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Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities (view source)
Revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
, 19:14, 29 September 2020no edit summary
{{Article|Has page=Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities|Has bibtex key=Abstract|Has article title=Buying Supermajorities|Has author=Groseclose and Snyder|Has year=1993|In journal=|In volume=|In number=|Has pages=|Has publisher=}}==Model Setup==2011 2nd Year exam paper question.* Players: Legislators, vote buyers A and B. * Choice space: <math>(x,s)\in R</math>. * Preferences: Legislators: <math>u_{i}=u_{i}(x)-u_{i}(s)</math>* Game form: A first, b second. Bribe upon commitment to vote. * Information: Complete/perfect. * EQM: SPNE, Pure strategies, tie rule: Vote for last offer. * Because lobbyists are worried about competitors invading coalitions, it is sometimes cheaper to bribe a large majority, possibly including the entire legislature. Rui's points:* Sequence matters, * More than minimum winning coalition* First mover advantage and 2nd mover advantage. * "The proofs are horrendous, you don't need to know those."
