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@article{siebert2010licensing,
title={Licensing in the Patent Thicket-Timing and Benefits},
author={Siebert, R.B. and Von Graevenitz, G.},
year={2010},
abstract={Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms’ patents mutually block the use of important technologies. Firms facing patent thickets patent intensively to acquire bargaining chips and use licensing to ensure freedom to operate. Such licensing allows rivals to either avoid or resolve hold-up from blocking patents. R&D incentives depend on whether licensing takes place ex ante or ex post. We model the choice between ex ante licensing and entry into patent portfolio races leading to ex post licensing. It is shown that higher degrees of blocking lead firms to license ex post, while stronger product market competition leads firms to license ex ante. Empirical results support these theoretical predictions.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Hold-up, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Licensing can be a solution for hold-up in patent thickets... Explosive growth of patenting world wide has raised fears that patent systems may inhibit economic activity rather than foster it (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Bessen and Meurer, 2008). The growth in patenting arising from legal reform (Jaffe, 2000), increasing technological complexity (von Graevenitz et al., 2008) and feedback mechanisms within the patent system (Ziedonis, 2004) is leading to patent thickets (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). These occur in semiconductor- and information technology (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004) and increasingly in other fields such as genetic diagnostic testing (Huys et al., 2009). In a patent thicket many firms hold patents protecting components of a single technology. Whenever a firm uses such a technology it is vulnerable to hold-up by firms holding blocking patents (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Shapiro, 2001). The threat posed by blocking patents frequently induces firms to build large patent portfolios in costly patent portfolio races. These bolster firms’ bargaining positions in disputes with rivals (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Lemley, 2001). Patent thickets undermine the proper functioning of patent systems: they raise costs of using complex technology and increase incentives to acquire marginal patents.},
tags={},
filename={[[Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits]].pdf}
}
@article{von2012incidence,
title={Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets-The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity},
author={von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S. and Harhoff, D.},
journal={Journal of Industrial Economics},
year={2012},
abstract={We investigate incidence and evolution of patent thickets. Our empirical analysis is based on a theoretical model of patenting in complex and discrete technologies. The model captures how competition for patent portfolios and complementarity of patents affect patenting incentives. We show that lower technological opportunities increase patenting incentives in complex technologies while they decrease incentives in discrete technologies. Also, more competitors increase patenting incentives in complex technologies and reduce them in discrete technologies. To test these predictions a new measure of the density of patent thickets is introduced. European patent citations are used to construct measures of fragmentation and technological opportunity. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel capturing patenting behavior of 2074 firms in 30 technology areas over 15 years. GMM estimation results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. The results show that patent thickets exist in 9 out of 30 technology areas. We find that decreased technological opportunities are a surprisingly strong driver of patent thicket growth.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Hold-up, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={The literature on patent thickets shows that several institutional arrangements allow firms to disentangle overlapping property rights - these include licensing, patent pools, standard setting as well as litigation (Shapiro, 2001, Scotchmer, 2005). There is some evidence that firms holding a large share of patents within a given technology benefit substantially from their patent portfolio and may be able to reduce the likelihood of hold-up... Secondly, the conditions under which strategic complementarity is likely to arise in our model fit our current understanding of settings in which patent thickets arise very well. These are settings in which technologies are highly complex, in which many firms seek to build large patent portfolios and in which the combination of multiple parties’ technologies yields the best standards and products... This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of patent thickets... To test our model we derive a new measure of complexity of blocking relationships in patent thickets.},
tags={},
filename={[[vonGraevenitz (2012) - Incidence And Growth Of Patent Thickets]].pdf}
}
@article{ziedonis2004don,
title={Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms},
author={Ziedonis, R.H.},
journal={Management Science},
volume={50},
number={6},
pages={804--820},
year={2004},
abstract={How do firms avoid being “fenced in” by owners of patented technologies used, perhaps unknowingly, in the design or manufacture of their products? This paper examines the conditions under which firms expand their own portfolios of patents in response to potential hold-up problems in markets for technology. Combining insights from transactions cost theory with recent scholarship on intellectual property and its exchange, I predict firms will patent more aggressively than otherwise expected when markets for technology are highly fragmented (i.e., ownership rights to external technologies are widely distributed); this effect should be more pronounced for firms with large investments in technology-specific assets and under a strong legal appropriability regime. Although these characteristics of firms and their external environments have been highlighted in the theoretical literature, prior research has not explored the extent to which such factors interact to shape the patenting behavior of firms. To empirically test these hypotheses, I develop a citations-based “fragmentation index” and estimate the determinants of patenting for 67 U.S. semiconductor firms between 1980 and 1994. Accumulating exclusionary rights of their own may enable firms to safeguard their investments in new technologies while foregoing some of the costs and delays associated with ex ante contracting.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Measures, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Others raise similar concerns about the effects of dense “thickets” of overlapping patent claims, but predict that firms will “navigate” through these thickets by devising institutional solutions such as patent pools or joint ventures (Merges 2001, Shapiro 2001), or by acquiring firms with blocking patents (Graff et al. 2003)... the additional problems posed by multiple, fragmentary patent owners (i.e., the “patent thicket” or, more precisely, the “diffuse entitlements” problem)... A subtle but important insight from this “anticommons” (or “diffuse entitlements”) theory is that a firm’s bargaining challenge is affected by the level of dispersion among rights holders—not just by the number of patents in a “thicket” or the number of owners per se (as modeled by Shapiro 2001 and Buchanan and Yoon 2002)... Combining insights from transactions cost theory with studies of intellectual property (IP) and its exchange, I predict firms will patent more aggressively than otherwise expected when rights to complementary patents (i.e., ones that would likely be infringed if the firm manufactures or sells its products without a license) are widely distributed among outside entities...},
tags={},
filename={[[Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In]].pdf}
}
===Additional entries (already with pages)===
@article{epstein2004there,
title={Is there a biomedical anticommons},
author={Epstein, Richard A and Kuhlik, Bruce N},
journal={Regulation},
volume={27},
