Changes

=United States Patent and Trademark OfficeActs with pages=The [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]] is the organization within the United States government that reviews and grants patents and trademarks. Established under the Department of Commerce on July 19, 1952[https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/patent-and-trademark-office] by 35 U.S.C. §1[http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2013-title35/html/USCODE-2013-title35-partI-chap1-sec1.htm], the USPTO is intended to fulfill the mandate in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_States_of_America_1992]. Since 1790, the USPTO has issued more than 6.5 million patents[http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-web-database-now-includes-all-patents-dating-1790]. The agency's main offices reside in Alexandria, Virginia, with several satellite offices around the country.

=Current Issues Facing the The following acts have their own pages:*114, Ways & Means Committee, [[Innovation Promotion Act]]. See also https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2605*114, H.R.9 [[Innovation Act]]. See also [[H.R. 9: Innovation Act]]*114, S.1137 [[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act]]*114, H.R.2045 [[Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act]]*114, S.632 [[Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act]]*114, H.R.1896 [[Demand Letter Transparency Act]]*114, H.R.1832 [[Innovation Protection Act]]*112, H.R.1249 [[America Invents Act]]*112, S. 1138 [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]*113, S. 627 and 115, S. 295 [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]*113, H.R.845 [[The Shield Act]]*113, S. 2146 [[Patent System=Fee Integrity Act]]==Patent Pools==*114, S.1137 [[PATENT Act]]*114, S.632 [[STRONG Patents Act]]*114, [[S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016]]

{| {{table}}| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Bill'''| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Congress'''| align="center" style="background:# Essential patents included only. f0f0f0;"|'''Sponsor'''| align="center" style="background:# Complementary patents included only. f0f0f0;"|'''Committee'''| align="center" style="background:# Sensitive information may not be shared amongst parties. f0f0f0;"|'''Reports'''| align="center" style="background:# Substitute products may still be developed by parties included f0f0f0;"|'''Last Action'''|-| [[Innovation Promotion Act|H.R.2605 - Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2013]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Rep. Schwartz, Allyson Y. [D-PA-13] (Introduced 06/28/2013)||House - Ways and Means||||06/28/2013 Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.|-| [[H.R. 9: Innovation Act|H.R.9 - Innovation Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Goodlatte, Bob [R-VA-6] (Introduced 02/05/2015)||House - Judiciary||H. Rept. 114-235||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act|S.1137 - PATENT Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA] (Introduced 04/29/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act|H.R.2045 - Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Burgess, Michael C. [R-TX-26] (Introduced 04/28/2015)||House - Energy and Commerce||H. Rept. 114-877||12/16/2016 Placed on the licensing agreement Union Calendar, Calendar No. 688.|-| [[Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act|S.632 - STRONG Patents Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE] (Introduced 03/03/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[Demand Letter Transparency Act|H.R.1896 - Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Polis, Jared [D-CO-2] (Introduced 04/20/2015)||House - Judiciary||||05/15/2015 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.|-| [[Innovation Protection Act|H.R.1832 - Innovation Protection Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Conyers, John, Jr. [D-MI-13] (Introduced 04/16/2015)||House - Judiciary||||05/15/2015 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.|-| [[America Invents Act|H.R.1249 - Leahy-Smith America Invents Act]]||112th Congress (2011-2012)||Rep. Smith, Lamar [httpR-TX-21] (Introduced 03/30/2011)||House - Judiciary; Budget||H. Rept. 112-98||09/16/2011 Became Public Law No:112-29. (TXT | PDF)|-| [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act|S.1138 - Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]||112th Congress (2011-2012)||Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT] (Introduced 05/26/2011)||Senate - Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions||||05/15/2012 Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Subcommittee on Primary Health and Aging. Hearings held. With printed Hearing: S.Hrg. 112-570.|-| [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act|S.495 - Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]||115th Congress (2017-2018) | Get alerts||Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT] (Introduced 03/02/2017)||Senate - Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions||||03/02/2017 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.|-| [[The Shield Act|H.R.845 - Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Rep. DeFazio, Peter A. [D-OR-4] (Introduced 02/27/2013)||House - Judiciary||||04/08/www2013 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, And The Internet.|-| [[Patent Fee Integrity Act|S.wipo2146 - Patent Fee Integrity Act]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Sen.intFeinstein, Dianne [D-CA] (Introduced 03/export13/sites2014)||Senate - Judiciary||||03/www13/ip2014 Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.|-competition| [[PATENT Act|S.1137 - PATENT Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA] (Introduced 04/en29/studies2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/patent_pools_report25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship.pdfHearings held.|-| [[STRONG Patents Act|S.632 - STRONG Patents Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE] (Introduced 03/03/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.|-| [[S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016|S.1890 - Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Hatch, Orrin G. [R-UT] (Introduced 07/29/2015)||Senate - Judiciary | House - Judiciary||S. Rept. 114-220; H. Rept. 114-529||05/11/2016 Became Public Law No: 114-153. (TXT | PDF)|-| |}

