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PTLR Up Group Processed BibTeX (view source)
Revision as of 04:44, 7 March 2013
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This page is part of the [[Patent Thicket Litature Review]]
==Notes==
This page contains the processed Up Group BibTeX entries. With the exception of the first entry (Andrews) they all need reviewing and correcting.
==The Processed Up Group BibTeX Records==
@article{andrews2002genes,
title={Genes And Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights},
author={Andrews, L.B.},
journal={Nature Reviews Genetics},
volume={3},
number={10},
pages={803--807},
year={2002},
abstract={Concerns about human gene patents go beyond moral disquiet about creating a commodity from a part of the human body and also beyond legal questions about whether genes are unpatentable products of nature. New concerns are being raised about harm to public health and to research. In response to these concerns, various policy options, such as litigation, legislation, patent pools and compulsory licensing, are being explored to ensure that gene patents do not impede the practice of medicine and scientific progress.},
abstract={},
discipline={Biology,Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Genetics},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={Whatever policies society develops for gene patents, policymakers will be influenced by the fact that the ‘bio’ in biotechnology — the genes in the gene patents — comes from people. Researchers need the trust of those whom they study to get access to their tissue for research into diagnostics and cures. Using the biological resources of the public (and a substantial amount of public funding), genes have been discovered and patented. Now, policy makers are being asked to ensure that the public receives the benefits.},
thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary Inputs},
thicket_def_extract={Economist Carl Shapiro elaborates on the problems created by a ‘patent thicket’. Using traditional economic analysis, he has shown how, when several monopolists exist that each control a different raw material needed for development of a product, the price of the resulting product is higher than if a single firm controlled trade in all of the raw materials or made the product itself. However, the combined profits of the producers are lower in the presence of complementary monopolies. So, if there are several patent holders whose permission is needed to create a gene therapy (and any one of them could block the production of the gene therapy), inefficiencies in the market are created, potentially harming both the patent holder and the patent users.},
tags={IPR Policy, Effects on Research},
filename={Andrews (2002) - Genes And Patent Policy Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights.pdf}
}
@article{attaran2004patents,
title={Patents do not Strangle Innovation, but Their Quality Must be Improved},
author={Attaran, A.},
journal={Bulletin of the World Health Organization},
volume={82},
number={10},
pages={788},
year={2004},
abstract={},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={},
industry={Pharma},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={Possibilities and facts are not the same thing, however, and there is surprisingly little empirical data to show that the patent thicket is subtracting from the rate of innovation or society's benefit from it. Maybe that is happenning without anyone noticing, but the available evidence suggests otherwise.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Against Thickets!},
filename={Attaran (2004) - Patents Do Not Strangle Innovation But Their Quality Must Be Improved.pdf}
}
@article{ayres2007tradable,
title={Tradable Patent Rights},
author={Ayres, I. and Parchomovsky, G.},
year={2007},
abstract={},
discipline={Law, Econ, Theory},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets also harm regular users of patented products and technology by making it more expensive for users to gain access to the relevant product or technology},
thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary Inputs},
thicket_def_extract={...particularly disconcerting result of the increase in the number of patents is the emergence of patent thickets: multiple patents that cover a single product or technology. The term "patent thicket" probably originated in the 1970s in a series of cases involving Xerox's patents. See Gavin Clarkson, Objective Identification of Patent Thickets: A Network Analytic Approach (2004) In such settings, the need to secure licenses from multiple patentees, each possessing a veto power over the production of new innovation...},
tags={IPR Policy, Tradable Patent Rights, Coase Quote},
filename={Ayres Parchomovsky (2007) - Tradable Patent Rights.pdf}
}
@article{barnett2009isintellectual,
jstor_articletype = {research-article},
title = {Is Intellectual Property Trivial?},
author = {Barnett, Jonathan M.},
journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
volume = {157},
number = {6},
pages = {pp. 1691-1742},
year = {2009},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Refs Heller/Heller \& Eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={This is a common theme of the expanding literature on "anticommons" effects, whereby proliferating intellectual property rights creates a "thicket" that impedes subsequent innovation. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller... Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg...},
tags={Overview of Patent-based IP},
filename={Barnett (2009) - Is Intellectual Property Trivial.pdf}
}
@article{barnett2009property,
jstor_articletype = {research-article},
title = {Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes},
author = {Barnett, Jonathan M.},
journal = {The Yale Law Journal},
volume = {119},
number = {3},
year = {2009},
pages = {pp. 384-456},
publisher = {The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.},
copyright = {Copyright © 2009 The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.},
