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|Has author=Ed Egan,
|Has paper status=Idea
}}
{{AcademicPaper
|Has title=Adverse Selection in the Market for Ideas
==Summary==Rational ignorance at the patent office can only be efficient if there is no market for ideas. If patents are sold in a market then, as their is an information asymmetry between the inventor (or current user) and the purchaser, one should expect a market for lemons. Low quality patents would be more likely to be litigated as they are less clear and hence more prone to be infringed. They would also be more likely to be found invalid conditional on litigation. Using a novel dataset on patent reassignments, this paper explores the relationship between patent sales and litigation outcomes.
Rational ignorance at the patent office can only be efficient if there is no market for ideas. If patents are sold then, as their is an information asymmetry between the inventor (or current user) and a purchaser, we expect a market for lemons. ==Data==
Data*Core Patent data:[[Redesigning Patent Database]]*Patent data with Assignment Reassignment Data: [[Redesigning Patent Database]]
Is the Market for Ideas a Market for Lemons? (view source)
Revision as of 10:53, 18 March 2019
, 10:53, 18 March 2019no edit summary
{{AcademicPaper
|Has title=Is the Market for Ideas a Market for Lemons?
|Has author=Ed Egan
|Has paper status=IdeaTabled
}}
==Summary==
*Patent litigation data: [[Lex Machina]]
==Policy Relevance==
*Huge implications for patent reform!
*First estimate of the effects of the [[America Invents Act]] on patent quality
*Current [[Patent policy|Patent acts]] are weakening enforcement rights - can we estimate the effect on the market?