=United States Patent and Trademark Office==Benefits===The creation of patent pools mainly benefits the owners of complementary or essential patents. Complementary patents cover multiple technologies protected by separate patents required for the development of a specific new product, and therefore, necessitate shared licensing [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Cross-licensing between companies in a patent pool facilitates building upon previous technologies and increases the efficiency of innovation by organizing complementary intellectual property assets under one contract [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Companies can also reduce the amount spent on litigation by settling disputes with the creation of patent pools. This would benefit small- and medium-sized businesses that usually cannot afford the costs of expensive litigation. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]

Constructive uses of patent pools include "new combat aircraft during World War I," advances in radio frequency identification technology, and the Eco-Patent Commons created by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. The Eco-Patent Commons eliminates royalties for a number of patents to be used for eco-friendly innovation and pools patents that have potential for sustainable design applications [http{{#section://www.theglobalipcenter.com/sites/default/files/reports/documents/Prizes__Patent_Pools.pdf].United_States_Patent_and_Trademark_Office|USPTO}}{{#section:United_States_Patent_and_Trademark_Office|USPTO2}}

===Risks=Patent Pools==

Patent pools have many flawsare agreements between patent owners to share, which may explain why they have been or cross-license, their own patents with one another.[http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] Generally, patent pools cover mature and complex technologies that require complementary patents to develop compatible products and services. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Complementary patents are patents that are must be used so infrequently. together for the development of a specific new product, and therefore, necessitate shared licensing [http://www.theglobalipcenterwipo.comint/export/sites/defaultwww/filesip-competition/reportsen/documentsstudies/Prizes__Patent_Poolspatent_pools_report.pdf (GIPCWIPO)].

'''Elimination of Competition''' Opponents criticize patent pools for the potential of anti-competitive behavior and collusion, primarily with regards to substitute patents. Substitute or non-essential patents cover competing technologies that can be developed in parallel without risk of infringement [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf]. Patent pools formed between entities holding substitute patents eliminate competition in that particular technological sector, reinforcing the parallels drawn between Certain patent pools have been found to share competitively sensitive information such as marketing and cartels pricing strategies and R&D findings.[http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Patent The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission stated that patent pools potentially may create a way barriers to entry for companies to share competitively sensitive information, such as pricing, marketing strategies, or R&D information among its members." new firms since the required patents will be inaccessible [http://www.wipojustice.intgov/sites/default/exportfiles/sitesatr/wwwlegacy/ip-competition2007/en07/studies11/patent_pools_report222655.pdf (WIPODOJ)]

'''Licensing Practices''' If a In order to address the concerns raised against patent pool restricts its members from licensing its patents independentlypools, it lowers the incentive to produce alternatives and inflates the costs of goods or technology for consumers. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission state that restrictions on licensing may create "a barrier (DOJ) has taken steps to entry if existing relationships make it harder for 'new firms standardize patent pools in order to come in and overcome prevent violations of antitrust laws. The DOJ requires the following characteristics for a patent thicket'." [httppool://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf (DOJ)]

