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Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees (view source)
Revision as of 18:30, 30 September 2011
, 18:30, 30 September 2011no edit summary
**For costs above the closed rule cut off the floor's expected utility is unaffected.
*For very '''extreme''' committees - the '''open rule''' is preferred irrespective of the cost of specialization
===Other Notes===
Proposition 1: For <math><P^{u}|s=0></math>, the legislative equilibrium is: (i) <math>b^{\ast}\in P</math>, (ii) <math>p^{\ast}(b)=-\bar{\omega}=1/2</math>, (iii) <math>g^{\ast}=\{\omega|\omega\in[0,1]\}</math>, and (iv) EU_{f}(P^{U}|s=0)=-\sigma^{2}_{w}</math>, (v) <math>EU_{c}(P^{U}|s=0)=-\sigma_{\omega}^{2}-x_{c}^{2}</math>.
Proof: <math>g^{\ast}(b)=\{w\in [0,1]\}</math> since b is not a function of w since c does not observe w. FLoro chooses p such that <math>\max_{p}\int_{0}^{1}-(p+w)^{2}f(w)dw, f(w)=1, w\in[0,1]</math>.
