologies. When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firms, patent thickets exist, which researchers have argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, patent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, which is called ‘‘royalty stacking,’’ and if such costs are passed on to consumers, prices of products based on cumulative technologies will be driven up, dubbed as ‘‘double marginalization.’’ The literature, however, does not address these issues under different forms of licensing contracts. This article develops a game-theoretic model where a downstream firm seeks to license N patents that read on its product from upstream firms. It discusses a variety of licensing forms widely used in practice and attempts to discover whether royalty stacking and double marginalization occur under these forms of licenses. It also studies the impact of bargaining power between parties. It is found that when patent ownership becomes more fragmented, neither royalty stacking nor double marginalization occurs under profit-based royalty, fixed fee, and hybrid licenses. Such problems occur only under pure quantity-based or pure revenue-based royalty licenses when the downstream firm’s bargaining power is low. It is also shown that no matter how fragmented the ownership structure of patent is, hybrid licenses consisting of a fixed fee and a quantity- or revenue-based royalty rate lead to the same market outcomes as a fully integrated firm that owns all the patents and the downstream market. This article has interesting implications for both research and practice. First, the results show that even under the same patent ownership structure, different forms of licenses lead to quite different market outcomes. Therefore, it is suggested that firms and policy makers pay more attention to contractual forms of licenses when trying to minimize the negative impact of Science}patent thickets. Second, the extant literature has largely assumed that quantity-based royalties are used, where double marginalization is the most severe. In practice, revenue-based royalties are most common, under which double marginalization is much milder. Third, the results show that patent pools can be most effective in mitigating royalty stacking and double marginalization when quantity-based or revenue-based royalties are the sole or primary payment form, abstract={especially when downstream firms have low bargaining power.}, discipline={BiologyEcon}, research_type={PolicyTheory, Discussion, Industry StatisticsMathematical}, industry={Biology, Stem CellGeneral},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={While When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firms, patent thickets exist, which researchershave argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, especially in academiapatent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, fi nd ways around patent restrictionswhich is called ‘‘royalty stacking, ’’ and many companies have no trouble executing license agreementsif such costs are passed on to consumers, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines prices of inquiryproducts based on cumulative technologies will be driven up, dubbed as ‘‘double marginalization.’’}, thicket_def={refs heller eisenberg, refs eisenbergRefs Heller/Eisenberg/Lessig/Shapiro/Bessen and Maskin}, thicket_def_extract={While Related, and often overlapping, patents owned by many entities are often described as ‘‘patent thickets’’ and researchershave argued that patent thickets can be detrimental to innovation, especially in academiainformation industries such as software (see, fi nd ways around patent restrictionsamong others, Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Lessig, 2001; Shapiro, 2001; Bessen and many companies have no trouble executing license agreementsMaskin, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of inquiry2009).}, tags={IncentivesPatent Pools, Patent ProliferationLicensing, License AgreementsRoyalties, Patent Pooldouble marginalization, Open Sourceupstream, downstream}, filename={Goozner Lin (20062011) - Innovation Licensing Strategies In BiomedicineThe Presence Of Patent Thickets.pdf}
}
@article{hemphill2003preemptiveliu2008internal, title={Preemptive Patenting, Human Genomics, and the US Biotechnology SectorInternal Sequential Innovations: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights with Societal WelfareHow does Interrelatedness Affect Patent Renewal?}, author={HemphillLiu, K. and Arthurs, J. and Cullen, TJ.Aand Alexander, R.}, journal={Technology in SocietyResearch Policy}, volume={2537}, number={35}, pages={337946--349953}, year={20032008}, publisherabstract={Elsevier}The value of patented innovations has attracted substantial research attention, abstract={Within especially in the biotechnology sector context of the US economy, aggressive patenting, i.epatent renewal. preemptive patentingHowever, of human genomic research results often assumes that a firm’s patented innovations are practiced by private-sector firms, the academic community, independent from each other.We draw upon evolutionary economics and non-profit organizations. Preemptive patenting has traditionally been practiced by the private sector as suggest that some of a competitive strategyfirm’s patents share important genealogical relationships, being driven by economic considerationswhich we refer to as internal sequential innovations. Recently, academics We propose internal sequential innovations are more valuable and patients/consumers have instituted preemptive patenting strategies as a way of ensuring access therefore more likely to genomic sequences for, respectively, research study purposes and lifebe renewed than stand-enhancing access to diagnostic gene testingalone innovations. To reduce this non-economic motivation for preemptive patenting by these nontraditional competitors, it is recommended that the biotechnology industry initiate We examine our hypotheses from a strategy dataset of its own which will: (1) relax firm patent enforcement of genomic sequences that are essential for academic researchers to use in their studies; US pharmaceutical and (2) provide for a ‘means-test’ approach that incorporates a ‘staggered’ fee-schedule for academic researchers to charge their subjects, ibiotechnology patents.e. patients, for gene tests The results confirm our hypotheses at both the patent and diagnostic resultsthe firm levels.}, discipline={PolicyEcon}, research_type={DiscussionEmpirical}, industry={Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={ProAssumed Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent rightsWith the power of the intellectual regime, firms often attempt to create internal sequential innovations offer a ‘patent larger thicket,’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product or process, but on a host of related products or processes [11]. Firms protection that try to compete with can define the inventing firm will find their attempts to duplicate the central product or process blocked by the inventing firm’s grip on alternative underlying technologies. Many in a set of the firm’s overlapping patents on related products or processes may never be used or licensed; such ‘sleeping patents’ are held only to raise the costs of entry or imitation by potential rivals.}, thicket_def={def33def6}, thicket_def_extract={To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent rightsWith the power of the intellectual regime, firms often attempt to create internal sequential innovations offer a ‘patent larger thicketof protection that can define the underlying technologies in a set of overlapping patents. That is,’ ia sequence of patents revolving around the same technological trajectory can define the intellectual property more precisely and protect it with an enlarged degree of coverage.eThe holder of such patented innovations can thereafter exclude competitors from the collective scope of the claims laid out in all of the sequential patents (Wagner and Parchomovsky, 2005). obtaining patents not just on one central product or processIn contrast, but on stand-alone innovations are more likely to be invented around and the underlying intellectual property has a host higher hazard of related products or processes [11]being appropriated (Shapiro, 2000).}, tags={preemptive patenting, consumer welfare, international affairsInternal sequential innovations, strategic valuerenewals}, filename={Hemphill Liu (20032008) - Preemptive Patenting Human Genomics And The Us Biotechnology SectorInternal Sequential Innovations.pdf}
}
}
number={4},
pages={629255--633}, year={2006}, publisher={Elsevier}, abstract={Patents do not always promote innovation, particularly when they restrict access to fundamental scientific discoveries and the tools of basic research. However, there are legal and policy approaches that may help to ameliorate problems associated with patenting these sorts of inventions.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion, Commentary}, industry={General, Research}, thicket_stance={Weakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={Although upstream patents have been widely criticized, and there are a number of cases where specific patents clearly seem to have impeded innovation, there is little objective evidence to support a conclusion that patents constitute a widespread substantial obstacle to biomedical R&D, particularly in the academic sector.}, thicket_def={Refs heller/eisenberg, rai/eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={Upstream patents have been criticized on a number of counts. For example, it has been proposed that the proliferation of patents covering research tools has resulted in a “patent thicket,” rendering it virtually impossible to conduct biomedical research without inadvertently infringing upon a host of conflicting patent claims (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Rai and Eisenberg, 2002)}, tags={patents of dubious quality, research use, public domain}, filename={Holman (2006) - Clearing A Path Through The Patent Thicket.pdf} } @article{holman2008trends, title={Trends in Human Gene Patent Litigation}, author={Holman, C.M.}, journal={Science}, volume={322}, number={5899}, pages={198--199280},
year={2008},
publisher={American Association for the Advancement of ScienceSAGE Publications}, abstract={Patents are effective tools for promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. Originator companies should be able to recoup their R & D investments during the term of the basic patent / SPC on an active pharmaceutical substance. Generic competition should be available immediately after expiry of that term. The chances of market entry for generic medicines companies in all markets the day following expiry of the main basic patent in all European Union markets is, however, not possible or, at best, is extremely diffi cult. Due to a diminishing number of newly registered products and contracting product pipelines, originator companies may be tempted to unjustly prolong the patent monopoly of existing products. The result is known as the ‘ evergreening ’ of a basic patent with the help of follow-on patents to keep generic competitors off the market. These follow-on patents are often weak or trivial and, upon careful examination, it is clear that they should never have been granted. Patent quality is therefore of the utmost importance. The European patent system should only reward true inventions and should discourage patent applications for ordinary innovation. An important way of reducing the incidence of poor quality follow-on patents is to remedy certain structural defi ciencies and weaknesses in the current examination procedure. Priority must be given to ensuring that the European Patent Offi ce (EPO) has the resources it needs to continue to improve the quality of patent examiners, along with their training and remuneration, and to increase the number of more experienced senior examiners in order to give every patent application the deliberate, expert review it deserves. This would lead to a more stringent application of the patentability requirements and fewer trivial patents. Applicants should be more rigorously required to provide patent applications of the highest quality accompanied by all relevant information at the start of the examination process. Similarly, they should be under obligation to disclose all information known to them that is material to the patentability of their invention. Furthermore, better third-party participation would also help to avoid inappropriate follow-on patents from being granted. When such patents are granted, an immediate review should be possible to avoid the assertion of ultimately invalid patents to hinder generic competition. This would require an acceleration of the current opposition proceedings that today can take many years. The structure established under the European Patent Convention only provides for a common and single European patent application and granting system by the EPO. A European patent is not a unitary patent, but essentially a bundle of national patents. As a result, questions of patent infringement and validity are governed by various national laws and are handled by the national courts operating under different procedural rules. This purely national litigation system results in a complex arena of multiple patent litigation involving high costs, forum shopping and diverging, even contradictory, court decisions. The lack of a central judiciary composed of experienced patent judges is regarded as one of the major defects in the current patent system. An effective solution would be the creation of a central European patent court that would deal with questions of invalidity and infringement at a pan-European level. Until this has been achieved, specialised national patent courts should be created with technically skilled judges with powers to reach a decision within an acceptable timeframe. Furthermore, the standard for obtaining an interim injunction should be returned to its roots as an equitable remedy since injunctions today are often used simply as a litigious tactic. This change would require a litigant to establish the existence of irreparable harm that cannot be compensated by monetary damages before a court would take the far-reaching step of enjoining a product. Finally, measures should be taken to ensure that originator companies do not use other means to unjustly prolong their monopoly by, for example, introducing a system of patent linkage, obtaining improperly granted SPCs, deploying inaccurate marketing campaigns for promoting ‘ new ’ products with no substantial added therapeutic value as innovative products, etc.},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
