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Diamond (1989) - Reputation Acquisition In Debt Markets (view source)
Revision as of 20:56, 29 April 2010
, 20:56, 29 April 2010no edit summary
We now (ab)use measure theory to get three results. The (ab)uses are by assuming that some population is of measure zero but that by continuity we can allow some positive measure into the population and the result will hold.
First we solve the end game with f_{BG}=0 - the end game being the part of the game from which the GB types choose bad projects forward to infinity. If the end game is bounded then the part of the game in which reputation works is unbounded. With f_{BG}=0 the interest rates are deterministic and tend towards r:
r_{t}=r\cdot \frac{\pi ^{t-1}f_{B}+1-f_{B}}{\pi ^{t}f_{B}+1-f_{B}}
Building on this there is the case of moral hazard without adverse selection - that is there are no bad types. In this case we get the following proposition:
'''Proposition''': With no adverse selection interest rates are constant, and if reputation ever works it works immediately at t=1 and stops working at some t^{\prime }<T.
With adverse selection as well we get the alternative proposition:
'''Proposition''': If r_{t} falls over time and a type GB borrower optimally selects safe projects at time $t^{\prime \prime } and risky projects at some t^{\prime }<t^{\prime \prime }, then risky projects are optimal for all t<t^{\prime }. This implies that if safe projects are optimal at two dates t_{1}<t_{2}, then safe projects are optimal for all t\in \{t_{1},t_{1}+1,...,t_{2}\}.
For further detail see either the paper or Tadelis' write-up of the paper:
*Tadelis, Steve (2007), "Topics in Contracts and Organizations: Lecture Notes", UC Berkeley, September [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Tadelis%20(2007)%20-%20Topics%20in%20Contracts%20and%20Organizations%20Lecture%20Notes.pdf pdf] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Tadelis%20(2007)%20-%20Topics%20in%20Contracts%20and%20Organizations%20Lecture%20Notes.tex tex]