==Patent Trolls==# Essential patents included only. Patent Trolls are an innovation bogeymen, with numerous research articles and legislation addressing ways to curb troll activity. Patent Trolls, also known as [[Patent Assertion Entities]] (PAEs), generate revenue through suing or threatening to sue businesses that infringe on # Complementary patentsincluded only. Experts dispute terms for such corporations, labeling them as either [[Patent Assertion Entities]] (PAEs) or [[Non-Practicing Entities]] (NPEs)# Sensitive information may not be shared amongst parties. There is no widely agreed upon definition of 'Patent Troll', because it is often used interchangeably with # Substitute products may still be developed by parties included in the terms [[licensing agreement.# Patent Assertion Entities]] and [[Non-Practicing Entities]], whereas we make a distinction between these three termspool has an established expiration date. For our study, we define Patent Trolls as a 'person # Pricing in downstream production cannot be affected by or entity that attempts to enforce patent rights against supposed infringement far beyond discussed by members of the patent's actual value'pool. [httpshttp://enwww.wikipediawipo.orgint/export/sites/wikiwww/Patent_trollip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf]. Their asked damages are far beyond the market value of the patent. This is a tactic used to scare small businesses in the initial demand letter, when pressing them to pay the fee to license the patent.

These restrictions allow for patentees and standard setting organizations to maximize the benefits of creating patent pools. The current creation of patent system in pools mainly benefits the United States is facing owners of complementary and essential patents. Essential patents are patents required for a product or process to meet a fair amount criticism on multiple frontsgiven sector's technical standards. Skeptics have argued that Cross-licensing between companies in a patent pool facilitates building upon previous technologies and increases the current system is broken efficiency of innovation by organizing complementary intellectual property assets under one contract [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Mutually blocking patents often slow technological developments as it allows neither party can make use of its technology without infringing on the presence of other party's patent. By forming a patent trollspool, though metrics regarding both parties can develop substitute technologies without risk of infringement. Companies can also reduce the prevalence amount spent on litigation by settling disputes with the creation of patent trolls are unclearpools. Several important pieces This would benefit small- and medium-sized businesses that usually cannot afford the costs of legislation have been proposed to combat these reported patent trolls, expensive litigation. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] Transaction costs as well as royalties can also be lowered in a "Prize System for Invention", which rewards innovative companies with monetary prizes instead of patentspatent pool.

'''Hypothesis: Patent trolls will generally push for settlements and jury trials.''' In all of the cases eDekka filed in 2015, each one asked for trial by jury.However, another company that is considered a big patent troll, Oberalis does not file for trial by jury. In cases that involve educational institutions (PAEs/NPEs but not patent trolls), the educational institution doesn't ask for a jury trial. In fact, the company being sued responds to the complaint with a jury demand. Some examples of this:*Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. Apple Inc*Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co*The Regents of the University of California v. Micro Therapeutics Inc. et al*Cambridge University Press et al v. Patton et al ==Prize System for Inventions== The current patent system allows companies to file for the right to exclude if they have a novel, non-obvious invention. The right to exclude creates a temporary monopoly for a certain product, which leads to higher product costs for the consumer. One example of a patent leading to exorbitantly high prices would be Daraprim, a drug produced by Turing Pharmaceuticals. Martin Shkreli, the CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, led the charge to increase the price of Daraprim from $13.50 to $750 per pill. [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34331761 (BBC)] Critics of the current patent system also believe it does not incentivize enough research and development for drugs that benefit society as a whole. [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-28/news/31877151_1_drug-prices-intellectual-property-innovation (Economic Times)] Because of such abuses of patent protections, economists and legislators have advocated for a prize system (see [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]) instead of a patent system for pharmaceutical drugs. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/radical-bill-seeks-to-reduce-cost-of-aids-drugs-by-awarding-prizes-instead-of-patents/2012/05/19/gIQAEGfabU_story.html (Washington Post)] Under this system, companies that invent a new drug will receive a lump sum prize. The rights to the drug will then be placed in the public domain, creating generic drugs. The biggest benefit of a prize system is the ability to target research towards a specific problem. With prize money as the incentive, research companies are more likely to devote time and resources towards the identified issue. In addition, the prize system lowers barriers to entry; nontraditional parties are encouraged to participate.  Although the prize system idea sounds promising for individuals requiring medication without high reservation price, the issue of sustained government funding for such endeavors hurts this proposal. Private investors, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, offer similar prize systems for pharmaceuticals discoveries. However, if private investment has proven to be effective, why does the government need to intervene? Legislators have proposed bills that provide for prize systems for a small class of drugs (see [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]). Prize systems could take many different forms:# Opt-in systems where the government pays at least the monopoly profits that the patent holder would expect to receive# System where patents are exchanged for compensation through an auction# Offer cash subsidy to consumers who value the patented product more than the marginal cost but cannot afford the patented product at a monopoly price ===Problems & Considerations Surrounding the Prize System=Patent Trolls== No one knows the economic effects of prize systems; there is lack of empirical evidence supporting the benefits of a prize system over a patent system. There are several factors that need to be considered in creating a prize system [http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/scitech/volume131/documents/wei_web.pdf (BU)]: '''Valuation Problems'''What is the criteria for awarding a prize and how much prize money is each innovative drug worth? This is one of the biggest problems in establishing a prize system. Prize payments that are too low won’t provide enough incentive, while payments that are too high may incur resource duplication costs. The prize payment amount also has to be individually tailored to the benefit of the drug. People suggest the value of the payment be dependent on the ‘social value’ of a drug, but how is that social value determined? Will a distinction be made between medically necessary drug inventions and lifestyle improvement drugs (e.g. acne medication)? '''Timing of Prize Payments'''The timing of the prize payment has to be timed well; if awarded too early other companies may not be incentivized to produce a drug that would’ve been higher quality than the drug that won the prize. After the prize is awarded, incentive to commercialize the drug is reduced since there is no patent system. One potential solution is to defer prize payment until there has been a certain degree of commercialization.

