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@article{anand2000structure,
title={The structure of licensing contracts},
author={Anand, Bharat N and Khanna, Tarun},
journal={The Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume={48},
number={1},
pages={103--135},
year={2000},
abstract={Industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing, but empirical analyses are extremely rare. We amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts, and use it to present some simple 'facts' concerning licensing behavior. Our analysis reveals robust cross-industries differences in several contractual features, such as exclusivity, cross-licensing, ex-ante versus ex-post technology transfers, and licensing to related},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
}
@article{green1995division,
title={On the division of profit in sequential innovation},
author={Green, Jerry R and Scotchmer, Suzanne},
journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
pages={20--33},
year={1995},
abstract={In markets with sequential innovation, inventors of derivative improvements might undermine the profit of initial innovators through competition. Profit erosion can be mitigated by broadening the first innovator's patent protection and/or by permitting cooperative agreements between initial innovators and later innovators. We investigate the policy that is most effective at ensuring the first innovator earns a large share of profit from the second-generation products it facilitates. In general, not all the profit can be transferred to the first innovator, and therefore patents should last longer when a sequence of innovations is undertaken by different firms rather than being concentrated in one firm.},
discipline={Econ, Mgmt},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@article{hayslett1995antitrust,
title={1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial Use of Legal Monopolies with the Prohibition of Antitrust Law},
author={Hayslett III, Thomas L},
journal={J. Intell. Prop. L.},
volume={3},
pages={375},
year={1995},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@article{jaffe2000us,
title={The US patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation process},
author={Jaffe, Adam B},
journal={Research policy},
volume={29},
number={4},
pages={531--557},
year={2000},
abstract={This paper surveys the major changes in patent policy and practice that have occured in the last two decades in the U.S., and reviews the existing analyses by the economists that attempt to measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of technological change. It also reviews the broader theoretical and empirical literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy. Despite the significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting, robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few. Possible reasons for these limited results are discussed, and possible avenues for future research are suggested. q2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@inproceedings{kortum1998stronger,
title={Stronger protection or technological revolution: what is behind the recent surge in patenting?},
author={Kortum, Samuel and Lerner, Josh},
booktitle={Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy},
volume={48},
pages={247--304},
year={1998},
abstract={We investigate the cause of an unprecedented surge of U.S. patenting over the past decade. Conventional wisdom points to the establishment of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit by Congress in 1982. We examine whether this institutional change, which has benefited patent holders, explains the burst in US. patenting. Using both international and domestic data on patent applications and awards, we conclude that the evidence is not favorable to the conventional view. Instead, it appears that the jump in patenting reflects an increase in U.S. innovation spurred by changes in the management of research.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@article{levin1987appropriating,
title={Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development},
author={Levin, Richard C and Klevorick, Alvin K and Nelson, Richard R and Winter, Sidney G and Gilbert, Richard and Griliches, Zvi},
journal={Brookings papers on economic activity},
volume={1987},
number={3},
pages={783--831},
year={1987},
abstract={},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@article{merges1990complex,
title={On the complex economics of patent scope},
author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R},
journal={Columbia Law Review},
pages={839--916},
year={1990},
abstract={},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@article{merges1999institutions,
title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools},
author={Merges, Robert P},
journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper},
year={1999}
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@article{Oecd1994measurement,
title={Using patent data as science and technology indicators},
author={OECD},
journal={OECD},
year={1994},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@article{Scotchmer2008standing,
title={Standing on the shoulders of giants},
author={Scotchmer},
journal={The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume={5},
number={1}
pages={29-41},
year={1991},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
PTLR Down Group Processed BibTeX (view source)
Revision as of 18:37, 9 April 2013
, 18:37, 9 April 2013→Additional entries
==The Processed Down Group BibTeX Records==
@article{balasubramanian2011what,
tags={Strategic Behavior, Incentives for Innovation},
filename={Gilbert Newbery (1982) - Preemptive Patenting And The Persistence Of Monopoly.pdf}
}
tags={genetic diagnostic testing, patent proliferation, research sector},