industry={Biology, GeneticsPharmaceutical}, thicket_stance={AntiWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={There is also good reason to think that even Certain structural deficiencies and weaknesses in the claims most likely to be infringedcurrent examination procedure, reciting short fragments of genomic DNAhowever, or broadly defined methods result in the grant of testing for genetic variation, would not necessarily be infringed by all forms patents of WGSvariable quality, particularly next-generation technologies that do not amplify genes. A giving a patent owner / originator company that provides WGS services, but that leaves the job facing expiry of analyzing a basic product patent the sequence data for clinically important variations opportunity to others, would be particularly unlikely to be found liable for infringing any of these gene patentscreate what is known as a ‘patent thicket’ (see below). The most obvious structural issues are discussed below.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Whole Genome Sequencing, InfringementEvergreening}, filename={Holman Mallo (20122008) - Debunking Patent Related Barriers To Market Entry For Generic Medicines In The Myth That Whole Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands Of Gene PatentsEuropean Union.pdf}
}
@article{horn2003alternativemeniere2008patent, title={Alternative approaches to IP management: One-stop technology platform licensingPatent Law and Complementary Innovations}, author={HornM{\'e}ni{\`e}re, LY.}, journal={Journal of commercial biotechnologyEuropean Economic Review}, volume={952}, number={27}, pages={1191125--1271139}, year={2003}, publisher={Palgrave Macmillan2008}, abstract={As a pioneering, oneThe patent system was initially designed to provide incentives to develop stand-stop technology platform licensing enterprisealone innovations in fi
elds such as mechanics, MPEG LA chemicals or pharmaceuticals. Its application is presented therefore problematical in more recent
elds such as a template for patent poolingbiotechnology and ICT industries, where innovation patterns are different. A well-known problem concerns cumulative innovations. By providing Patent law must then trade off the marketplace rights granted to upstream patent owners with fairthe incentives to develop subsequent innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). Another issue concerns complementary innovations, reasonablewhich are the focus of the paper. When
final products embody several complementary innovations, non- discriminatory access to a portfolio the scattering of worldwide essential patents under a single licencebetween various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). In biotechnology, this example is the case of therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests that require the use of a one-stop technology platform licensing programme enables widespread implementationmultiple patented gene fragments (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, interoperability computer hardware and use of fundamental broad-based technologies covered by many patents owned by many software, where
firms have to navigate "patent ownersthickets" (Shapiro, 2001). This paper will: Shapiro (12001) present observations from MPEG LA’s unique experience reports, for example, that in the semi-conductor industry
rms receive thousands of patents each year and perspective including manufacturers can potentially infringe on hundreds of patents with a description single product". The situation is similar in the U.S. software industry, where there are potentially dozens or hundreds of patents covering individual components of a product(FTC, 2003). I study the necessary elements problem of the production of complementary innovations in a model of dynamic R&D competition between two
firms, and principles argue that in some cases complementary innovations should not be patentable as such, but bundled with other innovations prior to patenting. To do so I consider two complementary innovations and examine whether they should be patented separately or as a bundle. This approach echoes several papers on which such efforts cumulative innovations where patentability requirements are basedde
ned as the need to develop two or more successive innovations before obtaining a patent (Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Hunt, 1995; ODonoghue, what works Scotchmer and whyThisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). As regards complementary innovations, the optimal patenting rule depends on a trade-off between the pro
fit loss due to scattered complementary patents, and the possible bene
fit of patent disclosure. The scattering of complementary patents between different owners creates a double marginalization issue. Since each patentee behaves as a monopolist, the Cournot (1838) theorem predicts that prices do not maximize the
rmspro
ts (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2005)1 . The requirement that complementary innovations be bundled prior to patenting can be a way to prevent this pro
t loss. However, small innovations are not disclosed when innovations have to be bundled prior to patenting (2Scotchmer and Green, 1990) describe efforts . As a result,
firms lose the possibility to quit the race after a
first innovation has been patented, which leads to R&D cost duplications. I show that patent disclosure has a positive social effect, although it does not permit a fully effi cient coordination between
firms. In this context, bundling innovations prior to apply patenting can be more effi cient if innovations can be devel- oped quickly. As I argue in the Conclusion, this innovative licensing condition is consistent with the legal de
nition of the "inventive step" patentability requirement. The paper is structured in six sections. First, the model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 then considers the case in which innovations can be patented separately, while Section 4 focuses on the case in which they must be bundled prior to patenting. Section 5 compares the social outcomes of the biotechnology two require- ments. Finally, Section 6 concludes and pharmaceutical industries within discusses the larger context policy implications of historical patent pooling as a solution to biotechnology bottlenecksthe model.}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={DiscussionTheory}, industry={TechnologyICT, Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In addition, there has been enormous growth in The present paper upholds policy arguments that emphasize the number importance of issued patents containing progressively narrower claims. Therefore, licences under multiple patents owned by multiple patent owners are required. In the absence a severe application of this patentability requirement as a patent pool, the transaction costs required means to identify limit the blocking patents and conclude negotiations for a licence under each size of them (assuming the "patent owners thickets" and to promote innovation in sectors where complementary innovations are even willing to enter into licence negotiationsfrequent (Jaffe, 2000; Barton, 2003; FTC, 2003)... When
final products embody several complementary innovations, to say nothing the scattering of paying multiple royalties, are too costly for patents between various owners jeopardizes the average user – with commercial exploitation of the result that technological advancementproducts because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, adoption and use are impeded1990; freedom of technological movement is restrictedHeller & Eisenberg, 1998; the potential for conflict is increased; and traditional one-on-one licensing arrangements fall short.Shapiro, 2001)}, thicket_def={refs shapirodef1}, thicket_def_extract={ThereforeIt is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, if the ‘thicket’2 of essential IP rights underlying their use cannot be accessed under reasonable terms computer hardware and conditions software, where
rms have to navigate "patent thickets" (eg costShapiro, 2001) applied evenly to all similarly situated competitors, the best of standards often go unused.}, tags={technology platform licensingPatent disclosure, bundling and separate patents, standards pools}, filename={Horn Meniere (20032008) - Alternative Approaches To IP ManagementPatent Law And Complementary Innovations.pdf}
}
@article{hussinger2006silencemaskus2006reforming, title={Is silence golden? Patents versus secrecy at Reforming US Patent Policy: Getting the firm levelIncentives Right}, author={HussingerMaskus, K.E.}, journal={Economics of Innovation and New Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization}, volume={151}, number={84}, pages={735127--752153},
year={2006},
publisher={Taylor \& FrancisMIT Press}, abstract={In the 1990s, patenting schemes changed in many respects: up- coming new technologies accelerated the shift from price competition towards competition based on technical inventions, a worldwide surge in patenting took place, and the ‘patent thicket’ arose as a conse- quence of strategic patenting. This study analyzes the importance of patenting versus secrecy as an effective alternative to protect intellec- tual property in the inventions’ market phase. The sales figure with new products is introduced as a new measure for the importance of IP protection tools among product innovating firms. Focusing on the German manufacturing in 2000, it turns out that patents are impor- tant to protect intellectual property in the market, whereas secrecy seems to be rather important for early-stage inventions.}, discipline={EconPolicy}, research_type={empiricalCommentary, econometric modelDiscussion}, industry={General, Manufacturing}, thicket_stance={neutralWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={A further development is that In addition to the costs of individual patents gained in value by their ability , researchers have to be linked contend with other patents“patent thickets.” That is, which encourages patenting of marginal inven- tions. The resulting complex network technologies, such as biomedical research tools,embody a number of single patents that bears technological inputs, many legal pitfalls for of which are patented. A different company, in turn, could own each patent applicants was given . Negotiating these thickets raises the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001)cost of securing rights. These developments put into question Weaker patent standards encourage patent proliferation and an increased number enlargement of patents motivated by an increased need the thickets for IP protection research in areas such as biotechnology, agricultural chemicals, and hint at the strategic value of patents to have driven the patent surgepharmaceuticals.. To summarize: on the one hand, recent changes in patenting schemes have caused an elevated need for patents as an IP protection tool. On That suggests patent thickets and transactions costs may slow down the other hand, they gained in importance as strategic instrumentsdiffusion of scientific research.}, thicket_def={refs shapirodef42}, thicket_def_extract={The resulting complex network In addition to the costs of single individual patents that bears many legal pitfalls for patent applicants was given the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001)researchers have to contend with “patent thickets. These developments put into question an increased ” That is, complex technologies, such as biomedical research tools,embody a number of patents motivated by an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic value technological inputs, many of patents to have driven the patent surgewhich are patented.}, tags={patenting secrecyTRIPS, patent proliferation, firm strategyIPR Reform}, filename={Hussinger Maskus (2006) - Is Silence Golden Patents Versus Secrecy At Reforming Us Patent Policy Getting The Firm LevelIncentives Right.pdf}
}
@article{huys2009legalmasur2010costly, title={Legal uncertainty in the area of genetic diagnostic testingCostly Screens and Patent Examination}, author={Huys, I. and Berthels, N. and MatthijsMasur, GJ. and Van Overwalle, GS.}, journal={Nature biotechnologyJournal of Legal Analysis}, volume={272}, number={102}, pages={903687--909734}, year={20092010}, publisher={Nature Publishing GroupOxford University Press}, abstract={A The United States Patent and Trademark Office has acquired a well-deserved reputation for inefficacy and inefficiency. Proposals for reforming the patent landscape analysis of 22 common genetic diagnostic tests shows substantially fewer claims office have thus focused on genes per se than initially suggested but raises questions improving the quality of legal uncertainty patent review while decreasing its cost. Yet this view overlooks the valuable function performed by the high costs associated with obtaining a patent: these costs serve as an effective screen against low-value patents. Moreover, due to asymmetries in patent values, the claims’ scopecostly screen is likely to select against socially harmful patents in disproportionate numbers. Although the patent office is the most prominent forum in which this type of costly screening operates, it is not the only one. In a variety of other contexts, the private costs of navigating an administrative process may complement the process itself in screening out unwanted participants.}, discipline={BiologyLaw, LawPolicy}, research_type={Empirical studyDiscussion, Industry StatisticsCommentary}, industry={Biology, GeneticsGeneral}, thicket_stance={AntiAssumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={With respect to genesThird, 25% there are patents of low private value and low (or negative) social value; this class of the identified patentsincludes both discarded, filed by different applicants, claim a human gene, suggesting unenforced patents that increase the possibility of the existence of a search costs and risk imposed on commercial firms—the "patent thicket. In contrast to this relatively high number of gene claims", in popular parlance (Shapiro 2001)—and worthless, largely unenforceable patents usable only 3% of these gene claims can be classified as occupying a blocking positionfor extracting nuisance settlements (see Section 2.2. Therefore, a hindering patent thicket cannot be demonstrated).}, thicket_def={def33Refs Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={FirstThird, is a patent thicketthere are patents of low private value and low (or negative) social value; this class of patents includes both discarded, defined as many blocking unenforced patents from many different ownersthat increase the search costs and risk imposed on commercial firms—the ‘‘patent thicket, emerging ’’ in the genetic diagnostic sector?popular parlance (Shapiro 2001)...}, tags={genetic diagnostic testingScreening Patents, patent proliferation, research sectoradministrative costs of patents}, filename={Huys Masur (20092010) - Legal Uncertainty In The Area Of Genetic Diagnostic TestingCostly Screens And Patent Examination.pdf}
}
