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*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
==Reference==
*Noel, M.D. and Schankerman, M. (2006), "Strategic patenting and software innovation", Working Paper
@article{noel2006strategic,
title={Strategic patenting and software innovation},
author={Noel, M.D. and Schankerman, M.},
year={2006},
abstract={Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Noel Schankerman (2006) - Strategic Patenting And Software Innovation.pdf}
}
==File(s)==
*[[Media:Noel Schankerman (2006) - Strategic Patenting And Software Innovation.pdf|Download the PDF]]
*[[:Image:Noel Schankerman (2006) - Strategic Patenting And Software Innovation.pdf|Repository record]]
==Abstract==
Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.
Noel Schankerman (2006) - Strategic Patenting And Software Innovation (view source)
Revision as of 17:33, 18 March 2013
, 17:33, 18 March 2013no edit summary
*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
==Reference==
*Noel, M.D. and Schankerman, M. (2006), "Strategic patenting and software innovation", Working Paper
@article{noel2006strategic,
title={Strategic patenting and software innovation},
author={Noel, M.D. and Schankerman, M.},
year={2006},
abstract={Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Noel Schankerman (2006) - Strategic Patenting And Software Innovation.pdf}
}
==File(s)==
*[[Media:Noel Schankerman (2006) - Strategic Patenting And Software Innovation.pdf|Download the PDF]]
*[[:Image:Noel Schankerman (2006) - Strategic Patenting And Software Innovation.pdf|Repository record]]
==Abstract==
Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.
