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Heller Eisenberg (1998) - Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons In Biomedical Research (view source)
Revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
, 19:14, 29 September 2020no edit summary
{{Article
|Has page=Heller Eisenberg (1998) - Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons In Biomedical Research
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons In Biomedical Research
|Has author=Heller Eisenberg
|Has year=1998
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
|Has publisher=
}}
*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
:''"...a resource is prone to underuse in a 'tragedy of the anticommons' when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use."''
===Legal Discussion===
The article considers the issue of anti-commons in U.S. Biomedical Research.
*Typical solutions to anticommons in the biomedical field, such as patent pools, can be derailed by high transaction costs, heterogeneous interests and cognitive biases.
:''"Current examples in biomedical research demonstrate two mechanisms by which a government might inadvertently create an anticommons: either by creating too many concurrent fragments of intellectual property rights in potential future products or by permitting too many upstream patent owners to stack licenses on top of the future discoveries of downstream users."''
