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Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures (view source)
Revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
, 19:14, 29 September 2020no edit summary
{{Article
|Has page=Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=Bargaining In Legislatures
|Has author=Baron Ferejohn
|Has year=1989
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
|Has publisher=
}}
*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]
Note: N members, member 1 is recognized, member j is excluded member recognized, member
A: <math>\frac{1-\hat{y}^{a}}{m}\geq \delta V_{i}(y^{i})</math>. This means that the amendment <math>\max V_{i}^{m^{\ast}(y_{i}). </math>
==== Substantive conclusions ====
* Possibility of delay.
* Size of winning coalition can be larger than the minimum winning coalition.
* <math>\frac{\partial m}{\partial \delta}<0</math>. , and (separately) <math>\frac{\partial m}{\partial n}<0</math> (Rui says this latter one needs to be checked).
* More equal because proposer spreads wealth more broadly.
