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=Federal The following acts have their own pages:*114, Ways & Means Committee, [[Innovation Promotion Act]]. See also https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2605*114, H.R.9 [[Innovation Act]]. See also [[H.R. 9: Innovation Act]]*114, S.1137 [[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act]]*114, H.R.2045 [[Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act]]*114, S.632 [[Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act]]*114, H.R.1896 [[Demand Letter Transparency Act]]*114, H.R.1832 [[Innovation Protection Act]]*112, H.R.1249 [[America Invents Act]]*112, S. 1138 [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]*113, S. 627 and 115, S. 295 [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]*113, H.R.845 [[The Shield Act]]*113, S. 2146 [[Patent Fee Integrity Act]]*114, S.1137 [[PATENT Act]]*114, S.632 [[STRONG Patents Act]]*114, [[S. 1890: Defend Trade Commission=Secrets Act of 2016]]
==Antitrust Law==
In recent years, there has been an increase in patent reform legislation presented and reviewed in Congress. This increase is due to wide range criticisms on current patent institutions and practices, which demand stricter reform. {{#section:United_States_Patent_and_Trademark_Office|USPTO}}{{#section:United_States_Patent_and_Trademark_Office|USPTO2}}
USPTO: As of January 2016, the current patent backlog is 561,585 [http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (USPTO)], leading to more cases being referred to lower, random courts. '''A patent backlog is the number of patent applications still waiting for review or approval.''' These courts increase the cost of processing a patent application and rely on juries without technical or procedural expertise to decide whether high level technology or processes satisfy the requirements for protection [https://hbr.org/2015/03/why-congress-needs-to-pass-the-innovation-act-this-time]. '''The USPTO continues to grant patents without the necessary time or resources to search all relevant references. ''' ==Patent Litigation: Critics at Wired believe that the amount of patent litigation and patent infringement claimed has created a "disastrous environment for innovation." [http://www.wired.com/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-patent-problem/ (Wired)] Litigation and lawsuits may result in a significant decrease in product development. In 2015, Google and Apple invested more in supporting patent purchases and litigation than in R&D.[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html?_rPools==0 (NYT-PW)] New Industries: The biotechnology industry as a whole provides new ethical challenges to the patent system and introduces new competitive threats such as me-too drugs. Me-too drugs are approved after a pioneering drug and function as substitutes [http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf (WHO)]. Government Policy: patents slowing down or even preventing the government from enacting necessary policy reform
==Patent Pools==pools are agreements between patent owners to share, or cross-license, their own patents with one another.[http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] Generally, patent pools cover mature and complex technologies that require complementary patents to develop compatible products and services. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Complementary patents are patents that are must be used together for the development of a specific new product, and therefore, necessitate shared licensing [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)].
Patent Opponents criticize patent pools are agreements between "two or more patent owners for the potential of anti-competitive behavior and collusion, primarily with regards to license one substitute patents. Substitute or more non-essential patents cover competing technologies that can be developed in parallel without risk of their patents to one another or to third parties." infringement [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] Generally, . Certain patent pools cover mature have been found to share competitively sensitive information such as marketing and complex technologies that require complementary patents to develop compatible products pricing strategies and servicesR&D findings. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf] The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission stated that patent pools may create barriers to entry for new firms since the required patents will be inaccessible [http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf (WIPODOJ)].
More recentlyIn order to address the concerns raised against patent pools, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken steps to standardize patent pools in order to prevent violations of antitrust laws. The DOJ requires the following characteristics for a patent pool:
===Benefits=== '''Efficiency''': These restrictions allow for patentees and standard setting organizations to maximize the benefits of creating patent pools. The creation of patent pools mainly benefits the owners of complementary or and essential patents. Complementary Essential patents cover multiple technologies protected by separate are patents required for the development of a specific new product, and therefore, necessitate shared licensing [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]or process to meet a given sector's technical standards. Cross-licensing between companies in a patent pool facilitates building upon previous technologies and increases the efficiency of innovation by organizing complementary intellectual property assets under one contract [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Mutually blocking patents often slow technological developments as neither party can make use of its technology without infringing on the other party's patent. By forming a patent pool, both parties can develop substitute technologieswithout risk of infringement. '''Cost Reduction''': Companies can also reduce the amount spent on litigation by settling disputes with the creation of patent pools. This would benefit small- and medium-sized businesses that usually cannot afford the costs of expensive litigation. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] Transaction costs as well as royalties can also be lowered in a patent pool. ===Risks=== '''Elimination of Competition''': Opponents criticize patent pools for the potential of anti-competitive behavior and collusion, primarily with regards to substitute patents. Substitute patents cover competing technologies that can be developed in parallel without risk of infringement [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf]. Patent pools formed between entities holding substitute patents eliminate competition in that particular technological sector, reinforcing the parallels drawn between patent pools and cartels [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Patent pools potentially create a way for companies to share competitively sensitive information, such as pricing, marketing strategies, or R&D information among its members." [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] For example, R&D information and developments could be shared in grant-back provisions, a requirement that companies share new or downstream technologies and innovations with members of the pool without additional fees. '''Licensing Practices''': If a patent pool restricts its members from licensing its patents independently, it lowers the incentive to produce alternatives and inflates the costs of goods or technology for consumers. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission state that restrictions on licensing may create "a barrier to entry if existing relationships make it harder for 'new firms to come in and overcome the patent thicket'." [http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf (DOJ)] '''Pricing''': Given agreements between patent holders to reduce royalties, there may be collusion to fix higher prices for consumers. Technology may become inaccessible to a large number of consumers, hurting the overall public good.