pages={54},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biomedial},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={[[Epstein Kuhlik (2004) - Is There A Biomedical Anticommons]].pdf}
}
@article{merges1999institutions,
title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools},
author={Merges, Robert P},
journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper},
year={1999},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={[[Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions]].pdf}
}
@article{murray2007formal,
title={Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge?: An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis},
author={Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
volume={63},
number={4},
pages={648--687},
year={2007},
abstract={Although many scholars suggest that IPR has a positive effect on cumulative innovation, a growing “anticommons” perspective highlights the negative role of IPR over scientific knowledge. At its core, this debate is centered on how intellectual property rights over a given piece of knowledge affect the propensity of future researchers to build upon that knowledge in their own scientific research activities. This article frames this issue around the concept of dual knowledge, in which a single discovery may contribute to both scientific research and useful commercial applications, and finds evidence for a modest anti-commons effect. A key implication of dual knowledge is that it may be simultaneously instantiated as a scientific research article and as a patent. Such patent-paper pairs are at the heart of our empirical strategy.We exploit the fact that patents are granted with a substantial lag, often many years after the knowledge is initially disclosed through paper publication. The knowledge associated with a patent-paper pair therefore diffuses within two distinct intellectual property environments, one associated with the pre-grant period and another after formal IP rights are granted. Relative to the expected citation pattern for publications with a given quality level, the anti-commons perspective suggests that the citation rate for a scientific publication should fall after formal IP rights associated with that publication are granted. Employing a differences-in-differences estimator for 169 patent-paper pairs (and including a control group of other publications from the same journal for which no patent is granted), we find evidence for a modest anti-commons effect (the citation rate after the patent grant declines by approximately 10 to 20 percent). This decline becomes more pronounced with the number of years elapsed since the date of the patent grant and is particularly salient for articles authored by researchers with public sector affiliations.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={[[Murray Stern (2007) - Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder The Free Flow Of Scientific Knowledge]].pdf}
===Additional entries (without pages)=== @article{bessen2003patentziedonis2004don, title={Patent thicketsDon't fence me in: Strategic patenting Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of complex technologiesfirms}, author={BessenZiedonis, James}, journal={Available at SSRN 327760}, year={2003} abstract={Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership of a product’s technology is shared, not exclusive. In that case I show that if patent standards are low, firms build “thickets” of patents, especially incumbent firms in mature industries. When they assert these patents, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenses, making R&D incentives sub-optimal. On the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and patent standards are high, firms pursue strategies of “mutual non-aggression.” Then R&D incentives are stronger, even optimalH.}, discipline journal={Management Science}, research_type volume={50}, industry number={6}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename pages={Bessen (2003) 804- Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies.pdf} } @article{epo2013workshop, title={Workshop on Patent Thickets}, author={EPC, Economic and Scientific Advisory Board}, journal={European Patent Office Recommendations, Available at http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2013/20130313.html820}, year={20132004}, abstract={This report represents the summary and synthesis How do firms avoid being “fenced in” by owners of the ESAB workshop on patent thickets that was held on 26 September 2012 in Leuvenpatented technologies used, perhaps unknowingly, Belgium. This was the third workshop in a series held in 2012, comprising the role and structure design or manufacture of fees, patent quality, and patent thickets. Separate reports were produced for each topic. The workshop on patent thickets was designed to (1) encourage their products? This paper examines the exchange of thoughts from different stakeholders and discover conditions under which firms expand their perceptions own portfolios of patent thickets; (2) ponder sectoral differences, both patents in incidence and impact; (3) suggest ideas for future research; and (4) suggest possible institutional approaches response to address challenges raised by the existence of patent thickets and the implications of those approaches potential hold-up problems in markets for different stakeholderstechnology. Other important considerations were the role of standards, royalty stacking, compulsory licensing, and patent pools. Early discussions centred around the definition and incidence of patent thickets and there was widespread agreement on what the term represents. A patent thicket conjures up the image of a bramble, a large dense bush Combining insights from transactions cost theory with thorns recent scholarship on the branches making it difficult to pass through without getting severely scratched. Thus a patent thicket usually involves (1) multiple patents on (2) the same, similar, or complementary technologies, (3) held by different parties, making it difficult to negotiate intellectual property rights (for example, licensing agreements) to the point where some scholars feel it might be socially inefficient.}, discipline={}, research_type={}, industry={}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Finally, the group tackled prescriptive aspects. There was a lively discussion on whether patent thickets are a problem per se. While there was no clear answer to that, participants did agree that patent thickets appear to be closely related to the management of innovation and its complexity... A patent thicket generally has several characteristics (von Graevenitzexchange, Wagner, & Harhoff, 2011). It usually involves (1) multiple patents or I predict firms will patent applications on (2) the same, similar, or complementary technologies, (3) held by different parties. Granted patents as well as patent applications may represent a barrier more aggressively than otherwise expected when markets for new entrants, therefore a fair measure of patent thickets should include both.}, thicket_def={#A-T, #B, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Overlapping Patents}, thicket_def_extract={Thus a patent thicket usually involves (1) multiple patents on (2) the same, similar, or complementary technologies, technology are highly fragmented (3) held by different parties, making it difficult to negotiate intellectual property rights (for example, licensing agreements) to the point where some scholars feel it might be socially inefficient.i.e.. What is a patent thicket? A patent thicket conjures up the image of a thicket, or bramble, a large dense bush with thorns on the branches making it difficult to pass through without getting severely scratched. Thus a patent thicket is a “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property ownership rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, 2001, p. 120external technologies are widely distributed). This makes it difficult to negotiate intellectual property rights (for example, licensing agreements1), to the point where some observers feel it might be socially inefficient (Bessen & Meurer, 2008b; Scotchmer, 1996). In such a situation, it is argued that strategic uses of the patent system by applicants may this effect should be interfering more pronounced for firms with one of the goals of the system, by obliging innovators to spend inordinate resources on transaction costs to bring new large investments in technology that builds on prior work to market. Such high transaction costs, if and when they exist, would tend to discourage innovation rather than encourage it.