abstract = {It is commonly asserted that innovation markets suffer from excessive intellectual property protections, which in turn stifle output. But empirical inquiries can neither confirm nor deny this assertion. Under the agnostic assumption that we cannot assess directly whether intellectual property coverage is excessive, an alternative query is proposed: can the market assess if any "propertization outcome" is excessive and then undertake actions to correct it? This process-based approach takes the view that innovator populations make rent-seeking investments that continuously select among innovation regimes that trade off securing innovation gains (which tends to demand more property) against reducing transaction costs and associated innovation losses (which tends to demand less). If we can identify the conditions under which privately interested investments in lobbying, enforcement, and transactional arrangements are likely to yield socially interested propertization outcomes, then the underlying datum at issue—whether there is "too much" intellectual property—can be determined indirectly at some reasonable degree of approximation. This approach identifies a "property trap" effect where, under high coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to fail: litigation risk and associated transaction cost burdens drive innovators to overconsume state-provided property rights. Conversely, under low coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to succeed: adversely affected entities that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs have incentives to undertake actions that weaken property-rights coverage, including constrained enforcement, forming cooperative arrangements, or even forfeiting intellectual property to the public domain. Counterintuitively, these relationships imply that large firms that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs tend to have the strongest incentives and capacities to take actions that correct overpropertization outcomes. Preliminary evidence is drawn from the semiconductor, financial services, and information technology industries.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={Weakly Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={Popular and scholarly commentary widely assumes that certain innovation markets -especially multicomponent markets such as biotechnology, software, and information technology- suffer from thickets of overlapping property rights that restrain and encumber research and development activities, thereby slowing, rather than promoting, innovative output. But this often-repeated statement loses considerable force given that empirical inquiries to identify patent thickets or related "anticommons" effects in these markets have so far failed to confirm or reject any inhibitory effect on innovation activity},
thicket_def={Refs Heller/Heller \& Eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={But empirics have yet to track rhetoric: the too much property thesis has yet to be supported or denied by definitive evidence and, more generally, stands in uncomfortable contrast with the continuing innovative vigor of the markets where intellectual property thickets are usually claimed to be most intense... Popular and scholarly commentary widely assumes that certain innovation markets -especially multicomponent markets such as biotechnology, software, and information technology- suffer from thickets of overlapping property rights that restrain and encumber research and development activities, thereby slowing, rather than promoting, innovative output. But this often-repeated statement loses considerable force given that empirical inquiries to identify patent thickets or related "anticommons" effects in these markets have so far failed to confirm or reject any inhibitory effect on innovation activity.},
tags={IP Regime Selection, Against Thicket},
filename={Barnett (2009) - Property As Process How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes.pdf}
}
@article{barton2002antitrust,
jstor_articletype = {research-article},
Title = {Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios},
author = {Barton, John H.},
journal = {Antitrust Law Journal},
jstor_issuetitle = {},
volume = {69},
number = {3},
jstor_formatteddate = {2002},
pages = {pp. 851-882},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843540},
ISSN = {00036056},
abstract = {},
language = {English},
year = {2002},
publisher = {American Bar Association},
copyright = {Copyright © 2002 American Bar Association},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={None},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Oligoploies, Antitrust, Mutual Blocking},
filename={Barton (2002) - Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios.pdf}
}
@article{baumol2004entrepreneurial,
jstor_articletype = {research-article},
title = {Entrepreneurial Enterprises, Large Established Firms and Other Components of the Free-Market Growth Machine},
author = {Baumol, William J.},
journal = {Small Business Economics},
jstor_issuetitle = {},
volume = {23},
number = {1},
jstor_formatteddate = {Aug., 2004},
pages = {pp. 9-21},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40229341},
ISSN = {0921898X},
abstract = {The paper studies the principal influences accounting for the unprecedented growth and innovation performance of the free-market economies. It indicates that vigorous oligopolistic competition, particularly in high-tech industries, forces firms to keep innovating in order to survive. This leads them to internalize innovative activities rather than leaving them to independent inventors, and turns invention into an assembly-line process. The bulk of private R&D spending is shown to come from a tiny number of very large firms. Yet the revolutionary breakthroughs continue to come predominantly from small entrepreneurial enterprises, with large industry providing streams of incremental improvements that also add up to major contributions. Moreover, these firms voluntarily disseminate much of their innovative technology widely and rapidly, both as a major revenue source and in exchange for complementary technological property of other firms, including direct competitors. This helps to internalize the externalities of innovation and speeds elimination of obsolete technology. Some policy implications for industrialized and developing countries are also discussed.},
