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2.) '''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Lecture 2 Class Slides])
*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]
*Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Knight%20(2000)%20-%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Requirements%20for%20Tax%20Increases%20Evidence%20from%20the%20States.pdf pdf]. Presentation in 2001 version of class: [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/c/c9/Knight_Presentation.pdf pdf].
*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2006)%20-%20Committees%20With%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Yield%20Commitment%20With%20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
