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*A continuum of price-setting firms with unit measure compete selling an homogenous product *A mass <math>\mu</math> is interested in purchasing the product *Consumers have quasi-linear utility : <math>u(q) + y</math> where <math>y\,</math> is a numeraire good *The indirect utility of consumers is : <math>V(p,M) = v(p) + M\,</math>
*By [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roy%27s_identity Roy's identity]:
*There is a search cost <math>c\,</math> per price quote *The customer purchases after <math>n\,</math> price quotes *The final indirect utility of the customer is <math>V(p,M) = v(p) + M - cn\,</math>
Recall that <math>M=e(p,u)\,</math>, so that <math>v(e(p,u),p)=u\,</math> when the expenditure function is evaluated at <math>p\,</math> and <math>u\,</math>.
Baye Morgan Scholten (2006) - Information Search and Price Dispersion (view source)
Revision as of 20:26, 25 January 2010
, 20:26, 25 January 2010→Search Theoretic Models of Price Dispersion
The general framework used through-out is as follows:
where <math>v(\cdot)\,</math> in nonincreasing in <math>p\,</math>, and <math>M\,</math> is income.
<math>q(p) \equiv -v'(p)\,</math>.
'''A on the derivation of demand'''
<math>d/dp(v(M,p)) = dv(M,p)/dm \cdot dM/dp + dv/dp = 0, where dM/dp = de(p,u)/dp\,</math>.
<math>\therefore q(m,p) = de(p,u)/dp = -frac{dv/dp}{dv(M,p)/dm}\,</math>