@article{iyama2005usptomerges2006introductory, title={The USPTO's proposal Introductory Note to Brief of a biological research tool patent pool doesn't hold waterAmicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange}, author={IyamaMerges, SR.P.}, journal={Stanford Law ReviewBerkeley Tech. LJ}, volume={21}, pages={1223997--12411016}, year={20052006},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Written TheoryCommentary, Discussion}, industry={BiologyGeneral, Technology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={But how likely is it that a As noted above, the existence of the patent thicket and the problem of low quality patents make it especially easy for biological research will develop? According trolls to acquire patents that arguably cover one of the NIH working group on research tools, hundreds or thousands of processes incorporated in a thicket of research tool patents has already begun to form.single high technology product.The troll waits until a company with deep pockets makes irreversible investments in the arguably infringing technology.The cumulative result troll may even revise the terms of these actions is the initial formation of patent (through a patent thicket for research tools"reissuance" or "continuation") in light of the target's investment in order to strengthen the infringement claim. The negative consequence troll then uses the threat of an extensive research tool patent thicket injunction shutting down production to demand a significant share of the total profit associated with the product. This gamesmanship results in no social benefit and its accompanying licensing scheme is the potential chilling effect on innovationa great deal of harm.}, thicket_def={refs shapiroShapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Under this metaphorAs the Federal Trade Commission recently explained, innovation in the computer and Internet industry is often incremental and cumulative, a patent thicket arises when each block and the pace of change is granted separate yet concurrent exclusivity rightsrapid. 4 The sonet result is that each marketable product in this industry may incorporate--often in an incidental, tangential, and sometimes unintentional way-called hundreds or even thousands of patented processes. This is commonly described as a "patent thicket is the resulting nexus ": "a dense web of concurrent and overlapping IP intellectual property rights that one a company must navigate hack its way through in order to practice any evolutionary form of scienceactually commercialize new technology." Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120-21 (Adam Jaffee et al. eds., 2001); see also To Promote Innovation 2:27-31, 3:2, 34-35, 52-53}, tags={Patent poolTrolls, antitrustinjunction}, filename={Iyama Merges (20052006) - The Usptos Proposal Introductory Note To Brief Of A Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesnt Hold WaterAmicus Curiae In Ebay V MercExchange.pdf}
}
@article{jacob2009patentsmertes2010managing, title={Patents Managing the Patent Thicket and PharmaceuticalsMaximizing Patent Lifetime in Vaccine Technology}, author={JacobMertes, M.M.M. and St{\"o}tter, G.}, journal={Human Vaccines}, Robin volume={6}, yearnumber={200910}, journalpages={A paper given on 29th November at the Presentation of the Directorate860-General of Competition’s Preliminary Report of the Pharma-sector inquiry863}, year={2010}, publisher={Landes Bioscience}, abstract={Patents are exclusive rights for a limited period of time that are granetd to provide an incentive for innovation and in exchange for the public disclosure of an invention. Patenting in the medical field, especially in the field of human vaccine technologies, is full of pitfalls, because the products that finally access the market are often covered by a multitude of exclusive IP rights. This commentary gives an overview on obstacles in vaccine patenting and how to overcome them, and intends to provide a patenting guideline for researchers.}, discipline={PublicLaw, Policy}, research_type={Discussion, Commentary}, industry={PharmaceuticalVaccine, Biology}, thicket_stance={NeutralWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Every patentee Managing the patent thicket in the fields of a major invention vaccine technology is likely to come up with improvements and alleged improvements to his invention. By the time his main patent has expired there will challenging as one product may be covered by a thicket plurality of patents intended exclusive IP rights that have to extend his monopolybe considered when developing a product and building up a patent portfolio. Some will be goodConsequently, others bad. It licensing is a key point in the nature of the vaccine industry.If a basic patent is held by a powerful patent system itself that this holder refusing to grant a license under reasonable commercial terms or abuses a market-dominating position, it should happen and it has always happened. There is nothing new about “evergreening”be examined, only whether the name and the implication which flows from the word, that there is something sinister going on and that it has only recently been discoveredrequirements to request a compulsory license are fulfilled.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={competitionlicensing, patent portfolio}, filename={Jacob Mertes Stotter (20092010) - Patents Managing The Patent Thicket And PharmaceuticalsMaximizing Patent Lifetime In Vaccine Technology.pdf}
}
@article{jensen2004achievingmeurer2002business, title={Achieving the optimal power of patent rightsBusiness Method Patents and Patent Floods}, author={JensenMeurer, P.HM. and Webster, EJ.}, journal={Australian Economic ReviewWash. UJL \& Pol'y}, volume={37}, number={48}, pages={419309--426342}, year={2004}, publisher={Wiley Online Library2002}, abstract={In this paper, we identify three policy instruments governments have at their disposal to affect the power of patent rights to prevent imitation: the size of the inventive step used to make the patent granting decision, the rigour of the patent examination process and the predisposition of the courts to affirm the patent office's decision. We develop a simple framework to analyse the effects of changing these policy instruments on ex ante investment in invention in the light of recent concerns about the potential effects of socially undesirable patents.}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={Written TheoryDiscussion, Commentary},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The patent owner may do this by creating Furthermore, a thicket of pantents, so other parties are swamped with so much complex technical documentation that they cannot separate patents may stultify development of technology because of the chaff cost of securing patent licenses from the wheat. Developing large numbers of patent thickets is relatively easy to do in this regime since the patent examination process is cursory..owners.the average cost of dispute resolution will be high}, thicket_def={def35def43}, thicket_def_extract={The patent owner may do this by creating Furthermore, a thicket of pantents, so other parties are swamped with so much complex technical documentation that they cannot separate patents may stultify development of technology because of the chaff cost of securing patent licenses from the wheat. Developing patent thickets is relatively easy to do in this regime since the large numbers of patent examination process is cursoryowners...the average cost of dispute resolution will be high}, tags={Designing patent systempools, business methods patents, patent floods}, filename={Jensen Webster Meurer (20042002) - Achieving The Optimal Power Of Business Method Patents And Patent RightsFloods.pdf}
}
@articlebook{kato2004patentmuris2001competition, title={Patent pool enhances market competitionCompetition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead}, author={KatoMuris, AT.J.}, journal={International Review of Law and Economics}, volume={24}, number={2}, pages={255--268}, year={20042001}, publisher={ElsevierUS FTC}, abstract={This article investigates a pool of substitute patents that enable firms to reduce marginal costs of production. Contrary to the general belief, it is shown that a pool of substitute patents may promote competition under certain conditions, thereby enhancing social welfare in the product market. The intuition is that when firms compete in licensing fees, resultant low licensing fees discourage firms from licensing to outside firms. This leads to fewer licensees than when a patent pool is formed.}, discipline={EconPolicy}, research_type={Model, TheorySpeech},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={ProWeakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={In the field of economicsMoreover, even if there were a "patent pools are analyzed by Shapiro (2000). He considers the role of patent pools in “patent thicket" problem,” which means that there are so many patents issued others state that firms have found a single new patent will likely infringe on some other patents. This situation discourages and retards researchrange of means to overcome these obstacles, development including cross-licenses and commercializationpatent pooling.}, thicket_def={Refs Quotes Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={In the field of economicsAccording to Professor Carl Shapiro, a "patent pools are analyzed by Shapiro (2000). He considers the role of patent pools in “patent thicket" has formed,” which means that there are so many patents issued he describes as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a single company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new patent will likely infringe on some other patents. This situation discourages and retards research, development and commercializationtechnology."}, tags={patent poolsCompetition, FTC, substitute patentsAntitrust, welfareIPR Reform}, filename={Kato Muris (20042001) - Patent Pool Enhances Market CompetitionAnd Intellectual Property Policy The Way Ahead.pdf}
}
@article{kesselheim2005universitynapoleon2009impact, title={University-based science Impact of Global Patent and biotechnology productsRegulatory Reform on Patent Strategies for Biotechnology}, author={KesselheimNapoleon, A.SV. and Avorn, J.}, journal={JAMA: the journal of the American Medical AssociationPitt. J. Tech. L. \& Pol'y}, volume={293}, number={79}, pages={8501--85431}, year={2005}, publisher={Am Med Assoc2009}, abstract={The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries have long relied on pat- enting as the primary means of allocating ownership and control over new discoveries. Yet, patent protection is a double-edged sword that has major implications for the future of innovation in biomedical science in the United States. Excessive “upstream” patenting of genes and molecular targets could hinder further research by creating a need for expensive and inefficient cross- licensing. However, limiting such basic science patenting could allow pri- vate entities to use the results of years of costly publicly funded research to produce and market lucrative products without compensating university- or public sector–based innovators. Academic and other nonprofit research cen- ters would, therefore, be deprived of revenue for pursuing novel therapeu- tics or other seminal research work that may not be patentable. Recent court cases illustrate the inherent conflicts in allocating ownership and control of basic biomedical discoveries. Several options exist to avoid the complex prob- lems of overlapping basic science patents while still rewarding pivotal dis- coveries and encouraging further innovation. These include establishing ba- sic science patent pools and mandating arbitration arrangements that would assign credit and royalties for biotechnology innovations that depend on prior research that was performed, financed, or both in the public sector.}, discipline={BiologyLaw, Policy},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Basic investigations conducted at universities Pharmaceutical companies typically grow a patent thicket seeking a wide range of chemical variants and academic medical cen- tersanalogs, methods of synthesizing the drug, chemical intermediates in this synthesis, usually publicly fundeddifferent crystal forms, often pro- duce key insights about the mecha- nisms underlying physiological function different finished dosage forms and disease statesvarious methods of use. Private corpora- tions 62 Obtaining permission from various patent holders for use of patents can then commercialize these insights prove to be difficult particularly if the patent holder’s objective in creating the thicket is to block innovation by designing outsiders. Because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on them. In this chain of developmenttechnologies, allowing patenting of each incremental we could conceivably witness cumulative innovation could risk generating with infringement on many patents which ultimately serves as a dense thicket of overlap- ping intellectual rights drag on innovation and thus hinder research effortscommercialization.}, thicket_def={quotes shapiroQuotes Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Basic investigations conducted at universities and academic medical cen- tersThis pattern, usually publicly fundedhowever, often pro- duce key insights about the mecha- nisms underlying physiological function and disease states. Private corpora- tions can then commercialize these insights by designing and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on themhas created what some would characterize as a “Patent Thicket” 59 in biotechnology. In this chain of developmentThat is, allowing patenting emerging from the overabundance of each incremental innovation could risk generating a patent filings and associated activity is “a dense thicket web of overlap- ping overlapping intellectual rights and thus hinder research efforts.property rights”}, tags={University research, upstream patentsInternational Patent System, defining lineage of productsIPR Reform}, filename={Kesselheim Avorn Napoleon (20052009) - University Based Science Impact Of Global Patent And Regulatory Reform On Patent Strategies For Biotechnology Products.pdf}
}