}, tags={}, filename={EPO (2012) - Workshop on Patent Thickets.pdf} } @article{galasso2007broad, title={Broad cross-license agreements specific assets and persuasive patent litigation: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industry}, author={Galasso, Alberto}, journal={LSE STICERD Research Paper Nounder a strong legal appropriability regime. EI45}, year={2007} abstract={}, discipline={}, research_type={}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Galasso (2007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Litigation.pdf} } @article{hall2007empirical, title={An empirical analysis Although these characteristics of patent litigation firms and their external environments have been highlighted in the semiconductor industry}theoretical literature, author={Hall, Bronwyn H and Ziedonis, Rosemarie}, journal={University prior research has not explored the extent to which such factors interact to shape the patenting behavior of California at Berkeley working paper}, year={2007}, publisher={Citeseer} abstract={Semiconductor firms sell products that embed hundreds if not thousands of patented inventions. To empirically test these hypotheses, elevating concerns about patentI develop a citations-related hold-up in this sector. This paper examines based “fragmentation index” and estimate the incidence and nature determinants of patent lawsuits involving 136 dedicated patenting for 67 U.S. semiconductor firms between 1973 1980 and 20011994. By supplementing patent litigation data with information drawn from archival sources, we estimate the probability that firms will be involved in patent lawsuits, either as enforcers of Accumulating exclusionary rights or as targets of litigation filed by other patent owners. We further distinguish between disputes that involve product-market rivals and those that do not. Overall, we find little evidence that semiconductor their own may enable firms have adopted a more aggressive stance towards patent enforcement since the 1970s, despite the effective strengthening of U.S. patent rights to safeguard their investments in the 1980s and widespread entry by small firms. In fact, their litigation rate as enforcers new technologies while foregoing some of patents remains relatively stable over the past two decades once we control for factors such as the number of patents they own costs and changes in R&D spendingdelays associated with ex ante contracting. In striking contrast, we find an escalation in their baseline risk as targets of litigation brought by outside patent owners.}, discipline={Econ, Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Semiconductor}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Hall Ziedonis (2007) - An Empirical Analysis Of Patent Litigation In The Semiconductor Industry.pdf} } @article{harhoff2007strategic, title={The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and competition policies}, author={Harhoff, Dietmar and Hall, Bronwyn H and von Graevenitz, Georg and Hoisl, Karin and Wagner, Stefan and Gambardella, Alfonso and Giuri, Paola}, journal={Report commissioned by European Commission}, year={2007} abstract={},
===Missing Papers (without pages)===
PTLR Core Group Processed BibTeX (view source)
Revision as of 21:31, 8 April 2013
, 21:31, 8 April 2013→The Processed Core Group BibTeX Records
For the reviews see the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page. Do not edit these BibTeX entries without also editting the entries in their pages. Links to the pages are available through the filename tag.
@article{bessen2003patent,
title={Patent thickets: Strategic patenting of complex technologies},
author={Bessen, James},
journal={Available at SSRN 327760},
year={2003}
abstract={Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership of a product’s technology is shared, not exclusive. In that case I show that if patent standards are low, firms build “thickets” of patents, especially incumbent firms in mature industries. When they assert these patents, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenses, making R&D incentives sub-optimal. On the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and patent standards are high, firms pursue strategies of “mutual non-aggression.” Then R&D incentives are stronger, even optimal.},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies.pdf}
}
@article{clarkson2004objective,
tags={},
filename={[[Cockburn MacGarvie Muller (2010) - Patent Thickets Licensing And Innovative Performance]].pdf}
}
@article{epo2013workshop,
title={Workshop on Patent Thickets},
author={EPC, Economic and Scientific Advisory Board},
journal={European Patent Office Recommendations, Available at http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2013/20130313.html},
year={2013}
abstract={This report represents the summary and synthesis of the ESAB workshop on patent thickets that was held on 26 September 2012 in Leuven, Belgium. This was the third workshop in a series held in 2012, comprising the role and structure of fees, patent quality, and patent thickets. Separate reports were produced for each topic. The workshop on patent thickets was designed to (1) encourage the exchange of thoughts from different stakeholders and discover their perceptions of patent thickets; (2) ponder sectoral differences, both in incidence and impact; (3) suggest ideas for future research; and (4) suggest possible institutional approaches to address challenges raised by the existence of patent thickets and the implications of those approaches for different stakeholders. Other important considerations were the role of standards, royalty stacking, compulsory licensing, and patent pools. Early discussions centred around the definition and incidence of patent thickets and there was widespread agreement on what the term represents. A patent thicket conjures up the image of a bramble, a large dense bush with thorns on the branches making it difficult to pass through without getting severely scratched. Thus a patent thicket usually involves (1) multiple patents on (2) the same, similar, or complementary technologies, (3) held by different parties, making it difficult to negotiate intellectual property rights (for example, licensing agreements) to the point where some scholars feel it might be socially inefficient.},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={Weakly Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Finally, the group tackled prescriptive aspects. There was a lively discussion on whether patent thickets are a problem per se. While there was no clear answer to that, participants did agree that patent thickets appear to be closely related to the management of innovation and its complexity... A patent thicket generally has several characteristics (von Graevenitz, Wagner, & Harhoff, 2011). It usually involves (1) multiple patents or patent applications on (2) the same, similar, or complementary technologies, (3) held by different parties. Granted patents as well as patent applications may represent a barrier for new entrants, therefore a fair measure of patent thickets should include both.},
thicket_def={#A-T, #B, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Overlapping Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Thus a patent thicket usually involves (1) multiple patents on (2) the same, similar, or complementary technologies, (3) held by different parties, making it difficult to negotiate intellectual property rights (for example, licensing agreements) to the point where some scholars feel it might be socially inefficient.... What is a patent thicket? A patent thicket conjures up the image of a thicket, or bramble, a large dense bush with thorns on the branches making it difficult to pass through without getting severely scratched. Thus a patent thicket is a “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, 2001, p. 120). This makes it difficult to negotiate intellectual property rights (for example, licensing agreements1), to the point where some observers feel it might be socially inefficient (Bessen & Meurer, 2008b; Scotchmer, 1996). In such a situation, it is argued that strategic uses of the patent system by applicants may be interfering with one of the goals of the system, by obliging innovators to spend inordinate resources on transaction costs to bring new technology that builds on prior work to market. Such high transaction costs, if and when they exist, would tend to discourage innovation rather than encourage it.},
