Changes

===Additional entries(already with pages)===

@article{bessen2003patentepstein2004there, title={Patent thicketsIs there a biomedical anticommons}, author={Epstein, Richard A and Kuhlik, Bruce N}, journal={Regulation}, volume={27}, pages={54}, year={2004}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Biomedial}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Epstein Kuhlik (2004) - Is There A Biomedical Anticommons.pdf} }  @article{merges1999institutions, title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: Strategic patenting the case of complex technologiespatent pools}, author={BessenMerges, JamesRobert P}, journal={Available University of California at SSRN 327760Berkeley Working Paper}, year={1999}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf} }  @article{murray2007formal, title={Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge?: An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis}, author={Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, volume={63}, number={4}, pages={648--687}, year={20032007}, abstract={Patent race models assume Although many scholars suggest that an innovator wins IPR has a positive effect on cumulative innovation, a growing “anticommons” perspective highlights the only patent covering a productnegative role of IPR over scientific knowledge. But when technologies are complexAt its core, this debate is centered on how intellectual property right is defective: ownership rights over a given piece of knowledge affect the propensity of future researchers to build upon that knowledge in their own scientific research activities. This article frames this issue around the concept of dual knowledge, in which a product’s technology is sharedsingle discovery may contribute to both scientific research and useful commercial applications, not exclusiveand finds evidence for a modest anti-commons effect. In A key implication of dual knowledge is that case I show that if it may be simultaneously instantiated as a scientific research article and as a patent. Such patent standards -paper pairs are low, firms build “thickets” at the heart of our empirical strategy.We exploit the fact that patentsare granted with a substantial lag, especially incumbent firms in mature industriesoften many years after the knowledge is initially disclosed through paper publication. When they assert these patentsThe knowledge associated with a patent-paper pair therefore diffuses within two distinct intellectual property environments, innovators one associated with the pre-grant period and another after formal IP rights are forced granted. Relative to share rents under cross-licensesthe expected citation pattern for publications with a given quality level, making R&D incentives subthe anti-optimal. On commons perspective suggests that the other hand, when lead time advantages citation rate for a scientific publication should fall after formal IP rights associated with that publication are significant granted. Employing a differences-in-differences estimator for 169 patent-paper pairs (and including a control group of other publications from the same journal for which no patent standards are highis granted), firms pursue strategies we find evidence for a modest anti-commons effect (the citation rate after the patent grant declines by approximately 10 to 20 percent). This decline becomes more pronounced with the number of years elapsed since the date of “mutual nonthe patent grant and is particularly salient for articles authored by researchers with public sector affiliations.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Discussion, Empirical}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Murray Stern (2007) -aggressionDo Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder The Free Flow Of Scientific Knowledge.” Then R&D incentives are strongerpdf} }  @article{walsh2003effects, title={Effects of research tool patents and licensing on biomedical innovation}, author={Walsh, John P and Arora, Ashish and Cohen, Wesley M}, journal={Patents in the Knowledge-based Economy}, volume={285}, pages={286}, year={2003}, even optimal. abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Bessen Walsh Arora Cohen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Effects Of Complex TechnologiesResearch Tool Patents And Licensing On Biomedical Innovation.pdf} }

@article{epstein2004there, title={Is there a biomedical anticommons}, author={Epstein, Richard A and Kuhlik, Bruce N}, journal={Regulation}, volume={27}, Additional entries (without pages)={54}, year={2004}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Biomedial}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Epstein Kuhlik (2004) - Is There A Biomedical Anticommons.pdf} }

@article{galasso2007broadbessen2003patent, title={Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigationPatent thickets: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industryStrategic patenting of complex technologies}, author={GalassoBessen, AlbertoJames}, journal={LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI45Available at SSRN 327760}, year={20072003} abstract={Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership of a product’s technology is shared, not exclusive. In that case I show that if patent standards are low, firms build “thickets” of patents, especially incumbent firms in mature industries. When they assert these patents, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenses, making R&D incentives sub-optimal. On the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and patent standards are high, firms pursue strategies of “mutual non-aggression.” Then R&D incentives are stronger, even optimal.},

tags={}, filename={Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies.pdf} }  @article{galasso2007broad, title={Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigation: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industry}, author={Galasso, Alberto}, journal={LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI45}, year={2007} abstract={}, discipline={}, research_type={}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Galasso (2007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Litigation.pdf} }