filename={Huys (2009) - Legal Uncertainty In The Area Of Genetic Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
}
tags={Patent Pools},
filename={Joshi Nerkar (2011) - When Do Strategic Alliances Inhibit Innovation By Firms.pdf}
}
tags={RAND, Licensing, Patent Holdup, SSO},
filename={Lemley (2007) - Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup Of Standards And One Not To.pdf}
}
tags={Patent statistics},
filename={Marco Rausser (2008) - The Role Of Patent Rights In Mergers.pdf}
}
tags={Licensing, scientific research productivity},
filename={Murray Stern (2006) - When Ideas Are Not Free The Impact Of Patents On Scientific Research.pdf}
}
tags={TRIPS, SPLT, WIPO, International, Patent Law},
filename={Reichman Dreyfuss (2007) - Harmonization Without Consensus.pdf}
}
tags={patent, thicket, trolls, sequential innovation},
filename={Turner (2011) - Patent Thickets Trolls And Unproductive Entrepreneurship.pdf}
}
===Additional entries===
@article{anand2000structure,
title={The structure of licensing contracts},
author={Anand, Bharat N and Khanna, Tarun},
journal={The Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume={48},
number={1},
pages={103--135},
year={2000},
abstract={Industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing, but empirical analyses are extremely rare. We amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts, and use it to present some simple 'facts' concerning licensing behavior. Our analysis reveals robust cross-industries differences in several contractual features, such as exclusivity, cross-licensing, ex-ante versus ex-post technology transfers, and licensing to related},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Anand Khanna (2000) - The Structure Of Licensing Contracts.pdf}
}
@article{green1995division,
title={On the division of profit in sequential innovation},
author={Green, Jerry R and Scotchmer, Suzanne},
journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
pages={20--33},
year={1995},
abstract={In markets with sequential innovation, inventors of derivative improvements might undermine the profit of initial innovators through competition. Profit erosion can be mitigated by broadening the first innovator's patent protection and/or by permitting cooperative agreements between initial innovators and later innovators. We investigate the policy that is most effective at ensuring the first innovator earns a large share of profit from the second-generation products it facilitates. In general, not all the profit can be transferred to the first innovator, and therefore patents should last longer when a sequence of innovations is undertaken by different firms rather than being concentrated in one firm.},
discipline={Econ, Mgmt},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Green Scotchmer (1995) - On The Division Of Profit In Sequential Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{merges1990complex,
title={On the complex economics of patent scope},
author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R},
journal={Columbia Law Review},
pages={839--916},
year={1990},
abstract={},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Merges Nelson (1990) - On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope.pdf}
}
@article{Scotchmer2008standing,
title={Standing on the shoulders of giants},
author={Scotchmer},
journal={The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume={5},
number={1}
pages={29-41},
year={1991},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Scotchmer (2008) - Standing On The Shoulders Of Giants.pdf}
}
@article{jaffe2000us,
title={The US patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation process},
author={Jaffe, Adam B},
journal={Research policy},
volume={29},
number={4},
pages={531--557},
year={2000},
abstract={This paper surveys the major changes in patent policy and practice that have occured in the last two decades in the U.S., and reviews the existing analyses by the economists that attempt to measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of technological change. It also reviews the broader theoretical and empirical literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy. Despite the significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting, robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few. Possible reasons for these limited results are discussed, and possible avenues for future research are suggested. q2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Jaffe (2000) - The Us Patent System In Transition.pdf}
}
@article{levin1987appropriating,
title={Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development},
author={Levin, Richard C and Klevorick, Alvin K and Nelson, Richard R and Winter, Sidney G and Gilbert, Richard and Griliches, Zvi},
journal={Brookings papers on economic activity},
volume={1987},
number={3},
pages={783--831},
year={1987},
abstract={},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Levin (1987) - Appropriating The Returns From Industrial Research And Development.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{kortum1998stronger,
title={Stronger protection or technological revolution: what is behind the recent surge in patenting?},
author={Kortum, Samuel and Lerner, Josh},
booktitle={Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy},
volume={48},
pages={247--304},
year={1998},
abstract={We investigate the cause of an unprecedented surge of U.S. patenting over the past decade. Conventional wisdom points to the establishment of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit by Congress in 1982. We examine whether this institutional change, which has benefited patent holders, explains the burst in US. patenting. Using both international and domestic data on patent applications and awards, we conclude that the evidence is not favorable to the conventional view. Instead, it appears that the jump in patenting reflects an increase in U.S. innovation spurred by changes in the management of research.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Kortum Lerner (1998) - Stronger Protection Or Technological Revolution.pdf}