tags={},
filename={EPO (2012) - Workshop on Patent Thickets.pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Entezarkheir (2010) - Patent Thickets And Market Value An Empirical Analysis]].pdf}
}
@article{epstein2004there,
title={Is there a biomedical anticommons},
author={Epstein, Richard A and Kuhlik, Bruce N},
journal={Regulation},
volume={27},
pages={54},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biomedial},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={[[Epstein Kuhlik (2004) - Is There A Biomedical Anticommons]].pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Galasso Schankerman (2010) - Patent Thickets Courts And The Market For Innovation]].pdf}
}
@article{galasso2007broad,
title={Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigation: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industry},
author={Galasso, Alberto},
journal={LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI45},
year={2007}
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Galasso (2007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Litigation.pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Hall (2005) - A Note On The Bias In Herfindahl Type Measures Based On Count Data]].pdf}
}
@article{hall2001patent,
title={The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the US semiconductor industry, 1979-1995},
author={Hall, B.H. and Ziedonis, R.H.},
journal={RAND Journal of Economics},
pages={101--128},
year={2001},
abstract={We examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation. Recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to R&D. Yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid- 1980s. We explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 U.S. semiconductor firms during 1979-1995. The results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of U.S. patent rights spawned "patent portfolio races" among capital-intensive firms, but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={Semiconductor},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Dubious Patents, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={The semiconductor industry also provides an excellent setting within which to examine the effects of stronger patent rights on firms engaged in rapidly advancing, "cumulative" technologies. Much like multimedia or computer firms, semiconductor firms often require access to a "thicket" of intellectual property rights in order to advance the technology or to legally produce or sell their products. Given the rapid pace of technological change in this industry, however, any new product or process is likely to overlap with technologies previously or simultaneously developed by external parties (Grindley and Teece, 1997)... This concern appears especially salient among firms that have made costly and rapidly depreciating investments in facilities that use a "thicket" of innovations developed by many parties. To obtain the rights to infringe patents held by external parties and to improve their leverage in negotiations with other patent owners, these firms amass larger patent portfolios of their own with which to trade... If patent rights were strictly awarded to inventors of "nonobvious," "useful," and "novel" inventions, then it should become increasingly difficult to obtain a patent when a thicket of prior art exists, and the number of successful patent applications should fall.},
tags={},
filename={[[Hall Ziedonis (2001) - The Patent Paradox Revisited]].pdf}
}
}
@article{hall2001patenthall2007empirical, title={The patent paradox revisited: an An empirical study analysis of patenting patent litigation in the US semiconductor industry, 1979-1995}, author={Hall, B.Bronwyn H. and Ziedonis, R.H.Rosemarie}, journal={RAND Journal University of EconomicsCalifornia at Berkeley working paper}, pagesyear={101--1282007}, yearpublisher={2001Citeseer}, abstract={We examine the patenting behavior of Semiconductor firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation. Recent survey evidence suggests sell products that semiconductor firms do embed hundreds if not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to R&D. Yet the propensity thousands of semiconductor firms to patented inventions, elevating concerns about patent has risen dramatically since the mid- 1980srelated hold-up in this sector. We explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives This paper examines the incidence and analyzing the patenting behavior nature of 95 patent lawsuits involving 136 dedicated U.S. semiconductor firms during 1979between 1973 and 2001. By supplementing patent litigation data with information drawn from archival sources, we estimate the probability that firms will be involved in patent lawsuits, either as enforcers of exclusionary rights or as targets of litigation filed by other patent owners. We further distinguish between disputes that involve product-1995market rivals and those that do not. The results suggest Overall, we find little evidence that semiconductor firms have adopted a more aggressive stance towards patent enforcement since the 1980s 1970s, despite the effective strengthening of U.S. patent rights spawned "patent portfolio races" among capital-intensive in the 1980s and widespread entry by small firms. In fact, but it also facilitated entry their litigation rate as enforcers of patents remains relatively stable over the past two decades once we control for factors such as the number of patents they own and changes in R&D spending. In striking contrast, we find an escalation in their baseline risk as targets of litigation brought by specialized design firmsoutside patent owners.}, discipline={Econ, Law}, research_type={Theory, EmpiricalDiscussion},
industry={Semiconductor},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Dubious Patents, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={The semiconductor industry also provides an excellent setting within which to examine the effects of stronger patent rights on firms engaged in rapidly advancing, "cumulative" technologies. Much like multimedia or computer firms, semiconductor firms often require access to a "thicket" of intellectual property rights in order to advance the technology or to legally produce or sell their products. Given the rapid pace of technological change in this industry, however, any new product or process is likely to overlap with technologies previously or simultaneously developed by external parties (Grindley and Teece, 1997)... This concern appears especially salient among firms that have made costly and rapidly depreciating investments in facilities that use a "thicket" of innovations developed by many parties. To obtain the rights to infringe patents held by external parties and to improve their leverage in negotiations with other patent owners, these firms amass larger patent portfolios of their own with which to trade... If patent rights were strictly awarded to inventors of "nonobvious," "useful," and "novel" inventions, then it should become increasingly difficult to obtain a patent when a thicket of prior art exists, and the number of successful patent applications should fall.},
tags={},
filename={[[Hall Ziedonis (20012007) - An Empirical Analysis Of Patent Litigation In The Patent Paradox Revisited]]Semiconductor Industry.pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Hargreaves (2011) - Digital Opportunity]].pdf}
}
@article{harhoff2012conflict,
title={Conflict Resolution, Public Goods and Patent Thickets},
author={Harhoff, D. and Von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S.},
journal={Public Goods and Patent Thickets (April 15, 2012)},
year={2012},
