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{{Project
|Has project output=Content
|Has sponsor=McNair Center
|Has title=Creating a Guide to Patent Litigation
|Has owner=Marcela Interiano,Brian Ayash
|Has project status=Complete
}}
This project supported [[Leveraged Buyout Innovation (Academic Paper)]]
=Variable List=
Complete list:
https://docs.google.com/a/rice.edu/spreadsheets/d/1OwcNDYXo_TefwPjUFHo5xVaBpOH4tmTnZmyBsuQRb_s/edit?usp=sharing
Abridged list:
LBO factors/incidence:
*Log assets
*R&D
*Operating income
*Sales
*Tax
*Liquidity
*ROA
*ROIC
*Growth
*Book val per share
*Earnings variability
*Takeover speculation/competing bid
*Tobin's Q
*Industry dummies (probably 2 digit NAICS)
LBO characteristics
*Division or full firm?
*acquisition premium
*breakdown of financing package:
*common equity
*preferred equity
*senior debt
*junior debt
*cash
=LBO Effects on Innovation Papers=
===Lerner et al 2011===
Final sample consists of 6398 patents from 472 firms granted from 1984 through may 2007.
Buyouts of corporate divisions are most common, followed by private-to-private deals (investments in independent unquoted entities), secondary deals (firms that were already owned by another private equity investor), then public-to-private deals
Robustness Checks:
*Concern one: Private equity investments for which there was already an existing investor, patents may be double-counted. Employs these patents only the first time they appear then drops them. Results are little changed
*Concern two: Only measures citation count during the 3 years after the award. Using a longer window increases accuracy but decreases sample size. Repeats the analysis through the end of the second calendar year after the patent grant and after the fourth year and finds that results are quantitatively similar.
*Concert three: In divisional buyouts corporate parents may retain best patents and only give low quality patents to the PE backed division. This may lead to an apparent increase in quality in the patents applied for after the award. Addresses this issue by using the longer window for patents above and by rerunning cross tabulations and regressions with divisional buyouts excluded from the sample. Key results are little changed by this shift.
Variables:
file = {Van de Gucht and Moore (1998) - Predicting duration and reversal prob of LBOs.pdf}
}
Van de Gucht and Moore find that hazard rate of LBO reversals peaks at about 7 to 8 years after the buyout.
Data:
*343 LBO transactions $100 million+ (1980-1992) Securities Data Corporation
*Restricted to those with stock returns in CRSP in year before LBO, post-LBO status identifiable in Newspaper Abstracts or Ward's Business Directory (1994)
Variables:
*Full LBO
*Size
*Industry Q
*R&D/Sales
=Innovation Factors/Phenomena Papers=
pages = {1365--1379}
}
Seeks to establish commonality in the measurement of innovative performance. Its indicators include R&D inputs(expenditures), patent counts, patent citations, and new product announcements. Results of study are that any of these four indicators could be taken as a measure of innovative performance in the broad sense.
=Unsorted=
pages = {9--37},
file = {Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\James Chen\\AppData\\Roaming\\Zotero\\Zotero\\Profiles\\g2eepc1b.default\\zotero\\storage\\P9BC7B8C\\S0219869X05000221.html:text/html}
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