}
@article{merges1999institutions,
title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools},
author={Merges, Robert P},
journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper},
year={1999}
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf}
}
@article{hayslett1995antitrust,
title={1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial Use of Legal Monopolies with the Prohibition of Antitrust Law},
author={Hayslett III, Thomas L},
journal={J. Intell. Prop. L.},
volume={3},
pages={375},
year={1995},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={HayslettIII (1995) - 1995 Antitrust Guidelines For The Licensing Of Intellectual Property.pdf}
}
@article{Oecd1994measurement,
title={Using patent data as science and technology indicators},
author={OECD},
journal={OECD},
year={1994},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={OECD (1994) - The Measurement Of Scientific And Technological Activities Using Patent Data As Science And Technology Indicators.pdf}
}
===Additional Entries From Uncertain File===
@article{bessen2007empirical,
title={An Empirical Look At Software Patents},
author={Bessen, James and Hunt, Robert M.},
journal={Economics & Management Strategy},
year={2007},
abstract={U.S. legal changes have made it easier to obtain patents on inventions that use software. Software patents have grown rapidly and now comprise 15 percent of all patents. They are acquired primarily by large manufacturing firms in industries known for strategic patenting; only 5 percent belong to software publishers. The very large increase in software patent propensity over time is not adequately explained by changes in R&D investments, employment of computer programmers, or productivity growth. The residual increase in patent propensity is consistent with a sizeable rise in the cost effectiveness of software patents during the 1990s. We find evidence that software patents substitute for R&D at the firm level; they are associated with lower R&D intensity. This result occurs primarily in industries known for strategic patenting and is difficult to reconcile with the traditional incentive theory of patents.},
discipline={Econ, Law},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Bessen Hunt (2007) - An Empirical Look At Software Patents.pdf}
}
@article{bessen2009sequential,
title={Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation},
author={Bessen, James and Maskin, Eric},
journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume={40},
number={4},
pages={611--635},
year={2009},
abstract={We argue that when innovation is (<sequential" (so that each successive invention builds in an essential way on its predecessors) and (icomplementary " (so that each potential innovator takes a different research line), patent protection is not as useful for encouraging innovation as in a static setting. Indeed, society and even inventors themselves may be better off without such protection. Furthermore, an inventor s prospective profit may actually be enhanced by competition and imitation. Our sequential model of},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@book{bessen2008patent,
title={Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put innovators at risk},
author={Bessen, James and Meurer, Michael James},
year={2008},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={} ,
filename={Bessen Meurer (2008) - Patent Failure.pdf}
}
@article{blundell2002individual,
title={Individual effects and dynamics in count data models},
author={Blundell, Richard and Griffith, Rachel and Windmeijer, Frank},
journal={Journal of Econometrics},
volume={108},
number={1},
pages={113--131},
year={2002},
abstract={In this paper we examine the panel data estimation of dynamic models for count data that include correlated fixed effects and predetermined variables. Use of a linear feedback model is proposed. The standard Poisson conditional maximum likelihood estimator for non-dynamic models, which is shown to be the same as the Poisson maximum likelihood estimator in a model with individual specific constants, is consistent when regressors are predetermined. A quasi-differenced GMM estimator is consistent for the parameters in the dynamic model, but when series are highly persistent, there is a problem of weak instrument bias. As estimator is proposed that utilizes pre-sample information of the dependent count variable, which is shown in Monte Carlo simulations to possess desirable small sample properties. The model and estimators are applied to data on US patents and R&D expenditures.},
discipline={Econ, Policy},
research_type={Empirical, Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Blundell Griffith Windmeijer (2002) - Individual Effects And Dynamics In Count Data Models.pdf}
}
@techreport{gans2000does,
title={When does start-up innovation spur the gale of creative destruction?},
author={Gans, Joshua S and Hsu, David H and Stern, Scott},
year={2000},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}
abstract={},
discipline={Econ, Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={High-tech},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Gans Hsu Stern (2000) - When Does Start Up Innovation Spur The Gale Of Creative Destruction.pdf}
}
@article{grindley1997managing,
title={Managing intellectual capital: licensing and cross-licensing in semiconductors and electronics},
author={Grindley, Peter C and Teece, David J},
year={1997},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Grindley Teece (1997) - Licensing And Cross Licensing In Semiconductors And Electronics.pdf}
