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8,9,10.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking''' ===Problem Set===
1314.) '''Economic Policymaking '''*[[Fernandez Rodrik (1991) - Resistance To Reform Status Quo Bias In The Presence Of Individual Specific Uncertainty |Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991)]], Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]*[[Fearon (1994) - Rationalist Explanations For War |Fearon, J. (1994)]], Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]
*Fernandez15, R16. ) '''Political Competition and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias Conflict in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]Weakly Institutionalized Environments'''
*Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]
14,15.) '''Political Competition and Conflict in Weakly Institutionalized Environments'''
*Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]
'''Additional paper(s) (Unknown class)'''
*Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website]
==Links to Pages on Wikipedia==
The following construct and theorem definitions may be usefulSee also:*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem Arrow's Possibility Theorem]*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method Condorcet Point]*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logrolling LogrollingBPP Political Science]*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pork_barrel Pork Barrel Spending]
no edit summary
*This page is in the [[BPP]] category[[Category:BPP]]
*Back to [[PHDBA279A]] for all years.
<big>'''Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy'''</big>
PHDBA 279A - Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Business. This page details the course as it was taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and [[Rui deFigueiredo de Figueiredo]] in the Fall of 2009. The [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A.doc course outline] provides the official requirements. The evaluation of the course is based on two problem sets and one course paper. Note that due to re-scheduling requirements the classes are not listed in order.
==1st Half==
The first half is was taught by Ernesto Dal Bo ([mailto:dalbo@haas.berkeley.edu email] and [http://www2.haas.berkeley.edu/Faculty/dalbo_ernesto.aspx website]). ===Problem Set=== Problem Set 1: *Questions: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-ProblemSet1.pdf pdf]*Answers: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-ProblemSet1-Answers.pdf Problem Set 1pdf] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279-PS1v2.tex tex](© Ed Egan). Note that the posted answers may not be correct. See also: [[Help using LaTeX]]. ===Paper List=== The paper list by class number is as follows ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A1.zip Zip of part 1 papers]):
1.) '''Spatial voting and legislative institutions''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture1.pdf Lecture 1 Class Slides])
*Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20(1979)%20-%20Institutional%20Arrangements%20and%20Equilibrium%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models.pdf pdf]
*Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice ", 37, 503-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20Weingast%20(1981)%20-%20Structure%20Induced%20Equilibrium%20and%20Legislative%20Choice.pdf pdf]*Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Romer%20Rosenthal%20(1978)%20-%20Political%20Resource%20Allocation,%20Controlled%20Agendas%20and%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf pdf]*McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482472?482. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McKelvey%20(1976)%20-%20Intransitivities%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models%20and%20Some%20Implications%20for%20Agenda%20Control.pdf pdf]
2.) '''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Lecture 2 Class Slides])
*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]
*Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Knight%20(2000)%20-%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Requirements%20for%20Tax%20Increases%20Evidence%20from%20the%20States.pdf pdf]. Presentation in 2011 version of class: [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/c/c9/Knight_Presentation.pdf pdf].
*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2006)%20-%20Committees%20With%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Yield%20Commitment%20With%20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
3.) '''Externalities in voting games''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Lecture 4 Class Slides])
*Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krasa%20Polborn%20(2009)%20-%20Is%20mandatory%20voting%20better%20than%20voluntary%20voting.pdf pdf]
*Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57–6657?66. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Borgers%20(2004)%20-%20Costly%20voting.pdf pdf]
*Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf]
4.) '''The efficiency of democracy''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Lecture 6 Class Slides])
*Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf]
*Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986), Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(1), 1-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bernheim%20Whinston%20(1986)%20-%20Menu%20Auctions%20Resource%20Allocation%20and%20Economic%20Influence.pdf pdf]
6.) '''Corruption deterrence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Lecture 8 Class Slides])
*Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]
*Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cadot%20(1987)%20-%20Corruption%20as%20a%20Gamble.pdf pdf]
7.) '''The electoral control of politicians''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Lecture 9 Class Slides])
*Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf]
*Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf]
==2nd Half==
The second half is taught by Rui de Figueiredo ([mailto:rui@haas.berkeley.edu email] and the paper list by class number is as follows ([http://wwwwww2.edeganhaas.comberkeley.edu/pdfsFaculty/PHDBA279A2defigueiredo_rui.zip Zip of part 2 papersaspx website]):.
Problem Set 2:*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-ProblemSet2.pdf Questions] - Released Wed 18th Nov*[https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxleGFtc3VwcGxlbWVudHxneDozY2I0MjliZjBmMjQ2MmM3 Draft Answers], not guaranteed to be correct. * [http://www.edegan.com/repository/PhDBA%20279%20Problem%20Set%202%20(Rui)%20Lucy's%20Writeup.pdf More draft answers]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/PhDBA%20279A%20PS2%20Question%205.pdf Elaboration on Q5]*Answers - Due to be submitted at the [http://opa.berkeley.edu/AcademicCalendar/calendardisp.aspx?terms=current end of Fall semester (19th December)] ===Paper List=== The paper list by class number is as follows ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A2.zip Zip of part 2 papers]): 8.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking''' *[[Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms]], American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20(1979)%20-%20A%20Rational%20Choice%20Perspective%20on%20Congressional%20Norms.pdf pdf]*[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures |Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)]], Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf] 9.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking (Continued)''' *[[Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control]], American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]*[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf] 10.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking (Continued)'''
*Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf]
*Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf]
11,12.) '''Applications to Non-Market Strategy'''
*[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])
*[[de Figueiredo Edwards (2007) - Does Private Money Buy Public Policy |de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007)]], Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2009), The Market For Legislative Influence Over Regulatory Policy, Berkeley Haas School Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2009)%20-%20The%20Market%20For%20Legislative%20Influence%20Over%20Regulatory%20Policy.pdf pdf]
12.) '''Applications to Non-Market Strategy (Continued)'''*[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007)]], Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])*[[Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity |Ting, Michael (2009)]], "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek) 13.) '''Whistleblowing and Delay'''*[[Austensmith Feddersen (2008) - Public Disclosure Private Revelation Or Silence |Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008)]], Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides])
*Dyck, A., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2008), Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Chicago Booth School of Business Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dyck%20Morse%20Zingales%20(2008)%20-%20Who%20Blows%20the%20Whistle%20on%20Corporate%20Fraud.pdf pdf]
*[[Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed |Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991)]], Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]
*Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20(1994)%20-%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf]
*Powell, R. (1996), Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 255-289.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(1996)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20the%20Shadow%20of%20Power%20Games%20and%20Economic%20Behavior.pdf pdf]
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(2005)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Law.pdf pdf]
*[[de Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation |de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002)]], Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]
*Powell, R. (2004), The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information, American Political Science Review 98, 231-241. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(2004)%20-%20The%20Inefficient%20Use%20of%20Power%20Costly%20Conflict%20with%20Complete%20Information.pdf pdf]
