Changes

===Part 1 - Dal Bo===Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez ('''A'''ccepted or '''R'''ejected by Dal Bo):*'''(A)''' Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]*'''(R)''' Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krasa%20Polborn%20(2009)%20-%20Is%20mandatory%20voting%20better%20than%20voluntary%20voting.pdf pdf]*'''(R)''' Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57?66. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Borgers%20(2004)%20-%20Costly%20voting.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] *'''(A)(3)''' Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf]*'''(A)(3)''' Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf]*'''(A)(3)''' Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]*'''(A)(2)''' Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf]*'''(A)(2)''' Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf]*'''(A)''' Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]*'''(A)(1)''' Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf]

Papers added by Dal Bo:*Borgers'''(1)''' Ferejohn, TJ. (20041986), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 57–665-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BorgersFerejohn%20(20041986)%20-%20Costly20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20voting20Control.pdf pdf]

*Dal Bó, E. Note - Emphasis placed on '''(20071), Bribing Voters, American Journal ''' Control of Political SciencePoliticians, 51'''(42). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20''' Competition and influence, and '''(20073)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters''' Efficiency of Democracy, in that order.pdf pdf]

===Part 2 - de Figueiredo===Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez (marked as '''H'''igh or '''L'''ow priority by de Figueiredo):*Tullock'''(H)''' Baron, GD. and J. Ferejohn (19671989), The Welfare Costs of MonopoliesBargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), Tariffs1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]*'''(H)''' Gilligan, T. and TheftK. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Western Economic Journal 5of Law, 224-32. Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/TullockGilligan%20Krehbiel%20(19671987)%20-%20The20Collective%20Welfare20Decision%20Costs20making%20of20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]*'''(L)''' [[Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments]], ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Monopolies20Asymmetric%20Tariffs20Information%20and%20Theft20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf] *Becker'''(H)''' [[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, GD. (19832001), A Theory Theories of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political InfluenceStrategic Nonmarket Participation]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(32001), 371%20-400%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions. pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BeckerBaron%20(19832001)%20-%20A20Theories%20Theory20of%20of20Strategic%20Competition20Nonmarket%20Among20Participation%20Pressure20Majority%20Groups20Rule%20for20and%20Political20Executive%20Influence20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])*Coate'''(H)''' de Figueiredo, SR. J. P. Jr. and SG. Morris Edwards (19952007), On the Form of Transfers to Special InterestsDoes Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Political Economy 103Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]*'''(H)''' Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (62007), 1210Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-35634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/CoateBaron%20Morris20Diermeier%20(19952007)%20-%20On20Strategic%20the20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20Form20-%20of20Strategic%20Transfers20Activism%20to20and%20Special20Nonmarket%20Interests20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])*'''(H)''' Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]*Grossman'''(H)''' Alesina, GA. and EA. Helpman Drazen (19941991), Protection for SaleWhy are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 8481, 8331170-501188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/GrossmanAlesina%20Helpman20Drazen%20(19941991)%20-%20Protection20Why%20for20are%20Stabilizations%20Sale20Delayed.pdf pdf] *DixitFernandez, AR., G. Grossman and ED. Helpman Rodrik (19971991), Common Agency and CoordinationResistance to Reform: General Theory and Application to Government Policy MakingStatus Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, Journal of Political Economy 105American Economic Review 81, 7521146-691155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20GrossmanFernandez%20Helpman20Rodrik%20(19971991)%20-%20Common20Resistance%20Agency20to%20and20Reform%20Status%20Coordination20Quo%20General20Bias%20Theory20in%20and20the%20Application20Presence%20to20of%20Government20Individual%20Policy20Specific%20Making20Uncertainty.pdf pdf] *Becker'''(H)''' Alesina, GA. and GD. Stigler Rodrik (19741994), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, Distributive Politics and the Compensation of EnforcersEconomic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Legal Studies 3Economics 109, 1465-19490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BeckerAlesina%20Stigler20Rodrik%20(19741994)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement20Distributive%20Malfeasance20Politics%20and%20the20Economic%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers20Growth.pdf pdf] *Barro'''(L)''' de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (19732005), The Control Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Politicians: An Economic ModelLaw, Public Choice 14 (September)Economics and Organization 21, 19103-42135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BarrodeFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(19732005)%20-%20The20Self-Enforcing%20Control20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model20Law.pdf pdf]

The following papers were added by de Figueiredo:*'''(H)''' Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek)*Baron'''(H)''' de Figueiredo, DR. and J. Ferejohn P., Jr. (19892002), Bargaining in LegislaturesElectoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 83 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(December2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]*'''(L)''' Austen-Smith, 1181D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BaronAustenSmith%20Ferejohn20Feddersen%20(19892008)%20-%20Bargaining20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20in20or%20Legislatures20Silence.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides], © Bo Cowgill and Tarek Ghani)

*GilliganThe following additional papers from our syllabus were selected by Shelef, Thompson, T. and Ket al. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf] *KrishnaRomer, VT. and JH. Morgan Rosenthal (20011978), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American "Political Science Review 95Resource Allocation, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf] *[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | BaronControlled Agendas and the Status Quo, D. (2001)Public Choice", Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1033, 727-4543. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-Romer%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron20Rosenthal%20(20011978)%20-%20Theories20Political%20of20Resource%20Strategic20Allocation,%20Nonmarket20Controlled%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule20Agendas%20and%20Executive20the%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf]) *de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo20Status%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy20Quo.pdf pdf] *Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (20071991), Strategic Activism Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Nonmarket StrategyProcedural Control, American Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16Political Science 35, 59957-63490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(20071991)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron20Bargaining%20Diermeier20Majoritarian%20(2006)20Incentives%20-20Pork%20Strategic20Barrel%20Activism20Programs%20and%20Nonmarket20Procedural%20Strategy20Control.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf]) *Fearon[[Battaglini, JM. (19942002), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdfMultiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk] *Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf] *Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81Econometrica 70, 11461379-11551401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20RodrikBattaglini%20(19912002)%20-%20Resistance20Multiple%20to20Referrals%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of20and%20Individual20Multidimensional%20Specific20Cheap%20Uncertainty20Talk.pdf pdf]

*AlesinaThe following papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, Aet al. but were not in our syllabus:*Bendor and D. Rodrik Mookherjee (19941987), Distributive Politics - Institutional *Structure and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465the Logic*[[Snyder (1991) -490. On Buying Legislatures]]*[[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities]]*Grossman and Helpman (1994)%20Protection for Sale*Snyder (1990) -%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf]Campaign Contributions as Investments*Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) - Why is there so little money in US Politics

*de Figueiredo, R. J. P.Note that of the above, Jr. Grossman and B. Weingast Helpman (1994) was included in Baron (20052001), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. [http://www.edeganAnsolabehere et al.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(20052003)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Lawshould be included as it was referenced heavily.pdf pdf]