}
@article{hall2005exploring,
title={Exploring the patent explosion},
author={Hall, Bronwyn},
journal={Essays in Honor of Edwin Mansfield},
pages={195--208},
year={2005},
abstract={This paper looks more closely at the sources of patent growth in the United States since 1984. It confirms that the increase is largely due to US patenters, with an earlier surge in Asia, and some increase in Europe. Growth has taken place in all technologies, but not in all industries, being concentrated in the electrical, electronics, computing, and scientific instruments industries. It then examines whether these patents are valued by the market. We know from survey evidence that patents in these industries are not usually considered important for appropriability, but are sometimes considered necessary to secure financing for entering the industry. I compare the market value of patents held by entrant firms to those held by incumbents (controlling for R&D). Using data on publicly traded firms 1980-1989, I find that in industries based on electrical and mechanical technologies the market value of entrants’ patents is positive in the post-1984 period (after the patenting surge), but not before, when patents were relatively unimportant in these industries. Also, the value of patent rights in complex product industries (where each product relies on many patents held by a number of other firms) is much higher for entrants than incumbents in the post-1984 period. For discrete product industries (where each product relies on only a few patents, and where the importance of patents for appropriability has traditionally been higher), there is no difference between incumbents and entrants.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Hall (2005) - Exploring The Patent Explosion.pdf}
}
@techreport{hall2001nber,
title={The NBER patent citation data file: Lessons, insights and methodological tools},
author={Hall, Bronwyn H and Jaffe, Adam B and Trajtenberg, Manuel},
year={2001},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}
abstract={This paper describes the database on U.S. patents that we have developed over the past decade, with the goal of making it widely accessible for research. We present main trends in U. S. patenting over the last 30 years, including a variety of original measures constructed with citation data, such as backward and forward citation lags, indices of originality and generality, self-citations, etc. Many of these measures exhibit interesting differences across the six main technological categories that we have developed (comprising Computers and Communications, Drugs and Medical, Electrical and Electronics, Chemical, Mechanical and Others), differences that call for further research. To stimulate such research, the entire database about 3 million patents and 16 million citations is now available on the NBER website. We discuss key issues that arise in the use of patent citations data, and suggest ways of addressing them. In particular, significant changes over time in the rate of patenting and in the number of citations made, as well as the inevitable truncation of the data, make it very hard to use the raw number of citations received by different patents directly in a meaningful way. To remedy this problem we suggest two alternative approaches: the fixed-effects approach involves scaling citations by the average citation count for a group of patents to which the patent of interest belongs; the quasi-structural approach attempts to distinguish the multiple effects on citation rates via econometric estimation.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Hall Jaffe Trajtenberg (2001) - The Nber Patent Citation Data File.pdf}
}
@article{harhoff2004determinants,
title={Determinants of opposition against EPO patent grants—the case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals},
author={Harhoff, Dietmar and Reitzig, Markus},
journal={International journal of industrial organization},
volume={22},
number={4},
pages={443--480},
year={2004},
abstract={We use a newly developed data set covering all biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents granted by the European Patent Office. We analyze the determinants of opposition which can be considered an early form of litigation. In our sample, the validity of 8.6 percent of the patents are attacked in the opposition proceeding. Using citation and patent family indicators, we show that valuable patents are more likely to be attacked, and that opposition is particularly likely to occur in areas with strong cumulative patent numbers and with greater uncertainty.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Harhoff Reitzig (2004) - Determinants Of Opposition Against EPO Patent Grants.pdf}
}
@book{jaffe2004innovation,
title={Innovation and its discontents: How our broken patent system is endangering innovation and progress, and what to do about it},
author={Jaffe, Adam B and Lerner, Josh},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Jaffe Lerner (2004) - Innovation And Its Discontents.pdf}
}
@article{lanjouw2001tilting,
title={Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions*},
author={Lanjouw, Jean O and Lerner, Josh},
journal={Journal of Law and Economics},
volume={44},
number={2},
pages={573--603},
year={2001},
abstract={This paper examines the economic role of preliminary injunctions in legal disputes. We present a model in which differences in financing costs drive the use of preliminary injunction and explore the implications of this legal remedy for ex post efficiency and ex ante incentives. Controlling for the nature of the dispute, we examine the relationships between the financial status of litigating parties and whether a preliminary injunction is requested. The empirical analysis uses detailed data compiled for a sample of 252 patent suits and reveals patterns generally consistent with those suggested by the model.},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lanjouw Lerner (2001) - Tilting The Table The Use Of Preliminary Injunctions.pdf}