title={An empirical analysis of patent litigation in the semiconductor industry}, author={Hall, Bronwyn H and Ziedonis, Rosemarie}, journal={University of California at Berkeley working paper}, year={2007}, publisher={Citeseer} abstract={Semiconductor firms sell products that embed hundreds if not thousands of patented inventions, elevating concerns about patent-related hold-up in this sector. This paper examines the incidence and nature of patent lawsuits involving 136 dedicated U.S. semiconductor firms between 1973 and 2001. By supplementing patent litigation data with information drawn from archival sources, we estimate the probability that firms will be involved in patent lawsuits, either as enforcers of exclusionary rights or as targets of litigation filed by other patent owners. We further distinguish between disputes that involve product-market rivals and those that do not. Overall, we find little evidence that semiconductor firms have adopted a more aggressive stance towards patent enforcement since the 1970s, despite the effective strengthening of U.S. patent rights in the 1980s and widespread entry by small firms. In fact, their litigation rate as enforcers of patents remains relatively stable over the past two decades once we control for factors such as the number of patents they own and changes in R&D spending. In striking contrast, we find an escalation in their baseline risk as targets of litigation brought by outside patent owners.}, discipline={Econ, Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Semiconductor}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Hall Ziedonis (2007) - An Empirical Analysis Of Patent Litigation In The Semiconductor Industry.pdf} }

title={The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and competition policies}, author={Harhoff, Dietmar and Hall, Bronwyn H and von Graevenitz, Georg and Hoisl, Karin and Wagner, Stefan and Gambardella, Alfonso and Giuri, Paola}, journal={Report commissioned by European Commission}, year={2007} abstract={}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Harhoff Hall vonGraevenitz Hoisl Wagner Gambardella Giuri (2007) - The Strategic Use Of Patents And Its Implications For Enterprise And Competition Policies.pdf} }

title={Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, The}, author={Heller, Michael A}, journal={HARV. l. rEV.}, volume={111}, pages={621}, year={1997}, abstract={Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty while street kiosks in front are full of goods? This article develops a theory of anitcommons property to help explain the puzzle of empty storefronts and full kiosks. Anticommons property can be understood as the mirror image of commons property. By definition, in a commons, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse – a tragedy of the commons. In an anitcommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse – a tragedy of the anitcommons. Anticommons property may appear whenever new property rights are being defined. For example in Moscow, multiple owners have been endowed initially with competing rights in each storefront, so no owner holds a useable bundle of rights and the store remains empty. Once an anticommons has emerged, collecting rights into private property bundles can be brutal and slow. This article explores the dynamics of anitcommons property in transition economies, formalizes the empirical material in a property theory framework, and then shows how the idea of anticommons property can be a useful new tool for understanding a range of property puzzles. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists might pay more attention to the content of the property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clarify rights. }, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf} }

title={Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?}, author={Mann, Ronald J}, journal={Texas Law Review}, volume={83}, pages={961--1009}, year-{2005}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Mann (2005) - Do Patents Facilitate Financing In The Software Industry.pdf} }  @article{merges1996contracting, title={Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations}, author={Merges, Robert P}, journal={Cal L. Rev.}, volume={84}, pages={1293}, year={1996}, abstract={As intellectual property rights have gained in prominence, businesspeople and scholars alike have complained of the increasing burden of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this, litigating intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property experts, especially scholars, have responded to this burgeoning thicket of rights with a series of initiatives to expedite deal making by means of statutory compulsory licensing. These licenses are classic examples of "liability rulesh" in the foundational legal entitlements framework of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed. They appear to be a compromise: they address the mushrooming transactional hurdle created by new and stronger intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the economic advantages that accompany strengthened rights. In this Article, Professor Merges argues that proposals to create more compulsory licenses are rooted in a faulty theoretical framework. Based on a survey of the diverse institutions various industries have cultivated to handle intellectual property transactions, Merges contends that "repeat players" (individuals and firms that frequently need to exchange rights) can and often do take steps to overcome transactional bottlenecks. Whether through copyright collectives, such as ASCAP and BMI in the music industry, or undertakings such as patent pools in automobile and aircraft manufacturing, those with a recurring need to transact in intellectual property rights invest in administrative structures that lower the costs of exchanging rights. Among other functions, these collective rights organizations promulgate rules and procedures for placing a monetary value on members' property rights. They thus conserve on transaction costs either by making it easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating the occasion for repeat-play, reciprocal bargaining, versus more costly one-shot exchanges. Drawing on a body of academic literature known as the new institutional economics, Professor Merges explains and analyzes the origins and operation of these organizations. He also argues that entitlement theory must be adjusted to recognize the possibility that such institutions will evolve out of a background of strong property rights. More generally, he points out that entitlement theory ought to incorporate a more dynamic understanding of the importance of contracting after entitlements are granted. Professor Merges applies his observations and theoretical insights to an important contemporary controversy: whether Congress ought to legislate a compulsory license for digital content needed by the multimedia industry. He argues that it should not. Given the underlying economics, and consistent with experience in other industries, existing intellectual property rights will force industry participants to invest in institutions to conduct transactions. Indeed, consistent with the analysis in this Article, evidence indicates this is already occurring}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules.pdf} }  @article{merges1999institutions, title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools}, author={Merges, Robert P}, journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper}, year={1999}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf} }

title={On the complex economics of patent scope}, author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R}, journal={Columbia Law Review}, pages={839--916}, year={1990}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Merges Nelson (1990) - On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope.pdf} }

