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==Background Literature==
The following papers provide seminal background material:
*[[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization |Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972)]], "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]
*[[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm |Coase, Ronald (1937)]], "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]
*[[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process |Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978)]], "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]
PHDBA602 (Theory of the Firm) (view source)
Revision as of 21:17, 16 December 2010
, 21:17, 16 December 2010→Papers
==Papers==
===IntroductionGeneral Overviews===The following papers were suggested as a starting point:*[[Grossman Hart Gibbons, Robert (19862005) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart "Four formal(1986izable)]], "The Costs and Benefits theories of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integrationthe firm?", Journal of Political EconomyEconomic Behavior & Organization, vol.9458, pp. 691200-719245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20HartGibbons%20(19862005)%20-%20The20Four%20Costs20formalizable%20and%20Benefits20theories%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]*[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom20the%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses20firm.pdf pdf]*[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005stub)]]*Holmstrom, "Four formalBengt R. and Jean Tirole (izable1989) theories , "Chapter 2 The theory of the firm?", Journal In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Economic Behavior & Industrial Organization, vol. 58Elsevier, Volume 1, pp.200Pages 61-245133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/GibbonsHolmstrom%20Tirole%20(20051989)%20-%20Four20Chapter%202%20formalizable20The%20theories20Theory%20of20Of%20the20The%20firm.pdf 20Firm pdf]
===Background Literature===*Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The Handbook of Industrial American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf] [[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization |(1989stub) also provides a chapter on the theory ]]*Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the firmFirm", Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] [[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm |(stub)]] ===Transaction Cost Economics===*HolmstromKlein, Benjamin Robert, Bengt RG. Crawford, and Jean Tirole Armen A. Alchian (19891978), "Chapter Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2 . (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf] [[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The theory Competitive Contracting Process |(stub)]]*[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], "The Vertical Integration of the firmProduction: Market Failure Considerations,"American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]*[[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics |Williamson, Oliver (1979)]], In"Transaction-Cost Economics: Richard Schmalensee The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Robert WilligEconomics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]*[[Williamson (1991) - Comparative Economic Organization The Analysis Of Discrete Structural Alternatives |Williamson, Oliver (1991)]], "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]*[[Williamson (1999) - Public And Private Bureaucracies |Williamson, EditorOliver E. (s1999)]], Handbook "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Industrial Law, Economics and Organization, ElsevierVol 15, Volume 1March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf] ===Property Rights Model===*Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), Pages 61"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-133%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership. pdf pdf] [[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |(stub)]]*Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, Dec., pp. 1119-1158 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/HolmstromHart%20Tirole20Moore%20(19891990)%20-%20Chapter20Property%20220Rights%20The20and%20the%20Theory20Nature%20Of20of%20The20the%20Firm .pdf pdf] [[Hart Moore (1990) - Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm|(stub)]] ===Multi-tasking===*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdfpdf] [[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |(stub)]]
===Centralization/Decentralization:===
*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]
*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]
===Relational Contracting:===
*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] "Informal authority in organizations", Journal of law, economics, & organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]
*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]
===Firm Boundaries:===
*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]
*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], "The Firm As A Subeconomy", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]
*[[Dessein Santos (2006) - Adaptive Organizations |Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006)]], "Adaptive Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20Santos%20(2006)%20-%20Adaptive%20Organizations pdf]
*[[Bajari Tadelis (2001) - Incentives versus Transaction Costs A Theory of Procurement Contracts| Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001)]], "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20versus%20Transaction%20Costs%20A%20Theory%20of%20Procurement%20Contracts pdf]