language = {English},
year = {2004},
publisher = {Springer},
copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Springer},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ, Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manu- facturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic conse- quences this threatens for each of them is the for- mation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities},
thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary Inputs},
thicket_def_extract={Similar perils for the public interest arise in the last of the reasons for voluntary technology sharing - the problem of "patent thickets" and the widespread patent pools that have been formed to deal with the thicket problem. A complex piece of equipment, such as a computer, characteristically is made up of components each of which is covered by a surprisingly large number of patents, and the patents pertinent for such an item are often owned by a considerable number of different firms, many of them direct competitors in the final-product market. For example, Peter N. Detkin, vice president and assistant general counsel at Intel Corporation, estimates that there were more than 90,000 patents generally related to microprocessors held by more than 10,000 parties in 2002 (Federal Trade Commission, 2002, p. 667). This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manufacturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic consequences this threatens for each of them is the formation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities...},
tags={Pool, Startups and Incumbents},
filename={Baumol (2004) - Entrepreneurial Enterprises Large Established Firms And Other Components.pdf}
}
@article{bawa2005will,
title={Will the nanomedicine patent land grab thwart commercialization?},
author={Bawa, Raj},
journal={Nanomedicine: nanotechnology, biology, and medicine},
volume={1},
pages={346--350},
year={2005},
abstract={},
discipline={Biology},
research_type={},
industry={Nanomedicine},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Currently, there are too many players holding too many nanotech-related patents; this has created the current fragmented, messy patent landscape. Most experts agree that this patent landscape is already producing thickets},
thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro, Complementary inputs with infringement, Includes innovation loss},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology". Such patent thickets, as a result of multiple blocking patents, are considered to discourage and stifle innovation. Claims in such patent thickets have been characterized as boften broad, overlapping and conflicting — a scenario ripe for massive patent litigation battles in the future...},
tags={Commercialization},
filename={Bawa (2005) - Will The Nanomedicine Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization.pdf}
}
@article{bawa2005nanotechnology,
title={The nanotechnology patent ‘gold rush’},
author={Bawa, R. and Bawa, SR and Maebius, S.B.},
journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights},
volume={10},
number={5},
pages={426--433},
year={2005},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={},
industry={Nanotech},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Broad patents},
thicket_def_extract={Predatory inventors are individuals or corporations that patent every possible application around a novel early technology. If this approach becomes commmon... it could inevitably create nanotech patent thickets.},
tags={Licensing, Patenting strategy},
filename={Bawa Bawa Maebius (2005) - The Nanotechnology Patent Gold Rush.pdf}
}
@article{beard2002patent,
title={Patent thickets, cross-licensing, and antitrust},
author={Beard, T.R. and Kaserman, D.L.},
journal={Antitrust Bull.},
volume={47},
pages={345},
year={2002},
publisher={HeinOnline},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket problem can be severe in certain technologically dynamic industries. Consider, for example, the semiconductor industry. In that industry, there reportedly are already over 250,000 patents in existence that, in principle, a new innovation potentially could infringe. In addition, there are several thousand additional patent applications typically in the process of review.' 4 As a result of these extant and forthcoming patents, it is virtually impossible for a firm to know, ex ante, whether a given microprocessor innovation will infringe a patent held by another firm. The patent thicket associated with this industry, then, is quite formidable, and it creates considerable uncertainty regarding the future legal status of any intellectual property created by R&D activities.},
thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary Inputs},
thicket_def_extract={Where a highly complex product or process is covered by numerous interrelated patents, any holder of a patent that applies to that product or process potentially may block production and/or impede further technological developments, thereby jeopardizing the returns on other parties' prior investments. In such situations (i.e., where a given product is potentially affected by numerous patents owned by a number of different parties), the resulting uncertainty regarding unforeseen patent claims can dampen firms' incentives to invest in R&D activities. This potential for numerous interrelated patents to deter R&D investment has been called the patent thicket (or minefield) problem.},
tags={Cross-licensing, Anti-trust},
filename={Beard Kaserman (2002) - Patent Thickets Cross Licensing And Antitrust.pdf}
}
@article{callaway2008patent,
title={Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry},
author={Callaway, D.},
journal={Hastings Bus. LJ},
volume={4},