abstract={Litigation and post-grant validity challenges at patent offices provide an important mechanism for correcting erroneous patent grants. However, such challenges will only be initiated if the (expected) private gains from challenging a granted patent right exceed the respective costs. Two important aspects may influence the likelihood of challenges. First, there is a public goods problem: firms may refrain from challenges if they anticipate that others will also benefit from the revocation of a weak patent. Second, as more firms are caught up in patent thickets, challenges to weak patents will become too costly as they invite counter-challenges. We use data on opposition proceedings initiated against patents granted at the European Patent Office (EPO) to study the importance of these mechanisms. This paper identifies a significant increase in the incidence of opposition in technical fields characterized by high concentration of patent ownership. Additionally, in fields with a large number of mutually blocking patents, the incidence of opposition is sharply reduced, particularly amongst those firms that are caught up in and driving the growth of patent thickets. Thus, while post-grant reviews may help to resolve problems in some areas, they are less suited to deal with patent thickets and contexts with dispersed patent ownership. We discuss the implications of these results for efforts to deal with patent thickets and weak patents.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Hold-up},
thicket_def_extract={Formal models of patenting in patent thickets do not attempt to span both complex and discrete technologies as we do here... Complexity increases with the number of facets. With higher complexity it is increasingly probable that ownership of patents in a technological opportunity becomes dispersed. We assume that the value of owning patents 3 in technological opportunities with more than one facet depends on the share of patents in each technological opportunity that firms own. This captures the interdependence of patents in complex technologies and the possibility for hold-up within them.... Due to the complexity of the technology hold-up may arise: in the case of LASIK there has was a string of court cases between VISX Inc. and Nidek Inc. after 1998 regarding infringement of VISX patents on LASIK... The literature on patent thickets shows that several institutional arrangements allow firms to disentangle overlapping property rights... This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of patent thickets.},
tags={},
filename={[[Harhoff VonGraevenitz Wagner (2012) - Conflict Resolution Public Goods And Patent Thickets]].pdf}
}
}
@article{harhoff2012conflictharhoff2007strategic, title={Conflict Resolution, Public Goods The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and Patent Thicketscompetition policies}, author={Harhoff, D. Dietmar and Von Hall, Bronwyn H and von Graevenitz, G. Georg and Hoisl, Karin and Wagner, S.Stefan and Gambardella, Alfonso and Giuri, Paola}, journal={Public Goods and Patent Thickets (April 15, 2012)Report commissioned by European Commission}, year={20122007}, abstract={Litigation and post-grant validity challenges at patent offices provide an important mechanism for correcting erroneous patent grants. However, such challenges will only be initiated if the (expected) private gains from challenging a granted patent right exceed the respective costs. Two important aspects may influence the likelihood of challenges. First, there is a public goods problem: firms may refrain from challenges if they anticipate that others will also benefit from the revocation of a weak patent. Second, as more firms are caught up in patent thickets, challenges to weak patents will become too costly as they invite counter-challenges. We use data on opposition proceedings initiated against patents granted at the European Patent Office (EPO) to study the importance of these mechanisms. This paper identifies a significant increase in the incidence of opposition in technical fields characterized by high concentration of patent ownership. Additionally, in fields with a large number of mutually blocking patents, the incidence of opposition is sharply reduced, particularly amongst those firms that are caught up in and driving the growth of patent thickets. Thus, while post-grant reviews may help to resolve problems in some areas, they are less suited to deal with patent thickets and contexts with dispersed patent ownership. We discuss the implications of these results for efforts to deal with patent thickets and weak patents.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={EmpiricalDiscussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Hold-up}, thicket_def_extract={Formal models of patenting in patent thickets do not attempt to span both complex and discrete technologies as we do here... Complexity increases with the number of facets. With higher complexity it is increasingly probable that ownership of patents in a technological opportunity becomes dispersed. We assume that the value of owning patents 3 in technological opportunities with more than one facet depends on the share of patents in each technological opportunity that firms own. This captures the interdependence of patents in complex technologies and the possibility for hold-up within them.... Due to the complexity of the technology hold-up may arise: in the case of LASIK there has was a string of court cases between VISX Inc. and Nidek Inc. after 1998 regarding infringement of VISX patents on LASIK... The literature on patent thickets shows that several institutional arrangements allow firms to disentangle overlapping property rights... This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of patent thickets.},
tags={},
filename={[[Harhoff VonGraevenitz Hall vonGraevenitz Hoisl Wagner Gambardella Giuri (20122007) - Conflict Resolution Public Goods The Strategic Use Of Patents And Patent Thickets]]Its Implications For Enterprise And Competition Policies.pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Heller Eisenberg (1998) - Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons In Biomedical Research]].pdf}
}
@article{heller1997tragedy,
title={Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, The},
author={Heller, Michael A},
journal={HARV. l. rEV.},
volume={111},
pages={621},
year={1997},
abstract={Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty while street kiosks in front are full of goods? This article develops a theory of anitcommons property to help explain the puzzle of empty storefronts and full kiosks. Anticommons property can be understood as the mirror image of commons property. By definition, in a commons, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse – a tragedy of the commons. In an anitcommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse – a tragedy of the anitcommons. Anticommons property may appear whenever new property rights are being defined. For example in Moscow, multiple owners have been endowed initially with competing rights in each storefront, so no owner holds a useable bundle of rights and the store remains empty. Once an anticommons has emerged, collecting rights into private property bundles can be brutal and slow. This article explores the dynamics of anitcommons property in transition economies, formalizes the empirical material in a property theory framework, and then shows how the idea of anticommons property can be a useful new tool for understanding a range of property puzzles. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists might pay more attention to the content of the property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clarify rights. },
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf}
}
}
@bookarticle{mossoff2009stitchmann2005patents, title={A stitch Do Patents Facilitate Financing in timethe Software Industry?}, author={Mann, Ronald J}, journal={Texas Law Review}, volume={83}, pages={961--1009}, year-{2005}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Mann (2005) - Do Patents Facilitate Financing In The Software Industry.pdf} } @article{merges1996contracting, title={Contracting into liability rules: The rise Intellectual property rights and fall of the sewing machine patent thicketcollective rights organizations}, author={MossoffMerges, ARobert P}, journal={Cal L. Rev.