@article{murray2007formalmerges1996contracting, title={Do formal intellectual Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge?: An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesisand collective rights organizations}, author={MurrayMerges, Fiona and Stern, ScottRobert P}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior \& OrganizationCal L. Rev.}, volume={63}, number={484}, pages={648--6871293}, year={20071996}, abstract={Although many As intellectual property rights have gained in prominence, businesspeople and scholars suggest that IPR has a positive effect on cumulative innovation, a growing “anticommons” perspective highlights alike have complained of the negative role increasing burden of IPR over scientific knowledge. At its coreobtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this debate is centered on how , litigating intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property experts, especially scholars, have responded to this burgeoning thicket of rights over with a given piece series of initiatives to expedite deal making by means of knowledge affect the propensity statutory compulsory licensing. These licenses are classic examples of future researchers to build upon that knowledge "liability rulesh" in their own scientific research activities. This article frames this issue around the concept foundational legal entitlements framework of dual knowledge, in which a single discovery may contribute to both scientific research Guido Calabresi and useful commercial applications, and finds evidence for a modest anti-commons effectA. Douglas Melamed. A key implication of dual knowledge is that it may They appear to be simultaneously instantiated as a scientific research article compromise: they address the mushrooming transactional hurdle created by new and as a patent. Such patent-paper pairs are at stronger intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the heart of our empirical strategyeconomic advantages that accompany strengthened rights.We exploit the fact In this Article, Professor Merges argues that patents proposals to create more compulsory licenses are granted with rooted in a substantial lag, often many years after the knowledge is initially disclosed through paper publicationfaulty theoretical framework. The knowledge associated with Based on a patent-paper pair therefore diffuses within two distinct survey of the diverse institutions various industries have cultivated to handle intellectual property environmentstransactions, one associated with the pre-grant period Merges contends that "repeat players" (individuals and another after formal IP firms that frequently need to exchange rights are granted) can and often do take steps to overcome transactional bottlenecks. Relative to Whether through copyright collectives, such as ASCAP and BMI in the expected citation pattern for publications music industry, or undertakings such as patent pools in automobile and aircraft manufacturing, those with a given quality level, the anti-commons perspective suggests recurring need to transact in intellectual property rights invest in administrative structures that lower the citation rate costs of exchanging rights. Among other functions, these collective rights organizations promulgate rules and procedures for placing a scientific publication should fall after formal IP monetary value on members' property rights associated with that publication are granted. Employing a differencesThey thus conserve on transaction costs either by making it easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating the occasion for repeat-inplay, reciprocal bargaining, versus more costly one-differences estimator for 169 patent-paper pairs (and including shot exchanges. Drawing on a control group body of other publications from academic literature known as the same journal for which no patent is granted)new institutional economics, we find evidence for a modest anti-commons effect (Professor Merges explains and analyzes the citation rate after origins and operation of these organizations. He also argues that entitlement theory must be adjusted to recognize the patent grant declines by approximately 10 possibility that such institutions will evolve out of a background of strong property rights. More generally, he points out that entitlement theory ought to 20 percent). This decline becomes incorporate a more pronounced with the number dynamic understanding of years elapsed since the date importance of the patent grant contracting after entitlements are granted. Professor Merges applies his observations and is particularly salient theoretical insights to an important contemporary controversy: whether Congress ought to legislate a compulsory license for articles authored digital content needed by researchers with public sector affiliationsthe multimedia industry. He argues that it should not.}Given the underlying economics, discipline={Econ}and consistent with experience in other industries, research_type={Discussion, Empirical}, existing intellectual property rights will force industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Murray Stern (2007) - Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder The Free Flow Of Scientific Knowledgeparticipants to invest in institutions to conduct transactions.pdf} }  @article{walsh2003effectsIndeed, title={Effects of research tool patents and licensing on biomedical innovation}, author={Walsh, John P and Arora, Ashish and Cohen, Wesley M}, journal={Patents consistent with the analysis in the Knowledge-based Economy}this Article, volume={285}, pages={286}, year={2003}, abstract={evidence indicates this is already occurring}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Software}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Walsh Arora Cohen Merges (20031996) - Effects Of Research Tool Patents And Licensing On Biomedical InnovationContracting Into Liability Rules.pdf} }

title={Patent litigation in the US semiconductor industry}, author={Ziedonis, Rosemarie}, volume={138}, year={2003}, abstract={}, discipline={}, research_type={}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Ziedonis (2003) - Patent Litigation In The Us Semiconductor Industry.pdf} }