}
@article{lanjouw2001characteristics,
title={Characteristics of patent litigation: a window on competition},
author={Lanjouw, Jean O and Schankerman, Mark},
journal={RAND journal of economics},
pages={129--151},
year={2001},
abstract={The cost of engaging in litigation over intellectual property assets diminishes their value as an incentive to invest in research. The frequency of court cases ref ectsfirms' strategies for appropriating innovation rents. We examine the characteristics of litigated patents and their owners by combining, for the first time, information about patent case filings from the U.S. district courts with detailed data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. By comparing filed cases to a control group, we show that there is substantial variation across patents in their exposure to litigation risk. We use this empirical evidence to examine hypotheses about the determinants of patent suits.},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lanjouw Schankerman (2001) - Characteristics Of Patent Litigation A Window On Competition.pdf}
}
@article{lee1980market,
title={Market structure and innovation: a reformulation},
author={Lee, Tom and Wilde, Louis L},
journal={The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
pages={429--436},
year={1980},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={}, ,
filename={Lee Wilde (1980) - Market Structure And Innovation A Reformulation.pdf}
}
@article{lerner1995patenting,
title={Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors},
author={Lerner, Josh},
journal={JL \& Econ.},
volume={38},
pages={463},
year={1995},
abstract={This article empirically examines the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs. I show that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards, particularly those of firms with low litigation costs. This pattern is consistent with the literature of costly litigation, which suggests that firms that have high litigation costs will take greater precautions to avoid litigation. These results are robust to a variety of control variables and modifications that seek to test alternative explanations.},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lerner (1995) - Patenting In The Shadow Of Competitors.pdf}
}
@article{meyer2000patent,
title={Patent Citations in a Novel Field of Technology—What Can They Tell about Interactions between Emerging Communities of Science and Technology?},
author={Meyer, Martin},
journal={Scientometrics},
volume={48},
number={2},
pages={151--178},
year={2000},
abstract={This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of patent citation analysis in general and its application to novel fields of science and technology in particular. It introduces into the subject-matter by discussing an empirical problem, the relationship of nano-publications and nano-patents as representations of nano-science and nano-technology. Drawing on a variety of sources, different interpretations of patent citations are presented. Then, the nature of patent citations is further investigated by comparing them to citations in the scientific literature. After characterizing the citation linkage as indicators of reciprocal relationships between science and technology, patent citations in nano-science and technology are analyzed in terms of interfield and organizational knowledge-flows.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Meyer (2000) - Patent Citations In A Novel Field Of Technology.pdf}
}
@article{milgrom1990rationalizability,
title={Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities},
author={Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John},
journal={Econometrica},
volume={58},
number={6},
pages={1255--1277},
year={1990}
abstract={We study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Milgrom Roberts (1990) - Rationalizability Learning And Equilibrium In Games With Strategic Complementarities.pdf}
}
@article{reinganum1989timing,
title={The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion},
author={Reinganum, Jennifer F},
journal={Handbook of industrial organization},
volume={1},
pages={849--908},
year={1989},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={} ,
filename={Reinganum (1989) - The Timing Of Innovation Research Development And Diffusion.pdf}
}
@book{scotchmer2004innovation,
title={Innovation and incentives},
author={Scotchmer, Suzanne},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={} ,
filename={Scotchmer (2004) - Innovation And Incentives.pdf}
}
@article{teece1986profiting,
title={Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy},
author={Teece, David J},
journal={Research policy},
volume={15},
number={6},
pages={285--305},
year={1986},
abstract={},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Teece (1986) - Profiting From Technological Innovation}
}
===Additional Entries Added During the Write-up===
@article{buchanan2000symmetric,
title={Symmetric tragedies: Commons and anticommons},
author={Buchanan, James M and Yoon, Yong J},
journal={JL \& Econ.},
volume={43},
pages={1},
year={2000},
publisher={HeinOnline},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Buchanan Yoon (2000) - Symmetric Tragedies.pdf}
}
@article{merges1990complex,
title={On the complex economics of patent scope},
author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R},
journal={Columbia Law Review},
pages={839--916},
year={1990},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Merges Nelson (1990) - On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope.pdf}
}
