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→Sub Section II.) Empirical Tests of Reputational Incentive Models
Class 5.) '''Reputational Incentives cont.''' (4/27/10)
*[[Mcdevitt (2010) - Names And Reputations An Empirical Analysis |'''McDevitt, Ryan (2010)''' ]], "Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis," mimeo, northwestern university [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McDevitt%20(2010)%20-%20Names%20and%20Reputations%20An%20Empirical%20Analysis.pdf pdf]*[[Mcdevitt (2010) - A Business By Any Other Name Firm Name Choice As A Signal Of Firm Quality |'''McDevitt, Ryan (2010)''' ]], "A Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality.," mimeo, northwestern university [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McDevitt%20(2010)%20-%20A%20Business%20by%20Any%20Other%20Name%20Firm%20Name%20Choice%20as%20a%20Signal%20of%20Firm%20Quality.pdf pdf]
*Hubbard, Thomas (2002) "How Do Consumers Motivate Experts? Reputational Incentives in an Auto Repair Market," Journal of Law and Economics, October 2002, 437-468. (Supplemental Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hubbard%20(2002)%20-%20How%20Do%20Consumers%20Motivate%20Experts.pdf pdf]
*Resnick, Paul, Richard Zeckhauser, John Swanson, and Kate Lockwood (2006) "The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment," Experimental Economics, Volume 9, Number 2 (Supplemental Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Resnick%20Zeckhauser%20Swanson%20Lockwood%20(2006)%20-%20The%20Value%20of%20Reputation%20on%20eBay.pdf pdf]