'''Administrative Problems'''{{#section:The Truth Behind Patent Trolls|trolls}}The MIPF creates a board of trustees Currently, there is no systematic data that has proves the responsibility existence of awarding prize payments. Though the board of 13 members is designed to be unbiased, it is unlikely patent trolls and that they will not be subject to political and external pressures, leading to a distorted allocation of resourcesquantifies their financial effects on companies.

=Proposed Patent Reform=

<section begin=Patent_Reform />'''[[Innovation Act]]''':{{#section:Innovation_Act| summary}}'''[[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act]]''':{{#section:Protecting_American_Talent_and_Entrepreneurship_(PATENT)_Act| PatentAct}}<section end=Reasons for Patent Reform==Patent_Reform />

*Many patents are approved because [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]] examiners don’t have time or resources ===Bills Relevant to search all the relevant references**The current patent backlog, as of January 2016, is 561,585. [http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (USPTO)]**Total Pendency, time between patent filing and patent action, is 26.1 months, as of January 2016. [http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVIDInnovation=1004 (USPTO)]***Total Pendency goal time is 20 months by FY2019. [http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004 (USPTO)]* “The past three decades of wanton patent-granting have created a disastrous environment for innovation. Today it’s practically impossible to build anything without violating a patent of some kind—and risking a multimillion-dollar lawsuit for your troubles.” [http://www.wired.com/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-patent-problem/ (Wired)]*Technology industry has too many overly broad patents, leading to incredibly silly patent litigation cases**Amazon “owns” the process that allows people to buy things with a single click. **Apple now claims the exclusive right to sell rounded-edged, rectangular-shaped communication devices on which icons are arranged in a grid with a row of persistent icons at the bottom**A small company in Tyler, Texas, once demanded more than $600 million from Google because of the design of the borders around its display ads.*‘’’Patent Trolls’’’ are nonpracticing entities that don’t make products but exist solely on the revenue of its patents**Costs a few thousand dollars to secure a patent, which can bring in millions through litigation**It is usually more expensive to win a case against a troll than to just settle*Last year, for the first time, spending by Apple and Google on patent lawsuits and unusually big-dollar patent purchases exceeded spending on research and development of new products, according to public filings. [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html?_r=0 (NYT-PW)]*Me-too drugs: a drug that is approved after a pioneering drug and is the 'same'; it is not clinically superior to the original drug [http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf (WHO)]