}, yearvolume={84}, pages={20091293}, publisheryear={George Mason University School of Law1996}, abstract={Scholarly interest As intellectual property rights have gained in how anticommons theory applies to patents has skyrocketed since Professor Michael Heller first proposed a decade ago that excessively fragmented interests in land can frustrate its commercial development. There is now a vigorous debate on whether anticommons exist in patent lawprominence, businesspeople and scholars alike have complained of the increasing burden of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, if sofailing this, whether these “patent thickets” impede innovation in patented productslitigating intellectual property disputes. This article contributes Intellectual property experts, especially scholars, have responded to this debate burgeoning thicket of rights with a series of initiatives to expedite deal making by analyzing means of statutory compulsory licensing. These licenses are classic examples of "liability rulesh" in the rise foundational legal entitlements framework of Guido Calabresi and fall of the first patent thicket in American historyA. Douglas Melamed. They appear to be a compromise: they address the “Sewing Machine War” mushrooming transactional hurdle created by new and stronger intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the 1850seconomic advantages that accompany strengthened rights. In this Article, Professor Merges argues that proposals to create more compulsory licenses are rooted in a faulty theoretical framework. The invention Based on a survey of the sewing machine in the antebellum era represents many firsts in the American legal system—the first patent thicketdiverse institutions various industries have cultivated to handle intellectual property transactions, the first “patent trollMerges contends that "repeat players" (individuals and firms that frequently need to exchange rights) can and often do take steps to overcome transactional bottlenecks. Whether through copyright collectives,” such as ASCAP and BMI in the first patent pool. Significantlymusic industry, this case study verifies that or undertakings such as patent thickets exist pools in automobile and aircraft manufacturing, those with a recurring need to transact in intellectual property rights invest in administrative structures that they can frustrate commercial development lower the costs of new productsexchanging rights. Among other functions, these collective rights organizations promulgate rules and procedures for placing a monetary value on members' property rights. But They thus conserve on transaction costs either by making it also challenges widely held assumptions in easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating the patent thicket literatureoccasion for repeat-play, reciprocal bargaining, versus more costly one-shot exchanges. Many scholars believe that this is largely Drawing on a modern problem arising from a host body of allegedly academic literature known as the new issues in the patent system, such as incremental high-tech innovation, excessive litigationinstitutional economics, Professor Merges explains and analyzes the rise origins and operation of “patent trollsthese organizations.” Yet He also argues that entitlement theory must be adjusted to recognize the sewing machine patent thicket exhibited all possibility that such institutions will evolve out of a background of these phenomenastrong property rights. More generally, revealing he points out that patent thickets have long existed within entitlement theory ought to incorporate a more dynamic understanding of the historically successful American patent systemimportance of contracting after entitlements are granted. The denouement of Professor Merges applies his observations and theoretical insights to an important contemporary controversy: whether Congress ought to legislate a compulsory license for digital content needed by the sewing machine patent thicket in multimedia industry. He argues that it should not. Given the Sewing Machine Combination of 1856underlying economics, the first privately formed patent pool, further challenges the widely held belief that patent thickets are best solved through new statutesand consistent with experience in other industries, regulations or court decisions that limit existing intellectual property rights will force industry participants to invest in patentsinstitutions to conduct transactions. To the contraryIndeed, consistent with the Sewing Machine Combination was formed against the backdrop of the strong protection of patent rights analysis in the antebellum erathis Article, evidence indicates this is already occurring}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules. Thuspdf} } @article{merges1999institutions, title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the story case of the invention patent pools}, author={Merges, Robert P}, journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper}, year={1999}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={[[Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions]].pdf} } @article{merges1990complex, title={On the sewing machine is a striking account complex economics of early American technologicalpatent scope}, commercial author={Merges, Robert P and legal ingenuityNelson, Richard R}, journal={Columbia Law Review}, pages={839--916}, year={1990}, which heralds important empirical lessons for how patent thicket theory is understood and applied today. abstract={}, discipline={EconLaw},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={SewingSoftware},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention}, thicket_def_extract={Professor Michael Heller first proposed a decade ago that excessively fragmented interests in land can frustrate its commercial development. There is now a vigorous debate on whether anticommons exist in patent law, and, if so, whether these “patent thickets” impede innovation in patented products... A “patent thicket” exists when too many patents covering individual elements of a commercial product are separately owned by different entities... According to economic theory, the problem of such excessive fragmentation of ownership interests is straightforward: It increases transaction costs, accentuates hold-out problems, and precipitates costly litigation, which prevents commercial development of the affected property.12 Additionally, a patent thicket can block new research into follow-on inventions... no one has yet explained why this patent thick arose beyond identifying the fact that there were overlapping patent claims. But this does not by itself create a patent thicket, as there have to be reasons why patent-owners assert these property claims against each other to the point of creating a litigation free-for-all, replicating the conditions of Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature.}, tags={Patent Pool}, filename={[[Mossoff Merges Nelson (20091990) - A Stitch In Time On The Rise And Fall Complex Economics Of The Sewing Machine Patent Thicket]]Scope.pdf}
}
tags={Patent Pool},
filename={[[Mossoff (2011) - Rise And Fall Of The First American Patent Thicket]].pdf}
}
@book{mossoff2009stitch,
title={A stitch in time: The rise and fall of the sewing machine patent thicket},
author={Mossoff, A.},
year={2009},
publisher={George Mason University School of Law},
abstract={Scholarly interest in how anticommons theory applies to patents has skyrocketed since Professor Michael Heller first proposed a decade ago that excessively fragmented interests in land can frustrate its commercial development. There is now a vigorous debate on whether anticommons exist in patent law, and, if so, whether these “patent thickets” impede innovation in patented products. This article contributes to this debate by analyzing the rise and fall of the first patent thicket in American history: the “Sewing Machine War” of the 1850s. The invention of the sewing machine in the antebellum era represents many firsts in the American legal system—the first patent thicket, the first “patent troll,” and the first patent pool. Significantly, this case study verifies that patent thickets exist and that they can frustrate commercial development of new products. But it also challenges widely held assumptions in the patent thicket literature. Many scholars believe that this is largely a modern problem arising from a host of allegedly new issues in the patent system, such as incremental high-tech innovation, excessive litigation, and the rise of “patent trolls.” Yet the sewing machine patent thicket exhibited all of these phenomena, revealing that patent thickets have long existed within the historically successful American patent system. The denouement of the sewing machine patent thicket in the Sewing Machine Combination of 1856, the first privately formed patent pool, further challenges the widely held belief that patent thickets are best solved through new statutes, regulations or court decisions that limit property rights in patents. To the contrary, the Sewing Machine Combination was formed against the backdrop of the strong protection of patent rights in the antebellum era. Thus, the story of the invention of the sewing machine is a striking account of early American technological, commercial and legal ingenuity, which heralds important empirical lessons for how patent thicket theory is understood and applied today.