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#[[Clarkson (2005) - Patent Informatics For Patent Thicket Detection]]
#[[Clarkson DeKorte (2006) - The Problem Of Patent Thickets In Convergent Technologies]]
#[[Cockburn MacGarvie (2009) - Patents Thickets And The Financing Of Early Stage Firms]]
#[[Cockburn MacGarvie Muller (2010) - Patent Thickets Licensing And Innovative Performance]]
#[[Cockburn Macgarvie (2011) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry]]
#*[[Cockburn MacGarvie (2006) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry]]
#[[Cockburn MacGarvie (2009) - Patents Thickets And The Financing Of Early Stage Firms]]
#*Note that Cockburn MacGarvie (2009) really is a different paper from Cockburn Macgarvie (2011), despite their similarities
#[[Entezarkheir (2010) - Patent Thickets And Market Value An Empirical Analysis]]
#[[EPO (2012) - Workshop on Patent Thickets]]
====Informal Theory (Econ)====
#[[Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies]]
#[[Farrell (2009) - Intellectual Property As A Bargaining Environment]]
#[[Shapiro (2001) - Navigating The Patent Thicket]]
====Formal Theory With Empirics====
#[[Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies]]
#[[Galasso (2007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Litigation]]
#[[Galasso Schankerman (2010) - Patent Thickets Courts And The Market For Innovation]]
The following papers do not explicitly discuss patent thickets but are vital to an understanding of thickets or their measures:
#[[Hall (2005) - A Note On The Bias In Herfindahl Type Measures Based On Count Data]]
 
@article{hall2005note,
title={A note on the bias in Herfindahl-type measures based on count data},
author={Hall, B.H.},
journal={Revue D' Economie Industrielle, Paris Editions, Techniques Et Economiques},
volume={110},
pages={149},
year={2005},
abstract={A Herfindahl index of constructed from shares based on count data where the number of counts is small will generally be biased downward because of the statistical properties of count data and Jensen’s inequality. This note suggests a simple correction for the bias and illustrates its applicability when using measures based on patent data and patent citation data.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Measures},
filename={[[Hall (2005) - A Note On The Bias In Herfindahl Type Measures Based On Count Data]].pdf}
}
The following papers were erroneously classified as core:
tags={},
filename={Lessig (2001) - The Future Of Ideas.pdf}
}
 
Likewise, Kiley (1992)'s article in Science appears to coin the term 'thicket'. It too doesn't merit a write-up:
 
@article{kiley1992patents,
title={Patents on random complementary DNA fragments?},
author={Kiley, Thomas D},
journal={Science},
volume={257},
number={5072},
pages={915--918},
year={1992},
publisher={American Association for the Advancement of Science},
abstract={The proposal by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to patent products resulting merely from sequencing the human genome is a mistake: at worst, it is wrong in patent law; at best, it relies on deficiencies in law concerning what is "useful" as a requirement for patents. The proposal is symptomatic of a problem besieging biotechnology-attempts to control the raw material of scientific experimentation before research has determined the practical value of such material-that needs curing on many fronts. Corrective measures are proposed for adoption by the Executive branch, the Congress, and the courts.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Genetics},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Because every step along the way draws another patent application, the path towardp ublicp ossessiono f realb enefit is increasinglyo bscuredb y dense thicketso f intersecting, overlapping, and cross-blocking patents.},
thicket_def={#B, #C1, Dubious Patents, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Today, patents are avidly pursued all along the lengthy road from the most basic science throught o the marketplacef or pharmaceuticals. Because every step along the way draws another patent application, the path towardp ublicp ossessiono f realb enefit is increasinglyo bscuredb y dense thicketso f intersecting, overlapping, and cross-blocking patents. Those operating at the beginnings of the road are most insistent on their right to nail down leverage that will remain formidabled espitem arketplacer ejectiono f the uses to which they say their inventions may be put. The frank aim of these early stagew orkersis to control ultimatea pplications discovered by others. The system is abused if those who would benefit in this way from the later labors of others can posit patents on the most strained utilities imaginable. Typical is the suggestion by NIH that organ differentiation( 18) is sufficient utility for a patent reaching to dominate the later discovery by others of a life-saving application for a cDNA!},
tags={First Thicket!},
filename={Kiley (1992) - Patents On Random Complementary Dna Fragments.pdf}
}
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