@article{kim2004verticalnielsen2006compulsory, title={Vertical Structure and Compulsory Patent PoolsLicensing: Is It a Viable Solution in the United States}, author={KimNielsen, C.M. and Samardzija, SM.HR.}, journal={Review of Industrial OrganizationMich. Telecomm. \& Tech. L. Rev.}, volume={25}, number={313}, pages={231--250509}, year={20042006}, publisherabstract={Springer}As technology continues to advance at a rapid pace, abstract={It is well known so do the number of patents that patent pools can enhance efficiency by eliminating cover every aspect of making, using, and selling these innovations. In 1996, to compound the rapid change of technology, the com- plements problemU.S. Supreme Court affirmed that business methods are also patentable. This paper investigates how Hence in the presence current environment, scores of vertically integrated firms affects patents, assigned to many different parties, may cover a single electronic device or software—making it increasingly impossible to manufacture an electronic device without receiving a cease and desist letter or other notice from a patentee demanding a large royalty or threatening an injunction. Companies, particularly those in the economic impact high technology sector, have been asserting for some time now that they are under constant threat of a patent poollawsuits that threaten to shut them down. Without As a patent poolresult, numerous radical changes to the presence of integrated firms may either increase or decrease U.S. Patent Act and patent practice before the final product price as there U.S. Patent & Trademark Office have been proposed. Certain proposed changes, however, are two countervailing effects – reduced double marginalization meeting with resistance because of a reliance on long term patent protection and raising rivals’ costsexclusivity of patent rights by different industries. HoweverNotwithstanding, when there is certain foreign governments have already enacted provisions making it possible to obtain a compulsory patent pool, vertical integration always lowers license in the final product price. In conclusion, event that a patentee is not practicing his invention or is simply refusing to license the economic efficiency arguments rights to his invention for patent pools are enhanced when some firms are vertically integrateda reasonable royalty fee.}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={Theory, MathematicalDiscussion}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={When distinct firms are selling inputs – all of which are required for pro- duction Many of the final product – they fail to internalize patents overlap and block the effect use of other patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputsa company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology. This results in each ”3 It is hypothesized that patent holder setting too high a royalty rate. A ‘‘patent pool’’ has begun thickets increase transactional costs and stifle innovation by making it more expensive and difficult to attract widespread attention as a solution bring new developments to both the transaction cost and com- plements problemsmarket. }, thicket_def={Refs shapiro and heller/eisenbergQuotes Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={The proliferation Many of fragmented the patents overlap and block the use of other patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web of overlapping patent intellectual property rights is increasingly being recognized as a serious problem; referred to as that a ‘‘patent thicket’’ (or ‘‘anticommons’’ by Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Besides the additional transaction costs incurred company must hack its way through in navigating a patent thicket, Shapiro (2001) has called attention order to another source of inefficiency – the complements problem. When distinct firms are selling inputs – all of which are required for pro- duction of the final product – they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This results in each patent holder setting too high a royalty rateactually commercialize new technology. ”}, tags={vertical integration, patent pools, raising rivals' costsCompulsory Licensing, double marginalizationRoyalties}, filename={Kim Nielsen Samardzija (20042006) - Vertical Structure And Compulsory Patent PoolsLicensing.pdf}
}
discipline={Law},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion}, industry={GeneralNanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={All three developments have led While many companies will want to use these nanomaterials, the LuxReport states these companies will be forced to what is perceived as a marked increase in junk license patentsfrom many different sources. Potentially, as well as what Carl Shapiro has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping sets of patent rights leading there will be significant transactional costs for further nanotechnology developments due to a maze these overlapping claims. Moreover, the quality of cross-licensing agreementsthese nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question, as well as " so the rise navigation of hold-up litigationa patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents.}, thicket_def={Refs Shapirodef1}, thicket_def_extract={All three developments have led to what The notion of a patent thicket is perceived as a marked increase in junk patents, as well as what Carl Shapiro has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping sets where an overlapping set of patent rights leading requires that those seeking to a maze of cross-licensing agreements, as well as the rise of hold-up litigation.commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees}, tags={supreme court, cases, patent reformWritten Description Requirement for Patent Grant Procedures}, filename={King Paredes (20072006) - Clearing The Patent ThicketWritten Description Requirement In Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
@techreportarticle{lampe2009patentrai2003engaging, title={Do Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-century Sewing Machine IndustrySystem Reform}, author={LampeRai, RArti K.L. and Moser}, journal = {Columbia Law Review}, P. volume = {103}, yearnumber ={20095}, institutionpages ={National Bureau of Economic Researchpp. 1035-1135}, abstract={Members The Court of a Appeals for the Federal Circuit, charged with adjudicating appeals in patent pool agree to use a set cases, has adopted an unusual approach that arrogates power over fact finding while it simultaneously invokes rule-formalism. Although the Federal Circuit's approach may be justified by the fact-finding and policy application deficiencies of patents as if they were jointly owned by all members the trial courts and the Patent and license them as Trademark Office (PTO), it has had a package to other firms. Regulators favor pools as a means to encourage negative impact on innovation: Pools are expected to reduce litigation risks for their members policy and lower license fees and transactions costs for other firmshas resulted in a patent system that is sorely in need of reform. This paper uses Article argues that because of the example interdependence of the first various institutions within the patent pool in U.S. historysystem, reform of the Sewing Machine Combination (1856system must be both multi-1877) institutional and closely attentive to perform the first empirical test institutional competence of the effects system's actors. Although Congress should clearly bolster the PTO's fact-finding abilities, giving plenary responsibility over factual questions to the PTO would not be cost effective. Accordingly, Congress should endow the system with improved fact-finding expertise through the institution of a patent pool on innovationspecialized trial courts. Contrary to theoretical predictionsAs for actual policy formulation, each of the sewing machine pool appears to have discouraged patenting and innovationavailable institutional options--the legislature, in particular for the members of PTO, and the poolcourts--has substantial associated liabilities. Data on stitches per minuteOn balance, however, the Federal Circuit is probably best positioned to formulate patent policy, so long as an objectively quantifiable measure the fact-finding expertise of innovation, confirm these findingsinferior institutions is bolstered and additional appellate mechanisms are instituted. Innovation for both members By paying attention to institutional design and outside firms slowed as soon as revising our institutions accordingly, we can achieve the pool patent system we should have had been established and resumed only after it had dissolvedall along.}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={EmpiricalDiscussion, Theory}, industry={SewingGeneral}, thicket_stance={ProNeutral}, thicket_stance_extract={Almost one hundred years laterDefensive patenting has become particularly prominent in certain industries like the semiconductor industry, where innovation is cumulative, and a thicket of relevant patents often exists. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, patent pools have reThe Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-emerged as a remedy for 1995, 32 RAND J. Econ. 101, 104 (2001). In such industries , firms gain freedom to operate through defensive patenting. Indeed, within the semiconductor industry, it appears that are plagued much of the increase in patenting per R&D dollar over the last two decades has been the consequence of defensive patenting. See id. (noting that firms "appear to be engaged in 'patent portfolio races' aimed at reducing concerns about being held up by litigation external patent owners and at negotiating access to external technologies on more favorable terms"). According to Hall and Ziedonis, this increase in defensive patenting "is causally related to the pro-patent blocking, which occurs when owners of competing patents prevent shift in the U.S. legal environment in the commercialization of new technologies1980s." Id. I discuss this alleged "pro-patent" shift infra Part III.B.}, thicket_def={Refs shapiroReferences Heller/Eisenberg, Multiple overlapping patents}, thicket_def_extract={Moreover, the guidelines on utility incorporate, at least implicitly, economic concerns that setting the utility standard too low could impede scientific progress by creating a transaction-cost-heavy thicket of patents on basic research}, tags={Patent pools, incentives to innovationIPR Reform}, filename={Lampe Moser Rai (20092003) - Do Patent Pools Encourage InnovationEngaging Facts And Policy.pdf}
}
@techreportarticle{lampe2012patentreitzig2007sharks, title={Do On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New DealPrey—Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed”}, author={LampeReitzig, RM.Land Henkel, J. and MoserHeath, PC.}, yearjournal={Research Policy}, volume={36}, number={1}, pages={2012134--154}, institutionyear={National Bureau of Economic Research2007}, abstract={Patent trolls (or sharks) are patent holding individuals or (often small) firms who trap R&D intensive manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms and large manufacturers within a theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Econometric ModelTheory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={For example, We further argued that the creation increasing technology monitoring efforts for victims of a pool may reduce the need for member trolls, namely large manufacturing R&D intensive firms , due to create ballooning numbers of patent thickets applications, probably led to the increase of sharks’ relevance for innovators. It facilitates 'trapping’ manufacturers by reducing ‘hiding’ patented technologies in confusing patent thickets—a second necessary condition for sharks to operate. oreover, the threat strengthening of litigation patent holder’s rights in certain jurisdictions (e.g.the US) most likely enabled sharks to operate more profitably, Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004)too.}, thicket_def={refs shapirodef7}, thicket_def_extract={We also investigate whether part As both articles show, the “strategic use” of patents (the observed decline may be driven by two most important types being blocking and cross-licensing with patent ‘thickets’ playing a reduction in lower-quality or “strategic” patents. For examplemajor role for the latter), has classically been discussed from the creation perspective of a pool may reduce the need for member firms to create those patent thickets by reducing holders who either engage in the threat production of litigation (etheir own technological goods or consider themselves professional intellectual property suppliers who repeatedly interact with manufacturers.g., Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004)}, tags={patent pools, effects on innovationPatent Trolls and Sharks and their operations}, filename={Lampe Moser Reitzig Henkel Heath (20122007) - Do On Sharks Trolls And Their Patent Pools Encourage InnovationPrey.pdf}
}
@articleinproceedings{leaffer2009patentrubinfeld2004strategic, title={Patent Misuse and InnovationThe Strategic Use of Patents: Implications for Antitrust}, author={LeafferRubinfeld, MD.}L. and Maness, journal={J. High Tech. LR.}, volumebooktitle={10}Antitrust, pages={142Patent and Copyright Conference}, year={20092004},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Written TheoryDiscussion}, industry={GeneralRetail}, thicket_stance={Weak ProNeutral}, thicket_stance_extract={Single company acquisition The competitive offensive advantage associated with a patent thicket can be high. It follows, of course, that there is also a dense web of overlapping patents-patent thickets15-substantial defensive advantage as well. The result may create a seemingly impenetrable web which be a company must hack its way through in order “race” to commercialize new technologygrow one’s IP portfolio.1 6 As Unfortunately, however, it is not clear whether that race will be “to the number of issued patents skyrockettop” (i.e., companies more frequently enter into arrangements with competitors "not only to recover their investment from creating patented products but also to avoid in the patent landmines that line social interest), or “to the path bottom” (i.e., harmful from a social point of innovationview)."}, thicket_def={def34def1}, thicket_def_extract={A firm with Shapiro (2001) characterizes a large patent portfolio enveloping thicket as a competitor's key technologies-one “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that could be termed a "patent thicket"-has the potential company must hack its way through in order to use it to suppress competition in the ultimate goods marketactually commercialize new technology.142 As stated above, patent thickets may encompass patents of dubious merit.143 Unfortunately, it is costly to innovate around assertions of infringement”}, tags={antitrust, patent misusePatent Thickets strategic use in negotiation and business strategy}, filename={Leaffer Rubinfeld Maness (20092004) - Patent Misuse And InnovationThe Strategic Use Of Patents Implications For Antitrust.pdf}
}
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={They are often viewed as the “simplest solution” to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with multiple stakeholders that Patent thickets have overlapping sets of IP (long been a.k.a patent thickets) or are uncertain if there is possible infringement concern due to the potential for delaying deployment of patent issues (a.k.a. Patent Hold-Up)products and adversely affecting consumers.}, thicket_def={def37def9}, thicket_def_extract={...Patent thickets, layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with offer products that embody technologies owned by multiple stakeholders that firms, and licensing policies have overlapping sets drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers. Patent thickets involve complementary products, which gives rise to double marginalization - the so-called royalty stacking problem - and has the potential to retard diffusion of IP (anew technologies and reduce consumer welfare.k.a patent thickets)}, tags={patent poolOptimal licensing policies regarding downstream competition, nanotechnologyfixed access fees}, filename={Lee Rey Salant (20062012) - Examining The Viability Abuse Of Patent Pools For The Growing Nanotechnology Patent ThicketDominance And Licensing Of Intellectual Property.pdf}
}