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Sewing},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={Professor Michael Heller first proposed a decade ago that excessively fragmented interests in land can frustrate its commercial development. There is now a vigorous debate on whether anticommons exist in patent law, and, if so, whether these “patent thickets” impede innovation in patented products... A “patent thicket” exists when too many patents covering individual elements of a commercial product are separately owned by different entities... According to economic theory, the problem of such excessive fragmentation of ownership interests is straightforward: It increases transaction costs, accentuates hold-out problems, and precipitates costly litigation, which prevents commercial development of the affected property.12 Additionally, a patent thicket can block new research into follow-on inventions... no one has yet explained why this patent thick arose beyond identifying the fact that there were overlapping patent claims. But this does not by itself create a patent thicket, as there have to be reasons why patent-owners assert these property claims against each other to the point of creating a litigation free-for-all, replicating the conditions of Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature.},
tags={Patent Pool},
filename={[[Mossoff (2009) - A Stitch In Time The Rise And Fall Of The Sewing Machine Patent Thicket]].pdf}
}
@article{murray2007formal,
title={Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge?: An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis},
author={Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
volume={63},
number={4},
pages={648--687},
year={2007},
abstract={Although many scholars suggest that IPR has a positive effect on cumulative innovation, a growing “anticommons” perspective highlights the negative role of IPR over scientific knowledge. At its core, this debate is centered on how intellectual property rights over a given piece of knowledge affect the propensity of future researchers to build upon that knowledge in their own scientific research activities. This article frames this issue around the concept of dual knowledge, in which a single discovery may contribute to both scientific research and useful commercial applications, and finds evidence for a modest anti-commons effect. A key implication of dual knowledge is that it may be simultaneously instantiated as a scientific research article and as a patent. Such patent-paper pairs are at the heart of our empirical strategy.We exploit the fact that patents are granted with a substantial lag, often many years after the knowledge is initially disclosed through paper publication. The knowledge associated with a patent-paper pair therefore diffuses within two distinct intellectual property environments, one associated with the pre-grant period and another after formal IP rights are granted. Relative to the expected citation pattern for publications with a given quality level, the anti-commons perspective suggests that the citation rate for a scientific publication should fall after formal IP rights associated with that publication are granted. Employing a differences-in-differences estimator for 169 patent-paper pairs (and including a control group of other publications from the same journal for which no patent is granted), we find evidence for a modest anti-commons effect (the citation rate after the patent grant declines by approximately 10 to 20 percent). This decline becomes more pronounced with the number of years elapsed since the date of the patent grant and is particularly salient for articles authored by researchers with public sector affiliations.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={[[Murray Stern (2007) - Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder The Free Flow Of Scientific Knowledge]].pdf}
}
filename={Reitzig Henkel Heath (2007) - On Sharks Trolls And Their Patent Prey.pdf}
}
@incollection{shapiro2001navigating,
title={Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting},
tags={},
filename={[[Siebert Graevenitz (2008) - Does Licensing Resolve Hold Up In The Patent Thicket]].pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Jostling For Advantage Or Not]].pdf}
}
@article{siebert2010licensing,
title={Licensing in the Patent Thicket-Timing and Benefits},
author={Siebert, R.B. and Von Graevenitz, G.},
year={2010},
abstract={Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms’ patents mutually block the use of important technologies. Firms facing patent thickets patent intensively to acquire bargaining chips and use licensing to ensure freedom to operate. Such licensing allows rivals to either avoid or resolve hold-up from blocking patents. R&D incentives depend on whether licensing takes place ex ante or ex post. We model the choice between ex ante licensing and entry into patent portfolio races leading to ex post licensing. It is shown that higher degrees of blocking lead firms to license ex post, while stronger product market competition leads firms to license ex ante. Empirical results support these theoretical predictions.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Hold-up, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Licensing can be a solution for hold-up in patent thickets... Explosive growth of patenting world wide has raised fears that patent systems may inhibit economic activity rather than foster it (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Bessen and Meurer, 2008). The growth in patenting arising from legal reform (Jaffe, 2000), increasing technological complexity (von Graevenitz et al., 2008) and feedback mechanisms within the patent system (Ziedonis, 2004) is leading to patent thickets (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). These occur in semiconductor- and information technology (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004) and increasingly in other fields such as genetic diagnostic testing (Huys et al., 2009). In a patent thicket many firms hold patents protecting components of a single technology. Whenever a firm uses such a technology it is vulnerable to hold-up by firms holding blocking patents (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Shapiro, 2001). The threat posed by blocking patents frequently induces firms to build large patent portfolios in costly patent portfolio races. These bolster firms’ bargaining positions in disputes with rivals (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Lemley, 2001). Patent thickets undermine the proper functioning of patent systems: they raise costs of using complex technology and increase incentives to acquire marginal patents.},
tags={},
filename={[[Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits]].pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[VonGraevenitz Wagner Harhoff (2011) - How To Measure Patent Thickets A Novel Approach]].pdf}
}
}
discipline={Econ},
research_type={DiscussionMeasures, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={Others raise similar concerns about the effects of dense “thickets” of overlapping patent claims, but predict that firms will “navigate” through these thickets by devising institutional solutions such as patent pools or joint ventures (Merges 2001, Shapiro 2001), or by acquiring firms with blocking patents (Graff et al. 2003)... the additional problems posed by multiple, fragmentary patent owners (i.e., the “patent thicket” or, more precisely, the “diffuse entitlements” problem)... A subtle but important insight from this “anticommons” (or “diffuse entitlements”) theory is that a firm’s bargaining challenge is affected by the level of dispersion among rights holders—not just by the number of patents in a “thicket” or the number of owners per se (as modeled by Shapiro 2001 and Buchanan and Yoon 2002)... Combining insights from transactions cost theory with studies of intellectual property (IP) and its exchange, I predict firms will patent more aggressively than otherwise expected when rights to complementary patents (i.e., ones that would likely be infringed if the firm manufactures or sells its products without a license) are widely distributed among outside entities...},
tags={},
filename={Harhoff Hall vonGraevenitz Hoisl Wagner Gambardella Giuri [[Ziedonis (20072004) - The Strategic Use Of Patents And Its Implications For Enterprise And Competition PoliciesDont Fence Me In]].pdf}
