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Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model (view source)
Revision as of 16:34, 12 June 2011
, 16:34, 12 June 2011no edit summary
==Abstract==
This paper applies economic theory to an analysis of behavior in the public sector. The model focuses on the division of interest between the public and its political representatives. The division of interest arises because the public officeholder is assumed to act to advance his own interests, and these interests do not coincide automatically with those of his constituents. The electoral process and some elements of the political structure are then analyzed as mechanisms which can be used to move the officeholder toward a position where the advancement of self-interest approximates the advancement of the interests of his constituents
==Model==
* The players in the model are citizens and a competitive supply of politicians.
* All live indefinitely.
* All voters are ideologically homogenous and can coordinate to discipline the executive.
* There are elections in every period.
* Citizen's utility is equal to <math>1-x</math>
Timing of game:
# Politician is elected.
# Voter commits to reelection rule.
# Politician chooses <math>x</math>.
# Voter decides whether to reelect or not according to rule.
