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Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model (view source)
Revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
, 19:14, 29 September 2020no edit summary
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|Has article title=The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model
|Has author=Barro
|Has year=1973
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==Reference(s)==
Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf]
* The players in the model are citizens and a competitive supply of politicians.
* All live indefinitely.
* All voters are ideologically homogenous and can coordinate to discipline the executive. All voters can essentially be treated as a single coherent actor.
* There are elections in every period.
* Citizen's utility is equal to <math>1-x</math>
# Politician is elected.
# Voter commits to reelection rule.
# Politician chooses <math>x\in[0,1]</math>.
# Voter decides whether to reelect or not according to rule.
<b>Paper's question</b>: What's the optimal voting rule?
Notice: If the voters fire iff <math>x>0</math>, all politicians will choose <math>x=1</math> forever and gets voted out the next round. If voters never fire, politician always takes everything.
As such, the voter wants to choose <math>\bar{x}</math> as low as possible while not inducing him to steal 1 now and lose office.
Later versions of the model incorporate wages, egos and multi-period terms into the model.
