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[[Category:{{Project|Has project output=Content|Has sponsor=McNair Projects]]Center|Has title=Overconfidence Papers|Has owner=|Has start date=|Has deadline=|Has keywords=|Has notes=|Has project status=Complete|Is dependent on=}}
Overconfidence Papers (view source)
Revision as of 13:39, 21 September 2020
, 13:39, 21 September 2020no edit summary
=Papers=
institution={National bureau of economic research}
abstract={A common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance
and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest, publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In addition, we show that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely because of increases in stock option grants.}
}
==Yermack 1995==
@article{yermack1995corporations,
title={Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?},
author={Yermack, David},
journal={Journal of financial economics},
volume={39},
number={2},
pages={237--269},
year={1995},
publisher={Elsevier}
abstract={This paper analyzes stock option awards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options' performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests examine whether the mix of compensation between stock options and cash pay can be explained by corporate liquidity, tax status, or earnings management. Results indicate that few agency or financial contracting theories have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards.}
}
==Related Pages==
*[[Winner's Curse in Acquisitions (Academic Paper)]]
