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PHDBA279B Field Exam Papers (view source)
Revision as of 18:57, 27 April 2010
, 18:57, 27 April 2010→Tadelis' Section
The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279B 'Auctions and Contracts' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):
===Morgan's Section=== The following is a selection by Egan ('''A'''ccepted or '''R'''ejected by Morgan):*'''(A)''' [[Baye Morgan Scholten 2006 - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion,"]] Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf]*'''(R)''' Nitzan, Shmuel (1994), "Modeling Rent Seeking Contests", European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-46383PF-6/2/10b70895e020e1f895293f949e951dbd link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Nitzan%20(1994)%20-%20Modeling%20Rent%20Seeking%20Contests.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003) "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20(2003)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(2001)%20-%20Special%20Interest%20Politics%20Chapters%204%20And%205.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1988)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf] Nitzan (1994) was replaced by the paper that will be used for the 2012 class:*Konrad, Kai A. (2007), "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No . SP II 2007-01, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960458 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Konrad%20(2007)%20-%20Strategy%20in%20Contests-An%20Introduction.pdf pdf] Morgan provided the following comment: "My question will take a model from one of these papers and change it in an interesting way. Reading these papers may or may not help you solve my question." ===Tadelis' Section===The following is a complete list of the "key" (and required) readings from Steve's section:*Holmstrom B., (1999) "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20Managerial%20Incentive%20Problems.pdf pdf]*Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1992)%20-%20Optimal%20Incentive%20Contracts%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Career%20Concerns.pdf pdf]*Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Diamond%20(1989)%20-%20Reputation%20Acquisition%20in%20Debt%20Markets.pdf pdf]*Kreps, D. (1990), "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JBrDXvye-1UC&oi=fnd&pg=PA221&dq=Kreps,+D.++%22Corporate+Culture+and+Economic+Theory&ots=d4JUQusjjf&sig=7RVgXjAlocVC8FDJd2Ke1MsbjxY Google Books])*Tadelis, S. (2001) "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20The%20Market%20for%20Reputations%20as%20an%20Incentive%20Mechanism.pdf pdf]*Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008) "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levin%20Tadelis%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20Government%20Services.pdf pdf]*Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]*Goldberg, Victor P. (1977) "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1977)%20-%20Competitive%20Bidding%20and%20the%20Production%20of%20Precontract%20Information.pdf pdf]*Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000) "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Banerjee%20Duflo%20(2000)%20-%20Reputation%20Effects%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Contracting.pdf pdf]*Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009) "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Forbes%20Lederman%20(2009)%20-%20Adaptation%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Airline%20Industry.pdf pdf] The following papers selected yet(on empirics of reputation) were excluded by Egan:*[[Cabral Hortacsu (2008) - Dynamics Of Seller Reputation |Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008)]], "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cabral%20Hortacsu%20(2008)%20-%20Dynamics%20of%20Seller%20Reputation.pdf pdf]*[[Jin Leslie (2009) - Reputational Incentives For Restaurant Hygiene |Jin, G. and P. Leslie (2009)]], "Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1): 237-67 (Supplemental Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Jin%20Leslie%20(2009)%20-%20Reputational%20Incentives%20for%20Restaurant%20Hygiene.pdf pdf]*[[Mcdevitt (2010) - Names And Reputations An Empirical Analysis |McDevitt, Ryan (2010)]], "Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis," mimeo, northwestern university [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McDevitt%20(2010)%20-%20Names%20and%20Reputations%20An%20Empirical%20Analysis.pdf pdf]*[[Mcdevitt (2010) - A Business By Any Other Name Firm Name Choice As A Signal Of Firm Quality |McDevitt, Ryan (2010)]], "A Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality.," mimeo, northwestern university [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McDevitt%20(2010)%20-%20A%20Business%20by%20Any%20Other%20Name%20Firm%20Name%20Choice%20as%20a%20Signal%20of%20Firm%20Quality.pdf pdf]