Patent Trolls are an innovation bogeymen, with numerous research articles and legislation addressing ways to curb troll activity. Patent Trolls, also known as [[Patent Assertion Entities]] (PAEs), generate revenue through suing or threatening to sue businesses that infringe on patents. Experts dispute terms for such corporations, labeling them as either Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) or Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs). PAEs are defined by the FTC as "firms with a business model based primarily on buying patents and then attempting to generate revenue by asserting them against businesses that are already practicing the patented technologies."[https://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/patent-assertion-entities-pae-study] NPEs are firms that rely on Patent Licensing activities for revenue. [http://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report] There is no widely agreed upon definition of 'Patent Troll', because it is often used interchangeably with the terms [[Patent Assertion Entities]] and [[Non-Practicing Entities]], whereas we make a distinction between these three terms. For our study, we define Patent Trolls as a 'person or entity that attempts to enforce patent rights against supposed infringement far beyond the patent's actual value'[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_troll]. Their asked damages are far beyond the market value of the patent. This is a tactic used to scare small businesses in the initial demand letter, when pressing them to pay the fee to license the patent.
http://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report
==Prize System for Inventions==
The current patent system allows companies to file for the right to exclude if they have a novel, non-obvious invention. The right to exclude creates a temporary monopoly for a certain product, which leads to higher product costs for the consumer. One example of a patent leading to exorbitantly high prices would be Daraprim, a drug produced by Turing Pharmaceuticals. Martin Shkreli, the CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, led the charge to increase the price of Daraprim from $13.50 to $750 per pill. [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34331761 (BBC)]
Critics of the current patent system also believe it does not incentivize enough research and development for drugs that benefit society as a whole. [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-28/news/31877151_1_drug-prices-intellectual-property-innovation (Economic Times)]
Because of such abuses of patent protections, economists and legislators have advocated for a prize system (see [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]) instead of a patent system for pharmaceutical drugs. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/radical-bill-seeks-to-reduce-cost-of-aids-drugs-by-awarding-prizes-instead-of-patents/2012/05/19/gIQAEGfabU_story.html (Washington Post)] Under this system, companies that invent a new drug will receive a lump sum prize. The rights to the drug will then be placed in the public domain, creating generic drugs. The biggest benefit of a prize system is the ability to target research towards a specific problem. With prize money as the incentive, research companies are more likely to devote time and resources towards the identified issue. In addition, the prize system lowers barriers to entry; nontraditional parties are encouraged to participate.
Although the prize system idea sounds promising for individuals requiring medication without high reservation price, the issue of sustained government funding for such endeavors hurts this proposal. Private investors, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, offer similar prize systems for pharmaceuticals discoveries. However, if private investment has proven to be effective, why does the government need to intervene?
Legislators have proposed bills that provide for prize systems for a small class of drugs (see [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]).
Prize systems could take many different forms:
# Opt-in systems where the government pays at least the monopoly profits that the patent holder would expect to receive
# System where patents are exchanged for compensation through an auction
# Offer cash subsidy to consumers who value the patented product more than the marginal cost but cannot afford the patented product at a monopoly price
===Problems & Considerations Surrounding the Prize System===
No one knows the economic effects of prize systems; there is lack of empirical evidence supporting the benefits of a prize system over a patent system. There are several factors that need to be considered in creating a prize system [http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/scitech/volume131/documents/wei_web.pdf (BU)]:
'''Valuation Problems'''{{#section:The Truth Behind Patent Trolls|trolls}}What Currently, there is no systematic data that proves the criteria for awarding a prize existence of patent trolls and how much prize money is each innovative drug worth? This is one of the biggest problems in establishing a prize system. Prize payments that are too low won’t provide enough incentive, while payments that are too high may incur resource duplication costs. The prize payment amount also has to be individually tailored to the benefit of the drug. People suggest the value of the payment be dependent quantifies their financial effects on the ‘social value’ of a drug, but how is that social value determined? Will a distinction be made between medically necessary drug inventions and lifestyle improvement drugs (e.gcompanies. acne medication)?