@article{lei2009patentsshapiro2003antitrust, title={Patents versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological ResearchAntitrust limits to patent settlements}, author={LeiShapiro, ZC. and Juneja}, R. and Wright journal={RAND Journal of Economics}, B.D. pages={391--411}, year={20092003}, abstract={A new survey shows scientists consider the proliferation Patents, patent litigation, and patent settlements increasingly influence competition. Settlements of intellectual property protection patent disputes come in many forms,including licensing and cross-licensing agreements, patent pools, mergers, and joint ventures. While frequently procompetitive, such settlements can stifle competition and harm consumers. I propose a specific antitrust rule limiting such settlements: a settlement must leave consumers at least as well off as they would have been from ongoing patent litigation. After establishing that profitable settlements satisfying this constraint generally exist, I show how this antitrust rule can be used to have a strongly negative effect on researchevaluate three types of settlements: mergers, patent pools, and negotiated entry dates.}, discipline={Biologyecon}, research_type={Survey, Regressiontheory}, industry={Biologygeneral}, thicket_stance={AntiAssumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Our respondents do not encounter an anticommons or As described in Shapiro (2001), more and more companies are facing a patent thicket. Rather, they believe that institutionally mandated MTAs put sand in the wheels of a lively system of intradisciplinary exchanges of research tools. Seeing no countervailing effect on the supply of these tools, they conclude that patenting impedes the progress of researchrequiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market.}, thicket_def={cites Shapiro and heller/eisenbergdef1}, thicket_def_extract={This question has been of particular concern for the biological sciencesAs described in Shapiro (2001), where production more and exchange of biological ‘research tools’ more companies are important for ongoing scientific progress. Recent studies addressing this issue in the United States1,2, Germany3, Australia4 and Japan5 find that “patent thickets”6 or an “anticommons”7 rarely affect the research of academic scientistsfacing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market.}, tags={research accessMergers, open sourcePatent Pools, IP RightsNegotiated Entry Dates, Settlement effects}, filename={Lei Juneja Wright Shapiro (20092003) - Patents Versus PatentingAntitrust Limits To Patent Settlements.pdf}
}
@article{lerner2005theeconomicssabety2004nanotechnology, title = {The Economics of Technology SharingNanotechnology innovation and the patent thicket: Open Source and BeyondWhich IP policies promote growth}, author = {LernerSabety, Josh and Tirole, JeanT.}, journal = {The Journal of Economic PerspectivesAlb. LJ Sci. \& Tech.}, volume = {19}, number = {215}, pages = {pp. 99-120}, abstract = {This paper reviews our understanding of the growing open source movement. We highlight how many aspects of open source software appear initially puzzling to an economist. As we have acknowledge, our ability to answer confidently many of the issues raised here questions is likely to increase as the open source movement itself grows and evolves. At the same time, it is heartening to us how much of open source activities can be understood within existing economic frameworks, despite the presence of claims to the contrary. The labor and industrial organization literatures provide lenses through which the structure of open source projects, the role of contributors, and the movement's ongoing evolution can be viewed.477}, year = {20052004}, publisher abstract= {American Economic Association}, copyright = {Copyright © 2005 American Economic Association}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={Discussion, Written Theory}, industry={GeneralNanotechnology, Radio}, thicket_stance={ProNeutral}, thicket_stance_extract={Firms can also address these problems in non-open-source waysOn the one hand, such as the fear of the patent pools, standard-setting organizationsthicket has been raised: "[i]f you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and self-imposed commitmentsso . . . In a the breadth and utilization of patent poolrights can be used not only to stifle competition, firms blend their patents with those of but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation."9On the other firms. These pools allow users hand, encouraging private investment in commercialization has also been raised: "[b]y enabling corporations to access a number negotiate exclusive licenses of firms’ patents simultaneouslypromising technologies [that were publicly funded], thereby avoiding ... [this] encourage[s] them to invest in the “patent thicketadditional research, development, and manufacturing capabilities needed to bring new products to market.”" The information technology industry did not suffer severe patent deadlock in its early years while the radio industry did}, thicket_def={def38def1}, thicket_def_extract={Second, open source avoids the problem Carl Shapiro defines "patent thicket" as "an overlapping set of a “patent thicket” when multiple firms have overlapping intellectual property patent rights, and at least one party attempts requiring that those seeking to extract a high fee for its particular contributioncommercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."}, tags={open sourcelicensing, patent poolsgovernment funding}, filename={Lerner Tirole Sabety (20052004) - Nanotechnology Innovation And The Economics Of Technology Sharing Open Source And BeyondPatent Thicket.pdf}
}
@article{lerner2003structuresantore2010patent, title={The Structure and Performance of Patent Pools: Empirical as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence}, author={LernerRudy Santore and Michael McKee, J. and StrojwasDavid Bjornstad}, M. journal = {Journal of Law and TiroleEconomics}, volume = {53}, number = {1}, J pages = {pp.167-183}, journalyear ={Working paper2010}, yearpublisher ={2003The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School}, abstract={Abstract Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that pool-like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents.}, discipline={Law, Econ}, research_type={Theory, Empirical, Regression},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Numerous commentators have suggested More recently, a National Academy of Sciences (2006) committee studied the issue, concluding that the proliferation even though evidence of these awards blocking or market failures has had socially detrimental consequences: overlapping intellectual property rights yet to emerge, the anticommons or patent thickets may make it difficult for inventors to commercialize new innovations. (Gallini [2002] reviews this literaturewell emerge as profit opportunities in biomedical markets grow.)}, thicket_def={def39def1}, thicket_def_extract={A more benign alternative is that firms enter into patent pools to solve Shapiro (2001) broadens the concept as a “patent thicket” problem: in which possible outcomes include excessively high fees for the presence use of overlapping intellectual property holdings that make it difficult for third parties to license the patent set, uncertainty regarding potential patent holdings infringement, and develop new technologies, in the limit, holdup problems.}, tags={Poolspatent pools}, filename={Lerner Strojwas Tirole Santore McKee Bjornstad (20032010) - The Structure And Performance Of Patent Pools Empirical EvidenceAs A Solution To Efficient Licensing Of Complementary Patents.pdf}
}
@techreportarticle{lerner2002efficientschmidt2008complementary, title={Efficient Patent PoolsComplementary Patents and Market Structure}, author={Lerner, J. and TiroleSchmidt, JK.}, year={20022008}, institutionpublisher={National Bureau of Economic ResearchCEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7005}, abstract={The paper builds a tractable model Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a patent pooldownstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, an agreement among patent owners it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to license a set non-integration. Horizontal integration of their patents to one another IP holders (or to third parties. It Þrst provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a patent pool to enhance welfare. It shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if ) solves the pool is otherwise welfare reducing, a property that allows complements problem but not the antitrust authorities to use this requirement to screen out unattractive poolsdouble mark-up problem. The paper then undertakes a number of extensions: cases where patents differ in importance, where asymmetric blocking patterns existVertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and where licensors are also licencees. We also undertake some initial explorations of the impact of pools on innovation. We conclude by showing that the analysis has broader applicability than pools, as it is also relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Innovations in computer hardwareThis “patent thicket” (Shapiro, software, and biotechnology often build 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on a number the revenues of the other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude holders when setting his royalties, so the adoption sum of new technologies - can all royalties will be severeinefficiently high.}, thicket_def={def40def1}, thicket_def_extract={Innovations in computer hardwareThis “patent thicket” (Shapiro, software, and biotechnology often build 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on a number the revenues of the other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude holders when setting his royalties, so the adoption sum of new technologies - can all royalties will be severeinefficiently high.}, tags={Patent patent pools, welfare}, filename={Lerner Tirole Schmidt (20022008) - Efficient Patent PoolsComplementary Patents And Market Structure.pdf}
}
year={2008},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General, Policy}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Many observers have suggested that patent-thicket problems where key patents are widely held affect many emerging industries. Patent While the issue of "thickets may lead " of complementary technologies in cumulative innovations has been extensively analyzed2, as well as the institutional solutions to three problems. Firstovercome this problem (Lerner and Tirole, royalty stacking may result: each individual patent holder may charge a royalty that seems reasonable when viewed in isolation2005 and Shapiro, but together they represent an unreasonable burden. Second2001), even if other firms agree little attention has been paid to license their fencing patents at a modest rate, a hold-out problem may result if a single firm then sets a high license fee for its technology Finally, the very process of arranging the needed licenses may prove to be time consuming. Patent pools thus offer a one-stop shop through which these problems can be avoidedso far.}, thicket_def={def41def10}, thicket_def_extract={Many observers have suggested that More precisely,
firms will patent a coherent group of inventions, which form what is sometimes called a patent-"bulk", aimed at protecting one product. The "bulk" can either be a "fence" of substitute patents or a "thicket problems - where key " of complementary patents are widely held affect many emerging industries(see Reitzig, 2004 and Cohen et al., 2000).}, tags={patent pools, licensing, grantback, royaltiesfences, substitutes and complements, welfare}, filename={Lerner Tirole Schneider (2008) - Public Policy Toward Fences And Competition In Patent PoolsRaces.pdf}
}
@article{lerner2007impactschmalensee2009standard, title={What is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts? Evidence from Lotus v. BorlandStandard-Setting, Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy}, author={Lerner, J. and ZhuSchmalensee, FR.}, journal={International The Journal of Industrial OrganizationEconomics}, volume={2557},
number={3},
pages={511526--529552}, year={20072009}, publisher={Wiley Online Library}, abstract={Economists have debated the extent Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to which strengthening standard-setting organizations (SSOs). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent protection spurs or detracts from technological -holders who practice their patents against innovation. This paper examines the reduction of software copyright protection in the Lotus v. Borland decision. If specialists who do not, that SSOs should not be required to conduct auctions among patent and copyright protections -holders before standards are substitutes, weakening of one form set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be associated with an increased reliance on the other. We find encouraged), and that the firms affected by the diminution antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of copyright protection disproportionately accelerated their patenting in subsequent yearspatent royalty rates. But little evidence can be found for any harmful effects on firms' performance and incentive to innovate: Some recent policy developments in fact, the increased reliance on patents is correlated with growth in measures such as sales and R&D expendituresthis area are discussed.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Regression, ModelTheory}, industry={Software, TechnologyGeneral}, thicket_stance={Weak ProWeakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={The environment One might argue that the rate of innovation or at least of patenting is a complex one: many other changesin fact too high in some sectors, such as particularly those in which the widespread dissemination of the Internet, may have differentially affected firms during patent thicket problem is severe. A problem 26 with this period. While our result contradicts argument is that the claim returns to major innovations would be reduced by Bessen and Hunt (2004) that software patents substitute for R&D at collective negotiation, not just the firm level, increased reliance on patenting could at returns to the same time minor advances that contribute more to patent thickets that slow down overall innovation in the industrythan to real progress. Therefore, the patent thicket problem – an overlapping set of patent rights requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees (Shapiro, 2001) – could still exist}, thicket_def={refs shapiroReferences Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Therefore, the patent thicket problem – an overlapping set of patent rights requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees (Shapiro, 2001) – could still exist}}, tags={uncertaintyStandard Setting, patent and copyright protectionsAntitrust Policy}, filename={Lerner Zhu Schmalensee (20072009) - What Is The Impact Of Software Patent ShiftsStandard Setting Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy.pdf}
}