}
@article{heller1997tragedyvon2012incidence, title={Tragedy Incidence and Growth of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, Patent Thickets-TheImpact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity}, author={Hellervon Graevenitz, Michael A}G. and Wagner, journal={HARVS. l. rEVand Harhoff, D.}, volumejournal={111}, pages={621Journal of Industrial Economics}, year={19972012}, abstract={Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty while street kiosks in front are full We investigate incidence and evolution of goods? This article develops patent thickets. Our empirical analysis is based on a theory theoretical model of anitcommons property to help explain the puzzle of empty storefronts patenting in complex and full kiosksdiscrete technologies. Anticommons property can be understood as the mirror image The model captures how competition for patent portfolios and complementarity of commons propertypatents affect patenting incentives. We show that lower technological opportunities increase patenting incentives in complex technologies while they decrease incentives in discrete technologies. By definitionAlso, more competitors increase patenting incentives in a commons, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, complex technologies and no one has the right to exclude anotherreduce them in discrete technologies. When too many owners have such privileges To test these predictions a new measure of use, the resource density of patent thickets is prone to overuse – a tragedy of the commonsintroduced. In an anitcommons, by my definition, multiple owners European patent citations are each endowed with the right used to exclude others from a scarce resource, construct measures of fragmentation and no one has an effective privilege of usetechnological opportunity. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource Our empirical analysis is prone to underuse – based on a tragedy panel capturing patenting behavior of the anitcommons. Anticommons property may appear whenever new property rights are being defined. For example in Moscow, multiple owners have been endowed initially with competing rights 2074 firms in each storefront, so no owner holds a useable bundle of rights and the store remains empty30 technology areas over 15 years. Once an anticommons has emerged, collecting rights into private property bundles can be brutal and slow. This article explores GMM estimation results confirm the dynamics predictions of anitcommons property in transition economies, formalizes the empirical material our theoretical model. The results show that patent thickets exist in a property theory framework, and then shows how the idea of anticommons property can be a useful new tool for understanding a range 9 out of property puzzles30 technology areas. The difficulties of overcoming We find that decreased technological opportunities are a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists might pay more attention to the content surprisingly strong driver of the property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clarify rightspatent thicket growth. },
discipline={Econ},
research_type={TheoryEmpirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Hold-up, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={The literature on patent thickets shows that several institutional arrangements allow firms to disentangle overlapping property rights - these include licensing, patent pools, standard setting as well as litigation (Shapiro, 2001, Scotchmer, 2005). There is some evidence that firms holding a large share of patents within a given technology benefit substantially from their patent portfolio and may be able to reduce the likelihood of hold-up... Secondly, the conditions under which strategic complementarity is likely to arise in our model fit our current understanding of settings in which patent thickets arise very well. These are settings in which technologies are highly complex, in which many firms seek to build large patent portfolios and in which the combination of multiple parties’ technologies yields the best standards and products... This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of patent thickets... To test our model we derive a new measure of complexity of blocking relationships in patent thickets.},
tags={},
filename={Heller [[vonGraevenitz (19982012) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf} } @article{mann2005patents, title={Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?}, author={Mann, Ronald J}, journal={Texas Law Review}, volume={83}, pages={961--1009}, year-{2005}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Mann (2005) - Do Patents Facilitate Financing In The Software Industry.pdf} } @article{merges1990complex, title={On the complex economics of patent scope}, author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R}, journal={Columbia Law Review}, pages={839--916}, year={1990}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Merges Nelson (1990) - On The Complex Economics Incidence And Growth Of Patent Scope.pdf} } @article{merges1996contracting, title={Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations}, author={Merges, Robert P}, journal={Cal L. Rev.}, volume={84}, pages={1293}, year={1996}, abstract={As intellectual property rights have gained in prominence, businesspeople and scholars alike have complained of the increasing burden of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this, litigating intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property experts, especially scholars, have responded to this burgeoning thicket of rights with a series of initiatives to expedite deal making by means of statutory compulsory licensing. These licenses are classic examples of "liability rulesh" in the foundational legal entitlements framework of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed. They appear to be a compromise: they address the mushrooming transactional hurdle created by new and stronger intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the economic advantages that accompany strengthened rights. In this Article, Professor Merges argues that proposals to create more compulsory licenses are rooted in a faulty theoretical framework. Based on a survey of the diverse institutions various industries have cultivated to handle intellectual property transactions, Merges contends that "repeat players" (individuals and firms that frequently need to exchange rights) can and often do take steps to overcome transactional bottlenecks. Whether through copyright collectives, such as ASCAP and BMI in the music industry, or undertakings such as patent pools in automobile and aircraft manufacturing, those with a recurring need to transact in intellectual property rights invest in administrative structures that lower the costs of exchanging rights. Among other functions, these collective rights organizations promulgate rules and procedures for placing a monetary value on members' property rights. They thus conserve on transaction costs either by making it easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating the occasion for repeat-play, reciprocal bargaining, versus more costly one-shot exchanges. Drawing on a body of academic literature known as the new institutional economics, Professor Merges explains and analyzes the origins and operation of these organizations. He also argues that entitlement theory must be adjusted to recognize the possibility that such institutions will evolve out of a background of strong property rights. More generally, he points out that entitlement theory ought to incorporate a more dynamic understanding of the importance of contracting after entitlements are granted. Professor Merges applies his observations and theoretical insights to an important contemporary controversy: whether Congress ought to legislate a compulsory license for digital content needed by the multimedia industry. He argues that it should not. Given the underlying economics, and consistent with experience in other industries, existing intellectual property rights will force industry participants to invest in institutions to conduct transactions. Indeed, consistent with the analysis in this Article, evidence indicates this is already occurring}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability RulesThickets]].pdf}
}
@techreport{clarkson2003sharper,
