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Baron (2001) - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation (view source)
Revision as of 18:46, 29 October 2009
, 18:46, 29 October 2009no edit summary
In the case where <math>y \le 0\,, \quad r^*=\frac{\alpha}{4}\left ( x+y \right )^2</math>
Now suppose that the interest has a utility function described by:
<math>U_g(w,z_g) = =\beta (w - z_g)^2 -R(x,y)\,, \quad</math> where<math>z_g \ge x\,</math> is the interest's ideal point and <math>\beta > 0\,</math> is the strength of the interest's preferences.
For <math>y \le 0\,</math>, the interest will recruit votes iff:
<math>-\Beta (x - z_g)^2 - \frac{\alpha}{4}\left ( x+y \right )^2 \ge \beta (y - z_g)^2</math>
Or: <math>z_g \ge z_g^-(x,y) \equiv \frac{x+y}{2} \left (1+\underbrace{\frac{\alpha(x+y)^2}{4 \beta (x-y)}_{recruitment factor}\right)</math>
Therefore if the agenda is exogenous, the interest will recruit if and only if <math>z_g</math> is to the right of the midpoint by the recruitment factor; that is the interest must be extreme in its interests by this factor to undertake recruitment.
This implies that interests that are moderate or centralist (defining centralist as interests whose preferred policy fall in the range <math>z_g \in [0,z_g^-(x,y)]\,</math>) will not act, leading to inertia in policies.
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