Changes

===Paper List===

The paper list by class number is as follows:

0.) '''The two principles: Revelation and Revenue Equivalence'''

Main ideas: The revelation principle forms the cornerstone for the theory of contracts and incentives in organizations. This topic reviews the revelation principle, the principal families of contract theory models, and the mechanism design paradigm.

*Chapters 8.E and 13 of Microeconomic Theory by Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green. Oxford University Press, 1995.

1.) '''Search'''

Main idea: This topic surveys a variety of consumer search models. The two principles play an important role in generalizing some of the findings. These models are cornerstones for modeling price competition.

*[[Baye Morgan Scholten 2006 - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion,"]] Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf]

2.) '''Contests'''

Main idea: This topic surveys the contest/all-pay auction literature. Again, the two principles prove extremely useful. This literature is the cornerstone for modeling political competition, patent and R&D races, and so on.

*Nitzan, Shmuel (1994), "Modeling Rent Seeking Contests", European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-46383PF-6/2/10b70895e020e1f895293f949e951dbd link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Nitzan%20(1994)%20-%20Modeling%20Rent%20Seeking%20Contests.pdf pdf]

3.) '''Platform Competition'''

Main idea: This topic highlights the emerging literarture on platform competition and two-sided markets. The revenue equivalence principle sees a little sue here as well. These are the leading modeling approaches for markets that are increasingly prominent.

*Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]

4.) '''Cheap talk'''

Main idea: This topic covers information flows in organizations by examining an archetypal class of signaling games in business and public policy---corporate lobbying as cheap talk.

*Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press

5.) '''Contracting under imperfect commitment'''

Main idea: This topic ties together the two principles with the previous unit on cheap talk signaling. The role of delegation in organizations is stressed.

*Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]

6.) '''Incomplete Contracts'''

Main idea: To tie together the classic incomplete contracting works with mechanism design.

*Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1988)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdf]

*Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]