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'''The Economics of Institutions'''
ECON 224 2009 - The Economics of Institutions is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Business. This page details the course as it was taught by Pablo Spiller ([mailto:spiller@haas.berkeley.edu email] and [http://www2.haas.berkeley.edu/Faculty/spiller_pablo.aspx website]) in the Spring of 2009.
==ECON224 Econ 224 2011== This section details the course as it was taught by Steve Tadelis and Noam Yuchtman the Spring of 2011. ===Tadelis Readings===* Prendergast. C. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1):7-63* Holmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2):324-340 * [[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process]], Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2):297-326. * [[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership]]: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3) pp. 691-719. * Tadelis, Steven and Oliver Williamson (2011) fTransaction-Cost Economics, to appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press * Levin, Jonathan (2003) "Relational incentive contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3):835l857. * [[Garicano (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production]], Journal of Political Economy, 108(5):874-904. * [[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization]], American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec., 1972), pp. 777-795. Available in JSTOR. * Holmström, Bengt (1979) "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics 10(1): 74-91. * Gibbons, Robert (1998) "Incentives in Organizations" The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4):115-132. * [[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm]], Economica, Available in JSTOR * [[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics]]: The Governance of Contractual Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct., 1979), pp. 233-261. Availabe in JSTOR. * Barzel, Yoram (1982) fMeasurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, Journal of Law and Economics, 25(1):27-48*[[Bajari Tadelis (2001) - Incentives versus Transaction Costs A Theory of Procurement Contracts| Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001)]], "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20versus%20Transaction%20Costs%20A%20Theory%20of%20Procurement%20Contracts pdf]* [[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited]], Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4):73-9* MacLeod, W. Bentley (2003), "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review 93(1):216-40. * Hayek, F. A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review 35(4): * Antràs, Pol, Luis Garicano and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2006) "Outsourcing in a Knowledge Economy." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1):31-77. ===Yuchtman Readings===* [[North & Weingast (1989)]]* [[Naidu (2010)]]* [[Grief (1993)]]* [[Clark (1985)]]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/La%20Porta%20et%20al%20%282008%29%20Summary.pdf La Porta et al (2008)]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Hansmann%20%281988%29%20Summary.pdf Hansmann (1988)]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Bubb%20and%20Kaufman%20%282009%29%20Summary.pdf Bubb (2009)]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Levin%20and%20Tadelis%20%282005%29%20Summary.pdf Levin and Tadelis (2005)] For the Papers below, see summaries [http://www.edegan.com/repository/279D%20%28Noam%29%20-%20Paper%20Summaries.pdf here]. * Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)* Manning (2003)* Lazear (2000)* Bandiera et al (2007) ==Econ224 2009== This section details the course as it was taught by Pablo Spiller ([mailto:spiller@haas.berkeley.edu email] and [http://www2.haas.berkeley.edu/Faculty/spiller_pablo.aspx website]) in the Spring of 2009. ===Readings===
The course readings ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/ECON224.zip zip file]), by lecture, were listed as follows:
1.) '''Institutions'''
*North, Douglass (1991). , "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]
*Williamson, Oliver (2000), "New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", Journal of Economic Literature [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]
*Williamson, Oliver (1998), "The Institutions of Governance", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1998)%20-%20The%20Institutions%20of%20Governance.pdf pdf]
2.) '''Thinking Institutionally: The Problem of Commitment'''
*Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1983) - Credible Commitments Using Hostages To Support Exchange |Williamson, Oliver, (1983)]], "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]*[[Williamson (1991) - Comparative Economic Organization The Analysis Of Discrete Structural Alternatives |Williamson, Oliver (1991)]], "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]
*Telser, Lester (1981), "A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Journal of Business, 27-44. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Telser%20(1981)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Self-Enforcing%20Agreements.pdf pdf]
*Hodgson, G.M. (2004), "Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: why an explanatory emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy," Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(2), April, 401-418. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hodgson%20(2004)%20-%20Opportunism%20is%20not%20the%20only%20reason%20why%20firms%20exist.pdf pdf]
*Gibbons, Robert (2004), "Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?" (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]
*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994), "The Firm as an Incentive System", The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. pp. 972-991 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Firm%20as%20an%20Incentive%20System.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics |Williamson, Oliver (1979)]], "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]
*Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen (1983), "Agency Problems and Residual Claims", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun.), pp. 327-349. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fama%20Jensen%20(1983)%20-%20Agency%20Problems%20and%20Residual%20Claims.pdf pdf]
*Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen (1983), "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun.), pp. 301-325. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fama%20Jensen%20(1983)%20-%20Separation%20of%20Ownership%20and%20Control.pdf pdf]
11.) '''Bureaucracy'''
*Spiller, Pablo (1990), "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1999) - Public And Private Bureaucracies |Williamson, Oliver E. (1999)]], "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]
*Prendergast, Canice (2003), "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]
*Dixit, Avinash (2002), "Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review", The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Autumn), pp. 696-727. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20(2002)%20-%20Incentives%20and%20Organizations%20in%20the%20Public%20Sector.pdf pdf]
*Demsetz, Harold (1968), "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]
*Goldberg (1976), "Regulation and Administered Contracts", Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, pp. 426-448. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1976)%20-%20Regulation%20and%20Administered%20Contracts.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1976) - Franchise Bidding For Natural Monopolies | Williamson, Oliver E. (1976)]], "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]
*Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]
*Troesken, W. (1997), "The sources of public ownership: Historical evidence from the gas industry", Journal of Law Economics & Organization, April, Vol. 13, pp. 1-25. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Troesken%20(1997)%20-%20The%20sources%20of%20public%20ownership.pdf pdf]
*Greif, Avner (1993), "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition", American Economic Review, 83 (3), 525-548. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Greif%20(1993)%20-%20Contract%20Enforceability%20and%20Economic%20Institutions%20in%20Early%20Trade.pdf pdf]
Note that, aside from these two papers, class 14 was left unspecified. A number of papers may have been set in class.
'''Seminal but not included''':
*[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]