@article{lin2001researchserafino2007survey, title={Research Versus Development: Patent Pooling, Innovation Survey of patent pools demonstrates variety of purposes and Standardization in the Software Industrymanagement structures}, author={LinSerafino, D.}, journal={JKnowledge Ecology International. Marshall Revhttp://keionline. Intell. Prop. L.}, volume={org/content/view/69/1}, pages={i}, year={20012007}, abstract={Despite the impressive pace The collective management of modern invention, intellectual property rights is a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road term used to the commercialization describe methods of managing large portfolios of new technologies. Specificallyintellectual property assets, including patents, as new technologies build upon old technologiescopyrights, they necessarily become increasingly complextrademarks, know-how and as a result, data. Patent pools are often subject one such mechanism. A “patent pool” is an agreement between two or more patent owners to the protection license one or more of multiple their patentsto one another or to third parties.2 In its 2001 White Paper on Patent Pools, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies. The difficulties of acquiring licenses (USPTO said, “A patent pool allows interested parties to gather all the necessary tools to practice a certain technology in one place, e.g, ‘one-stop shopping,’ rather than obtaining licenses from each patent owner individually. hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential ”3 The following paper provides a summary of features of 35 patent pools organized or proposed from 1856 to stifle the development and commercialization present. Each of these new technologies. As such, the patent pooling, once condemned as facilitating antitrust violations pools was organized in past eras, has been reintroduced as response to a practice that, if properly structured, has potentially strong pro-competitive benefitsparticular set of policy objectives and circumstances. Their purposes were heterogeneous. Patent pooling has Some were organized in order to promote the potential interests of monopolists or cartels. Others were organized to reduce promote competition and benefit the level users of research and invention in patents. There are pools that manage the patents on standards for new information technologies , that can compete with an incumbent standardenhance R&D for new biomedical or biotechnology agricultural products, or that seek to promote other objectives. Recent Some pools are organized by patent jurisprudence owners, others by manufacturers, and lenient federal antitrust agency of recent yet others by non-profit institutions, including governments. There is no single reason for creating a patent pooling proposals seem pool and no single way to create an environment that encourages the resurgence of manage a patent poolingpool.}, discipline={LawEcon}, research_type={Written Theory, Empirics}, industry={SoftwareGeneral, Technology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Despite The Supreme Court ruled in 1947 that the impressive pace division of modern inventionthe market by territory violated American antitrust laws, commentators have observed a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to and included the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, contract between National Lead and as a resultDuPont in this ruling, are often subject to the protection of multiple patentswhich read, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologiesin part.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., holdThe court also determined that “the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-out problems) for all such patents has the potential how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to stifle control the development and commercialization of these new technologiesdomestic industry for titanium dioxide products.”}, thicket_def={Refs Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies.}, tags={Open standards, SSO, patent pools}, filename={Lin Serafino (20012007) - Research Versus DevelopmentSurvey Of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety Of Purposes And Management Structures.pdf},
}
@article{lin2011licensingshand2007trends, title={Licensing Strategies Trends in Intellectual Property and Nanotechnology: Implications for the Presence of Patent ThicketsGlobal South}, author={LinShand, LH. and Wetter, K.J.}, journal={Journal of Product Innovation ManagementIntellectual Property Rights}, volume={28}, number={512}, pages={698111--725117}, year={20112007}, abstract={Many key industries (e.g., biomedical, pharmaceuticals, telecommunicationsThe race is on to win exclusive monopoly patents on nano-scale materials, devices and information technologies) are characterized by cumulative innovations, where processes. The US National Science Foundation predicts that the introduction immensely broad power and scope of nano-scale technologies will revolutionize manufacturing across all industry sectors - capturing a new product $1 trillion market within six or service often requires many complementary technologiesseven years. When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firmsAlthough industry analysts assert that nanotech is in its infancy, patent thickets existon fundamental nano-scale materials, which researchers have argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, patent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, which is called ‘‘royalty stacking,’’ tools and if such costs processes are passed on to consumers, prices of products based on cumulative technologies will already creating thorny barriers for would-be driven up, dubbed as ‘‘double marginalizationinnovators.’’ The literatureIndustry analysts warn that, however, does not address these issues under different forms 'IP roadblocks could severely retard the development of licensing contractsnanotechnology. This article develops ' After a game-theoretic model where a downstream firm seeks to license N patents that read on its product from upstream firms. It discusses a variety decade of licensing forms widely used in practice confusion and attempts to discover whether royalty stacking and double marginalization occur under these forms of licenses. It also studies the impact of bargaining power between parties. It is found that when patent ownership becomes more fragmentedcontroversy over biotech patents, neither royalty stacking nor double marginalization occurs under profit-based royaltySouth governments are now facing a newer, fixed fee, and hybrid licensesbigger technology wave. Such problems occur only under pure quantityBy 1 July 2013 even 'least developed' countries will be obligated by the World trade Organization's Trade-based or pure revenueRelated Asapects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) to acccommodate nanotechnology-based royalty licenses when the downstream firm’s bargaining power is lowrelated inventions. It is also shown Despite rosy predictions that no matter how fragmented the ownership structure of patent isnanotech will provide a technical fix for health, sustainable energy, hybrid licenses consisting of a fixed fee and a quantity- or revenue-based royalty rate lead to the same market outcomes as a fully integrated firm that owns all the patents and environmental security in the downstream market. This article has interesting implications for both research and practice. FirstSouth, researchers in the results show developing world are likely to find that even under participation in the same proprietary 'nanotech revolution' is highly restricted by patent ownership structuretolbooths, different forms of licenses lead obliging them to quite different market outcomes. Therefore, it is suggested that firms and policy makers pay more attention to contractual forms of licenses when trying to minimize the negative impact of patent thickets. Second, the extant literature has largely assumed that quantity-based royalties are used, where double marginalization is the most severe. In practice, revenue-based royalties are most common, under which double marginalization is much milder. Third, the results show that patent pools can be most effective in mitigating royalty stacking and double marginalization when quantity-based or revenue-based royalties are the sole or primary payment form, especially when downstream firms have low bargaining powerlicensing fees to gain access.}, discipline={EconLaw}, research_type={Theory, MathematicalDiscussion}, industry={GeneralNanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firmsAlthough industry analysts assert that nanotech is in its infancy, patent thickets existon fundamental nano-scale materials, which researchers have argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, patent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, which is called ‘‘royalty stacking,’’ tools and if such costs processes are passed on to consumers, prices of products based on cumulative technologies will already creating thorny barriers for would-be driven up, dubbed as ‘‘double marginalizationinnovators.’’}, thicket_def={Refs Heller/Eisenberg/Lessig/Shapiro/Bessen and Maskin}, thicket_def_extract={Related, and often overlapping, patents owned by many entities are often described as ‘‘patent thickets’’ and researchers have argued that patent thickets can be detrimental to innovation, especially in information industries such as software (see, among others, Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Lessig, 2001; Shapiro, 2001; Bessen and Maskin, 2009).}, tags={Patent Pools, Licensing, Royalties, double marginalization, upstreamTRIPS, downstreamDeveloping Countries}, filename={Lin Shand Wetter (20112007) - Licensing Strategies Trends In The Presence Of Patent ThicketsIntellectual Property And Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{macdonald2004meansschmidt2007negotiating, title={When Means Become Ends: Considering Negotiating the Impact of RNAi Patent Strategy on InnovationThicket}, author={MacdonaldSchmidt, SC.}, journal={Information Economics and PolicyNature biotechnology}, volume={1625}, number={13}, pages={135273--158280}, year={20042007}, abstractpublisher={The patent is supposed to be a means to an endNew York, that end being innovationNY: Nature Pub. Co. Whether the innovation comes from the protection the patent affords the inventor, or from the dissemination of the information of invention the patent allows1996-}, abstract={Patent disputes haven’t materialized in the patent is not meant to be an end in itself. This seems to be changingRNAi field yet, but once products near the patent acquiring a strategic value increasingly independent of innovation. If this development has gone largely unnoticedmarket, it may might be because the patent system tends to be viewed from the entrenched perspectives of lawyers and economists, and of a number of interest groups that justify their reliance on the system in terms of the innovation it is supposed to encouragedifferent story. These groups have never included small firms and developing countries in whose name they frequently defend the patent system. They may have some difficulty justifying a system whose strategic value is so divorced from its value for innovationCharlie Schmidt investigates.}, discipline={ManagementBiology}, research_type={Discussion, Commentary}, industry={Strategy, GeneralBiology}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The pharmaceutical industry has been instrumental in creating a patent system for the pharmaceutical industry, appropriate to the orderly innovation of that industry. Acceptance of the innovation myth has meant that this logic is rarely challenged. Thus, for instance, development may relate to many patents, not just one (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). The costs of navigating through mazes of overlapping patent rights – through patent thickets – are likely to be considerable (Shapiro, 2001), and are likely to be an obstacle to innovation.}, thicket_def={refs shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={The costs of navigating through mazes of overlapping patent rights – through patent thickets – are likely to be considerable (Shapiro, 2001)...}, tags={strategic use of patentsRNA Interface, Licensing, Royalties}, filename={Macdonald Schmidt (20042007) - When Means Become EndsNegotiating The Rnai Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
@article{mallo2008patentsomaya2003strategic, title={Patent-related Barriers Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not to Market Entry for Generic Medicines in the European Union: A Review of Weaknesses in the Current European Settle Patent System and Their Impact on Market Access of Generic MedicinesLitigation}, author={Mallo, L. and Roox, K. and Pike, J. and Brown, A. and Becker, S. and ThalerSomaya, G.Deepak}, journal={Strategic Management Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector}, volume={524}, number={41}, pages={255-pp. 17-280}, year={2008}, publisher={SAGE Publications38}, abstract={Patents Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are effective tools for promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. Originator companies should be able to recoup modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms with their R & D investments during the term of the basic patent / SPC on an active pharmaceutical substancepatented technologies. Generic competition should be available immediately after expiry Hypotheses are derived for two types of that term. The chances of market entry for generic medicines companies in all markets influences: the day following expiry use of the main basic patent in all European Union markets is, however, not possible or, at bestpatents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, is extremely diffi cult. Due to a diminishing number of newly registered products and contracting product pipelines, originator companies may be tempted their 'defensive' role in obtaining access to unjustly prolong the patent monopoly of existing productsexternal technologies through mutual hold-up. The result is known as the ‘ evergreening ’ of Parameter estimates from a basic patent with the help of follow-on patents to keep generic competitors off sample selection probit model provide support for the market. These follow-on patents are often weak or trivial and, upon careful examinationstrategic stakes hypotheses, it is clear that they should never have been granted. Patent quality is therefore of while the utmost importance. The European patent system should only reward true inventions and should discourage patent applications evidence for ordinary innovation. An important way of reducing the incidence of poor quality followmutual hold-on patents up is to remedy certain structural defi ciencies and weaknesses in the current examination procedureinconclusive. Priority must be given to ensuring Interindustry comparisons show that the European Patent Offi ce (EPO) has the resources it needs to continue to improve the quality nonsettlement of patent examiners, along with their training and remuneration, and to increase the number of more experienced senior examiners suits in order to give every patent application the deliberate, expert review it deserves. This would lead to a more stringent application of the patentability requirements both research medicines and fewer trivial patents. Applicants should be more rigorously required