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De Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation (view source)
Revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
, 19:14, 29 September 2020no edit summary
{{Article
|Has page=De Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation
|Has author=De Figueiredo
|Has year=2002
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
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*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]
The paper provides three propositions (3a,3b,3c) on pages 22-23:
*If <math>\alpha \,</math> is sufficiently large, both players play<math> \{(I,O)\}\,</math>*If <math>\alpha \,</math> is not sufficiently large to play <math>\{(I,O)\}\,</math>, an equilibrium is either: <math>\{(I,O);(NI,0)\}\,</math> or <math>\{(NI,O);(I,0)\}\,</math> if <math>\alpha\,</math> is sufficiently large*If <math>\alpha \,</math> is sufficiently small, the neither player will insulate
Proposition 4 states: As political uncertainty increases the parameter space over which the 1st and 3rd equilibria hold increases, while the parameter space over which the 2nd equilibrium holds decreases.
*If the costs of insulation are high, groups will choose not to insulate their programs - only groups with extremely weak future election prospects will do so.
*Most agencies created by policy will not be insulated (on average the strong players win and don't insulate), and therefore inefficiency can not be attributed to political uncertainty in most cases.
==Other Notes==
