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*speculation of takeover in financial press
*Q ratio
 
====Opler and Titman 1993====
 
@article{opler_determinants_1993,
title = {The {Determinants} of {Leveraged} {Buyout} {Activity}: {Free} {Cash} {Flow} vs. {Financial} {Distress} {Costs}},
volume = {48},
issn = {00221082},
shorttitle = {The {Determinants} of {Leveraged} {Buyout} {Activity}},
url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=0322636&site=ehost-live&scope=site},
doi = {10.1111/%28ISSN%291540-6261/issues},
abstract = {This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout activity by comparing firms that have implemented leveraged buyouts to those that have not. Consistent with the free cash flow theory, the authors find that firms that initiate leveraged buyouts can be characterized as having a combination of unfavorable investment opportunities (low Tobin's q) and relatively high cash flow. Leveraged buyout firms also tend to be more diversified than firms that do not undertake leveraged buyouts. In addition, firms with high expected costs of financial distress (e.g, those with high research and development expenditures) are less likely to do leveraged buyouts.},
number = {5},
urldate = {2016-06-17},
journal = {Journal of Finance},
author = {Opler, Tim and Titman, Sheridan},
month = dec,
year = {1993},
keywords = {Capital and Ownership Structure, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Financing Policy, Goodwill G32, Value of Firms},
pages = {1985--1999},
file = {Opler and Titman (1993) - Determinants of LBO activity.pdf}
}
 
Opler and Titman find support for the free cash flow theory and financial distress hypothesis. They also find that firms undergoing LBOs in the 1985 to 1990 subperiod were more diversified than those that did not.
 
Regression: Logit of Probability of Going Private (1980 to 1990):
*Operating income/assets
*Tobin's Q
*Machinery industry dummy
*R&D/sales
*Selling expenses/sales
*Log(assets)
*Diversification index
*High cash flow, low Q
*Low cash flow, high q
*Diversified, low q
 
===Unsorted===
file = {ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\James Chen\\AppData\\Roaming\\Zotero\\Zotero\\Profiles\\g2eepc1b.default\\zotero\\storage\\CCNSKDXX\\Van de Gucht and Moore - 1998 - Predicting the duration and reversal probability o.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\James Chen\\AppData\\Roaming\\Zotero\\Zotero\\Profiles\\g2eepc1b.default\\zotero\\storage\\2IA32N4Q\\S0927539897000236.html:text/html}
}
 
====Opler and Titman 1993====
 
@article{opler_determinants_1993,
title = {The {Determinants} of {Leveraged} {Buyout} {Activity}: {Free} {Cash} {Flow} vs. {Financial} {Distress} {Costs}},
volume = {48},
issn = {00221082},
shorttitle = {The {Determinants} of {Leveraged} {Buyout} {Activity}},
url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=0322636&site=ehost-live&scope=site},
doi = {10.1111/%28ISSN%291540-6261/issues},
abstract = {This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout activity by comparing firms that have implemented leveraged buyouts to those that have not. Consistent with the free cash flow theory, the authors find that firms that initiate leveraged buyouts can be characterized as having a combination of unfavorable investment opportunities (low Tobin's q) and relatively high cash flow. Leveraged buyout firms also tend to be more diversified than firms that do not undertake leveraged buyouts. In addition, firms with high expected costs of financial distress (e.g, those with high research and development expenditures) are less likely to do leveraged buyouts.},
number = {5},
urldate = {2016-06-17},
journal = {Journal of Finance},
author = {Opler, Tim and Titman, Sheridan},
month = dec,
year = {1993},
keywords = {Capital and Ownership Structure, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Financing Policy, Goodwill G32, Value of Firms},
pages = {1985--1999},
file = {Opler and Titman (1993) - Determinants of LBO activity.pdf}
}
 
Opler and Titman find support for the free cash flow theory and financial distress hypothesis. They also find that firms undergoing LBOs in the 1985 to 1990 subperiod were more diversified than those that did not.
 
Regression: Logit of Probability of Going Private (1980 to 1990):
*Operating income/assets
*Tobin's Q
*Machinery industry dummy
*R&D/sales
*Selling expenses/sales
*Log(assets)
*Diversification index
*High cash flow, low Q
*Low cash flow, high q
*Diversified, low q
====Berg and Gottschalg 2005====
pages = {9--37},
file = {Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\James Chen\\AppData\\Roaming\\Zotero\\Zotero\\Profiles\\g2eepc1b.default\\zotero\\storage\\P9BC7B8C\\S0219869X05000221.html:text/html}
}
 
====Malmendier and Tate 2008====
 
@article{malmendier_who_2008,
title = {Who makes acquisitions? {CEO} overconfidence and the market's reaction},
volume = {89},
issn = {0304-405X},
shorttitle = {Who makes acquisitions?},
doi = {10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002},
abstract = {Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. The effects are strongest if they have access to internal financing. We test these predictions using two proxies for overconfidence: CEOs' personal over-investment in their company and their press portrayal. We find that the odds of making an acquisition are 65\% higher if the CEO is classified as overconfident. The effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. The market reaction at merger announcement (-90 basis points) is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs (-12 basis points). We consider alternative interpretations including inside information, signaling, and risk tolerance. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
language = {English},
number = {1},
journal = {Journal of Financial Economics},
author = {Malmendier, Ulrike and Tate, Geoffrey},
month = jul,
year = {2008},
note = {WOS:000258567000002},
keywords = {cash flow, corporate diversification, diversification destroy value, firm, hubris, managerial biases, mergers and acquisitions, merger wave, overconfidence, returns, returns to mergers, stock-options, takeovers, tender offers, tobins-q},
pages = {20--43}
}

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