to provide patent applications of the highest quality accompanied computers is increased by all relevant information at the start of the examination process. Similarlystrategic stakes and, they should be under obligation to disclose all information known to them that is material to the patentability of their invention. Furthermorein addition, better thirdmutual hold-party participation would also help up appears to avoid inappropriate follow-on patents from being granted. When such patents are granted, play an immediate review should be possible to avoid the assertion of ultimately invalid patents to hinder generic competition. This would require an acceleration of the current opposition proceedings that today can take many years. The structure established under the European Patent Convention only provides for a common and single European important role in computer patent application and granting system by the EPOsuits. A European patent is not a unitary patent}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Wiley}, but essentially a bundle of national patents. As a result copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Wiley}, questions of abstract={Settlement outcomes in patent infringement and validity litigation are governed modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by various national laws and firms with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are handled by derived for two types of influences: the national courts operating under different procedural rules. This purely national litigation system results in a complex arena use of multiple patent litigation involving high costspatents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, forum shopping and diverging, even contradictory, court decisions. The lack of a central judiciary composed of experienced patent judges is regarded as one of the major defects their 'defensive' role in the current patent system. An effective solution would be the creation of a central European patent court that would deal with questions of invalidity and infringement at a panobtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-European levelup. Until this has been achieved, specialised national patent courts should be created with technically skilled judges with powers to reach Parameter estimates from a decision within an acceptable timeframe. Furthermoresample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the standard evidence for obtaining an interim injunction should be returned to its roots as an equitable remedy since injunctions today are often used simply as a litigious tacticmutual hold-up is inconclusive. This change would require a litigant to establish the existence of irreparable harm Interindustry comparisons show that cannot be compensated by monetary damages before a court would take the far-reaching step nonsettlement of enjoining a product. Finally, measures should be taken to ensure that originator companies do not use other means to unjustly prolong their monopoly patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased bystrategic stakes and, for examplein addition, introducing a system of mutual hold-up appears to play an important role in computer patent linkage, obtaining improperly granted SPCs, deploying inaccurate marketing campaigns for promoting ‘ new ’ products with no substantial added therapeutic value as innovative products, etcsuits.}, discipline={PolicyEcon, Management}, research_type={CommentaryTheory, Empirical, DiscussionEconometric Model}, industry={PharmaceuticalICT, Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weak ProAnti}, thicket_stance_extract={Certain structural defi ciencies and weaknesses When strong, watertight patents are available, as in pharma ceuticals, firms may be able to rely on them to isolate key commercial opportunities (Merges, 1998). On the current examination procedureother hand, howeverin systems products industries, result in the grant thickets of patents of variable qualitymay be necessary to foil attempts to invent around the patent, giving and obtain a robust patent owner / originator company facing expiry position. Moreover, defen sive patenting?the building of large patent port folios may become necessary if rivals, aided by a basic product patent the opportunity strong enforcement regime, are able to effectively threaten to create what is known as hold up a ‘ patent thicket ’ firm's commercial operations (see belowHall and Ziedonis, 2001). The most obvious structural issues are discussed below.}, thicket_def={Strategic Value, Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents}, thicket_def_extract={When strong, watertight patents are available, as in pharma ceuticals, firms may be able to rely on them to isolate key commercial opportunities (Merges, 1998). On the other hand, in systems products industries, thickets of patents may be necessary to foil attempts to invent around the patent, and obtain a robust patent position. Moreover, defen sive patenting?the building of large patent port folios may become necessary if rivals, aided by a strong enforcement regime, are able to effectively threaten to hold up a firm's commercial operations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).}, tags={Evergreeningnegotiating}, filename={Mallo Somaya (20082003) - Strategic Determinants Of Decisions Not To Settle Patent Related Barriers To Market Entry For Generic Medicines In The European UnionLitigation.pdf}
}
@article{maskus2006reformingsomaya2011innovation, title={Reforming US patent policyInnovation in Multi-Invention Contexts: getting the incentives rightMapping Solutions to Technological and Intellectual Property Complexity}, author={MaskusSomaya, KD.Eand Teece, D. and Wakeman, S.}, journal={Innovations: Technology, Governance, GlobalizationCalifornia Management Review}, volume={153},
number={4},
pages={12747--15379}, year={20062011}, publisher={MIT PressJSTOR},
abstract={},
discipline={PolicyManagement}, research_type={Commentary, DiscussionWritten Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In addition to the costs of individual patents, researchers have to contend with “patent thickets.” That is, complex technologies, Scholars such as biomedical research toolsMichael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg,embody a number of technological inputsCarl Shapiro, many and others have drawn attention—arguably too much attention—to the transactional problems created for innovators by such dispersed ownership and the density (or so-called thickets) of which are patentedpatents. A different company, in turn, could own each patent. Negotiating these thickets raises 58 Less attention has been paid by those authors to the cost equally important role of securing rightspatents for supporting innovation in multi-invention settings. Weaker patent standards encourage patent proliferation Innovators and an enlargement entrepreneurs are often among the most enthusiastic supporters of the thickets for research in areas such patent system because they perceive it as biotechnology, agricultural chemicals, and pharmaceuticalsproviding safeguards from misappropriation of their inventions...That suggests 59 Research has also shown that innovators are often able to devise “working solutions” to navigate patent thickets access concerns, and that patents may in turn be crucial for enabling transactions costs may slow down the diffusion of scientific researchin technology.60}, thicket_def={def42References Heller/Eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={In addition to Indeed, the costs plethora of individual patents, researchers have to contend with “patent thickets.” That isIP implicated, and the resulting complex technologieslicensing required, such as biomedical research tools,embody has led some academics to despair that some sections of the economy have—or are about to—experience a number “tragedy of technological inputsthe anticommons” (i.e., many of which are no one will use the patentedtechnology because licensing the required technologies is simply too challenging or too expensive).}, tags={TRIPSmulti-invention, negotiation, licensing, patent proliferationstrategy}, filename={Maskus Somaya Teece Wakeman (20062011) - Reforming Us Patent Policy Getting The Incentives RightInnovation In Multi Invention Contexts.pdf}
}
@article{masur2010costlytullis2005application, title={Costly Screens and Application of the Government License Defense to Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research: The Case for a Limited Patent ExaminationCompulsory Licensing Regime}, author={MasurTullis, JT.SK.}, journal={Journal of Legal AnalysisUCLA L. Rev.}, volume={2}, number={253}, pages={687--734279}, year={2010}, publisher={Oxford University Press2005}, abstract={Nanotechnology's potential impact on worldwide industries has nations around the world investing billions of dollars for research in order to capture a part of the projected trillion dollar market for nanotechnology products in 2010. The current rush to patent nanotechnologies may lead to an overcrowded nanotechnology patent thicket that could deter critical innovation and continued product development in the United States Patent . At this early stage of nanotechnology's life cycle, increasing numbers of broad and Trademark Office has acquired a wellpotentially overlapping patents are being issued--deserved reputation for inefficacy and inefficiencywhile few nonexclusive licenses are being offered. Proposals for reforming Furthermore, the lack of significant case law provides little guidance on proper nanotechnology patent office have thus focused on improving scope and validity, while the decline of legal defenses such as experimental use leaves innovators exposed to potential infringement liability for even the quality most fundamental of patent review while decreasing its costscientific research studies. Yet In this view overlooks Comment, the valuable function performed by author proposes that the U.S. government exercises the full extent of its rights under the twenty-five year old Bayh-Dole Act and develop the high costs associated with obtaining government license defense to create a limited patent: these costs serve as an effective screen against low-value patentscompulsory licensing regime for the fruits of federally funded research. MoreoverThe author argues that recipients of the billions of dollars in federal nanotechnology research funds should provide broad, due nonexclusive licenses to asymmetries in the privatized patent valuesrights they obtain as a result of public funding. Ultimately, a well-formulated government license defense, which assesses the costly screen is likely extent to select which an "infringing" act against socially harmful patents in disproportionate numbers. Although the a federally funded patent office is the most prominent forum in which this type falls along a spectrum of costly screening operatesfair use, it is not the only one. In would provide a variety of other contexts, means for overcoming the private costs innovation-impeding effects of navigating an administrative process may complement the process itself in screening out unwanted participantsabsolute exclusion rights.}, discipline={Law, Policy}, research_type={Discussion, Commentary}, industry={GeneralNanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={ThirdThe development of such a patent thicket could deter further innovation, there are patents of low private value 6 and low (or negative) social value; this class the active enforcement by nanotechnology patent holders of patents includes both discarded, unenforced patents that increase their exclusivity rights ultimately could result in the search costs and risk imposed on commercial firms—the ‘‘patent thicket,’’ creation of a nanotechnology anticommons-a situation in popular parlance (Shapiro 2001)—and worthlesswhich a scarce resource becomes prone to underuse because there are too many owners holding the right to exclude others from that resource, largely unenforceable patents usable only for extracting nuisance settlements (see Section 2.2.)and no one has an effective privilege of use.}, thicket_def={Refs Shapirodef1}, thicket_def_extract={ThirdUnfortunately, there are patents the rush to secure worldwide intellectual property rights in nanotechnology could lead to the development of low private value and low (or negative) social value; this class a "patent thicket." This term, coined by intellectual property scholars, refers to an overlapping set of patents includes both discardedpatent rights that requires researchers, inventors, unenforced patents that increase the search costs and risk imposed on commercial firms—the ‘‘patent thicket,’’ in popular parlance (Shapiro 2001)..entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize new technologies to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.}, tags={Screening Patents, administrative costs of patentsgovernment license defense}, filename={Masur Tullis (20102005) - Costly Screens And Patent ExaminationApplication Of The Government License Defense To Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research.pdf}
}
@article{merges2006introductorytaylor2003american, title={Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchangeAmerican Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change}, author={MergesTaylor, M.R.Pand Cayford, J.}, journal={Berkeley Harv. JL \& Tech. LJ}, volume={2117}, pages={997321}, year={20062003},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Commentary, DiscussionTheory}, industry={General, TechnologyBiotechnology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={As noted above, the existence of the The patent thicket and the is a problem of low quality patents make it especially easy for trolls to acquire patents that arguably cover one of the hundreds or thousands of processes incorporated because useful innovation in a single high technology product. The troll waits until a company with deep pockets makes irreversible investments in the arguably infringing technologybiotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies. The troll may even revise the terms field of biotechnology is particularly dependent on the patent (through a patent "reissuance" or "continuation") in light cumulative work of the target's investment in order many researchers, and therefore is vulnerable to strengthen the infringement claim. The troll then uses the threat of an injunction shutting down production to demand a significant share of the total profit associated with the product. This gamesmanship results in no social benefit and a great deal of harm“anticommons” problem mentioned earlier.}, thicket_def={refs Shapirodef1}, thicket_def_extract={As This pattern — the Federal Trade Commission recently explainedincreasing number of patents, innovation in the computer and Internet industry is often incremental and cumulativeincreasing patent breadth, and the pace issuance of change is rapid.4 The net result is that each marketable product in this industry may incorporate--often in an incidental, tangential, and sometimes unintentional way-hundreds or even thousands of patented processes. This is commonly described as patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call a "patent thicket"in biotechnology: "a dense web “an overlapping set of overlapping intellectual property patent rights requiring that a company must hack its way through in order those seeking to actually commercialize new technology." Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120-21 (Adam Jaffee et al. eds., 2001); see also To Promote Innovation 2:27-31, 3:2, 34-35, 52-53obtain licenses from multiple patentees}, tags={Patent Trolls, injunctionpatent policies negative effects on African agriculture}, filename={Merges Taylor Cayford (20062003) - Introductory Note To Brief Of Amicus Curiae In Ebay V MercExchangeAmerican Patent Policy Biotechnology And African Agriculture.pdf}