'''Timing of Prize Payments'''=[[America Invents Act]]=The timing of the prize payment has to be timed well; if awarded too early other companies may not be incentivized to produce a drug that would’ve been higher quality than the drug that won the prize. After the prize is awarded, incentive to commercialize the drug is reduced since there is no patent system. One potential solution is to defer prize payment until there has been a certain degree of commercialization.{{#section:Leahy_Smith_America_Invents_Act|aia}}
'''Administrative Problems'''The MIPF creates a board of trustees that has the responsibility of awarding prize payments. Though the board of 13 members is designed to be unbiased, it is unlikely that they will not be subject to political and external pressures, leading to a distorted allocation of resources. =Proposed Patent Reform=
A negative aspect of the patent system is the controversy <section begin=Patent_Reform />'''[[Innovation Act]]''':{{#section:Innovation_Act| summary}}'''[[Protecting American Talent and dispute that follows patent distribution of benefits. We can expect that there will also be challengers regarding the recipient of prize payments, thus the prize system has to specify how to resolve disputes, and also develop a thorough screening mechanism to confirm the reported benefits of the invented drug.Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act]]''':{{#section:Protecting_American_Talent_and_Entrepreneurship_(PATENT)_Act| PatentAct}}<section end=Patent_Reform />
==Proposed Legislation==Below is a table containing brief overviews of the bills pertaining to innovation that have been passed or introduced by the 114th Congress.
*{| class="wikitable"|-! Bill! Prognosis! Sponsor!Full Title!Date Introduced!Status|-|[[Innovation S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Actof 2016]][https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1890]*|Enacted|Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)|A bill to amend chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code, to provide Federal jurisdiction for the theft of trade secrets, and for other purposes.|JUL 29, 2015|Enacted — Signed by the President on May 11, 2016|-|[[H.R. 9: Innovation Act]] [Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr9]|36% | Bob Goodlatte (PATENTR-Virginia) | To amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Actto make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes.|Feb 5, 2015|Reported by Committee on Jun 11, 2015|-|[[S. 1137: PATENT Act]][https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1137]|36% | Charles “Chuck” Grassley (D-Iowa)|A bill to amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes.|Apr 29, 2015|Reported by Committee on Jun 4, 2015*|-|[[H.R. 2045: Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2045]|24% | Michael Burgess (TROLR-Texas) |To provide that certain bad faith communications in connection with the assertion of a United States patent are unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and for other purposes.|Apr 28, 2015|Reported by Committee on Apr 29, 2015|-|[[H.R. 1832: Innovation Protection Act]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1832]|5%| John Conyers Jr. (D-Michigan)|To provide for the permanent funding of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and for other purposes.|Apr 16, 2015|Referred to Committee on Apr 16, 2015|TROL -|[[S. 632: STRONG Patents Actof 2015]][https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s632]|4%| Chris Coons (D-Delaware)|A bill to strengthen the position of the United States as the world's leading innovator by amending title 35, United States Code, to protect the property rights of the inventors that grow the country's economy.|Mar 3, 2015|Referred to Committee on Mar 3, 2015*|-|[[S. 926: Grace Period Restoration Act of 2015]] [Support Technology https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s926]|4%| Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin)|A bill to amend the patent law to promote basic research, to stimulate publication of scientific documents, to encourage collaboration in scientific endeavors, to improve the transfer of technology to the private sector, and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Actother purposes.|Apr 14, 2015|Referred to Committee on Apr 14, 2015|-|STRONG [[H.R. 2370: End Anonymous Patents Act]][https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2370]|0%| Theodore Deutch (D-Florida)*|To amend title 35, United States Code, to require disclosure of ownership and transfers of ownership of patents, and for other purposes.|May 15, 2015|Referred to Committee on May 15, 2015|-|[[H.R. 1896: Demand Letter Transparency Actof 2015]]*[[Innovation Protection Act]https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1896]|0%| Jared Polis (D-Colorado)|To amend chapter 26 of title 35, United States Code, to require the disclosure of information related to patent ownership, and for other purposes.|Apr 20, 2015|Referred to Committee on Apr 20, 2015|}
*<ref name="GovTrack"> [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr9#] 'H.R. 9: Innovation Act', govtrack.us. </ref><ref name="innovationactsummary"> [Leahy Smith America Invents https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/782015_InnovationAct3.pdf] 'The Innovation Act', ''Judiciary Committee: Chairman Bob Goodlatte'', (Washington, D.C.). </ref><ref name="PAsummary"> [https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Patents,%2004-29-15,%20PATENT%20Act%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf]]'The Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act (PATENT) Act: Short Summary', "Senate Committee on the Judiciary" (Washington, D.C). </ref>*<ref name="patentactgovtrack"> [[Prize Fund for HIVhttps://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/AIDS s1137] 'S.1137: PATENT Act]]', 'govtrack.us'. </ref>*<ref name="USPTO report"> [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY15PAR.pdf]'United States Patent and Trademark Office Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2015', "United States Patent and Trademark Office", (Alexandria, Virginia). </ref>*[[The Shield ActCategory: Internal]]*[[Patent Fee Integrity ActCategory:Innovation Policy]]
no edit summary
=United States Patent and Trademark OfficeActs with pages=The [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]] (USPTO) is the organization within the United States government that reviews and grants patents and trademarks. Established under the Department of Commerce on July 19, 1952[https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/patent-and-trademark-office] by 35 U.S.C. §1[http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2013-title35/html/USCODE-2013-title35-partI-chap1-sec1.htm], the USPTO is intended to fulfill the mandate in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_States_of_America_1992]. Since 1790, the USPTO has issued more than 6.5 million patents[http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-web-database-now-includes-all-patents-dating-1790]. The agency's main offices reside in Alexandria, Virginia, with several satellite offices around the country.