*{| class="wikitable"|-! Bill! Prognosis! Sponsor!Full Title!Date Introduced!Status|-|[[Innovation S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Actof 2016]][https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1890]*|Enacted|Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)|A bill to amend chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code, to provide Federal jurisdiction for the theft of trade secrets, and for other purposes.|JUL 29, 2015|Enacted — Signed by the President on May 11, 2016|-|[[H.R. 9: Innovation Act]] [Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr9]|36% | Bob Goodlatte (PATENTR-Virginia) | To amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Actto make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes.|Feb 5, 2015|Reported by Committee on Jun 11, 2015|-|[[S. 1137: PATENT Act]][https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1137]|36% | Charles “Chuck” Grassley (D-Iowa)|A bill to amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes.|Apr 29, 2015|Reported by Committee on Jun 4, 2015*|-|[[H.R. 2045: Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2045]|24% | Michael Burgess (TROLR-Texas) |To provide that certain bad faith communications in connection with the assertion of a United States patent are unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and for other purposes.|Apr 28, 2015|Reported by Committee on Apr 29, 2015|-|[[H.R. 1832: Innovation Protection Act]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1832]|5%| John Conyers Jr. (D-Michigan)|To provide for the permanent funding of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and for other purposes.|Apr 16, 2015|Referred to Committee on Apr 16, 2015|TROL -|[[S. 632: STRONG Patents Actof 2015]][https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s632]|4%| Chris Coons (D-Delaware)|A bill to strengthen the position of the United States as the world's leading innovator by amending title 35, United States Code, to protect the property rights of the inventors that grow the country's economy.|Mar 3, 2015|Referred to Committee on Mar 3, 2015*|-|[[S. 926: Grace Period Restoration Act of 2015]] [Support Technology https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s926]|4%| Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin)|A bill to amend the patent law to promote basic research, to stimulate publication of scientific documents, to encourage collaboration in scientific endeavors, to improve the transfer of technology to the private sector, and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Actother purposes.|Apr 14, 2015|Referred to Committee on Apr 14, 2015|-|STRONG [[H.R. 2370: End Anonymous Patents Act]][https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2370]|0%| Theodore Deutch (D-Florida)*|To amend title 35, United States Code, to require disclosure of ownership and transfers of ownership of patents, and for other purposes.|May 15, 2015|Referred to Committee on May 15, 2015|-|[[H.R. 1896: Demand Letter Transparency Actof 2015]]*[[Innovation Protection Act]https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1896]|0%| Jared Polis (D-Colorado)|To amend chapter 26 of title 35, United States Code, to require the disclosure of information related to patent ownership, and for other purposes.|Apr 20, 2015|Referred to Committee on Apr 20, 2015|}

==Future LegislationMarket of Ideas ==*<section begin=Market_of_Ideas />[[Innovation Promotion ActMarket of Ideas Research Notes]]

=References=Previously Considered Patent Reform==<references>

*<ref name="GovTrack"> [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr9#] 'H.R. 9: Innovation Act', govtrack.us. </ref><ref name="innovationactsummary"> [Leahy Smith America Invents https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/782015_InnovationAct3.pdf] 'The Innovation Act', ''Judiciary Committee: Chairman Bob Goodlatte'', (Washington, D.C.). </ref><ref name="PAsummary"> [https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Patents,%2004-29-15,%20PATENT%20Act%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf]]'The Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act (PATENT) Act: Short Summary', "Senate Committee on the Judiciary" (Washington, D.C). </ref>*<ref name="patentactgovtrack"> [[Prize Fund for HIVhttps://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/AIDS s1137] 'S.1137: PATENT Act]]', 'govtrack.us'. </ref>*<ref name="USPTO report"> [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY15PAR.pdf]'United States Patent and Trademark Office Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2015', "United States Patent and Trademark Office", (Alexandria, Virginia). </ref>*[[The Shield ActCategory: Internal]]*[[Patent Fee Integrity ActCategory:Innovation Policy]]