}
@article{mertes2010managingvan2006clearing, title={Managing A Clearing House for Diagnostic Testing: the patent thicket Solution to Ensure Access to and maximizing patent lifetime in vaccine technologyUse of Patented Genetic Inventions?}, author={MertesVan Zimmeren, ME.Mand Verbeure, B.Mand Matthijs, G. and St{\"o}tterVan Overwalle, G.}, journal={Human VaccinesBulletin of the World Health Organization}, volume={684}, number={105}, pages={860352--863359}, year={20102006}, publisher={Landes BioscienceSciELO Public Health}, abstract={PAtents are exclusive In genetic diagnostics, the emergence of a so-called “patent thicket” is imminent. Such an overlapping set of patent rights for a limited period may have restrictive effects on further research and development of diagnostic tests, and the provision of time clinical diagnostic services. Currently, two models that are granetd may facilitate access to provide an incentive for innovation and use of patented genetic inventions are attracting much debate in exchange for various national and international fora: patent pools and clearing houses. In this article, we explore the public disclosure concept of an inventionclearing houses. Several types of clearing houses are identified. Patenting in First, we describe and discuss two types that would provide access to information on the patented inventions: the medical field, especially in information clearing house and the field of human vaccine technologiestechnology exchange clearing house. Second, is full three types of pitfalls, because the products clearing houses are analysed that finally not only offer access to information but also provide an instrument to facilitate the market are often covered by a multitude use of exclusive IP rightsthe patented inventions: the open access clearing house, the standardized licences clearing house and the royalty collection clearing house. This commentary gives an overview on obstacles in vaccine patenting A royalty collection clearing house for genetic diagnostic testing would be the most comprehensive as it would serve several functions: identifying patents and how patent claims essential to overcome themdiagnostic testing, matching licensees with licensors, developing and supplying standardized licences, collecting royalties, monitoring whether users respect licensing conditions, and intends providing dispute resolution services such as mediation and arbitration. In this way, it might function as an effective model for users to facilitate access to and use of the patented inventions. However, it remains to provide be seen whether patent holders with a patenting guideline for researchersstrong patent portfolio will be convinced by the advantages of the royalty collection clearing house and be willing to participate.}, discipline={Law, PolicyReport}, research_type={Discussion, Commentary}, industry={Vaccine, BiologyGenetics}, thicket_stance={Weak Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Managing Moreover, there are factors that may lead to the emergence of a patent thicket blocking problem in genetics in the fields future: increased awareness among researchers; and growing rate of vaccine technology is challenging as one product may be covered patent enforcement caused by a plurality the strategic enforcement of exclusive IP their rights that have to be considered when developing by patent holders and the proliferating complexity of biomedical research requiring a product broader range and building up greater number of inputs of which a patent portfolio. Consequently, licensing is a key point in the vaccine industry.If a basic patent growing number is held by a powerful patent holder refusing to grant a license under reasonable commercial terms or abuses a market-dominating position, it should be examined, whether the requirements to request a compulsory license are fulfilledpatented.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={This pattern — the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call a patent thicket in biotechnology: “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.}, tags={licensingpatent pools, patent portfolioclearing houses}, filename={Mertes Stotter VanZimmeren (20102006) - Managing The Patent Thicket And Maximizing Patent Lifetime In Vaccine TechnologyA Clearing House For Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
}
}
@bookarticle{muris2001competitionwang2010rise, title={Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way AheadRise of the Patent Intermediaries}, author={MurisWang, TA.JW.}, journal={Berkeley Tech.LJ}, volume={25}, yearpages={2001159}, publisheryear={US FTC2010}, abstract={Patents are evolving from purely exclusionary instruments into intellectual property assets that play a part in business strategy and have value as transactional goods. Businesses operating in the intellectual property marketplace have experienced an unprecedented explosion of activity involving these intangible but valuable assets. The new market for intellectual property has inspired entrepreneurial legal professionals and business professionals alike to create new companies and expand existing ones to act as middlemen, encouraging the continued proliferation of patent transactions. These entities operate and thrive in the intermediary market between buyers and sellers of intellectual property as well as auxiliary markets related to the protection of intellectual property.}, discipline={PolicyLaw}, research_type={SpeechDiscussion}, industry={GeneralICT}, thicket_stance={Weakly AntiAssumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Moreover, even if there were a "In this age of patent thicket" problemthickets, others state that firms have found a range of means to overcome these obstacles, including cross-licenses and patent pooling.an organization must tread carefully lest it infringe countless patents just by doing business (cites Heller Eisenberg's Anticommons)}, thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={According to Professor Carl Shapiro, defines a "patent thicket" has formed, which he describes as "a dense “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology."*” Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001)}, tags={Competition, FTC, Antitrust}, filename={Muris Wang (20012010) - Competition And Intellectual Property Policy Rise Of The Way AheadPatent Intermediaries.pdf}
}
@article{napoleon2009impactwagner2003information, title={Impact Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Global Patent and Regulatory Reform on Patent Strategies for BiotechnologyControl}, author={NapoleonWagner, V.JR.Polk}, journal={Pitt. J. Tech. L. \& Pol'yColumbia Law Review}, volume={9103}, pagesnumber ={14}, yearpages ={2009pp. 995-1034}, abstractyear ={2003}, disciplinepublisher ={Columbia LawReview Association, PolicyInc.}, research_typeabstract ={Discussion}, industry={Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Pharmaceutical companies typically grow a patent thicket seeking This Essay challenges a wide range of chemical variants and analogs, methods central tenet of synthesizing the drug, chemical intermediates in this synthesis, different crystal forms, different finished dosage forms and various methods recent criticism of use.62 Obtaining permission from various patent holders for use of patents can prove to be difficult particularly if intellectual property rights: the patent holder’s objective in creating suggestion that the thicket control conferred by such rights is detrimental to block innovation by outsiders. Because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies, we could conceivably witness cumulative innovation with infringement on many patents which ultimately serves as the continued flourishing of a drag on innovation public domain of ideas and commercializationinformation.}In this Essay, thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={This pattern, however, has created what some would characterize as a “Patent Thicket”59 in biotechnology. That is, emerging from Professor Wagner argues that such theories understate the overabundance significance of patent filings and associated activity is “a dense web the intangible nature of overlapping intellectual property rights”}information, tags={International Patent System, Patent reform}, filename={Napoleon (2009) - Impact Of Global Patent And Regulatory Reform On Patent Strategies For Biotechnology.pdf} } @article{nielsen2006compulsory, title={Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is It a Viable Solution in and thus overlook the United States}, author={Nielsen, C.M. and Samardzija, M.R.}, journal={Mich. Telecomm. \& Tech. L. Rev.}, volume={13}, pages={509}, year={2006}, abstract={As technology continues contribution that even perfectly controlled intellectual creations make to advance at a rapid pace, so do the number of patents that cover every aspect of making, using, and selling these innovationspublic domain. In 1996addition, to compound the rapid change this Essay shows that perfect control of propertized information--an animating assumption in much of technology, the Ucontemporary criticism--is both counterfactual and likely to remain so.S. Supreme Court affirmed These findings suggest that business methods are also patentable. Hence in increasing the current environment, scores appropriability of patents, assigned information goods is likely to many different partiesincrease, may cover a single electronic device or software—making it increasingly impossible to manufacture an electronic device without receiving a cease and desist letter or other notice from a patentee demanding a large royalty or threatening an injunction. Companiesrather than diminish, particularly those in the high technology sector, have been asserting for some time now that they are under constant threat quantity of lawsuits that threaten to shut them down"open" information. As a resultFurther, numerous radical changes to the U.S. Patent Act benefits of control in fostering coordination and patent practice before the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office have been proposed. Certain proposed changes, however, enabling flexibility in arrangements are meeting with resistance because essential elements of promoting progress in a reliance on long term patent protection and exclusivity of patent rights by different industrieschanging world. Notwithstanding}, certain foreign governments have already enacted provisions making it possible to obtain a compulsory patent license in the event that a patentee is not practicing his invention or is simply refusing to license the rights to his invention for a reasonable royalty fee filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants To Be Free.pdf},
discipline={Law},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={When strong, watertight patents are available, as in pharma ceuticals, firms may be able to rely on them to isolate key commercial opportunities (MergesControl-talk is of "the second enclosure movement, 1998). On " the other hand, in systems products industries, thickets lurking "tragedy of patents may be necessary to foil attempts to invent around the patentanticommons, and obtain a robust patent position. Moreover, defen sive patenting?" or the building dangers of large "patent port folios may become necessary if rivals, aided by a strong enforcement regime, are able thickets" -not to effectively threaten to hold up a firm's commercial operations mention the phenomenon of litigation efforts (or perhaps social movements?) sporting their own slogans (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001logos).}, thicket_def={Strategic Value, Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents}, thicket_def_extract={When strong, watertight patents are available, such as in pharma ceuticals, firms may be able to rely on them to isolate key commercial opportunities (Merges, 1998). On the other hand, in systems products industries, thickets of patents may be necessary to foil attempts to invent around "Free the patent, and obtain a robust patent position. MoreoverMouse, defen sive patenting?the building of large patent port folios may become necessary if rivals, aided by a strong enforcement regime, are able to effectively threaten to hold up a firm" "Create Like It's commercial operations (Hall and Ziedonis1790, 2001)" or "When Copyright Attacks."}, tagsthicket_def={negotiatingdef25}, filenamethicket_def_extract={Somaya (2003) - Strategic Determinants Of Decisions Not To Settle "Patent Litigation.pdf} } @article{somaya2011innovation, title={Innovation in Multi-Invention Contexts: Mapping Solutions to Technological and Intellectual Property Complexity}, author={Somaya, D. and Teece, D. and Wakeman, S.}, journal={California Management Review}, volume={53}, number={4}, pages={47--79}, year={2011}, publisher={JSTOR}, abstract={}, discipline={Management}, research_type={Written Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Scholars such as Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Carl Shapiro, and others have drawn attention—arguably too much attention—to the transactional problems created for innovators by such dispersed ownership and the density (or so-called thickets) of patents.58 Less attention has been paid by those authors " refer to the equally important role of patents for supporting innovation fact that in multi-invention settings. Innovators and entrepreneurs are often among the most enthusiastic supporters of the patent system because they perceive it as providing safeguards from misappropriation many areas of their inventions.59 Research has also shown that innovators are often able to devise “working solutions” to navigate patent access concerns, and that patents may in turn be crucial for enabling transactions in technology.60}, thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={Indeed, the plethora great numbers of IP implicatedrelated patents exist at any particular time, and the resulting complex licensing required, has led some academics many might have applicability to despair that some sections of the economy have—or are about to—experience a “tragedy of the anticommons” (i.e., no one will use the patented technology because licensing the required technologies is simply too challenging or too expensive)any commercial product.}, tags={multi-inventioninformation, negotiationdrm, licensing, strategycontrol}, filename={Somaya Teece Wakeman Wagner (20112003) - Innovation In Multi Invention Contexts.pdfInformation Wants to be Free}
}