{| {{table}}| align=Current Issues Facing "center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Bill'''| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Congress'''| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Sponsor'''| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Committee'''| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Reports'''| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Last Action'''|-| [[Innovation Promotion Act|H.R.2605 - Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2013]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Rep. Schwartz, Allyson Y. [D-PA-13] (Introduced 06/28/2013)||House - Ways and Means||||06/28/2013 Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.|-| [[H.R. 9: Innovation Act|H.R.9 - Innovation Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Goodlatte, Bob [R-VA-6] (Introduced 02/05/2015)||House - Judiciary||H. Rept. 114-235||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act|S.1137 - PATENT Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA] (Introduced 04/29/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act|H.R.2045 - Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Burgess, Michael C. [R-TX-26] (Introduced 04/28/2015)||House - Energy and Commerce||H. Rept. 114-877||12/16/2016 Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 688.|-| [[Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act|S.632 - STRONG Patents Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE] (Introduced 03/03/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[Demand Letter Transparency Act|H.R.1896 - Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Polis, Jared [D-CO-2] (Introduced 04/20/2015)||House - Judiciary||||05/15/2015 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.|-| [[Innovation Protection Act|H.R.1832 - Innovation Protection Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Conyers, John, Jr. [D-MI-13] (Introduced 04/16/2015)||House - Judiciary||||05/15/2015 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.|-| [[America Invents Act|H.R.1249 - Leahy-Smith America Invents Act]]||112th Congress (2011-2012)||Rep. Smith, Lamar [R-TX-21] (Introduced 03/30/2011)||House - Judiciary; Budget||H. Rept. 112-98||09/16/2011 Became Public Law No: 112-29. (TXT | PDF)|-| [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act|S.1138 - Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]||112th Congress (2011-2012)||Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT] (Introduced 05/26/2011)||Senate - Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions||||05/15/2012 Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Subcommittee on Primary Health and Aging. Hearings held. With printed Hearing: S.Hrg. 112-570.|-| [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act|S.495 - Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]||115th Congress (2017-2018) | Get alerts||Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT] (Introduced 03/02/2017)||Senate - Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions||||03/02/2017 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.|-| [[The Shield Act|H.R.845 - Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Rep. DeFazio, Peter A. [D-OR-4] (Introduced 02/27/2013)||House - Judiciary||||04/08/2013 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, And The Internet.|-| [[Patent System=Fee Integrity Act|S.2146 - Patent Fee Integrity Act]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Sen. Feinstein, Dianne [D-CA] (Introduced 03/13/2014)||Senate - Judiciary||||03/13/2014 Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.|-| [[PATENT Act|S.1137 - PATENT Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA] (Introduced 04/29/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[STRONG Patents Act|S.632 - STRONG Patents Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE] (Introduced 03/03/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016|S.1890 - Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Hatch, Orrin G. [R-UT] (Introduced 07/29/2015)||Senate - Judiciary | House - Judiciary||S. Rept. 114-220; H. Rept. 114-529||05/11/2016 Became Public Law No: 114-153. (TXT | PDF)|-| |}
==Criticisms=United States Patent and Trademark Office=
# Essential patents included only.
# Pricing in downstream production cannot be affected by or discussed by members of the patent pool. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf].
==Patent Trolls==
=Patent Reform==Bills Relevant to Innovation===
==Future LegislationMarket of Ideas ==*<section begin=Market_of_Ideas />[[Innovation Promotion ActMarket of Ideas Research Notes]]
=References=Previously Considered Patent Reform==<references>
