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�Implication: voters would be ready to pay to have a journalist broadcasting information on �<math>\theta</math>. Politician would pay to shut journalist up.
�
Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control (view source)
Revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
, 19:14, 29 September 2020no edit summary
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==Reference(s)==
Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf]
In the full information case, the politician is able to steal lots if <math>\theta</math> is high, and less if it is low.
Is voter worse off relative to when he could observe �<math>\theta</math>? Turns out: Politician is able to steal more when state� state is unobservable. Implication: voters would be ready to pay to have a journalist broadcasting information on <math>\theta</math>. Politician would pay to shut journalist up.
Perhaps this model could serve to investigate the role of freedom of speech and media involvement in political life?
